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ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can inject code into the Setup Wizard at runtime to extract CAPTCHA images. Zen can inject code into the libc of running processes to infect them with the malware.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit maintains persistence on an infected machine through rc.local and .bashrc files. [14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0298
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbot
Xbot uses phishing pages mimicking Google Play's payment interface as well as bank login pages.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used various batch scripts to establish C2 and download additional files. Gamaredon Group's backdoor malware has also been written to a batch file.[134][135][136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable Cloud Logs
An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what act... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can decode and decrypt data received from C2.[251][252][253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has created scheduled tasks in %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
Raindrop used steganography to locate the start of its encoded payload within legitimate 7-Zip code.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions
Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox has the ability to download next stage malware components to a compromised system.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used EternalBlue exploits for lateral movement.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to record video on a compromised host.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider filtering network traffic to untrusted or known bad domains and resources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can XOR encrypt C2 traffic.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use the Android CallScreeningService to silently block incoming calls.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has searched for vulnerabilities, tools, and geopolitical trends on Google to target victims.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used WMI to execute scripts used for discovery.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel can create a reverse shell between the infected host and a specified system.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 configured its payload to inject into the rundll32.exe.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 uses a tool to infect connected USB devices and transmit itself to air-gapped computers when the infected USB device is inserted.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used the NtQueueApcThread syscall to inject code into svchost.exe.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may collect domain group information by running net group /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has utilized techniques like reflective DLL loading to write a DLL into memory and load a shell that provides backdoor access to the victim.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to set a hardcoded and randomized sleep interval.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0326
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedDrop
RedDrop tricks the user into sending SMS messages to premium services and then deletes those messages.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 AcuTherm: A Hybrid Attack on Password Entry Based on Both Acoustic and Thermal Side-Channels
Despite predictions of their demise and calls for their deprecation, passwords remain the most popular form of user authentication. Traditional password vulnerabilities stem from their storage and/or low ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a domain user account.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
The GoldMax Linux variant has used a crontab entry with a @reboot line to gain persistence.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud API
Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various met... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group malware has used rundll32 to launch additional malicious components.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used social media platforms to hide communications to C2 servers.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collect information and files from a compromised host.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can encrypt data prior to exfiltration by using an RSA public key.[35][282] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.[58][59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can scan the network for open ports and vulnerable instances of RDP and SMB protocols.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Client Software Binary
Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web brow... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape impersonates the main thread of CExecSvc.exe by calling NtImpersonateThread.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux has a command to execute a shell command on the system.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses PowerShell scripts.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can disarm Windows Defender during the UAC process to evade detection.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can exfiltrate stolen information over its C2.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has discovered system processes by calling RmGetList.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses HTTP to communicate with a command and control server. [322] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0913
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Ensure that applications and devices do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely (e.g., plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell can obtain the victim PC name and OS version.[414] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has used a passive listener, capable of identifying a specific magic value before executing tasking, as a secondary command and control (C2) mechanism.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda checks for the existence of a Registry key and if it contains certain values.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has injected an install module into a newly created process.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.[167][168][169][170][171][172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon renamed a malicious service taskmgr to appear to be a legitimate version of Task Manager.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has used PowerShell to download additional modules.[235] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot contains keylogging functionality to steal passwords.[170] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 In-Depth Analyzing and Fuzzing for Qualcomm Hexagon Processor
Hexagon processors have been widely used on Qualcomm platforms. Almost all vital peripheral subsystems (e.g., baseband, WLAN, ADSP, NPU) are lade onto Hexagon processors.Security researchers have to face three main challenges. First, th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to duplicate a token from ntprint.exe.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has loaded a malicious DLL by spoofing the name of the legitimate Version.DLL and placing it in the same folder as the digitally-signed Microsoft binary OneDriveUpdater.exe.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis replaces the nonexistent Windows DLL "msfte.dll" with its own malicious version, which is loaded by the SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0654
ATT&CK Technique Name:ProLock
ProLock can use BITS jobs to download its malicious payload.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can check for specific files and directories associated with virtualization and malware analysis.[267] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry attempts to kill processes associated with Exchange, Microsoft SQL Server, and MySQL to make it possible to encrypt their data stores.[40][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer registers the broadcast receiver to listen for events related to device boot-up.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has been delivered via spearphishing emails that contain a malicious zip file.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster has the ability to query the Registry to detect a key specific to VMware.[85] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Reverse Engineering the M1
The release of M1 Macs marked a turning point for the open-source operating system community on Apple hardware. Now, the whole hardware stack would be proprietary, with little hope of reusing drivers written for standard PC hardware. At the same time, it offered an unprec... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 DeepLocker - Concealing Targeted Attacks with AI Locksmithing
In this talk, we describe DeepLocker, a novel class of highly targeted and evasive attacks powered by artificial intelligence (AI). As cybercriminals increasingly weaponize AI, cyber defenders must understand the mechanisms and implicati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT launches a shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control. [2] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Select Bugs From Binary Where Pattern Like CVE-1337-Days
Static code review is an effective way to discover vulnerability variants and exploitation primitives, but two of the most challenging tasks for static analysis are the effective code pattern extraction from huge amounts of various bugs and th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon creates a new service named "ntssrv" to execute the payload. Shamoon can also spread via PsExec.[52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can use net view to discover remote systems.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito's installer uses WMI to search for antivirus display names.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used malicious e-mail attachments to deliver malware.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates often contain patches for vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA551
TA551 has used spoofed company emails that were acquired from email clients on previously infected hosts to target other individuals.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has downloaded additional malware to execute on the victim's machine, including by using a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieves an additional payload.[177][178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0614
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaBricks
CostaBricks can implement a custom-built virtual machine mechanism to obfuscate its code.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth uses a fromCharCode() deobfuscation method to avoid explicitly writing execution commands and to hide its code. [15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used Tasklist to obtain information from a compromised host.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit access to the Instance Metadata API using a host-based firewall such as iptables. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used malware obtained after compromising other threat actors, such as OilRig.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Inform users that device rooting or granting unnecessary access to the accessibility service presents security risks that could be taken advantage of without their knowledge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke uses scheduled tasks typically named "Watchmon Service" for persistence.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Timestomp
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used net user /domain to enumerate domain accounts.[48] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.