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ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can execute an operator-provided Windows command by leveraging functions such as WinExec, WriteFile, and ReadFile.[115][120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Follow the White Rabbit: Simplifying Fuzz Testing Using FuzzExMachina
Setting up a fuzzing pipeline takes time and manual effort for identifying fuzzable programs and configuring the fuzzer.Usually only large software projects with dedicated testing teams at their disposal are equipped to use fuzz ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to use removable drives to spread through compromised networks.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type saves itself as a file named msdtc.exe, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.[100][101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0374
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpeakUp
SpeakUp uses POST and GET requests over HTTP to communicate with its main C&C server. [316] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has created a scheduled task for persistence.[50] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Project Zero: Five Years of 'Make 0Day Hard'
This year marks the fifth anniversary of Project Zero, an applied security research team at Google that aims to "make 0day hard". It has been a tumultuous and exciting journey so far, and we've managed to explore a huge range of weird and wonderf... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda uses PowerShell to download and execute the payload.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use the Android CallScreeningService to silently block incoming calls.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0327
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skygofree
Skygofree can record audio via the microphone when an infected device is in a specified location.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used taskkill.exe and net.exe to stop backup, catalog, cloud, and other services prior to network encryption.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess has the ability to exfiltrate data, including Chrome and Edge browser database files, from compromised machines.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used a tool called MailSniper to search through the Exchange server mailboxes for keywords.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
The discovery modules used with Duqu can collect information on network connections.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
During the T9000 installation process, it drops a copy of the legitimate Microsoft binary igfxtray.exe. The executable contains a side-loading weakness which is used to load a portion of the malware.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can create Registry entries to enable services to run.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized privileged users can create and modify XDG autostart entries. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Attack Surface as a Service
Protecting public facing assets is becoming increasingly problematic for any company with an online presence today. Growing online communities providing pre-built tools to easily bypass traditional defenses and a constant tug-of-war between usability and security contrib... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ run key.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Prevent the creation of new network adapters where possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [235][236] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from LSASS memory.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0417
ATT&CK Technique Name:GRIFFON
GRIFFON has used a persistence module that stores the implant inside the Registry, which executes at logon.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has used the PowerKatz plugin that can be loaded into the address space of a PowerShell process through reflective DLL loading.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to use AES-256 symmetric encryption in CBC mode with HMAC-SHA-256 to encrypt task commands and XOR to encrypt shell code and configuration data.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq uses basic obfuscation in the form of spaghetti code.[112][164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has used an open-source tool to exploit a known Windows privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2016-0051) on unpatched computers.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has used the open-source library, Mbed Crypto, and generated AES keys to carry out the file encryption process.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig can leverage API functions such as ShellExecuteA and HttpOpenRequestA in the process of downloading and executing files.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can simulate user clicks on ads and system prompts to create new Google accounts.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been used to run the tasklist command on a compromised system.[104] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack
The recent hijack of Twitter prefix by RTCOMM demonstrated the central role of RPKI for Internet routing security. The RPKI filtering (ROV) by major networks limited the propagation of the hijacked prefix.We demonstrate the first downgrade attacks against RPKI, whic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy attempts to bypass default User Access Control (UAC) settings by exploiting a backward-compatibility setting found in Windows 7 and later.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can gather the hostname and the OS version to ensure it doesn’t run on a Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 systems.[314][315][316][317][318][319] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask may abuse the Windows schtasks command-line tool to create "hidden" scheduled tasks.[325] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Choo Choo, Network Train - The One to Rule Your Perimeter
I hear you saying: "MQTT again, that's an old and stale topic." It's actually not old or stale. MQTT is still out there and many servers are still open to attack. But even more interesting, what other devices are connected to those open serve... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to unpack itself into memory using XOR.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic Linker Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared li... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
The Duqu command and control protocol's data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete renamed task names to masquerade as legitimate Google Chrome, Java, Dropbox, Adobe Reader and Python tasks.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has configured payloads to load via LD_PRELOAD.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[264][265] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use Accessibility Services to detect which process is in the foreground.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy obtains additional code to execute on the victim's machine, including the downloading of a secondary payload.[487][92][488][17] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
At the end of day two of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Mika Devonshire, Seungjoo Kim, Asuka Nakajima, and Neil Wyler for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. Th... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Defender-Pretender: When Windows Defender Updates Become a Security Risk
EDRs evolved over the years and become the endpoint's most powerful layer of security. The signature update process is a critical component of security controls, without it, the security control would be useless against new thr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the taskkill command.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer's data wiper component removes the registry image path throughout the system and overwrites all files, rendering the system unusable. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can overwrite sectors of a victim host's hard drive at periodic offsets.[10][11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer executes payloads using the Windows API call CreateProcessW().[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can persist by setting Registry key values HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has used HTTP over ports 9005 and 9006 for network traffic, 9002 for C2 requests, 33666 as a WebSocket, and 8090 to download files.[15] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 IRonMAN: InterpRetable Incident Inspector Based ON Large-Scale Language Model and Association miNing
Contextual incident investigation and incident similarity assessment are crucial components of modern IR and proactive threat hunting strategies. However, current automated systems often rely on pat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[24] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 DBREACH: Database Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression Heuristics
Databases often store sensitive data such as personally identifiable information. For this reason, databases often provide a data-at-rest encryption feature. Large databases may also attempt to compress data to sav... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT can send randomly-generated data as part of its C2 communication.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Email Collection
Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum can deploy additional components or tools as needed.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has communicated with its C2 servers via HTTPS protocol.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server. Kazuar can also act as a webserver and listen for inbound HTTP requests through an exposed API.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT can retrieve an additional payload from its C2 server.[230][231] JHUHUGIT has a command to download files to the victim’s machine.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0938
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Minimize the exposure of API calls that allow the execution of code. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can steal cookie data and credentials from Google Chrome.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can collect notes and data from the MiCode app.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has been packaged in ISO files in order to bypass Mark of the Web (MOTW) security measures.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot can terminate a specific process by its process id.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can add itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UIF2IS20VK Registry keys.[275] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider filtering DNS requests to unknown, untrusted, or known bad domains and resources. Resolving DNS requests with on-premise/proxy servers may also disrupt adversary attempts to conceal data within DNS packets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can obtain running services on the victim.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Steps should be taken to periodically inventory internet accessible devices to determine if it differs from the expected. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1597.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Purchase Technical Data
Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can obtain information about process integrity levels.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can enumerate the processes that run on the platform.[166][170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
The Bazar loader has named malicious shortcuts "adobe" and mimicked communications software.[21][22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette can identify the system name of a compromised host.[346] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
A system info module in CozyCar gathers information on the victim host’s configuration.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can upload data from the victim's machine to the C2 server.[115] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Human or Not: Can You Really Detect the Fake Voices?
Voice is an essential medium for humans to transfer information and build trust, and the trustworthiness of voice is of great importance to humans. With the development of deep learning technologies, attackers have started to use AI techniques to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0275
ATT&CK Technique Name:UPPERCUT
UPPERCUT can download and upload files to and from the victim’s machine.[456] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 serv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada injects code into the Zygote process to effectively include itself in all forked processes. Additionally, code is injected into the Android Play Store App, web browser applications, and the system UI application.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has transferred implant files using Windows Admin Shares.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has stored collected data in a file called stari.txt.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used legitimate access granted to Managed Service Providers in order to access victims of interest.[7][8][9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has attempted to brute force hosts over SSH.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can use multiple custom routines to decrypt strings prior to execution.[102][103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0358
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ruler
Ruler can be used to automate the abuse of Outlook Home Pages to establish persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Upon identifying a compromised network device being used to bridge a network boundary, block the malicious packets using an unaffected network device in path, such as a firewall or a router that has not been compromised. Continue to monitor for additional ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can retrieve and execute additional PowerShell payloads from the C2 server.[357] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A Broken Chain: Discovering OPC UA Attack Surface and Exploiting the Supply Chain
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) is emerging as one of the most important architectures for industrial communication and industry 4.0 transformation. It is platform-independent and trusted for connecting Industrial e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS accesses sensitive data in files, such as saving Skype calls by reading them out of the Skype database files.[11] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.