text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect the computer name and enumerate all drives on a compromised host.[216][217] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Reverse Engineering the M1
The release of M1 Macs marked a turning point for the open-source operating system community on Apple hardware. Now, the whole hardware stack would be proprietary, with little hope of reusing drivers written for standard PC hardware. At the same time, it offered an unprece... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has added a Registry key to ensure all future macros are enabled for Microsoft Word and Excel as well as for additional persistence.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable legacy network protocols that may be used to intercept network traffic if applicable, especially those that are not needed within an environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito can upload and download files to the victim.[303] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 The Kitten that Charmed Me: The 9 Lives of a Nation State Attacker
When our intel team talks about human error, we usually focus on the victim of a security incident. But in the investigation we ran in the past year, we flipped the script to highlight how the continued operational security errors o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster uses the system function blocks TCON and TDISCON to initiate and destroy TCP connections to arbitrary systems. Buffers may be sent and received on these connections with TRCV und TSEND system function blocks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 has functionality to copy itself to removable media.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use RSA asymmetric encryption with PKCS1 padding to encrypt data sent to the C2 server.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[15][16][17][18][19] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Don't @ Me: Hunting Twitter Bots at Scale
Automated Twitter accounts have been making headlines for their ability to spread spam and malware as well as significantly influence online discussion and sentiment. In this talk, we explore the economy around Twitter bots, as well as demonstrate how atten... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pluggable Authentication Modules
Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authenticati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has created scheduled tasks in %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has gathered information about local network connections using netstat.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can be launched by using DLL search order hijacking in which the wrapper DLL is placed in the same folder as explorer.exe and loaded during startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus.[4][27][51][36][52][17][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0277
ATT&CK Technique Name:FruitFly
FruitFly takes screenshots of the user's desktop.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner used shell scripts to launch various services and to start/stop the QEMU virtualization.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0323
ATT&CK Technique Name:Charger
Charger locks the device if it is granted admin permissions, displaying a message demanding a ransom payment.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
For C0011, Transparent Tribe registered domains likely designed to appear relevant to student targets in India.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa dropped and added officeupdate.exe to scheduled tasks.[80][81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Guardrails
Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY can establish using a AppCertDLLs Registry key.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi silently executes received commands with cmd.exe.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can collect the user name from the victim's machine.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious files.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS has a command to download an .exe and use process hollowing to inject it into a new process.[7][8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 "No Mr. Cyber Threat!" - A Psychological Approach To Managing the Fail-to-Challenge Vulnerability
An unrecognised individual enters a busy workplace. They are not wearing any ID and they are asking people if they can use their laptops or plug in an unauthorised USB device. Even though people typica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chinoxy
Chinoxy has established persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key and by loading a dropper to (%COMMON_ STARTUP%\\eoffice.exe).[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon has used RSA encryption for C2 communications.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0295
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid can collect passwords for Wi-Fi networks and online accounts, including Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Google, WhatsApp, Mail, and LinkedIn.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian has the ability to use Python to spawn a Unix shell.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 The Next Generation of Windows Exploitation: Attacking the Common Log File System
The Common Log File System (CLFS) is a new logging mechanism introduced by Windows Vista, which is responsible for providing a high-performance, universal log file subsystem. In this session, we will share our resea... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can delete the DLLs for its various components from a compromised host.[254] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has the ability to save and execute VBScript.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has masqueraded their XMRIG payload name by naming it wercplsupporte.dll after the legitimate wercplsupport.dll file.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
The Mimikatz credential dumper contains an implementation of an SSP.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has replayed stolen session token and passwords to trigger simple-approval MFA prompts in hope of the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use Data Protection API to encrypt its components on the victim’s computer, to evade detection, and to make sure the payload can only be decrypted and loaded on one specific compromised computer.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca adopted Cloudflare as a proxy for compromised servers.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
The PcShare payload has been injected into the logagent.exe and rdpclip.exe processes.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block modifications to service and other critical server parameters in the Registry.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has sent data to its C2 server via POST requests.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0298
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbot
Xbot steals all SMS message and contact information as well as intercepts and parses certain SMS messages.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has been delivered via spearphishing e-mails with password protected ZIP files.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.[9] This subjects AppleScript code to the same scrutiny as other .app files passing through Gatekeeper. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used IronPython scripts as part of the IronNetInjector toolchain to drop payloads.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious Kitten
Ferocious Kitten has conducted spearphishing campaigns containing malicious documents to lure victims to open the attachments.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can check for specific usernames, computer names, device drivers, DLL's, and virtual devices associated with sandboxed environments and can enter an infinite loop and stop itself if any are detected.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok can open a fake Google Play screen requesting bank card credentials and mimic the screen of relevant mobile banking apps to request user/bank card details.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca created a service using the command sc create "SysUpdate" binpath= "cmd /c start "[file path]""&&sc config "SysUpdate" start= auto&&netstart SysUpdate for persistence.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux can attempt to find a new C2 server if it receives an error.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Deep into Android Bluetooth Bug Hunting: New Attack Surfaces and Weak Code Patterns
In the past few years, researchers have found hundreds of security vulnerabilities in the AOSP Bluetooth module such as Blueborne and BlueFrag. Almost all of these vulnerabilities are caused by the process not proper... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has the ability to create the following Windows service to establish persistence on an infected host: sc create Windowscarpstss binpath= "cmd.exe /c cscript.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\w7_1.wsf humpback_whale" start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem".[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu launches a script to delete their original decoy file to cover tracks.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has used VBA macros to execute shellcode.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has modified Registry settings for security tools.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer uses the first COM port from the configuration file for the communication and the other two COM ports are opened to prevent other processes accessing them. This may block processes or operators from getting reporting messages from a device. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can use its ransomware module to encrypt device data and hold it for ransom.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to prevent automated analysis by sandboxes.[12][13] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 In-Depth Analyzing and Fuzzing for Qualcomm Hexagon Processor
Hexagon processors have been widely used on Qualcomm platforms. Almost all vital peripheral subsystems (e.g., baseband, WLAN, ADSP, NPU) are lade onto Hexagon processors.Security researchers have to face three main challenges. First, t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548
ATT&CK Technique Name:Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet enumerates and parses the System Data Blocks (SDB) using the s7blk_findfirst and s7blk_findnext API calls in s7otbxdx.dll. Stuxnet must find an SDB with the DWORD at offset 50h equal to 0100CB2Ch. This specifies that the system uses the Profibus communications proce... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0164
ATT&CK Technique Name:TDTESS
If running as administrator, TDTESS installs itself as a new service named bmwappushservice to establish persistence.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has inserted garbage characters into code, presumably to avoid anti-virus detection.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME can open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ and dropped a shortcut in %STARTUP%.[181][182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1499.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Exhaustion Flood
Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scarlet Mimic
Scarlet Mimic has used the left-to-right override character in self-extracting RAR archive spearphishing attachment file names.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Modern Secure Boot Attacks: Bypassing Hardware Root of Trust from Software
Many hardware vendors are armoring modern Secure Boot by moving Root of Trust to the hardware. While it is definitely the right direction to create more difficulties for the attacker, many layers of code exist between hardw... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to execute its payload via PowerShell.[8] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Fritzfrog: A Story of a Unique P2P Botnet
Botnets, as Botconf’s participants know very well, vary significantly. Their goals differ, as well as their TTPs and implementations. Nonetheless, most of them usually share the property of connecting to a remote attack server. In fact, great knowledge of the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has masqueraded as a legitimate Windows tool.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla attempted to trick targets into clicking on a link featuring a seemingly legitimate domain from Adobe.com to download their malware and gain initial access.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1474.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Software Supply Chain
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to prevent automated analysis by sandboxes.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used a malicious framework designed to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1083
ATT&CK Technique Name:File and Directory Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA551
TA551 has prompted users to enable macros within spearphishing attachments to install malware.[235] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use side-loading to run malicious executables.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included location tracking capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 President's Cup Cyber Competition: Finding the Best Cyber Talent in the US Government
In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) held the first cybersecurity competition for the Federal workforce. Dubbed the President's Cup Cybersecurity C... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times a day.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0553
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoleNet
MoleNet can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can retrieve IP, network adapter configuration information, and domain from compromised hosts.[179][180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos has used a compromised SSH client to capture the hostname, port, username and password used to establish an SSH connection from the compromised host.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can use email attachments for C2 communications.[17] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Sality
Sality is one of the longest-alive threats and probably the most underrated botnet ever. It made its first appearance in 2003 and is still active in 2015.There are more than 2 million active infections (as per 24 hours) and it has advanced features like a peer-to-peer botnet, a rootkit which is... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.