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ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can abuse Android’s accessibility service to record the screen PIN.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has used a macro function to set scheduled tasks, disguised as those used by Google.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can disable pop-up information about folders and desktop items and delete Registry keys to hide malicious services.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent an application from writing a signed vulnerable driver to the system.[144] On Windows 10 and 11, enable Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to assist in hardening against third p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve can identify and search networked drives for specific file name extensions.[47] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Security Industry Call-to-Action: We Need a Cloud Vulnerability Database
The shared responsibility model is broken. Companies are unable to keep up with cloud complexity, while vendors and cloud providers do not provide clear identification, tracking or severity for vulnerabilities discovered in th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0684
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROADTools
ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Superman Powered by Kryptonite: Turn the Adversarial Attack into Your Defense Weapon
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is wielding a profound impact on global economic and social progress as well as ordinary citizens' daily life. However, with the advancement of AI technology, the next-generation hacker... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
While Norsk Hydro attempted to recover from a LockerGoga infection, most of its 160 manufacturing locations switched to manual (non-IT driven) operations. Manual operations can result in a loss of productivity. [7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher establishes persistence by creating the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run.[95][96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains modules, such as Get-LocAdm for enumerating permission groups.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can establish persistence by registering a malicious DLL as an alternative Print Processor which is loaded when the print spooler service starts.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 used custom tools to create SOCK5 and custom protocol proxies between infected hosts.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0338
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobian RAT
Cobian RAT creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork collected and exfiltrated files from the infected system.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can check system flags and libraries, process timing, and API's to detect code emulation or sandboxing.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent.btz
Agent.btz saves system information into an XML file that is then XOR-encoded.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to use Smart Applet attacks to disable the Java SecurityManager sandbox.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
title:botconf2018 APT Attack against the Middle East: The Big Bang
Over the past few weeks, we discovered the comeback of an APT attack against the Middle East, and specifically against the Palestinian Authority. The APT group behind this attack launched a campaign over a year ago, and very little of this operation was... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Breaking Secure Bootloaders
Bootloaders often use signature verification mechanisms in order to protect a device from executing malicious software. This talk aims to outline actionable weaknesses in modern bootloaders which allow attackers to deploy unsigned code, despite these protection mechanism... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth uses incoming HTTP requests with a username keyword and commands and handles them as instructions to perform actions.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can disable SELinux Role-Based Access Control and deactivate PAM modules.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's loader can decrypt the backdoor code, embedded within the loader or within a legitimate PNG file. A custom XOR cipher or RC4 is used for decryption.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has been observed using a Registry Run key.[207][208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has modules to interact with the Windows task scheduler.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom collection method to intercept two-factor authentication soft tokens.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has used the BOtB tool which exploits CVE-2019-5736.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can locate files based on hardcoded file extensions.[320][321][322][323] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
Impacket contains various modules emulating other service execution tools such as PsExec.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST created VBScripts that were named after existing services or folders to blend into legitimate activities.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:COR_PROFILER
Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used post-exploitation tools including RemCom and the Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM) to execute processes.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0183
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tor
Traffic traversing the Tor network will be forwarded to multiple nodes before exiting the Tor network and continuing on to its intended destination.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has used VBScript to execute malicious commands and payloads.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:PittyTiger
PittyTiger attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.[52] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Cooper Knows the Shortest Stave: Finding 134 Bugs in the Binding Code of Scripting Languages with Cooperative Mutation
Scripting languages like JavaScript are being integrated into commercial software to provide unified interfaces. For example, Adobe Acrobat accepts JavaScript to dynamically mani... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Services File Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0280
ATT&CK Technique Name:MirageFox
MirageFox has a function for decrypting data containing C2 configuration information.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 uses a General Interrogation command to monitor the device’s Information Object Addresses (IOAs) and their IO state values.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has scanned specific lists of target IP addresses.[2] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Nyetya Malware & MeDoc Connection
The 27th of June 2017, a new wormable malware variant has surfaced. Talos is identifying this new malware variant as Nyetya. The sample leverages EternalBlue, EternalRomance, WMI, and PsExec for lateral movement inside an affected network. The presentation will be div... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from configuration or support files.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Rogue7: Rogue Engineering-Station Attacks on S7 Simatic PLCs
The Siemens industrial control systems architecture consists of Simatic S7 PLCs which communicate with a TIA engineering station and SCADA HMI on one side, and control industrial systems on the other side. The newer versions of the archit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
The Grandoreiro payload has been delivered encrypted with a custom XOR-based algorithm and also as a base64-encoded ZIP file.[39][140][140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK can decode shellcode using a custom rotating XOR cipher.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has delivered spearphishing emails that contain a zipped file with malicious contents.[138][139][140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has downloaded malicious DLLs which served as a ShadowPad loader.[445] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
The FunnyDream Keyrecord component can capture keystrokes.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic recursively searches for all .doc files on the system and collects a directory listing of the Desktop, %TEMP%, and %WINDOWS%\Temp directories.[120][121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can modify the binary ACL to prevent security tools from running.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Task/Job
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has used scheduled tasks to execute additional payloads and to gain persistence on a compromised host.[175][176][177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE gathers the MAC address of the victim’s machine.[120] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 PicoDMA: DMA Attacks at Your Fingertips
Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks are typically performed in real-time by an attacker that gains physical access to a high-speed expansion port on a target device, and can be used to recover full disk encryption keys and other sensitive data from memory, byp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rancor
Rancor has attached a malicious document to an email to gain initial access.[190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can use the tokens of users to create processes on infected systems.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 A Decade After Bleichenbacher '06, RSA Signature Forgery Still Works
In the 2006 CRYPTO rump session, Daniel Bleichenbacher gave a talk on how to exploit some implementation bugs of RSA signature verification for forgery attacks against key pairs with a small public exponent. What made his attac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT enumerated the Orion software Visual Studio solution directory path.[293] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged tools on their infrastructure to download directly onto a compromised system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts.[30] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Perception Deception: Physical Adversarial Attack Challenges and Tactics for DNN-Based Object Detection
DNN has been successful for Object Detection, which is critical to the perceptions of Autonomous Driving, and it also has been found vulnerable to adversarial examples. There has been an ongoing d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can use the Internet Explorer (IE) COM interface to connect and receive commands from C2.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has set an execution trigger date and time, stored as an ASCII Unix/Epoch time value.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can use HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.[361][362][363][314] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can identify administrator accounts on an infected host.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux uses crontab for persistence if it does not have root privileges.[4][5] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 To Loot or Not to Loot? That Is Not a Question When State-Nexus APT Targets Online Entertainment Industry
The online entertainment business is not a notable victim when we talk about Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks. Previously, APT research emphasized the victims in the public sector, su... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can show phishing popups when a targeted application is running.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has developed malware variants written in Python.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has injected the malware DLL into a target process.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation could detect unauthorized operating system modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can execute commands on a compromised network with the use of cmd.exe.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0145
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSOURCE
POWERSOURCE achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.[200] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using using trusted binaries to bypass application control. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can use a custom hex byte swapping encoding scheme to obfuscate tasking traffic.[11][12] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Decisions and Revisions - The Ever Evolving Face of the Black Hat NOC
This session is your chance to get up close and personal with the Black Hat NOC. We'll walk you through the process of deciding what equipment and services we deploy on the Black Hat network, and our reasoning around those decisi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos is triggered by an incoming TCP connection to a legitimate service from a specific source port.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can delete files from a compromised host.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious has the ability to add a Class ID in the current user Registry hive to enable persistence mechanisms.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has acquired, and sometimes customized, open source tools such as Mimikatz, Empire, VNC remote access software, and DIG.net.[55][56][57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT can check the victim's default browser to determine which process to inject its communications module into.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover takes screenshots of the compromised system's desktop and saves them to C:\system\screenshot.bmp for exfiltration every 60 minutes.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the Get-AcceptedDomain PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell.[28] They also used AdFind to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Prevent the use of unsigned executables, such as installers and scripts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 The Various Shades of Supply Chain: SBOM, N-Days and Zero Trust
Over the past two years, attacks on multiple targets in the semiconductor industry have consistently led to leaks of firmware source code. A compromised developer device could potentially give an attacker access to the source code rep... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask is able to delete the Security Descriptor (SD) registry subkey in order to "hide" scheduled tasks.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as DebuggerIsAttached and DebuggerIsLogging. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the COR_ENABLE_PROFILING environment variable is present and active.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty gathers information on victim’s drives and has a plugin for document listing.[333] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has added newly created accounts to the administrators group to maintain elevated access.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader has commands to list drives on the victim machine and to list file information for a given directory.[228] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Perfectly Deniable Steganographic Disk Encryption
Deniable encryption and steganography nominally safeguard sensitive information against forced password disclosure by concealing its very existence. However, while the presence of sensitive information may be 'plausibly' denied, the possession of ste... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.