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An example output from a system that does not have a vulnerable version of ffmpeg.dll installed: Fig.15 CAR script output CAR can also be leveraged to remediate this vulnerability. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
You need to execute this uninstallation script provided by Qualys. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
This script checks for 3CX Desktop App’s vulnerable version 18.12.407.0 & 18.12.416.0 for Windows. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
If any of these versions are installed on the system, the script will attempt to uninstall the vulnerable application. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Fig.16 CAR script for remediation You can also create dashboards for better visualization. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Fig.17 CAR dashboard for 3CX Qualys Multi-Vector EDR customers are protected against this threat as both the installer and the beacon are detected and will be remediated. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
(Note: our instance was set to audit-only mode for analysis.) | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Fig.18 EPP Scan Results Fig.19 Epp Detection for shellcode loader Multi-Vector EDR customers can also hunt through telemetry, looking for behavior indicators to identify this threat activity. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
A first step would look for instances where the 3cxdesktopapp.exe process executed in the environment using a QQL Query of process.name:”3xcdesktopapp.exe”. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Here you would want to look for evidence of the ffmpeg.dll file being loaded, which would be indicative that this machine may be impacted by this campaign. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Fig.20 EDR Behavioral Detection Telemetry Fig.21 EDR Shellcode Loader Detection Fig.22 Loaded malicious ffmpeg.dll telemetry While Qualys Endpoint Protection (EPP) users will be automatically protected by default, Qualys EDR-only customers can use the recently released auto-remediation feature to automatically take act... | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Conclusion Supply chain compromises are a growing concern for businesses, as they can lead to serious security breaches and financial losses. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
The attack was a multi-stage chain where attackers compromised a version of the 3CX VoIP desktop client, which was then used to target the company’s customers. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
This is reminiscent of the SolarWinds campaign that we examined back in December 2022. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Organizations should take immediate steps to stop using the vulnerable version of the software, apply patches and monitor for anomalous behavior in 3CX processes. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
It is also essential to enable behavioral monitoring to detect the presence of such attacks within the system. | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
MITRE TID Mapping TacticTechnique IDTechnique Name Resource Development T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware Resource Development T1587.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates Initial Access T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain Execution T1106 Native API Execution T1204.002 | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
User Execution: Malicious File Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Defense Evasion T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Defense Evasion T1497.003 Virtualization/San... | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Dead Drop Resolver Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol Collection T1005 Data from Local System Table.5 MITRE mapping IOCS ffmpeg.dll C485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02 7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896 c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9... | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
B86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadb | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Infostealer dll Cad1120d91b812acafef7175f949dd1b09c6c21a 7faea2b01796b80d180399040bb69835 GitHub Repository raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/IconStorages/images/main/ C2s akamaicontainer[.]com akamaitechcloudservices[.]com azuredeploystore[.]com azureonlinecloud[.]com azureonlinestorage[.]com dunamistrd[.]com glcloudservi... | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
Qualys Sabri Naoufal, Senior Malware Analyst, Qualys Mohammad Shabbir, Malware Analyst, Qualys Akshat Pradhan, Senior Engineer, Threat Research, Qualys | [] | 3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign |
On March 29, Crowdstrike published a report about a supply chain attack conducted via 3CXDesktopApp, a popular VoIP program. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Since then, the security community has started analyzing the attack and sharing their findings. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The following has been discovered so far: | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The infection is spread via 3CXDesktopApp MSI installers. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
An installer for macOS has also been trojanized. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The malicious installation package contains an infected dll library that decrypts a shellcode from the d3dcompiler_47.dll library’s overlay and executes it. | [
"T1140"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The decrypted payload extracts C2 server URLs from icons stored in a GitHub repository (the repository is removed). | [
"T1140"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The payload connects to one of the C2 servers, downloads an infostealer and starts it. | [
"T1105"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The infostealer collects system information and browser history, then sends it to the C2 server. | [
"T1041"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
As we reviewed available reports on the 3CX attack, we began wondering if the compromise concluded with the infostealer or further implants followed. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
To answer that question, we decided to review the telemetry we had on the campaign. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
On one of the machines, we observed a DLL named guard64.dll, which was loaded into the infected 3CXDesktopApp.exe process. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Interestingly enough, we opened an investigation into a case linked to that DLL on March 21, about a week before the supply chain attack was discovered. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
A DLL with that name was used in recent deployments of a backdoor that we dubbed “Gopuram” and had been tracking internally since 2020. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Three years ago, we were investigating an infection of a cryptocurrency company located in Southeast Asia. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
During the investigation, we found that Gopuram coexisted on victim machines with AppleJeus, a backdoor attributed to the Korean-speaking threat actor Lazarus. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Over the years, we observed few victims compromised with Gopuram, but the number of infections began to increase in March 2023. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
As it turned out, the increase was directly related to the 3CX supply chain attack. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
We found out that the threat actor specifically targeted cryptocurrency companies, dropping the following files on infected machines: C:\Windows\system32\wlbsctrl.dll, a malicious library (MD5: 9f85a07d4b4abff82ca18d990f062a84); C:\Windows\System32\config\TxR\<machine hardware profile GUID>.TxR.0.regtrans-ms, an encryp... | [
"T1027"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Once dropped, wlbsctrl.dll becomes loaded on every startup by the IKEEXT service via DLL hijacking. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
We further saw DLLs with the names ualapi.dll and ncobjapi.dll being sideloaded into spoolsv.exe and svchost.exe, respectively. | [
"T1574.002"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The wlbsctrl.dll library is responsible for decrypting and executing the shellcode stored in the C:\Windows\System32\config\TxR directory. | [
"T1140"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The decryption is notably performed through the CryptUnprotectData API function that uses a different encryption key internally on every machine. | [
"T1106"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
This makes it difficult for researchers to decrypt the payload from the file without physical access to the victim machines. | [
"T1140"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Snippet of the loading function using CryptUnprotectData The component loaded by the library is Gopuram’s main module. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
As mentioned above, its name in the export directory is guard64.dll. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The job of the main module is to connect to a C2 server and request commands. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The backdoor implements commands that allow the attackers to interact with the victim’s file system and create processes on the infected machine. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Gopuram was additionally observed to launch in-memory modules. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Just like the implants used in the 3CX campaign, Gopuram’s modules are DLL files that include an export function named DllGetClassObject. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
We have observed eight modules so far: Module name Description Ping Pings a host specified in the argument. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Connect Connects to a given host via a socket and waits for the server to send data. | [
"T1095"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Registry Manipulates registry (lists, adds, deletes and exports keys). | [
"T1112"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Service Manipulates (creates, lists, starts, stops and deletes) services. | [
"T1543.003"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Timestomp Performs timestomping on files. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Inject Performs payload injections through syscalls via mapping a shellcode to a remote process and creating a remote thread. | [
"T1055"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
KDU Kernel Driver Utility that allows an attacker to bypass driver signature enforcement. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The utility is used to load an unsigned driver (MD5: F684E10FF1FFCDD32C62E73A11382896). | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The driver collects information about installed AV filters and writes it to the C:\Windows\System32\catroot2\edb.chk.log file. | [
"T1518.001"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Update Encrypts a provided payload | [
"T1027"
] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
and writes it to the C:\Windows\System32\config\TxR\<machine hardware profile GUID>.TxR.0.regtrans-ms file. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Net Partially implements features of the net command: management of users, groups, sessions and network shares. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The discovery of the new Gopuram infections allowed us to attribute the 3CX campaign to the Lazarus threat actor with medium to high confidence. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Our attribution is based on the following facts: While investigating an attack on a Southeast Asian cryptocurrency company in 2020, we found Gopuram coexisting on the same machine with the AppleJeus backdoor, which is attributed to Lazarus. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The Gopuram backdoor has been observed in attacks on cryptocurrency companies, which is aligned with the interests of the Lazarus threat actor. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
While looking for additional implants that used the same loader shellcode as the 3CX implants, we discovered a sample on a multiscanner service (MD5: 933508a9832da1150fcfdbc1ca9bc84c) loading a payload that uses the wirexpro[.]com C2 server. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The same server is listed as an IoC for an AppleJeus campaign by Malwarebytes. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
First bytes of the loader shellcode used in 3CX and AppleJeus Note, though, that the shellcode is based on open-source code that has been used by other threat actors, for example, SilentBreak. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Still, the use of that shellcode along with the 0xF558F4DA constant (which is the ROR13 hash for the string DllGetClassObject) is a more unique pattern. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
While investigating a malicious MSI file (MD5: ec3f99dd7d9dbce8d704d407b086e84f) that has been uploaded to a multiscanner service, we observed the following two events: The dll library dropped from the MSI was observed to launch an in-memory payload that contacts the oilycargo[.]com domain. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
This domain name has previously been attributed to Lazarus by multiple researchers. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
In our telemetry, we observed AvBugReport.exe, the executable hosting dll, to contain Gopuram’s main module payload, guard64.dll. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
These four facts allow us to conclude that Lazarus is likely the threat actor deploying the Gopuram backdoor. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
As for the victims in our telemetry, installations of the infected 3CX software are located all over the world, with the highest infection figures observed in Brazil, Germany, Italy and France. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
As the Gopuram backdoor has been deployed to less than ten infected machines, it indicates that attackers used Gopuram with surgical precision. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
We additionally observed that the attackers have a specific interest in cryptocurrency companies. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
As it turns out, the infostealer is not the only malicious payload deployed during the 3CX supply chain attack. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
The threat actor behind Gopuram additionally infects target machines with the full-fledged modular Gopuram backdoor. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
We believe that Gopuram is the main implant and the final payload in the attack chain. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Our investigation of the 3CX campaign is still far from complete. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
We will continue analyzing the deployed implants to find out more details about the toolset used in the supply chain attack. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Gopuram indicators of compromise MD5 hashes 9f85a07d4b4abff82ca18d990f062a84 96d3bbf4d2cf6bc452b53c67b3f2516a File paths C:\Windows\System32\config\TxR\<machine hardware profile GUID>.TxR.0.regtrans-ms C:\Windows\system32\catroot2\edb.chk.log More indicators of compromise and YARA rules for detecting Gopuram components... | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Contact intelreports@kaspersky.com for more details. | [] | Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack |
Original release date: July 19, 2021SummaryThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory was written by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to provide information on a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group known in open-source reporting as APT40. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
This advisory provides APT40’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help cybersecurity practitioners identify and remediate APT40 intrusions and established footholds. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
APT40—aka BRONZE MOHAWK, FEVERDREAM, G0065, Gadolinium, GreenCrash, Hellsing, Kryptonite Panda, Leviathan, MUDCARP, Periscope, Temp. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Periscope, and Temp. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Jumper—is located in Haikou, Hainan Province, People’s Republic of China (PRC), and has been active since at least 2009. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
APT40 has targeted governmental organizations, companies, and universities in a wide range of industries—including biomedical, robotics, and maritime research—across the United States, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and the South China Sea area, as well as industries included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
On July 19, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed an indictment against four APT40 cyber actors for their illicit computer network exploitation (CNE) activities via front company Hainan Xiandun Technology Development Company (Hainan Xiandun). | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Hainan Xiandun employee Wu Shurong cooperated with and carried out orders from PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) Hainan State Security Department (HSSD) intelligence officers Ding Xiaoyang, Zhu Yunmin, and Cheng Qingmin to conduct CNE. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Wu’s CNE activities resulted in the theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, and other high-value information from companies and organizations in the United States and abroad, as well as from multiple foreign governments. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
These MSS-affiliated actors targeted victims in the following industries: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, education, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, research institutes, and transportation (rail and shipping). | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Click here for a PDF version of this report. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
(Updated July 19, 2021) Click here for indicators of compromise (IOCs) in STIX format. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Note: to uncover malicious activity, incident responders search for IOCs in network- and host-based artifacts and assess the results—eliminating false positives during the assessment. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
For example, some MD5 IOCs in the STIX file identify legitimate tools—such as Putty, cmd.exe, svchost.exe, etc.—as indicators of compromise. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Although the tools themselves are not malicious, APT 40 attackers placed and used them from non-standard folders on victim systems during computer intrusion activity. | [
"T1105"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
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