text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has collected the administrator username from a compromised host.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1590.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Topology
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and intern... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used Base64 encoding within malware variants.[288] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas captures screenshots based on specific keywords in the window’s title.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 will identify Microsoft Office documents on the victim's computer.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has stored a compressed payload in the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has stored encrypted orchestrator code and payloads in the Registry.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can use run keys and create link files in the startup folder for persistence.[108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka contains a keylogger module that collects keystrokes and the titles of foreground windows.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
A Threat Group-3390 tool can encrypt payloads using XOR. Threat Group-3390 malware is also obfuscated using Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression.[329][330][331] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker adds keys to the Registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and various other Registry locations.[41][42] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
At the end of day two of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Rodrigo Rubira Branco, Aanchal Gupta, Kymberlee Price, and Stefano Zanero for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec com... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette can check for the presence of 29 different antivirus tools.[94] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 FASTCash and INJX_Pure: How Threat Actors Use Public Standards for Financial Fraud
The INJX_Pure and Lazarus FASTCash malware families are each built on publicly documented standards that enable their respective operating threat actors to perform financial "cash outs" at ATMs. While each of these ma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos can upload and download files to and from the victim’s machine.[377] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can store copied files in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has used the GetAdaptersInfo() API call to get the victim's MAC address.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK has the ability to download files from C2 to the infected host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has staged stolen data locally on compromised hosts.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis replaces the nonexistent Windows DLL "msfte.dll" with its own malicious version, which is loaded by the SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame contains modules to infect USB sticks and spread laterally to other Windows systems the stick is plugged into using Autorun functionality.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has modified variables in kernel memory to turn off Driver Signature Enforcement after exploiting vulnerabilities that obtained kernel mode privileges.[8][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0442
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBShower
VBShower has attempted to complicate forensic analysis by deleting all the files contained in %APPDATA%..\Local\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word and %APPDATA%..\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails that required the user to click on a malicious link and subsequently open a decoy document with a malicious loader.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program inst... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can initiate a system shutdown.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can log keystrokes on the victim's machine.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has copied files of interest to the main drive's recycle bin.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can download additional files from its C2 via HTTP or DNS.[293][405] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Automated REST API Endpoint Identification for Security Testing at Scale: How Machine Learning Accelerates Security Testing
Unlike traditional web applications where a web crawler is used to discover various urls, REST API endpoints can be exposed in various formats and many REST services do not ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used multi-hop proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has been executed via Microsoft Word documents containing malicious macros.[248][249][250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can use a renamed image of cmd.exe for execution.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can be disguised as a Visual Studio file such as Windows.Data.TimeZones.zh-PH.pri to evade detection. Also, FoggyWeb's loader can mimic a genuine dll file that carries out the same import functions as the legitimate Windows version.dll file.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA has collected the device’s phone number and can check if the active network connection is metered.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has checked if the malware is running in a virtual environment with the anti-debug function GetTickCount() to compare the timing.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin gathers the IP address and domain from the victim’s machine.[200] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider removing mavinject.exe if Microsoft App-V is not used within a given environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0189
ATT&CK Technique Name:ISMInjector
ISMInjector creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy has established persistence via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run registry key.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can use netstat to enumerate network connections.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can perform keylogging.[122][123][124][125][126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used a scheduled task to launch its PowerShell loader.[41][42] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Under the SEA - A Look at the Syrian Electronic Army's Mobile Tooling
This briefing will highlight the most recent expansion of the tools of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), which are now known to include an entire mobile surveillanceware family (SilverHawk). This is the first time a family of mobi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull can mimic the names and descriptions of legitimate services such as iphlpsvc, IP Helper, and Onedrive to evade detection.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest obtains a list of running processes using the function kill_unwanted.[256] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Internet-Scale Analysis of AWS Cognito Security
This talk will show the results of an internet-scale analysis of the security of AWS Cognito configurations. During this research, it was possible to identify 2500 identity pools, which were used to gain access to more than 13000 S3 buckets (which are ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare has deleted its files and components from a compromised host.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can download and install additional malware after initial infection.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used various tools to steal files from the compromised host.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use HTTP or HTTPS for C2 communications.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer attempts to connect with a hardcoded internal proxy on TCP 3128 [default Squid proxy]. If established, the backdoor attempts to reach an external C2 server via the internal proxy. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0893
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data from Local System
Adversaries may target and collect data from local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, or local databases. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA communicates with the C2 server using HTTPS requests.[20] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Morning Refreshment Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
After decrypting itself in memory, RARSTONE downloads a DLL file from its C2 server and loads it in the memory space of a hidden Internet Explorer process. This "downloaded" file is actually not dropped onto the system.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
A variant of ADVSTORESHELL encrypts some C2 with 3DES.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team temporarily disrupted service to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector websites after compromising a Georgian web hosting provider in 2019.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can use proxies for C2 traffic.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has issued a shutdown command on a victim machine that, upon reboot, will run the ransomware within a VM.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has named a task RecoveryExTask as part of its persistence activity.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a new backdoor named FunnyDream.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has modified the Registry as part of its UAC bypass process.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Orz can gather the victim's Internet Explorer version.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache.[83][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can use an add on feature when creating payloads that allows you to create custom Python scripts ("scriptlets") to perform tasks offline (without requiring a session) such as sandbox detection, adding persistence, etc.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders excluding all .git folders, but only if the total data size is under 200MB.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger has functionality to disable security tools, including Kaspersky, BitDefender, and MalwareBytes.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0116
ATT&CK Technique Name:UACMe
UACMe contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has been distributed as a malicious link within an email.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.[88][2][89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can download additional modules from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla contacts its C2 based on a scheduled timing set in its configuration.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi obfuscates its configuration data with XOR.[270] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has decrypted and dropped the DCSrv payload to disk.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1090.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-hop Proxy
To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any prev... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Faking a Factory: Creating and Operating a Realistic Honeypot
Designing realistic ICS honeypot requires substantial time and resource investment, as well as in-depth knowledge not only of the technical aspects, but of industrial automation process. Over most of 2019, we designed and built a factor... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can contact actor-controlled C2 servers by using the Telegram API over HTTPS.[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla's payload has been renamed PowerShellInfo.exe.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare has used a variety of Windows API functions.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats used the public tool BrowserPasswordDump10 to dump passwords saved in browsers on victims.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and replace/modify service binaries, paths, and configs.[95][96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, su... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can identify the IP and port numbers for all remote connections from the compromised host.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon obtains the system time and will only activate if it is greater than a preset date.[63][64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Mircrosoft Word documents.[211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo's C2 communication has been encrypted using OpenSSL.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can access the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\mssmbios\Data\SMBiosData Registry key to obtain the System manufacturer value to identify the machine type.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce Registry key.[132][36][133][134][135] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.