text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint can uninstall the malicious service from an infected machine.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has placed a malicious payload in %WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\oci.dll so it would be sideloaded by the MSDTC service.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth uses an external software known as NetPass to recover passwords. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton is able to read, write and execute code in memory on the safety controller at an arbitrary address within the devices firmware region. This allows the malware to make changes to the running firmware in memory and modify how the device operates. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used tools to exploit the ZeroLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mivast
Mivast has the capability to gather NTLM password information.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Vlind Glitch: A Blind VCC Glitching Technique to Bypass the Secure Boot of the Qualcomm MSM8916 Mobile SoC
All modern mobile phone SoCs are protected with the secure boot mechanism. Secure Boot's first level is implemented in bootrom's code. This code is in ROM memory and cannot be modified. The Boo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates often contain patches for vulnerabilities that could be exploited for root access. Root access is often a requirement to impairing defenses. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to upload specific files to Dropbox.[22] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A New Class of DNS Vulnerabilities Affecting Many DNS-as-Service Platforms
We present a novel class of DNS vulnerabilities that affect multiple DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) providers. The vulnerabilities have been proven and successfully exploited on three major cloud providers including AWS Route 53 a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can interact with a victim’s Outlook session and look through folders and emails.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
The FunnyDream FilepakMonitor component can detect removable drive insertion.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors ran sc start to start the COMSysApp as part of the service hijacking and sc stop to stop and reconfigure the COMSysApp.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Orz can gather the victim OS version and whether it is 64 or 32 bit.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can close specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog boxes to mask external connections.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can call NtDelayExecution to pause execution.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT can capture passwords from common web browsers such as Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, and Firefox.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0490
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for iOS
XLoader for iOS has been installed via a malicious configuration profile.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae has created a service named "Windows Update Agent1" to appear legitimate.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using rundll32.exe.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has used several anti-emulation techniques to prevent automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes.[23] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Lunch Break
Lunch will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 12:00 PM - 1:30 PM.Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use the GetTickCount and GetSystemTimeAsFileTime API calls to inspect system time.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0590
ATT&CK Technique Name:NBTscan
NBTscan can be used to collect MAC addresses.[154][155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit communications with the container service to managed and secured channels, such as local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Do... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Using its protocol payloads, Industroyer sends unauthorized commands to RTUs to change the state of equipment. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
One version of Helminth uses a PowerShell script.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are c... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Web Cache Entanglement: Novel Pathways to Poisoning
Caches are woven into websites throughout the net, discreetly juggling data between users, and yet they are rarely scrutinized in any depth. In this session, I'll show you how to remotely probe through the inner workings of caches to find subtle i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team disabled event logging on compromised systems.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork payload uses process hollowing to hide the UAC bypass vulnerability exploitation inside svchost.exe.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used dumped hashes to authenticate to other machines via pass the hash.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can enable/disable RDP connection and can start a remote desktop session using a browser web socket client.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. This may mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of AiTM activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has used a fronted domain to obfuscate its hard-coded C2 server domain.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 leverages valid accounts after gaining credentials for use within the victim domain.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird performs multiple process injections to hijack system processes and execute malicious code.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon has an operational mode for encrypting data instead of overwriting it.[83][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:StreamEx
StreamEx has the ability to remotely execute commands.[317] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Ruling StarCraft Game Spitefully -- Exploiting the Blind Spot of AI-Powered Game Bots
With recent breakthroughs of deep neural networks in problems like computer vision, machine translation, and time series prediction, we have witnessed a great advance in the area of reinforcement learning. By integ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Ryan Flores, Lidia Giuliano, Ty Miller, and Ashley Shen for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Loc... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Morning Beverage Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control where appropriate. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:NTDS
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT creates a Registry key at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell to survive a system reboot.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.[87][88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec harvests plain-text credentials as a password filter registered on domain controllers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:dsquery
dsquery can be used to gather information on user accounts within a domain.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Email Hiding Rules
Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rul... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy's default encryption for its C2 communication channel is SSL, but it also has transport options for RSA and AES.[44] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Malware, Penny Stocks, Pharma Spam — Necurs Delivers
Email threats have always been a major part of the threat landscape. As the use of exploit kits and other malware distribution techniques have decreased, malicious spam campaigns play an even greater role in the distribution of malware to organizati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos encrypts all strings using RC4 and bundles all functionality into a single function call.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has obfuscated data with base64, AES, RC4, and bz2.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically check the integrity of system image to ensure it has not been modified. [3] [4] [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk can enumerate all services running on a compromised host.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used QuickZip to archive stolen files before exfiltration.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
MESSAGETAP uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP and finally extracts SMS message data and routing metadata. [19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider used wmic.exe to add a new user to the system.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used keylogging tools in their operations.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor can set attributes of log files and directories to HIDDEN, SYSTEM, ARCHIVE, or a combination of those.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a PowerShell-based keylogger as well as a tool called MECHANICAL to log keystrokes.[91][92][93][94][95][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used DNS for C2 including the publicly available requestbin.net tunneling service.[46][47][48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry enumerates current remote desktop sessions and tries to execute the malware on each session.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can identify the installed antivirus product on a targeted system.[82][83][83][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas can check that the device IP is not in the range of known Google IP addresses before triggering the payload and can delay payload deployment to avoid detection during testing and avoid association with unwanted ads.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy can inject a malicious DLL into a process.[50][51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader has the ability to download and execute PowerShell scripts.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can use RegOpenKeyW to access the Registry.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has used XOR-based encryption for collected files before exfiltration.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has a function that can watch the contents of the system clipboard for valid bitcoin addresses, which it then overwrites with the attacker's address.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack used hard-coded credentials to gain access to a network share.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.[40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can determine the system architecture it is running on to choose which version of the DLL to use.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious files to gain execution in the target environment.[212][213][214][215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to achieve persistence by adding a new task in the task scheduler to run every minute.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1071
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Layer Protocol
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traff... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Exploring a New Class of Kernel Exploit Primitive
Microsoft Security Response Center receives and examines many interesting bug classes. Often, the exploitability of those bugs is apparent, but this is not always the case. One interesting outlier is an arbitrary kernel pointer read primitive where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke installed a cron job that downloaded and executed files from the C2.[11][12][13] | secon |
title:Effective Seed Scheduling for Fuzzing with Graph Centrality Analysis
author:Dongdong She and
Abhishek Shah and
Suman Jana
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title:SLA-NFV: an SLA-aware High Performance Framework for Network Function
Virtualization
author:Chen Sun and
Jun Bi and
Zhilong Zheng and
Hongxin Hu
White Paper
Intel, Brocade, Cyan, Red Hat,
and Telefónica – NFV Services
End to End Network
Function Virtualization
Architecture Instantiation
How Intelligent NFV ... | 安全论文 |
title:Layering Public Key Distribution Over Secure DNS using Authenticated
Delegation
author:John P. Jones and
Daniel F. Berger and
Chinya V. Ravishankar
Layering Public Key Distribution Over Secure DNS
using Authenticated Delegation ∗
John P. Jones, Daniel F. Berger, Chinya V. Ravishankar
Department of Computer Scienc... | 安全论文 |
title:A User-Perceived Availability Evaluation of a Web Based Travel Agency
author:Mohamed Kaâniche and
Karama Kanoun and
Magnos Martinello
A User-Perceived Availability Evaluation
of a Web Based Travel Agency
Mohamed Kaâniche, Karama Kanoun, and Magnos Martinello*
LAAS-CNRS — 7 Avenue du Colonel Roche
31077 Toulouse C... | 安全论文 |
title:Sharing More and Checking Less: Leveraging Common Input Keywords to
Detect Bugs in Embedded Systems
author:Libo Chen and
Yanhao Wang and
Quanpu Cai and
Yunfan Zhan and
Hong Hu and
Jiaqi Linghu and
Qinsheng Hou and
Chao Zhang and
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Zhi Xue
Sharing More and Checking Less: Leveraging Common
Input Keyw... | 安全论文 |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.