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ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has been used to target Arabic-speaking users and used code that checks if the compromised machine has the Arabic language installed.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor can exfiltrate data by encoding it in the subdomain field of DNS packets.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0498
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cryptoistic
Cryptoistic has the ability delete files from a compromised host.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:BISCUIT
BISCUIT malware contains a secondary fallback command and control server that is contacted after the primary command and control server.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has searched network shares to access sensitive documents.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has the ability to hex-encode collected data from an infected host.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:PinchDuke
PinchDuke steals credentials from compromised hosts. PinchDuke's credential stealing functionality is believed to be based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch). Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with m... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 No Royal Road … Notes on Dangerous Game
Attribution fatigue is real. We are 20 years past Moonlight Maze, 15 years past Titan Rain, and a decade past the formation of NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre in Estonia. These recent ten years have seen the public dumping of stolen nation-state toolc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0160
ATT&CK Technique Name:certutil
certutil can be used to install browser root certificates as a precursor to performing Adversary-in-the-Middle between connections to banking websites. Example command: certutil -addstore -f -user ROOT ProgramData\cert512121.der.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has injected HTML codes into banking sites to steal sensitive online banking information (ex: usernames and passwords).[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy can download additional modules and payloads.[176] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Honey ?! Where is my PoS ?
It doesn’t pass a month without a news about a new POS (point-of-sale) malware or credit card data breach. By nature, the details of this kind of breach cannot be public (banks, ongoing investigation, reputation, …). But what do we know really from POS malware ? Can we creat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito uses a custom encryption algorithm, which consists of XOR and a stream that is similar to the Blum Blum Shub algorithm.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT checks for installed security software like antivirus and firewall.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has compressed and encrypted data before exfiltration using password protected .7z archives.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A New Class of DNS Vulnerabilities Affecting Many DNS-as-Service Platforms
We present a novel class of DNS vulnerabilities that affect multiple DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) providers. The vulnerabilities have been proven and successfully exploited on three major cloud providers including AWS Route 53 ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has used native OS commands to understand privilege levels and system details.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs downloads additional files that are base64-encoded and encrypted with another cipher.[190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors lured users into clicking a malicious link which led to the download of a ZIP archive containing a malicious .LNK file.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet gathers the username from the victim’s machine.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Create Process with Token
Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and run... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon creates a new service named "ntssrv" that attempts to appear legitimate; the service's display name is "Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service" and its description is "Helps guard against time change attempts targeting known and newly discovered vulnerabiliti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Injection
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Putter Panda
Malware used by Putter Panda attempts to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious has checked for AV software as part of its persistence process.[38] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Get Rich or Die Trying
In a World where oil is scarce and people click mail attachments they really shouldn’t, One Man sets out on an epic journey for glory, conquest, and other people’s money. So begins the amazing tale of the “Oil bot” campaign: a tale of a single man who ran a sting operation on a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred can download files and additional malware.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka is capable of stealing Outlook passwords.[15][16] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Shifting Knowledge Left: Keeping up with Modern Application Security
With security "shifting left" into DevSecOps, it's more difficult than ever to keep up with a rapidly evolving landscape of web technologies and the threats that come with them. While familiar vulnerability classes continue to pla... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has used Powershell to retrieve the malicious payload and download additional resources like Mimikatz. [82][83][84][85][86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Set PowerShell execution policy to execute only signed scripts. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 The Air-Gap Jumpers
The term 'air-gap' in cyber security refers to a situation in which a sensitive computer, classified network, or critical infrastructure is intentionally physically isolated from public networks such as the Internet. Air-gap isolation is mainly used to maintain trade secrets, pro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit
Hikit has the ability to download files to a compromised host.[214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
The Backdoor.Oldrea RAT is distributed through trojanized installers planted on compromised vendor sites. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to execute shell commands on the compromised host.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can obtain the computer name and UUID, and enumerate local drives.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion
During the Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion, the threat actors utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya used ports 5190 and 7900 for shellcode listeners, and 4444, 4445, 31337 for shellcode C2.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit is disguised as an Adobe Flash installer. When the file is opened it starts locking the infected computer. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa exfiltrates data from a supplied path over its C2 channel.[81] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Virtually Private Networks
Is Secure Remote Access like the emperor’s new clothes?Enterprise businesses equip staff with mobile devices such as laptops and smart phones to perform daily tasks. This makes the workforce much more mobile but places an implicit burden on the staff to ensure that they a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can break large files of interest into smaller chunks to prepare them for exfiltration.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can launch a fake Facebook login page.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
When available utilize hardware and software root-of-trust to verify the authenticity of a system. This may be achieved through cryptographic means, such as digital signatures or hashes, of critical software and firmware throughout the supply chain. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon encrypts the victim system using a combination of AES256 and RSA encryption schemes.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has gained execution through victims clicking on malicious LNK files contained within ISO files, which can execute hidden DLLs within the ISO.[83][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used rundll32 to run Mimikatz.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that allowed them to establish persistence by adding the following Registry key: "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost" /v COMSysApp /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "COMSysApp" /f.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can create a scheduled task to establish persistence.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can collect various pieces of device information, including OS version, phone model, and manufacturer.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has modified and used customized versions of publicly-available tools like PLINK and Mimikatz.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0210
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nerex
Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0160
ATT&CK Technique Name:certutil
certutil may be used to Base64 encode collected data.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL C2 messages are encrypted with custom stream ciphers using six-byte or eight-byte keys.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be warned against granting access to accessibility features and device administration services, and to carefully scrutinize applications that request these dangerous permissions. Users should be taught how to boot into safe mode to uninstall malicious app... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0808
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to distribute remote access tools.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has dropped and executed tools used for password cracking, including Hydra and CrackMapExec.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can record the IP address of the target machine.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot supports execution from the command-line.[333] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 The Data Distribution Service (DDS) Protocol is Critical: Let's Use it Securely!
We discovered and disclosed vulnerabilities in most of the OMG Data Distribution Service (DDS) implementations. DDS enables crucial technologies like autonomous driving, healthcare machinery, military tactical systems,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM uses the command line and rundll32.exe to execute.[291] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE has used the scheduled tasks \Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor, \Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility, \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults, and \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared to establish persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's client component is packed with UPX.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can silently accept an incoming phone call.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's macOS backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to 755.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to modify the Web content of organization login portals to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSL/TLS Inspection
SSL/TLS inspection can be used to see the contents of encrypted sessions to look for network-based indicators of malware communication protocols. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Library Loading
Ensure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting folder permissions abuse opportunities on systems, especially reviewing changes made to folders by third-party software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit communications with the container service to managed and secured channels, such as local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Do... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to access the file system on a compromised host.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
For Frankenstein, the threat actors obtained and used Empire.[51] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Stuxnet-in-a-Box: In-Field Emulation and Fuzzing of PLCs to Uncover the Next Zero-Day Threat in Industrial Control Systems
Recent years have been pivotal in the field of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security, with a large number of high-profile attacks exposing the lack of a design-for-securi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows adds the configuration to the Registry in XML format.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has used WinHTTP, CreateProcess, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has used weaponized documents attached to spearphishing emails for reconnaissance and initial compromise.[115][116][117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used several packing methods for obfuscation.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon identifies files matching certain file extension and copies them to subdirectories it created.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0364
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawDisk
RawDisk was used in Shamoon to write to protected system locations such as the MBR and disk partitions in an effort to destroy data.[3][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can obtain the computer name from a compromised host.[221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has encrypted domain-controlled systems using BitPaymer.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar is obfuscated using the open source ConfuserEx protector. Kazuar also obfuscates the name of created files/folders/mutexes and encrypts debug messages written to log files using the Rijndael cipher.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can collect information about domain groups and members.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has leveraged vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure VPNs to hijack sessions.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub can collect various pieces of device information, including device model and OS version.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has run whoami on compromised machines to identify the current user.[81] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 DevSecOps : What, Why and How
Security is often added towards the end, in a typical DevOps cycle through a manual/automated review. However, with DevSecOps, security can be injected at every stage of a DevOps pipeline in an automated fashion. Having a DevSecOps pipeline enables an organization to:C... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can identify drives on compromised hosts and retrieve the hostname via gethostbyname.[162] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Legal Landmines: How Law and Policy are Rapidly Shaping Information Security
The Internet was a much different place 25 years ago. Technology, and the free flow of information has rapidly changed the world forever. Along with that change came the frightening prospect of losing all of our privacy, at... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.