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fomc | 1,995 | The year-end spike? | 5 |
fomc | 1,995 | Well, their fiscal year-end is March 31st, and there is some pressure in their funds market then. There are occasions when the deutschemark money market experiences rather sharp spikes. These stem both from the German banking system and from foreign demand of which the Japanese may be a part, but I don't think quite as... | 72 |
fomc | 1,995 | That is a year-end, December 31st spike? | 12 |
fomc | 1,995 | Yes. | 2 |
fomc | 1,995 | Can we infer what the market forces are abstracting from our actions by looking at the potential spike characteristics in other currencies where Japanese banks are operating, like in London? | 33 |
fomc | 1,995 | That would be a little difficult. One of the problems is that two things are going on with Japanese banks at this point. One is the Japanese year-end premium. The other is the general Japanese risk premium. I think it's a little difficult, for some of the reasons that Peter just pointed out with respect to the funds fu... | 147 |
fomc | 1,995 | Okay. I don't want to press that; I don't think it's a big deal. I am just curious. Other questions for Peter? President Minehan. | 31 |
fomc | 1,995 | I have a couple of questions. On the Japanese funding situation, I know that all this planning is being done within the normal framework of Desk operations. I don't know about the rest of you, but the headlines in The New York Times about this special funding arrangement hit me as a surprise when I read them at 7:30 on... | 123 |
fomc | 1,995 | My recollection is that we thought the arrangement was so routine and so inconsequential that it did not enter anybody's mind to raise it. And, indeed, the way it came out was so distorted that I got numerous telephone calls as a result of a comment by Ralph Nader on the radio that we were bailing out the Japanese and ... | 162 |
fomc | 1,995 | Do we have these informal understandings with other central banks, other than the Bank of Japan, that if they run into dollar or liquidity problems (a) their banks are not to come to us and (b) there may be some way in which we can, within the normal procedures, help them with their funding? | 64 |
fomc | 1,995 | The answer is no. Some central banks realize that if they are talking about $500 million or $1 billion, they can sell bills to the Desk and we will execute such transactions for them relatively effectively. There are some less subtle or more anxious central bankers who approach the Desk to ask if we can guarantee that ... | 201 |
fomc | 1,995 | President Minehan, I think one dimension of this that Peter did not include in his report, because he gave a lot of background and the report was already long enough, is that there is a particular problem, which I am sure you will appreciate, in terms of the payments system. | 57 |
fomc | 1,995 | Oh yes. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | We have staff who have worried about this general problem of foreign-held dollars in the payments system for at least a decade to my knowledge. In some sense, because of the size of the Japanese banks and their role in the international financial system, they are a particular problem and this arrangement or procedure i... | 158 |
fomc | 1,995 | I totally agree and I certainly understand what you are talking about. The implication that we would do things after hours, after the securities wire closes and all of that, did seem to me to be a move that it would have been interesting at least to know about. | 53 |
fomc | 1,995 | Certainly. As the Chairman explained, it got publicity when it was not intended and the latter was somewhat premature in any case. | 25 |
fomc | 1,995 | The second question that I had was on the new procedure relating to your operations in coupon issues. Peter, is it your intention over this three- or four-day period, for however long you might spread your coupon pass, to pick certain portions of the yield curve on any given day as opposed to preselecting from a number... | 72 |
fomc | 1,995 | Yes. We would try to choose an area of the yield curve, say, the two- to three-year area or the five-year area, define it for the dealers, and then take propositions only in that portion of the curve. | 47 |
fomc | 1,995 | And you don't think that will have any disruptive effects on that given day? | 15 |
fomc | 1,995 | It might the first few times that we use the procedure. But my hope is that things would smooth out over time, as the dealers got used to it and they saw that we are like any big customer who might come along and buy up a certain maturity. I also want to be clear. I don't think we would necessarily be mechanical about ... | 122 |
fomc | 1,995 | Is it part of your plan to discuss this with major market participants outside of New York? | 18 |
fomc | 1,995 | The community to talk to first and foremost is the dealers, wherever they are located, since they are the ones who have to do the bidding and put in the propositions. | 34 |
fomc | 1,995 | Right. | 2 |
fomc | 1,995 | Obviously, once we begin it we'll have to have guidance for Peter Bakstansky in our press office and figure out what we are going to say more generally so that the Fed-watching community doesn't jump on it and misinterpret it. | 48 |
fomc | 1,995 | It might be useful to talk to Fidelity among others. | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | Yes. | 2 |
fomc | 1,995 | President Jordan. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | Peter, your description of the arrangements with Japan and the very unfortunate press reports and confusing stories relating to all that and now this discussion following Cathy's question just emphasizes in my view how obsolete swap agreements are in this environment. In the case where a country has very substantial am... | 275 |
fomc | 1,995 | You are raising a good point. I think we have always thought of swaps as a bit of a hybrid. Given our focus on having a short-term means of repayment, we have tried to think of the swap lines, or I try to think of them, as merely a liquidity arrangement with a central bank like the Bundesbank, notwithstanding the fact ... | 359 |
fomc | 1,995 | Peter, it strikes me that these swap line renewals, for which there basically is no longer any financial or economic purpose, have become exchanges of Christmas cards that serve to maintain our relationships with various central banks. Even at a 3 percent inflation rate, these lines are gradually becoming de minimis. I... | 254 |
fomc | 1,995 | My assumption--it's a very safe assumption, Mr. Chairman--is that in the case of the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan you would be giving a signal by cancelling the swap lines. For the reasons you cited, some people would not want to do that and we therefore have a problem with respect to the Norwegians, which is a par... | 278 |
fomc | 1,995 | Vice Chairman. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | I have the view that these arrangements have long outlived their usefulness. I have been in Peter's position and largely have argued that we may as well renew them because not doing so would be a newsworthy event. Each year there usually was something happening so that we didn't want that newsworthy event to occur. It ... | 159 |
fomc | 1,995 | Are you suggesting some formal or informal agreements--bilateral agreements in a sense? | 16 |
fomc | 1,995 | I don't think that we would need even an informal agreement, as our discussions with the Bank of Japan have suggested. If a need comes along and we have the kinds of relationships that we now enjoy with the other central banks, at that time we can sit down and figure out what if anything has to be done. If the approval... | 88 |
fomc | 1,995 | Governor Blinder. | 4 |
fomc | 1,995 | Peter, you mentioned that on Thursday and Friday, some of the Treasury securities maturing on November 15 started to sell at some discount. How much was it? I was on an airplane at that time, and I didn't see the market quotations. | 50 |
fomc | 1,995 | Those securities had already been selling off a bit, and that's rather awkward for a security with a short remaining maturity. | 23 |
fomc | 1,995 | That's why I was asking. | 6 |
fomc | 1,995 | The amount is small in absolute terms, but it is noticeable that dealers are turning them down. | 19 |
fomc | 1,995 | I meant the yield to maturity, not the prices. | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | I don't know it off the top of my head, I'm afraid. I think we discussed it in the document we submitted as a special report. Sandy--please go ahead. | 35 |
fomc | 1,995 | Because those November 15th coupons are so close to maturity, the smallest increment in price that you can see on the screen is 70 basis points of yield. If I tell you that it traded with a 1/256 change in price, I am telling you 70 basis points, which is incredibly dramatic. But I can't observe anything that is smalle... | 78 |
fomc | 1,995 | I see. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | A better comparison would be the bills that mature on the 16th, which also were of somewhat uncertain value then, but unfortunately I don't know the change in yield. That is an easier comparison because it's a shorter instrument. | 45 |
fomc | 1,995 | Did those come back after the announcement? | 8 |
fomc | 1,995 | Yes. There does not seem to be a distortion in the November 30 coupons. | 17 |
fomc | 1,995 | Any further questions for Peter on this? President Hoenig. | 12 |
fomc | 1,995 | Mr. Chairman, I just want to comment on the background of the informal arrangement with the Japanese. The memo that we got was very helpful. In the phone calls that I received, there were two issues that warranted some explanation. One was that the arrrangement was a bailout, and I think that notion followed upon the M... | 172 |
fomc | 1,995 | In fact, the purpose of our discussion with the Japanese was mainly to dispel any notion of subsidization. If it were not for the fact that they are such a large presence in this banking system, there really would not be an issue. But if they were to run into trouble, we could be dealing with very large numbers. | 67 |
fomc | 1,995 | I think the individuals I spoke to realized that. That's why they were saying that if a problem were to occur, we might get involved in a discount window loan; and lending at the basic discount rate would mean a big subsidy. The issue was why would we allow that, and on and on it went. Because they had this piece of mi... | 76 |
fomc | 1,995 | It happens. Further questions for Peter? Train wreck? | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | We need a vote to ratify the domestic operations. | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | I missed three out of three! [Laughter] | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | Move approval. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | Is there a second? | 5 |
fomc | 1,995 | Second. | 2 |
fomc | 1,995 | Without objection. I hope there is nothing to ratify in the next segment! | 16 |
fomc | 1,995 | No, no, I'm not seeking another vote. [Statement continued--see Appendix.] Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions from the Committee on this final part of my report. But maybe you are all tired of listening to my voice, and I wouldn't mind if you pass. | 60 |
fomc | 1,995 | Never! President Melzer. | 6 |
fomc | 1,995 | Peter, I would just like to say that I endorse the position you just expressed. I think there are a lot of risks associated with that. We have to evaluate things as they develop, but I wholeheartedly support what you are saying. Ultimately, I think it runs to even broader issues like the independence of the central ban... | 78 |
fomc | 1,995 | President Broaddus. | 5 |
fomc | 1,995 | I agree very much with Tom and I certainly endorse that position. I wonder if I may ask a related question, Mr. Chairman. Is it possible that in some of our operations other than Desk operations, things like Fedwire, we might wind up inadvertently making loans to the Treasury? Has that kind of possibility been consider... | 65 |
fomc | 1,995 | An inadvertent overdraft? | 6 |
fomc | 1,995 | Yes. In our Fedwire rules, as I understand it, we guarantee final payment at the end of the day. If on the day the Treasury defaulted we guaranteed some of these payments, could we be caught at the end of the day in an overdraft position? It seems to me it is the same kind of issue. I guess there is an array of possibi... | 76 |
fomc | 1,995 | It's illegal for us to grant an overdraft to the Treasury. The only condition under which it exists is inadvertence. I assume I have that right. | 31 |
fomc | 1,995 | Correct. Reserve Bank and Board staff have been talking to Treasury people about procedures to follow to avoid the concern that President Broaddus just expressed, so that wires wouldn't be sent if funds were not going to be available. We want to ensure that Treasury staff sending those wires understand that and simply ... | 161 |
fomc | 1,995 | In recent months and years, we collectively have been targeting a balance of about $5 billion for them. But we all recognize that forecasting the Treasury balance is in part an art, not a science, and the risks exist. But it's in the nature of a forecast that we are always forecasting tonight what the cash balance will... | 183 |
fomc | 1,995 | Governor Blinder. | 4 |
fomc | 1,995 | This is admittedly a very airy-fairy contingency if we don't think this default is going to happen. But let me go back into the mindset that you were in a minute ago. How many government securities issues are there, something like 300? | 49 |
fomc | 1,995 | 260 something. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | How many of those do we own a piece of? Almost all? | 14 |
fomc | 1,995 | Virtually all. | 4 |
fomc | 1,995 | How many of them do we actually buy and sell? | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | On any one day? | 5 |
fomc | 1,995 | No. If I watched you for a whole quarter, how many issues might you have dealt in either doing repos or buying outright or anything? | 28 |
fomc | 1,995 | Most of them. | 4 |
fomc | 1,995 | Right. Therefore, what kind of signal would you send if you told the market that these 55 issues are being shunned by the Federal Reserve, that we are not accepting them. | 37 |
fomc | 1,995 | It would send a very negative message. | 8 |
fomc | 1,995 | Isn't that what you are suggesting? | 8 |
fomc | 1,995 | No, I said nothing in my remarks that suggested that. I said the Desk was eager to find a way to demonstrate that they would be accepted as collateral in temporary operations. | 35 |
fomc | 1,995 | But we wouldn't do open market operations? I thought that's what you said. | 15 |
fomc | 1,995 | Temporary operations are open market operations. | 7 |
fomc | 1,995 | What were you suggesting? I missed it. | 9 |
fomc | 1,995 | My point was that I did not think that an intentional preemptive strike to buy the particular defaulted securities outright would be an appropriate action in the circumstances that I mentioned. | 35 |
fomc | 1,995 | I thought we were talking about purchases in the market. | 11 |
fomc | 1,995 | Yes, we are. | 5 |
fomc | 1,995 | I guess I am confused. | 6 |
fomc | 1,995 | We do outright purchases relatively infrequently --to wit my discussion about coupon passes--a handful of times a year. I am suggesting that we raise that to three or four handfuls a year for reasons of operational simplicity without changing the amount we would buy over the course of the year relative to reserve deman... | 149 |
fomc | 1,995 | That is, a special open market operation and not the normal course of business. | 16 |
fomc | 1,995 | Vice Chairman. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | I think the question has two aspects, Mr. Chairman. One is the purely practical view of people whose expertise is in markets, as mine used to be, as to what is the best thing to do to maintain an orderly market in the event of a default. I am in complete agreement with Peter's and Sandy's and Don's view that the best t... | 208 |
fomc | 1,995 | Governor Lindsey. | 3 |
fomc | 1,995 | I am going to follow up on what Governor Blinder said. If you are taking whatever is offered on the open market, might there not be a propensity for you to buy securities in default or potential default that people might have questions about? If you are willing to take whatever is offered and you are not willing to dis... | 81 |
fomc | 1,995 | If they were presented to us as propositions for temporary overnight or four-day System operations, and they were at the better end of the prices, we would look at what are the best prices and draw a line at an amount that meets our objective. My desire would be for the Desk to be indifferent to what the CUSIPs are, wh... | 184 |
fomc | 1,995 | Implicit in your question is that when we conduct our operations, a certain number of securities are offered in the market and we choose to buy or not to buy. As a practical matter, all securities are offered in the market at all times. There are active prices on all of them. Thus, it's not as though there is a limited... | 310 |
fomc | 1,995 | Beyond the technical issues, aren't we dealing with a moral hazard situation in the sense that if we show ourselves ready to close all the gaps when these situations occur, the chance of their happening with greater frequency increases? I think it's entirely appropriate to come at it from the point of view of financial... | 223 |
fomc | 1,995 | Any further questions for Peter on this issue? If not, let's move to Mike Prell and the staff report on the economy. | 26 |
fomc | 1,995 | [Statement--see Appendix.] | 6 |
fomc | 1,995 | Questions for Mike? President Parry. | 8 |
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