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ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy can create new users on an infected system.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can be used to automatically collect files from a compromised host.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Preemptively search through communication services to find shared unsecured credentials. Searching for common patterns like "password is ", "password=" and take actions to reduce exposure when found. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used a Perl reverse shell to communicate with C2.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT was executed with a Python script and worked in conjunction with additional Python-based post-exploitation tools.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1590
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gather Victim Network Information
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has used rundll32 for execution of the loader component.[25][26] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Keep Everyone In Sync: Effective Approaches Borrowed from Open Source Communities
Keeping members of a community in sync is a resource-consuming task. For example, many security researchers have to spend the whole day on IMs in order not to miss a single threat.As a former creator of an open sour... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Chain of Fools: An Exploration of Certificate Chain Validation Mishaps
Typically, when software needs to perform cryptographic tasks, developers use libraries or APIs that abstract many details away from them. They don't need to fully understand how TLS handshakes work to create a TLS socket, nor d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
A Volgmer variant is encoded using a simple XOR cipher.[348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1608.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Install Digital Certificate
Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors deleted all Windows system and security event logs using /Q /c wevtutil cl system and /Q /c wevtutil cl security.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can parse collected files to identify specific file extensions.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to steal written CD images and files of interest from previously connected removable drives when they become available again.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 servers.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson has the ability to delete files from a compromised host.[45][46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has the ability to download additional tools such as the RedLine Stealer to an infected host.[431] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has digitally signed executables using AVAST Software certificates.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
During C0010, UNC3890 actors downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised host.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to steal documents from the local system including the print spooler queue.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN collects the OS name, machine name, and architecture information.[388] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear can load and execute modules and Windows Application Programming (API) calls using standard shellcode API hashing.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has mimicked an existing Windows service by being installed as Windows Time Service.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT can collect local data from an infected machine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0063
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHOTPUT
SHOTPUT has a command to retrieve information about connected users.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can gain system level privilege by passing SeDebugPrivilege to the AdjustTokenPrivilege API.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0415
ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOSTWRITE
BOOSTWRITE has used the DWriteCreateFactory() function to load additional modules.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 2021: A Titan M Odyssey
In the past years, most of the Android devices were relying on ARM Trustzone for critical security features.In 2018, with the release of the Pixel 3, Google introduced the Titan M chip, a hardware security module used to enhance the device security by reducing its attack sur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used a script to parse files like /etc/hosts and SSH known_hosts to discover remote systems.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can install attacker-specified components or applications.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Launch Agent
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can identify users with local administrator rights.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Ensure proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can upload, download, and execute files on the victim.[448][449] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.[157][158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can lock the device with a password and permanently disable the screen.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.[11][12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has used SMTP for C2 communications.[1][2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki has used the embedTLS library for network communications.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis uses ipconfig to gather the IP address from the system.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.[54] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 TruEMU: An Extensible, Open-Source, Whole-System iOS Emulator
iOS is one of the most valuable targets for security researchers. Unfortunately, studying the internals of this operating system is notoriously hard, due to the closed nature of the iOS ecosystem and the absence of easily-accessible analy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot files have been named UltraVNC.exe and WINVNC.exe to appear as legitimate VNC tools.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy leverages WMI to enumerate anti-virus on the victim.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Hollowing
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. | secon |
title:botconf2015 A moose once bit my honeypot – A story of an embedded Linux botnet
Embedded Linux platforms, labeled “Internet of Things” devices these days, have been increasingly targeted by malware authors in the last few years, with most infections resulting in the compromised system taking part in a botnet. Whil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for code repositories like GitLab and GitHub to discover further high-privilege account credentials.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has sent spearphishing attachments attempting to get a user to click.[130][131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has been programmed to sleep outside local business hours (9 to 5, Monday to Friday).[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0312
ATT&CK Technique Name:WireLurker
WireLurker obfuscates its payload through complex code structure, multiple component versions, file hiding, code obfuscation and customized encryption to thwart anti-reversing.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the time command to retrieve the current time of a compromised system.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic can leverage a peer-to-peer C2 profile between agents.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0490
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for iOS
XLoader for iOS can obtain the device’s IMEM, ICCID, and MEID.[33] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Integration of Cyber Insurance Into A Risk Management Program
This session will provide information on the current data breach landscape and then discuss how Cyber Insurance is being integrated into a risk management plan. Information Security professionals and incident responders are in many cases... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can hook APIs, kill processes, break file system paths, and change ACLs to prevent security tools from running.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised service principals to make changes to the Office 365 environment.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to compress its components.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0417
ATT&CK Technique Name:GRIFFON
GRIFFON has used PowerShell to execute the Meterpreter downloader TinyMet.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used move to transfer files to a network share and has copied payloads--such as Prestige ransomware--to an Active Directory Domain Controller and distributed via the Default Domain Group Policy Object.[2][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
If running with root permissions, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchDaemons.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used base64 encoding for scripts.[78][79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has used compromised credentials to obtain unauthorized access to online accounts.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group queried compromised victim's active directory servers to obtain the list of employees including administrator accounts.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to systemd .timer unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. | secon |
title:botconf2013 Participatory Honeypots: A Paradigm Shift in the Fight Against Mobile Botnets
Due to the substantially different ecosystem we have to deal with when it comes to mobile security, it makes it harder to detect and react to malware attacks if using conventional techniques. We introduce the concept of Part... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher has used the KernelCallbackTable to hijack the execution flow of a process by replacing the __fnDWORD function with the address of a created Asynchronous Procedure Call stub routine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has been executed using regsvr32.exe.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk has a ransomware component that encrypts files with an AES key that is also RSA-1028 encrypted.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can make modifications to the Regsitry for persistence.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to compress stings with QuickLZ.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM has used VPN services, including SoftEther VPN, to access and maintain persistence in victim environments.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cherry Picker
Some variants of Cherry Picker use AppInit_DLLs to achieve persistence by creating the following Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows "AppInit_DLLs"="pserver32.dll"[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat is capable of running commands to obtain a list of files and directories, as well as enumerating logical drives.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0197
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHTRACK
PUNCHTRACK is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher.[260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used Reg to query the Registry for installed programs.[97][98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1105
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ingress Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has used dir to search for "programfiles" and "appdata".[31] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 The Next Gen PlugX/ShadowPad? A Dive into the Emerging China-Nexus Modular Trojan, Pangolin8RAT
Modular malware like PlugX and ShadowPad have been the most popular shared trojans used in Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations. Since mid-2020, TeamT5 has detected a new modular trojan emerging in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including .rtf, .doc, and .xls files.[135][136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to create scheduled tasks for persistence.[136][137][138][139][140][141][142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1593
ATT&CK Technique Name:Search Open Websites/Domains
Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting inform... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok proxies web traffic to potentially monitor and alter victim HTTP(S) traffic.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can abuse Android’s accessibility service to capture data from installed applications.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Reverse Engineering and Exploiting Builds in the Cloud
Continuous Integration, Delivery, and Deployment (CI/CD) and Containers are common terms in today’s IT landscapes and core approaches for modern software development and operation. We will give a short, to-the-point introduction of CI/CD with re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE checks to see if the system is configured with "Daylight" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.[55] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Compromising the macOS Kernel through Safari by Chaining Six Vulnerabilities
Compromising a kernel through a browser is the ultimate goal for offensive security researchers. Because of continuous efforts to eliminate vulnerabilities and introduce various mitigations, a remote kernel exploit from a b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Fault-Injection Detection Circuits: Design, Calibration, Validation and Tuning
This session covers the tunable replica circuit (TRC), a fault-injection detection circuit that has been integrated into Intel® Converged Security and Management Engine (Intel® CSME) in the recent 12th Gen Intel® Core™ P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can launch icacls /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.[305] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor has exfiltrated data using the already opened channel with its C&C server.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
The BRONZE BUTLER uploader or malware the uploader uses command to delete the RAR archives after they have been exfiltrated.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has access to destructive malware that is capable of overwriting a machine's Master Boot Record (MBR).[7][8] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.