text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has collected the username from the infected host.[61] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 The Dark Age of Memory Corruption Mitigations in the Spectre Era
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory-safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used the msiexec.exe command-line utility to download and execute malicious MSI files.[27] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Golden Chickens: Uncovering A Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) Provider and Two New Threat Actors Using It
…/… | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe and Windows Registry modifications to set the COR_PROFILER environment variable to execute a malicious DLL whenever a process loads the .NET CLR.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Zero - The Funniest Number in Cryptography
What is the funniest number in cryptography? 0. The reason is that for all x, x*0 = 0, i.e., the equation is always satisfied no matter what x is. This talk will explore crypto bugs in four BLS signatures' libraries (ethereum/py ecc, supranational/blst, he... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0374
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpeakUp
SpeakUp downloads and executes additional files from a remote server. [423] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0273
ATT&CK Technique Name:Socksbot
Socksbot creates a suspended svchost process and injects its DLL into it.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT uses Base64 to encode information sent to the C2 server.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
The "Uploader" variant of HAMMERTOSS visits a hard-coded server over HTTP/S to download the images HAMMERTOSS uses to receive commands.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can create a scheduled task to establish persistence.[117] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 TeamTNT: Explosive Cryptomining
Since the introduction of Amazon Web Services (AWS) there has been a steady migration from on-premise to cloud deployments. Misconfigured cloud services can be low-hanging fruit for an attacker. Palo Alto Networks found that Docker services were attacked about every 9... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. APT29 has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new payloads to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through hijacking by using application control solutions also capable of blocking libraries loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0243
ATT&CK Technique Name:DealersChoice
DealersChoice uses HTTP for communication with the C2 server.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has sent phishing emails containing a link to an actor-controlled Google Drive document or other free online file hosting services.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing e-mails that link to lure documents.[59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind communicates over ports 80, 443, 53, and 8080 via raw sockets instead of the protocols usually associated with the ports.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has a hardcoded list of services and processes to terminate.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.[3] Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being tar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has used a weaponized Microsoft Word document with an embedded RTF exploit.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used hidcon to run batch files in a hidden console window.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS has a command to take a screenshot and send it to the C2 server.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using GetIpNetTable.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can download additional files from C2 servers.[202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis has a command to delete files from the victim’s machine.[53][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has performed watering hole attacks.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has modified the Registry to hide created user accounts from the Windows logon screen. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:COR_PROFILER
Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has the curl command to send credentials over HTTP and the curl and wget commands to download new software.[332][333][334] TeamTNT has also used a custom user agent HTTP header in shell scripts.[335] | secon |
title:botconf2016 MISP, the Threat Sharing Platform, a Developer Perspective to Extensions and Collaboration
MISP is becoming a key open source package for indicator and threat sharing in the information security community. MISP improved its modularity in the recent versions and propose various ways to use and extend t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can use the touch -t command to change timestamps.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant can remotely open applications on the infected host with the ShellExecuteA command.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can listen in to victims' conversations through the system’s microphone.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has used malicious HTA files to drop and execute malware.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
The Industroyer IEC 104 module has 3 modes available to perform its attack. These modes are range, shift, and sequence. The range mode operates in 2 stages. The first stage of range mode gathers Information Object Addresses (IOA) and sends select and execute packets to ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 A Dirty Little History: Bypassing Spectre Hardware Defenses to Leak Kernel Data
The initial disclosure of Spectre in 2018 led to an unforeseen era of transient execution attacks. These attacks usually allow a lower-privileged attacker to leak arbitrary data from higher privileged security domains by... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can enumerate the targeted machine's name and GUID.[229][230] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Use & Abuse of Personal Information
Virtually any meaningful interaction occurring across the Internet requires the establishment of a user profile, which in turn requires entry of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) as a way for service providers to verify and support/track user activity. Su... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore has the capability to edit the Registry.[99][100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to download additional payloads from C2.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to impact data storage. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 registered domains imitating NATO, OSCE security websites, Caucasus information resources, and other organizations.[2][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0544
ATT&CK Technique Name:HenBox
HenBox can detect if the app is running on an emulator.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used PowerShell to gain access to merchant's networks, and a Metasploit PowerShell module to download and execute shellcode and to set up a local listener.[92][93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1069.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Groups
Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular gro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can check to see if the infected machine has VM tools running.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can obtain a list of installed applications.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can encrypt data and leave a ransom note.[90][91][92] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 WireGuard: Next Generation Secure Network Tunnel
The state of VPN protocols is not pretty, with popular options, such as IPsec and OpenVPN, being overwhelmingly complex, with large attack surfaces, using mostly cryptographic designs from the 90s. WireGuard presents a new abuse-resistant and high-per... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can collect the computer name from a compromised host.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has searched the Program Files directories for specific folders and has searched for strings related to its mutexes.[195][196][197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS gathers contacts from the system by dumping the victim's address book.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used net localgroup administrators to find local administrators on compromised systems.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used dllhost.exe to mask Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) and MicrosoftOutLookUpdater.exe for Plink.[92][93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windigo
Windigo has delivered a generic Windows proxy Win32/Glubteta.M. Windigo has also used multiple reverse proxy chains as part of their C2 infrastructure.[52] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Hand Me Your SECRET, MCU! Microarchitectural Timing Attacks on Microcontrollers are Practical
The discovery of Spectre and Meltdown has turned systems security upside down. These attacks have opened a novel frontier for exploration to hackers and shed light on the untapped potential of hidden tran... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has added RSA keys in authorized_keys.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
The PcShare payload has been injected into the logagent.exe and rdpclip.exe processes.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito’s installer is obfuscated with a custom crypter to obfuscate the installer.[219] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty gathers the computer name, the serial number of the main disk volume, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command systeminfo.[403] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors relied on a victim to open a PDF document and click on an embedded malicious link to download malware.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can change the CreationTime, LastAccessTime, and LastWriteTime file time attributes when executed with SYSTEM privileges.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to check if /usr/sbin/setenforce exists. This file controls what mode SELinux is in.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can wait 30 seconds before executing additional code if security software is detected.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1563
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Service Session Hijacking
Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. Wh... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Bypassing Windows Hello for Business and Pleasure
Windows Hello is the most popular password-less solution that includes authentication by either PIN code or biometric authentication. As a password-less technology, Windows Hello provides people with a more convenient authentication experience compa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can use Cron to create periodic and pre-scheduled background jobs.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used the command timeout 20 to pause the execution of its initial loader.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has used custom packers to protect its payloads.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete stores files and logs in a folder on the local drive.[52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff code is both obfuscated and packed with an FTT packer.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat is capable of downloading files from the C2.[295] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations, preventing notifications to the central computer.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack’s RAT makes a persistent target file with auto execution on the host start.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[262] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used multiple native APIs including ShellExecuteW to run executables,GetWindowsDirectoryW to create folders, and VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread for process injection.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.[269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
In cloud environments, ensure that users are not granted permissions to create or modify traffic mirrors unless this is explicitly required. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can drop a mouse-logger that will take small screenshots around at each click and then send back to the server.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has used WMI to execute files over the network.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1557.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:ARP Cache Poisoning
Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook has used legitimate web services to exfiltrate data.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0951
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird drops a malicious file (sspisrv.dll) alongside a copy of lsass.exe, which is used to register a service that loads sspisrv.dll as a driver. The payload of the malicious driver (located in its entry-point function) is executed when loaded by lsass.exe before the sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner used a batch script to run the Linux virtual machine as a service.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has used masscan to search for kubelets and the kubelet API for additional running containers.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cron
Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.