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Detect It Easy tool’s output is the total ‘6.51920’ entropy value, which turns out 81%. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
PEStudio tool’s output is total ‘6.519‘ entropy value. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
In addition to the entropy value, we can view all functions and imported addresses when we examine them with IDA. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
At this stage, we decide that it is not packed, and when we finally check with the “exeinfope,” the result is “not packed.” | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Strings have been searched, but since there is too much obfuscated information, no tangible results have been found. | [
"T1027"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
One remarkable result we achieved using PEStudio was that it uses ASLR. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We will continue the analysis by changing the ASLR ‘true‘ parameter to ‘false‘ and saving it. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Anti-Debugger control is provided with “IsDebuggerPresent” API. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
If the EAX register takes 1 as a value, the program will close itself, and it is impossible to debug with the analysis tools; that’s why changing it to 0 to run the program without closing. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The anti-debugger bypass technique will be done during dynamic analysis. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The beginning of obfuscated strings and the field where browser cookie information is collected. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The stealer also targets crypto wallets such as Binance, Electrum, and Ethereum and collects sensitive information from the victim’s machine. | [
"T1005"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The below figure shows the code snippet of stealers targeting crypto wallets. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
(0040772c) | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Here are the obfuscated collections. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Crypto Wallets: Deobfuscated strings come after. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Web Browsers: Deobfuscated strings come after. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The stealer has many obfuscated strings that are being covered by a random string, “edx765“, to evade detection. | [
"T1027"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Upon execution, the stealer passes the obfuscated string to a function that strips the arbitrary string and delivers the original string. | [
"T1027",
"T1140"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The results obtained by decoding strings are compared below. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Dynamic Analysis We have started with the first findings we detected while running LummaC2 Stealer in the “behavior” section. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Now, let’s move on to the detailed dynamic analysis stage, verify what we found in the “static analysis” section, and check if we can change the request to the C2 address. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
IsDebuggerPresent By changing the return value for IsDebuggerPresent, one of the most critical APIs we put in breakpoint, we perform the anti-debugging bypass operation. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
LummaC2 stealer sends this information to its C2 server, as shown below. | [
"T1041"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=оaj195iak20ka99441aj1″ We observed the IP address in Debugger, and via IDA, we found that the exact IP address is also referred to in the .rdata section. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Host: 195[.]123[.]226[.]91/c2sock One of the parts that will complicate the analysis processes that will perform the termination process has appeared again. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
If we try to skip this part directly, the process will terminate. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Network Activity When LummaC2 is run, the address it sends the POST request to and the C2 addresses are different. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We found the C2 address by researching VirusTotal. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We ran the LummaC2 instance directly in the virtual environment and monitored its activity. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
As a result, network activity was observed. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Making a ‘POST’ request, tmp.exe is trying to pass information. | [
"T1071.001"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The POST request is performed as follows. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Host: 195[.]123[.]226[.]91 You can find Shodan results about the host address here. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
When we examine the packet’s content captured with WireShark, we see a “PK” header. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
This means that the C2 is transmitted as a zip file during the POST request. | [
"T1041"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Let’s examine the stolen information by dumping the zip file. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”hwid” {78494464-3fdf-11ed-8279-806e6f6e6963} Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”pid” 1 Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”lid” xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx When we examine the contents of the zip file viewed from the PCAP file, it collects information, primarily system in... | [
"T1082"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
It targets the browsers we have seen in the static analysis codes. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The collected data is transferred to the C2 server as a zip file. | [
"T1041"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Since Microsoft Edge and Mozilla Firefox are installed in our analysis environment, Lumma Stealer only collects data from these browsers. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We have obtained different zip files because Lumma Stealer sent multiple POST requests to the “c2/sock” address. | [
"T1071.001"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
When we begin examining from the lowest to the highest in size, we find only the “System.txt” file in the lowest size file. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Its contents are specified in the following image. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
When we examine the file named Mozilla Firefox, when we view the .db file called cookies, we can see that it collects the following cookie information. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The content of the .db file named web data is shown in the image below. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
There is not much data for the Edge browser, so when we add the cookie information collected for Mozilla, we can see clearly in the following image that it has collected cookie information for many account details. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
In conclusion, Lumma Stealer collects cookie information, search histories, and key inputs from browsers and transfers them to the C2 address. | [
"T1005",
"T1041"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The list of all the information it tries to collect inside of the “Web Data” SQLite file is given in the last image. | [
"T1005"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We used the VirusTotal graphical interface for Threat Research at this research stage with the IP address sending the POST request. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
As seen in the screenshot below, the results of “collections,” “communicating files,” and “referer files” are displayed. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
After that, we opened the link information, and many malicious files and IP addresses were displayed. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We noticed a large number of open ports when we searched through Shodan, where 144[.]76[.]173[.]247 IP addresses in Germany caught our attention. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
We accessed C2 while visiting port 80. (VirusTotal Graph: Collection) | [
"T1071.001"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
In the next step, when we visit port 80, the login page can be displayed. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
C2 Login Page is shown in the screenshot below. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
C2:144[.]76[.]173[.]247/login Analyst Note: | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The IP address 144[.]76[.]173[.]247 was not encountered during the analysis. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Shodan Result Communication Addresses Requests 195[.]123[.]226[.]91 POST /c2sock: multipart/form-data;boundary=оaj195iak20ka99441aj1 144[.]76[.]173[.]247 GET/login LummaC2 behaves like other stealer-type malware, which can take away system and sensitive data from the victim’s machine. | [
"T1005",
"T1082"
] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
These dangerous programs can usually steal information from web browsers and target crypto wallets. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
The additional information stored on web browsers, such as login credentials, PII, and financial information, can be further leveraged to conduct fraud activities. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Threat actors can use the stolen data to steal cryptocurrencies from the victim’s accounts or sell this data to other threat actors for financial gain. Indicators of Compromise You can find the full list of IOCs in the SOCRadar Platform. | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Rules & Signatures MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 Defense Evasion Debugger Evasion T1622 Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 Defense Evasion Impair Defences T1562 Collection Automated Collection T1119 Collection Data from the Local System T1005 Command and Con... | [] | Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer |
Executive Summary The NetWalker ransomware, initially known as Mailto, was first detected in August 2019. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Since then, new variants were discovered throughout 2019 and the beginning of 2020, with a strong uptick noticed in March of this year. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
NetWalker has noticeably evolved to a more stable and robust ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, and our research suggests that the malware operators are targeting and attracting a broader range of technically advanced and enterprising criminal affiliates. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) discovered a large sum of bitcoins linked to NetWalker which suggest its extortion efforts are effective and that many victims have had no option other than to succumb to its criminal demands. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
We approached our investigation of NetWalker with some possible ideas about the threat actor behind it, only to later disprove our own hypothesis. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
We believe the inclusion of our thinking, and the means with which we debunked our own theory, highlight the importance of thorough research and we welcome further discussion on this topic. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
We believe it starts valuable discussions and helps avoid duplicate research efforts by others. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
We also encourage our peers in the industry to share information with us in case you have more evidence. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
McAfee protects its customers against the malware covered in this blog in all its products, including personal antivirus, endpoint and gateway. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
To learn more about how McAfee products can defend against these types of attacks, visit our blog on Building Adaptable Security Architecture Against NetWalker. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Check out McAfee Insights to stay on top of NetWalker’s latest developments and intelligence on other cyber threats, all curated by the McAfee ATR team. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Not only that, Insights will also help you prioritize threats, predict if your countermeasures will work and prescribe corrective actions. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Introduction Since 2019, NetWalker ransomware has reached a vast number of different targets, mostly based in western European countries and the US. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Since the end of 2019, the NetWalker gang has indicated a preference for larger organisations rather than individuals. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the adversaries behind NetWalker clearly stated that hospitals will not be targeted; whether they keep to their word remains to be seen. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
The ransomware appends a random extension to infected files and uses Salsa20 encryption. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
It uses some tricks to avoid detection, such as a new defence evasion technique, known as reflective DLL loading, to inject a DLL from memory. | [
"T1055"
] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
The NetWalker collective, much like those behind Maze, REvil and other ransomware, threatens to publish victims’ data if ransoms are not paid. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
As mentioned earlier, NetWalker RaaS prioritizes quality over quantity and is looking for people who are Russian-speaking and have experience with large networks. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
People who already have a foothold in a potential victim’s network and can exfiltrate data with ease are especially sought after. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
This is not surprising, considering that publishing a victims’ data is part of NetWalker’s model. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
The following sections are dedicated to introducing the NetWalker malware and displaying the telemetry status before moving on to the technical malware analysis of the ransomware’s behaviour. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
We will explain how the decryptor works and show some interactions between NetWalker’s operators and their victims. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
After this, we discuss the changes in modus operandi since September 2019, especially regarding payment behaviour. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Then we show our attempts, unfruitful as they were, at discovering a link between NetWalker and previous, seemingly unrelated ransomware variants. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Finally, we deliver an overview of IOCs related to NetWalker and its MITRE ATT&CK techniques. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Telemetry Using McAfee’s billion Insights sensors, we can show the global prevalence of the NetWalker ransomware. Figure 1. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
McAfee MVISION Insights shows global prevalence of the NetWalker ransomware Technical Analysis Ransom note (pre-March 2020) | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Before March 2020, the NetWalker ransom note indicated how to contact the adversary directly using anonymous email account services with random names (such as kkeessnnkkaa@cock.li and hhaaxxhhaaxx@tuta.io): Figure 2. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Example of ransom note prior to March 2020 Ransom Note (Post-March 2020) | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
On 12 March 2020, a researcher shared a screenshot of a new NetWalker ransom note in a tweet and we can see that the attackers have changed the contact method significantly. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Email communication has been dropped completely with victims now required to make contact through the NetWalker Tor interface where, after submitting their user key, they will then be redirected to a chat with NetWalker technical support. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
This change in contact method coincides with underground forum postings where NetWalker revealed it was opening its RaaS up for new affiliates. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
The Tor page was not the only noticeable change we will highlight in this blog. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Figure 3. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
Example of ransom note after March 2020 NetWalker Analysis Figure 4. NetWalker behavior NetWalker Resource Analysis (Pre-March 2020) | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
The NetWalker malware uses a custom resource type (1337 or 31337) containing its entire configuration. | [] | Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side |
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