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If a legitimate tool is identified by an incident responder, then the location of the tool should be assessed to eliminate false positives or uncover malicious activity. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
See Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more incident handling guidance. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Technical DetailsThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: framework, version 9. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
See the ATT&CK for Enterprise framework for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
APT40 | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[G0065] has used a variety of tactics and techniques and a large library of custom and open-source malware—much of which is shared with multiple other suspected Chinese groups—to establish initial access via user and administrator credentials, enable lateral movement once inside the network, and locate high value asset... | [
"T1005",
"T1078"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Table 1 provides details on these tactics and techniques. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Note: see the appendix for a list of the domains, file names, and malware MD5 hash values used to facilitate this activity. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Table 1: APT40 | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques Tactics Activities and Techniques Reconnaissance [TA0043] and Resource Development [TA0042] Gathered victim identity information [T1589] by collecting compromised credentials [T1589.001] Acquire infrastructure | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1583] to establish domains that impersonate legitimate entities [T1583.001], aka ‘typosquatting’, to use in watering hole attacks and as command and control (C2) | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0011] infrastructure Establish new [T1585.002] and compromise existing [T1586.002] email and social media accounts | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[1585.001] to conduct social engineering attacks Initial Access | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0001] External remote services (e.g., virtual private network | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[VPN] services) | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1133] Spearphishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and links [T1566.002] Drive-by compromises | [
"T1566.001"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1189] and exploitation of public-facing applications [T1190] Access to valid | [
"T1078",
"T1190"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1078], compromised administrative [T1078.001] accounts Execution | [
"T1078"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0002] Command and scripting interpreters | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1059] such as PowerShell [T1059.001] Exploitation of software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1203] using lure documents that dropped malware exploiting various Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) | [
"T1204.002"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
User execution | [
"T1204.002"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1204] of malicious files [T1204.002] and links | [
"T1204.002"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1566.002] attached to spearphishing emails [T1566.001] Persistence [TA0003], Privilege Escalation [TA0004], Credential Access | [
"T1566.001"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0006], Discovery [TA0007], and Lateral Movement | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0008] APT40 has used a combination of tool frameworks and malware to establish persistence, escalate privileges, map, and move laterally on victim networks. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Additionally, APT40 conducted internal spearphishing attacks [T1534]. BADFLICK/Greencrash China Chopper [S0020] Cobalt Strike [S0154] Derusbi/PHOTO [S0021] Gh0stRAT | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[S0032] GreenRAT jjdoor/Transporter jumpkick Murkytop (mt.exe) | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[S0233] NanHaiShu [S0228] Orz/AirBreak [S0229] PowerShell Empire | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[S0363] PowerSploit | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[S0194] Server software component: Web Shell [TA1505.003] Defense Evasion | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0005], Command and Control | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[TA0011], Collection [TA0009], and Exfiltration [TA0010] Use of steganography [T1027.003] to hide stolen data inside other files stored on GitHub Protocol impersonation | [
"T1027"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1001.003] by using Application Programming Interface (API) keys for Dropbox accounts in commands to upload stolen data to make it appear that the activity was a legitimate use of the Dropbox service Protocol tunneling [T1572] and multi-hop proxies | [
"T1090"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1090.003], including the use of Tor [S0183] Use of domain typosquatting for C2 infrastructure [T1583.001] Archive [T1560], encrypt [T1532], and stage collected data locally | [
"T1074.001"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
[T1074.001] and remotely [T1074.002] for exfiltration Exfiltration over C2 channel [T1041] MitigationsNetwork Defense-in-Depth Proper network defense-in-depth and adherence to information security best practices can assist in mitigating the threat and reducing the risk. | [
"T1041"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
The following guidance may assist organizations in developing network defense procedures. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Patch and Vulnerability Management Install vendor-provided and verified patches on all systems for critical vulnerabilities, prioritizing timely patching of internet-connected servers and software processing internet data—such as web browsers, browser plugins, and document readers. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Ensure proper migrating steps or compensating controls are implemented for vulnerabilities that cannot be patched in a timely manner. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Routinely audit configuration and patch management programs to ensure the ability to track and mitigate emerging threats. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Implementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors’ operations and protect resources and information systems. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Review the articles in the References section for more information on Chinese APT exploitation of common vulnerabilities. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Protect Credentials Strengthen credential requirements, regularly change passwords, and implement multi-factor authentication to protect individual accounts, particularly for webmail and VPN access and for accounts that access critical systems. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Do not reuse passwords for multiple accounts. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Audit all remote authentications from trusted networks or service providers. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Detect mismatches by correlating credentials used within internal networks with those employed on external-facing systems. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Log use of system administrator commands such as net, ipconfig, and ping. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Enforce principle of least privilege. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Network Hygiene and Monitoring Actively scan and monitor internet-accessible applications for unauthorized access, modification, and anomalous activities. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Actively monitor server disk use and audit for significant changes. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Log Domain Name Service (DNS) queries and consider blocking all outbound DNS requests that do not originate from approved DNS servers. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Monitor DNS queries for C2 over DNS. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Develop and monitor the network and system baselines to allow for the identification of anomalous activity. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Audit logs for suspicious behavior. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Identify and suspend access of users exhibiting unusual activity. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Use allowlist or baseline comparison to monitor Windows event logs and network traffic to detect when a user maps a privileged administrative share on a Windows system. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Leverage multi-sourced threat-reputation services for files, DNS, URLs, IP addresses, and email addresses. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Network device management interfaces—such as Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), Winbox, and HTTP—should be turned off for wide area network (WAN) interfaces and secured with strong passwords and encryption when enabled. | [
"T1027"
] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
When possible, segment critical information on air-gapped systems. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Use strict access control measures for critical data. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
APPENDIX: | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
APT40 Indicators of Compromise APT40 used the following domains, file names, and malware MD5 hash values to facilitate the CNE activity outlined in this CSA between 2009 through 2018. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Domains airbusocean[.]com https://pastebin[.]com/vfb5mbbu pacifichydrologic[.]org cargillnotice[.]com huntingtomingalls[.]com philippinenewss[.]com ccidmeekparry[.]info indiadigest[.]in philstarnotice[.]com ccvzvhjhdf[.]website jack-newnb[.]com porndec143.chickenkiller[.]com cdigroups[.]com kAty197.chickenkiller[.]com ... | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
For example, some MD5 IOCs in the table below identify legitimate tools—such as PuTTY, cmd.exe, svchost.exe, etc.—as indicators of compromise. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
01234c0e41fc23bb5e1946f69e6c6221 018d3c34a296edd32e1b39b7276dcf7f 019b68e26df8750e2f9f580b150b7293 01fa52a4f9268948b6c508fef0377299 022bd2040ec0476d8eb80d1d9dc5cc92 039d9ca446e79f2f4310dc7dcc60ec55 043f6cdca33ce68b1ebe0fd79e4685af 04918772a2a6ccd049e42be16bcbee39 04dc4ca70f788b10f496a404c4903ac6 060067666435370e0289d4a... | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
67dbecfb5e0f2f729e57d0f1eda82c67 685cbba8cf2584a3378d82dec65aa0bb | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
693a4c2fcaa67fb87e62f150fb65e00e 6ad33ab8b9ff3f02964a8aab2a40ebb5 6b540be7ac7159104b0ffa536747f1bf 6b7276e4aa7a1e50735d2f6923b40de4 6b930be55ed4bf8e16b30eadc3873dfd 6c67f275d50f6bfee4848de6d4911931 6c9cfada134ede220b75087c7698ebf2 6e843ef4856336fe3ef4ed27a4c792b1 6e97bf1b7c44edc66622b43e81105779 86e50d6dc28283dbd295079... | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov. References DOJ Press Release Talos Intelligence: | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
China Chopper Still Active | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
9 Years Later CISA China Cyber Threat Overview webpage CISA Alert TA15-314A: Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance CISA Alert AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities CISA Alert AA20-275A: | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Potential for China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.-China Tensions NSA Cybersecurity Advisory U/OO/179811-20: Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities Revisions July 19, 2021: | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Initial version Updated July 19, 2021: Added note and STIX file This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. | [] | AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department |
Operation Spalax: | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
Targeted malware attacks in Colombia url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/01/12/operation-spalax-targeted-malware-attacks-colombia/ ESET researchers uncover attacks targeting Colombian government institutions and private companies, especially from the energy and metallurgical industries | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
In 2020 ESET saw several attacks targeting Colombian entities exclusively. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
These attacks are still ongoing at the time of writing and are focused on both government institutions and private companies. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
For the latter, the most targeted sectors are energy and metallurgical. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
The attackers rely on the use of remote access trojans, most likely to spy on their victims. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
They have a large network infrastructure for command and control: ESET observed at least 24 different IP addresses in use in the second half of 2020. | [
"T1090"
] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
These are probably compromised devices that act as proxies for their C&C servers. | [
"T1090"
] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
This, combined with the use of dynamic DNS services, means that their infrastructure never stays still. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
We have seen at least 70 domain names active in this timeframe | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
and they register new ones on a regular basis. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
The attackers The attacks we saw in 2020 share some TTPs with previous reports about groups targeting Colombia, but also differ in many ways, thus making attribution difficult. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
One of those reports was published in February 2019, by QiAnXin researchers. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
The operations described in that blogpost are connected to an APT group active since at least April 2018. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
We have found some similarities between those attacks and the ones that we describe in this article: We saw a malicious sample included in IoCs of QiAnXin’s report and a sample from the new campaign in the same government organization. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
These files have fewer than a dozen sightings each. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
Some of the phishing emails from the current campaign were sent from IP addresses corresponding to a range that belongs to Powerhouse Management, a VPN service. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
The same IP address range was used for emails sent in the earlier campaign. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
The phishing emails have similar topics and pretend to come from some of the same entities – for example, the Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalia General de la Nacion) or the National Directorate of Taxes and Customs (DIAN). | [
"T1566.001"
] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
Some of the C&C servers in Operation Spalax use linkpc.net and publicvm.com subdomains, along with IP addresses that belong to Powerhouse Management. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
This also happened in the earlier campaign. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
However, there are differences in the attachments used for phishing emails, the remote access trojans (RATs) used and in most of the operator’s C&C infrastructure. | [
"T1566.001"
] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
There is also this report from Trend Micro, from July 2019. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
There are similarities between the phishing emails and parts of the network infrastructure in that campaign and the one we describe here. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
The attacks described in that article were connected to cybercrime, not espionage. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
While we have not seen any payload delivered by the attackers other than RATs, some of the targets in the current campaign (such as a lottery agency) don’t make much sense for spying activities. | [] | Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia |
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