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This Linux version of the BADCALL backdoor, sysnetd, loads its configuration from a file named /tmp/vgauthsvclog. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Since Lazarus operators have previously disguised their payloads, the use of this name, which is used by the VMware Guest Authentication service, suggests that the targeted system may be a Linux VMware virtual machine. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Interestingly, the XOR key in this case is the same as one used in SIMPLESEA from the 3CX investigation. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Loading a configuration file by BADCALL for Linux, cf. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Figure 8 Taking a look at the three 32-bit integers, 0xC2B45678, 0x90ABCDEF, and 0xFE268455 from Figure 5, which represent a key for a custom implementation of the A5/1 cipher, we realized that the same algorithm and the identical keys were used in Windows malware that dates back to the end of 2014 and was involved in ... | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
The decryption routine shared between the BADCALL for Linux and targeted destructive malware for Windows from 2014 Additional attribution data points To recap what we’ve covered so far, we attribute the 3CX supply-chain attack to the Lazarus group with a high level of confidence. | [
"T1140"
] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
This is based on the following factors: Malware (the intrusion set): The IconicLoader (samcli.dll) uses the same type of strong encryption – AES-GCM – as SimplexTea (whose attribution to Lazarus was established via the similarity with BALLCALL for Linux); only the keys and initialization vectors differ. | [
"T1027"
] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Based on the PE Rich Headers, both IconicLoader (samcli.dll) and IconicStealer (sechost.dll) are projects of a similar size and compiled in the same Visual Studio environment as the executables iertutil.dll (SHA-1: 5B03294B72C0CAA5FB20E7817002C600645EB475) and iertutil.dll (SHA-1: 7491BD61ED15298CE5EE5FFD01C8C82A2CDB40... | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
We include below the YARA rule RichHeaders_Lazarus_NukeSped_IconicPayloads_3CX_Q12023, which flags all these samples, and no unrelated malicious or clean files, as tested on the current ESET databases and recent VirusTotal submissions. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
SimplexTea payload loads its configuration in a very similar way to the SIMPLESEA malware from the 3CX official incident response. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
The XOR key differs (0x5E vs. 0x7E), but the configuration bears the same name: apdl.cf (see Figure 8). Figure 8. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Loading a configuration file by SimplexTea for Linux, cf. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Figure 6 Infrastructure: There is shared network infrastructure with SimplexTea, as it uses https://journalide[.]org/djour.php as it C&C, whose domain is reported in the official results of the incident response of the 3CX compromise by Mandiant. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
A hardcoded URL in SimplexTea for Linux Conclusion The 3CX compromise has gained a lot of attention from the security community since its disclosure on March 29th. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
This compromised software, deployed on various IT infrastructures, which allows the download and execution of any kind of payload, can have devastating impacts. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Unfortunately, no software publisher is immune to being compromised and inadvertently distributing trojanized versions of their applications. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
The stealthiness of a supply-chain attack makes this method of distributing malware very appealing from an attacker’s perspective. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Lazarus has already used this technique in the past, targeting South Korean users of WIZVERA VeraPort software in 2020. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Similarities with existing malware from the Lazarus toolset and with the group’s typical techniques strongly suggest the recent 3CX compromise is the work of Lazarus as well. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
It is also interesting to note that Lazarus can produce and use malware for all major desktop operating systems: Windows, macOS, and Linux. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Both Windows and macOS systems were targeted during the 3CX incident, with 3CX’s VoIP software for both operating systems being trojanized to include malicious code to fetch arbitrary payloads. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
In the case of 3CX, both Windows and macOS second-stage malware versions exist. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
This article demonstrates the existence of a Linux backdoor that probably corresponds to the SIMPLESEA macOS malware seen in the 3CX incident. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
We named this Linux component SimplexTea and showed that it is part of Operation DreamJob, Lazarus’s flagship campaign using job offers to lure and compromise unsuspecting victims. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
For any inquiries about our research published on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
IoCs Files SHA-1FilenameESET detection nameDescription 0CA1723AFE261CD85B05C9EF424FC50290DCE7DFguiconfigdLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
ESimplexTea for Linux. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
3A63477A078CE10E53DFB5639E35D74F93CEFA81HSBC_job_offer․pdfLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
EOdicLoader, a 64-bit downloader for Linux, written in Go. 9D8BADE2030C93D0A010AA57B90915EB7D99EC82HSBC_job_offer.pdf.zipLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
EA ZIP archive with a Linux payload, from VirusTotal. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
F6760FB1F8B019AF2304EA6410001B63A1809F1DsysnetdLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
GBADCALL for Linux. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
First seen2023-03-20 12:00:35 MD5CEDB9CDBAD254F60CFB215B9BFF84FB9 SHA-10CA1723AFE261CD85B05C9EF424FC50290DCE7DF SHA-256EEBB01932DE0B5605DD460CC82844D8693C00EA8AB5FFDF8DBEDE6528C1C18FD Filenameguiconfigd DescriptionSimplexTea for Linux. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
C&Chttps://journalide[.]org/djour.php Downloaded fromhttps://od[.]lk/d/NTJfMzg4MDE1NzJf/vxmedia DetectionLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
E PE compilation timestampN/A | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
First seen2023-03-16 07:44:18 MD53CF7232E5185109321921046D039CF10 SHA-13A63477A078CE10E53DFB5639E35D74F93CEFA81 SHA-256492A643BD1EFDACA4CA125ADE1B606E7BBF00E995AC9115AC84D1C4C59CB66DD FilenameHSBC_job_offer․pdf DescriptionOdicLoader, a 64-bit downloader for Linux, in Go. C&Chttps://od[.]lk/d/NTJfMzg4MDE1NzJf/vxmedia Do... | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
First seen2023-03-20 02:23:29 MD5FC41CB8425B6432AF8403959BB59430D SHA-19D8BADE2030C93D0A010AA57B90915EB7D99EC82 SHA-256F638E5A20114019AD066DD0E856F97FD865798D8FBED1766662D970BEFF652CA FilenameHSBC_job_offer.pdf.zip DescriptionA ZIP archive with a Linux payload, from VirusTotal. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
C&CN/A Downloaded fromN/A DetectionLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
First seen2023-02-01 23:47:05 MD5AAC5A52B939F3FE792726A13FF7A1747 SHA-1F6760FB1F8B019AF2304EA6410001B63A1809F1D SHA-256CC307CFB401D1AE616445E78B610AB72E1C7FB49B298EA003DD26EA80372089A Filenamesysnetd DescriptionBADCALL for Linux. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
C&Ctcp://23.254.211[.]230 Downloaded fromN/A DetectionLinux/NukeSped. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
G PE compilation timestampN/A Network IP addressDomainHosting providerFirst seenDetails 23.254.211[.]230N/AHostwinds LLC.N/AC&C server for BADCALL for Linux 38.108.185[.]7938.108.185[.]115od[.]lkCogent Communications2023-03-16Remote OpenDrive storage containing SimplexTea (/d/NTJfMzg4MDE1NzJf/vxmedia) 172.93.201[.]88jo... | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
This has been done mostly via LinkedIn in the past. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Resource DevelopmentT1584.001Acquire Infrastructure: | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
DomainsUnlike many previous cases of compromised C&Cs used in Operation DreamJob, Lazarus operators registered their own domain for the Linux target. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1587.001Develop Capabilities: MalwareCustom tools from the attack are very likely developed by the attackers. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1585.003Establish Accounts: Cloud AccountsThe attackers hosted the final stage on the cloud service OpenDrive. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1608.001Stage Capabilities: Upload MalwareThe attackers hosted the final stage on the cloud service OpenDrive. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Execution: Malicious FileOdicLoader masquerades as a PDF file in order to fool the target. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Initial AccessT1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing LinkThe target likely received a link to third-party remote storage with a malicious ZIP archive, which was later submitted to VirusTotal. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
PersistenceT1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration ModificationOdicLoader modifies the victim’s Bash profile, so SimplexTea is launched each time Bash is stared and its output is muted. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Defense EvasionT1134.002Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with TokenSimplexTea can create a new process, if instructed by its C&C server. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationSimplexTea stores its configuration in an encrypted apdl.cf. T1027.009Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded PayloadsThe droppers of all malicious chains contain an embedded data array with an additional stage. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1562.003Impair Defenses: Impair Command History LoggingOdicLoader modifies the victim’s Bash profile, so the output and error messages from SimplexTea are muted. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
SimplexTea executes new processes with the same technique. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File DeletionSimplexTea has the ability to delete files securely. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1497.003Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based EvasionSimplexTea implements multiple custom sleep delays in its execution. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
DiscoveryT1083File and Directory DiscoverySimplexTea can list the directory content together with their names, sizes, and timestamps (mimicking the ls -la command). | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Command and ControlT1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsSimplexTea can use HTTP and HTTPS for communication with its C&C server, using a statically linked Curl library. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Symmetric CryptographySimplexTea encrypts C&C traffic using the AES-GCM algorithm. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1132.001Data Encoding: Standard EncodingSimplexTea encodes C&C traffic using base64. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
T1090ProxySimplexTea can utilize a proxy for communications. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Over C2 ChannelSimplexTea can exfiltrate data as ZIP archives to its C&C server. | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
Appendix This YARA rule flags the cluster containing both IconicLoader and IconicStealer, as well as the payloads deployed in the cryptocurrency campaigns from December 2022. 123456789101112131415161718192021 /*The following rule will only work with YARA version >= 3.11.0*/import "pe"rule RichHeaders_Lazarus_NukeSped_I... | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
= 38 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(261, 29395) | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
>= 134 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(261, 29395) | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
<= 164 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(257, 29395) | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
>= 6 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(257, 29395) | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
<= 14} 20 Apr 2023 - 11:30AM | [] | Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack |
We continued to track Tomiris as a separate threat actor over three new attack campaigns between 2021 and 2023, and our telemetry allowed us to shed light on the group. | [] | Tomiris called they want their Turla malware back |
In this blog post, we’re excited to share what we now know of Tomiris with the broader community, and discuss further evidence of a possible connection to Turla. | [] | Tomiris called they want their Turla malware back |
Original release date: March 17, 2021 | Last revised: May 20, 2021SummaryThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK:registered:) framework, Version 8. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have observed continued targeting through spearphishing campaigns using TrickBot malware in North America. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
A sophisticated group of cybercrime actors is luring victims, via phishing emails, with a traffic infringement phishing scheme to download TrickBot. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
TrickBot—first identified in 2016—is a Trojan developed and operated by a sophisticated group of cybercrime actors. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Originally designed as a banking Trojan to steal financial data, TrickBot has evolved into highly modular, multi-stage malware that provides its operators a full suite of tools to conduct a myriad of illegal cyber activities. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
To secure against TrickBot, CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigation measures described in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, which include blocking suspicious Internet Protocol addresses, using antivirus software, and providing social engineering and phishing training to employees. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Technical DetailsTrickBot is an advanced Trojan that malicious actors spread primarily by spearphishing campaigns using tailored emails that contain malicious attachments or links, which—if enabled—execute malware (Phishing: | [
"T1566.001"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Spearphishing Attachment | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
[T1566.001], | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Phishing: Spearphishing Link | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
[T1566.002]). | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
CISA and FBI are aware of recent attacks that use phishing emails, claiming to contain proof of a traffic violation, to steal sensitive information. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
The phishing emails contain links that redirect to a website hosted on a compromised server that prompts the victim to click on photo proof of their traffic violation. | [
"T1204.002"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
(User Execution: Malicious Link [T1204.001], User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002]). | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
In clicking the photo, the victim unknowingly downloads a malicious JavaScript file that, when opened, automatically communicates with the malicious actor’s command and control (C2) server to download TrickBot to the victim’s system (Command and Scripting Interpreter: | [
"T1204.002"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
JavaScript [T1059.007]). | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Attackers can use TrickBot to: Drop other malware, such as Ryuk and Conti ransomware, or Serve as an Emotet downloader (Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105]).[1] TrickBot uses person-in-the-browser attacks to steal information, such as login credentials (Man in the Browser | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
[T1185]). | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Additionally, some of TrickBot’s modules spread the malware laterally across a network by abusing the Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol. | [
"T1570"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
TrickBot operators have a toolset capable of spanning the entirety of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, from actively or passively gathering information that can be used to support targeting (Reconnaissance [TA0043]), to trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy systems and data (Impact [TA0040]). | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
TrickBot is capable of data exfiltration over a hardcoded C2 server, cryptomining, and host enumeration (e.g., reconnaissance of Unified Extensible Firmware Interface or Basic Input/Output System [UEFI/BIOS] firmware) (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | [
"T1041"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
[T1041], Resource Hijacking [T1496], System Information Discovery.[2] | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
For host enumeration, operators deliver TrickBot in modules containing a configuration file with specific tasks. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Figure 1 lays out TrickBot’s use of enterprise techniques. Figure 1: MITRE ATT&CK enterprise techniques used by TrickBot MITRE ATT&CK Techniques According to MITRE, TrickBot [S0266] uses the ATT&CK techniques listed in table 1. Table 1: TrickBot ATT&CK techniques for | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
enterprise Initial Access | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
[TA0001] Technique Title ID Use Phishing: | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware. | [
"T1566.001"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 TrickBot has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails. | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Execution [TA0002] Technique Title ID Use Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled | [] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
Task T1053.005 TrickBot creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence. | [
"T1053.005"
] | AA21076A TrickBot Malware |
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