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ATT&CK ID:T1516
ATT&CK Technique Name:Input Injection
A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail can be delivered as a compressed, encrypted, and encoded payload.[356] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS has been disguised as update.exe to appear as a valid executable.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a command called RunAs, which creates a new process as another user or process context.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used Cobalt Strike to empty log files.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE has downloaded and executed additional plugins.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can gather information from the Keepass password manager.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher creates a new Windows service with the malicious executable for persistence.[53][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR, named "WinUpdate" [66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for regularly taking and testing data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[96] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has been incompletely signed with revoked certificates.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's installer can attempt to achieve persistence by creating a scheduled task.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has delayed execution for five to six minutes during its persistence establishment process.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck encrypts the victims machine followed by asking the victim to pay a ransom. [85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin uses regsvr32.exe to run a .sct file for execution.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use VBS to download and execute malicious files.[122][123][124][125][126][127][128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1573.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Symmetric Cryptography
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encry... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to check whether the infected system’s OS is Debian or RHEL/CentOS to determine which cryptocurrency miner it should use.[336] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0159
ATT&CK Technique Name:SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can collect host IP information from the victim’s machine.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has deployed tools after moving laterally using administrative accounts.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple can collect files, passwords, and other data from a compromised host.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can identify the username, machine name, system language, keyboard layout, OS version, and system drive information on a compromised host.[303][304][305][306][306][307][308][309] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth spawns a CMD process to execute commands. [28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Configure user permissions groups and roles for access to cloud storage.[6] Implement strict Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent access to storage solutions except for the applications, users, and services that require access.[5] Ensure ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has searched for attached VGA devices using lspci.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems.By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Two Bugs With One PoC: Rooting Pixel 6 From Android 12 to Android 13
Pixel 6 is the first phone to rock the new Tensor chip, fully designed and developed by Google. Shipping with Linux kernel 5.10, there are many new changes and challenges for rooting. However, there is little change in the attack... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used UPX to pack some payloads.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can download and execute a replica of itself using certutil.[269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 created and modified startup files for persistence.[27][28] APT41 added a registry key in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost to establish persistence for Cobalt Strike.[29] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Breaking Samsung's ARM TrustZone
The increasing popularity of connected devices in recent years has led manufacturers to put a greater emphasis on security, finding themselves in need of robust designs that would protect their users. From these requirements emerged the ARM TrustZone, a system-wide ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call EnumWindows, and checking for Qemu guest agent.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised identities to access networks via SSH, VPNs, and other remote access tools.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can launch an instance of itself with administrative rights using runas.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors archived collected files with WinRAR, prior to exfiltration.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis has a keylogger that works in every application installed on the device.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used LinkedIn to identify and target employees within a chosen organization.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Data exfiltration is done by Okrum using the already opened channel with the C2 server.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull can use cmd.exe to run various commands as a reverse shell.[258] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0110
ATT&CK Technique Name:at
at can be used to schedule a task on a system to be executed at a specific date or time.[4][1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a WMI event filter to invoke a command-line event consumer at system boot time to launch a backdoor with rundll32.exe.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to use removable drives to spread through compromised networks.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0891
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hardcoded Credentials
Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include: | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can create a cronjob for persistence if it determines it is on a Linux system.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can use a custom DGA to generate a subdomain for C2.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can capture webcam video on targeted systems.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0816
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy can use phishing overlays to capture users' credit card information.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used fragmented strings, environment variables, standard input (stdin), and native character-replacement functionalities to obfuscate commands.[6][36][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap attempts to gain root access by using local exploits.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0361
ATT&CK Technique Name:Expand
Expand can be used to download or upload a file over a network share.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES has collected the device’s location.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named "memdump".[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok can open a fake Google Play screen requesting bank card credentials and mimic the screen of relevant mobile banking apps to request user/bank card details.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to download a DLL from C2 to a compromised host.[397] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has set an Office 365 tenant level mail transport rule to send all mail in and out of the targeted organization to the newly created account.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0938
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Execution prevention may prevent malicious scripts from accessing protected resources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has checked the number of CPUs in the system to avoid being run in a sandbox or emulator.[31] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 {JS-ON: Security-OFF}: Abusing JSON-Based SQL Queries
All major SQL-based database engines such as Postgres, SQLite, MS SQL, and MySQL have in the last few years started to adopt native JSON features that enable data interactions with complicated JSON-type objects. While these native JSON features a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors registered hundreds of domains using Duck DNS and DNS Exit.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to delete files from a compromised host.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.[17][18][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can create a new service to establish persistence.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has used WinRAR to compress memory dumps prior to exfiltration.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized ssh-add function.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malware that adds Registry keys for persistence.[86][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound has the ability to map domain trusts and identify misconfigurations for potential abuse.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has a module for creating a local user if permissions allow.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can gather unsecured credentials for Azure AD services, such as Azure AD Connect, from a local machine.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can add a plist file in the Library/LaunchDaemons to establish persistence.[13][14] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Visiting the Bear’s Den
Sednit, a.k.a. Fancy Bear/APT28/Sofacy, is a group of attackers operating since at least 2004 and whose main objective is to steal confidential information from specific targets. Over the past two years, this group’s activity increased significantly, in particular with numerous... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1558.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silver Ticket
Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to gather metadata from a file and to search for file and directory names.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0950
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0462
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBAT
CARROTBAT has the ability to download and execute a remote file via certutil.[97] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Oh No! KPTI Defeated, Unauthorized Data Leakage is Still Possible
Meltdown is a hardware vulnerability affecting most modern processors, including Intel, AMD, IBM POWER, and ARM processors. It allows a rogue process to read the kernel data in CPU L1-d cache, even when it is not authorized to do so... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has captured credentials via fake Outlook Web App (OWA) login pages and has also used a .NET based keylogger.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1615
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group Policy Discovery
Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Po... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon encrypts configuration files and tasks for the malware to complete using CAST-128 algorithm.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has sent system information to a C2 server via HTTP and HTTPS POST requests.[116] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Fixing a Memory Forensics Blind Spot: Linux Kernel Tracing
The ubiquity of Linux servers across the internet and within cloud instances necessitates that defensive research maintains pace with the introduction of new features to the platform. Unfortunately, these research efforts have not adequatel... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.