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ATT&CK ID:T1635.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:URI Hijacking
Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed leveraging a module that scrapes email data from Outlook.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can collect and send OS version and computer name as a part of its C2 beacon.[276] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to list open windows on the compromised host.[24][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has collected information from Microsoft SharePoint services within target networks.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater has the ability to take screen captures.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can check device system properties to potentially avoid running while under analysis.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document likely sent via email.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to upload programs from Schneider PLCs.[1][2] INCONTROLLER can obtain existing program logic from Omron PLCs by using either the program upload or backup functions available through the HTTP server.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used type \\c$\Users\\Favorites\Links\Bookmarks bar\Imported From IE*citrix* for bookmark discovery.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to deobfuscate its payload prior to execution.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has packed tools with UPX, and has repacked a modified version of Mimikatz to thwart anti-virus detection.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has added itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
iOS users should be instructed to not download applications from unofficial sources, as applications distributed via the Apple App Store cannot list installed applications on a device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[237] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 What the Fuzz
Fuzzers have become one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of offensive security researchers. Yet, outside of a few big companies, they find little use in defensive scenarios. We believe it is time to change this. If you are not fuzzing your code, someone else will be. Various ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Secure Boot Under Attack: Simulation to Enhance Fault Attacks & Defenses
Secure Boot is widely deployed in modern embedded systems and an essential part of the security model. Even when no (easy to exploit) logical vulnerabilities remain, attackers are surprisingly often still able to compromis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has configured tools to automatically send collected files to attacker controlled servers.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1636.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Contact List
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the Contacts framework. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can create a new service to establish persistence.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0617
ATT&CK Technique Name:HELLOKITTY
HELLOKITTY can search for specific processes to terminate.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security products can typically detect jailbroken or rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to identify running services on a compromised host.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable,... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 The Journey of Hunting In-the-Wild Windows LPE 0day
From 2017 to 2021, Microsoft disclosed a total of 28 in-the-wild Windows LPE 0days, most of which are Windows kernel LPE vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are often used by top level APT and could cause great harm. For security vendors, it is... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0931
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Perfect Spray: A Journey From Finding a New Type of Logical Flaw at Linux Kernel To Developing a New Heap Exploitation Technique
Reliable exploitation is the key requirement for highly targeted and valuable attacks (such as APT). If the exploitation is not reliable, the exploitation may be fragile ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used administrative accounts, including Domain Admin, to move laterally within a victim network.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[66] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 leverages a hardcoded list of remote-station IP addresses to iteratively initiate communications and collect information across multiple priority IEC-104 priority levels.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
OS security updates typically contain exploit patches when disclosed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can be configured to use raw TCP or UDP for command and control.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team has used various social media channels to spearphish victims.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork used Visual Basic Scripts (VBS) on victim machines.[116][117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has collected the username from a compromised host.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has injected its dynamic library into descendent processes of sshd via LD_PRELOAD.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0277
ATT&CK Technique Name:FruitFly
FruitFly looks for specific files and file types.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can identify peripheral devices on targeted systems.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can bypass UAC to escalate privileges.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has moved staged encrypted archives to Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with China Chopper prior to exfiltration.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
To establish persistence, Okrum can install itself as a new service named NtmSsvc.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0919
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intelligence Program
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
A version of KONNI drops a Windows shortcut on the victim’s machine to establish persistence.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1480.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Environmental Keying
Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied envir... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy searches for files that are 60mb and less and contain the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .exe, .zip, and .rar. Zebrocy also runs the echo %APPDATA% command to list the contents of the directory.[334][335][336] Zebrocy can obtain the cur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has compromised email accounts to send spearphishing e-mails.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1578.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revert Cloud Instance
An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used DropBox URLs to deliver variants of PlugX.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
Data SPACESHIP copies to the staging area is compressed with zlib. Bytes are rotated by four positions and XOR'ed with 0x23.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch collects files from the local system that have the following extensions, then prepares them for exfiltration: .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .mdb, .rar, .zip, .doc, .docx.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1622
ATT&CK Technique Name:Debugger Evasion
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0864
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transient Cyber Asset
Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask is able to create "hidden" scheduled tasks for persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used VBScript to initiate the delivery of payloads.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has the capability to start services.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky scans the victim for files that contain certain keywords and document types including PDF, DOC, DOCX, XLS, and XLSX, from a list that is obtained from the C2 as a text file. It can also identify logical drives for the infected machine.[113][114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naid
Naid collects the domain name from a compromised host.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi is capable of creating a remote Bash shell and executing commands.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID can query LDAP to identify additional users on the network to infect.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has removed the watermark associated with enabling the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option by removing the relevant strings in the user32.dll.mui of the system.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.[281][282][283] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey can identify the IP address of a victim machine.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame can use Windows Authentication Packages for persistence.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a file injector DLL to spawn a benign process on the victim's system and inject the malicious payload into it via process hollowing.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can use VBScript to execute malicious code.[15][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve has the ability to use the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive messages.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic supports WebSocket and TCP-based C2 profiles.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS modifies the system partition to maintain persistence.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can halt execution if it identifies processes belonging to virtual machine software or analysis tools.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0374
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpeakUp
SpeakUp uses the cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep -c "cpu family" 2>&1 command to gather system information. [345] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1069.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Groups
Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to dete... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:InstallUtil
Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can update its configuration to use a different C2 server.[41] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 No One Is Entitled to Their Own Facts, Except in Cybersecurity? Presenting an Investigation Handbook To Develop a Shared Narrative of Major Cyber Incidents
You get a fact…and you get a fact…and you get a fact! It sounds like a meme until you realize that's how most people treat their conceptions of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use netstat to enumerate current network connections.[69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.[2][3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Two-Factor Authentication, Usable or Not? A Two-Phase Usability Study of the FIDO U2F Security Key
Why do people choose to use (or not use) Two Factor Authentication (2FA)? We report on some surprising results from a two-phase study on the Yubico Security Key working with Yubico. Despite the Yubico... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of users belonging to the local users and administrators groups with the commands net localgroup administrators and net localgroup users.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves can enumerate and search for files and directories.[246][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can bypass UAC to escalate privileges.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0597
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldFinder
GoldFinder logged and stored information related to the route or hops a packet took from a compromised machine to a hardcoded C2 server, including the target C2 URL, HTTP response/status code, HTTP response headers and values, and data received from the C2 node.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used obfuscated PowerShell to extract an encoded payload from within an .LNK file.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread communicates with the C2 server using HTTP requests.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can inject content into lsass.exe to load a module.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used printf and file I/O loops to delay process execution as part of API hammering.[5] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.