sentence stringlengths 1 13.5k | labels listlengths 0 15 | doc_title stringclasses 84
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[T1112], Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
[T1140], Disable or Modify System Firewall | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
[T1562.004], Windows Service [T1543.003], DLL Search Order Hijacking [T1574.001], Group Policy Modification | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
[T1484.001] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Ne... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Impossible Traveler CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Host Firewall Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Res... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: System Network Configuration Discovery [T1016], | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
System Information Discovery [T1082], Domain Account | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
[T1087.002] CORTEX XDR Cortex XDR monitors for behavioral events along a causality chain to identify discovery behaviors Lateral Movement | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Remote Desktop Protocol | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
[T1021.001] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for i... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned and set to appropriate actions Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies ... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] CORTEX XDR Monitors for behavioral events via BIOCs including the creation of zip archives Command and Control The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Remote Access Software [T1219], | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Encrypted Channel [T1573] CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block URL Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block IP NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure that the Certificate used for Decryption is Trusted Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Inhibit System Recovery [T1490] CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Ransomware Manual for incident response. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Palo Alto Networks Endpoint Malware Investigation Conclusion Black Basta ransomware operators have been active since at least April 2022. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Although their RaaS has only been active for the past couple of months it had compromised at least 75 organizations at the time of this publication. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Due to the high-profile nature and steady stream of Black Basta attacks identified globally in 2022, the operators and/or affiliates behind the service likely will continue to attack and extort organizations. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Palo Alto Networks helps detect and prevent Black Basta ransomware in the following ways: WildFire: | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
All known samples are identified as malware. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Cortex XDR: Identifies indicators associated with Black Basta. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Anti-Ransomware Module blocks Black Basta encryption behaviors on Windows. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Local Analysis detection for Black Basta binaries on Windows and Linux. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Behavioral Threat Prevention prevents Black Basta behaviors. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Next-Generation Firewalls: | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
DNS Signatures detect the known C2 domains, which are also categorized as malware in Advanced URL Filtering. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200. Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file sam... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Additional Resources Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Amidst the ever-changing threat landscape, new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) seem to emerge daily, creating extreme challenges for security teams. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The broad range of attack methods utilized by attackers seems to present an insurmountable problem: how do you defend against a playbook that does not yet exist?Faced with the growing number of novel and uncommon attack methods, it is essential for organizations to adopt a security solution able to detect threats based... | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
In March 2023, Darktrace observed an emerging trend in the use of an application known as ‘PerfectData Software’ for probable malicious purposes in several Microsoft 365 account takeovers. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Using its anomaly-based detection, Darktrace DETECT:trade_mark: was able to identify the activity chain surrounding the use of this application, potentially uncovering a novel piece of threat actor tradecraft in the process. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Microsoft 365 IntrusionsIn recent years, Microsoft’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) suite, Microsoft 365, along with its built-in identity and access management (IAM) service, Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), have been heavily targeted by threat actors due to their near-ubiquitous usage across industries. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Four out of every five Fortune 500 companies, for example, use Microsoft 365 services [1]. | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Malicious actors typically gain entry to organizations’ Microsoft 365 environments by abusing either stolen account credentials or stolen session cookies | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
[2]. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Once inside, actors can access sensitive data within mailboxes or SharePoint repositories, and send out emails or Teams messages. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
This activity can often result in serious financial harm, especially in cases where the malicious actor’s end-goal is to elicit fraudulent transactions. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Darktrace regularly observes malicious actors behaving in predictable ways once they gain access to customer Microsoft 365 environment. | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
One typical example is the creation of new inbox rules and sending deceitful emails intended to convince recipients to carry out subsequent actions, such as following a malicious link or providing sensitive information. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
It is also common for actors to register new applications in Azure AD so that they can be used to conduct follow-up activities, like mass-mailing or data theft. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The registration of applications in Azure AD therefore seems to be a relatively predictable threat actor behavior [3][4]. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Darktrace DETECT understands that unusual application registrations in Azure AD may constitute a deviation in expected behavior, and therefore a possible indicator of account compromise. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
These registrations of applications in Azure AD are evidenced by creations of, as well as assignments of permissions to, Service Principals in Azure AD. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Darktrace has detected a growing trend in actors creating and assigning permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Further investigation of this Azure AD activity revealed it to be part of an ongoing account takeover. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
‘PerfectData Software’ Activity Darktrace observed variations of the following pattern of activity relating to an application named ‘PerfectData Software’ within its customer base:Actor signs in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint associated with a Virtual Private Server (VPS) or Virtual Private Network (VPN) s... | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
In March 2023, Darktrace observed a malicious actor signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from a Kuwait-based IP address within the Autonomous System, AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o. | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
This IP address is associated with the VPN service, HMA VPN. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Over the next couple of days, an actor (likely the same malicious actor) signed in to the account several more times from two different Nigeria-based endpoints, as well as a VPS-related endpoint and a HMA VPN endpoint. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
During their login sessions, the actor performed a variety of actions. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
First, they created and assigned permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
This Service Principal creation represents the registration of an application called ‘PerfectData Software’ in Azure AD. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Although the reason for registering this application is unclear, within a few days the actor registered and granted permission to another application, ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’, and created a new inbox rule names ‘s’ on the mailbox of the hijacked account. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
This inbox rule moved emails meeting certain conditions to a folder named ‘RSS Subscription. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’ application was likely registered by the actor to facilitate mass-mailing activity. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Immediately after these actions, Darktrace detected the actor sending out thousands of malicious emails from the account. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The emails included an attachment named ‘Credit Transfer Copy.html’, which contained a suspicious link. | [
"T1566.001"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Further investigation revealed that the customer’s network had received several fake invoice emails prior to this initial intrusion activity. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Additionally, there was an unusually high volume of failed logins to the compromised account around the time of the initial access. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Figure 1: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account. | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
In a separate case also observed by Darktrace in March 2023, a malicious actor was observed signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint within the Autonomous System, AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON. | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The endpoint appears to be related to the VPN service, Surfshark VPN. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
This login was followed by several failed and successful logins from a VPS-related within the Autonomous System, AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The actor was then seen registering and assigning permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
As with the previous example, the motives for this registration are unclear. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The actor proceeded to log in several more times from a Surfshark VPN endpoint, however, they were not observed carrying out any further suspicious activity. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Figure 2: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
It was not clear in either of these examples, nor in fact any of cases observed by Darktrace, why actors had registered and assigned permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’, and there do not appear to be any open-source intelligence (OSINT) resources or online literature related to the malicious usa... | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
That said, there are several websites which appear to provide email migration and data recovery/backup tools under the moniker ‘PerfectData Software’. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
It is unclear whether the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ by malicious actors observed on the networks of Darktrace customers was one of these tools. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
However, given the nature of the tools, it is possible that the actors intended to use them to facilitate the exfiltration of email data from compromises mailboxes. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
If the legitimate software ‘PerfectData’ is the application in question in these incidents, it is likely being purchased and misused by attackers for malicious purposes. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
It is also possible the application referenced in the incidents is a spoof of the legitimate ‘PerfectData’ software designed to masquerade a malicious application as legitimate. | [
"T1036.005"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Darktrace CoverageCases of ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains detected by Darktrace typically began with an actor signing into an internal user’s Microsoft 365 account from a VPN or VPS-related endpoint. | [
"T1078"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
These login events, along with the suspicious email and/or brute-force activity which preceded them, caused the following DETECT models to breach:SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential UseSaaS / Access / Suspicious Login AttemptSaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Following Suspicious Login Attempt(... | [
"T1110"
] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Logic Following OAuth Grant SaaS / Admin / New Application Service | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
PrincipalIaaS / Admin / Azure Application Administration ActivitiesSaaS / Compliance / New Email RuleSaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email RuleSaaS / Email Nexus / Suspicious Internal Exchange ActivitySaaS / Email Nexus / Possible Outbound Email SpamSaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Outbound Email SpamSaa... | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
In cases where Darktrace RESPOND:trade_mark: was enabled in autonomous response mode, ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains resulted in breaches of the following RESPOND models:• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Significant Compliance Activity BlockIn response to th... | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
When applied autonomously, these RESPOND actions would seriously impede an attacker’s progress and minimize network disruption. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Figure 4: A RESPOND model breach created in response to a malicious actor's registration of 'PerfectData Software'In addition, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously investigate registrations of the ‘PerfectData Software’ application and summarized its findings into digestible reports. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event log showing AI Analyst autonomously pivoting off a breach of 'SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant' to uncover details of an account hijacking. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Conclusion Due to the widespread adoption of Microsoft 365 services in the workplace and continued emphasis on a remote workforce, account hijackings now pose a more serious threat to organizations around the world than ever before. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
The cases discussed here illustrate the tendency of malicious actors to conduct their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services, while also registering new applications, like PerfectData Software, with malicious intent. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
While it was unclear exactly why the malicious actors were using ‘PerfectData Software’ as part of their account hijacking, it is clear that either the legitimate or spoofed version of the application is becoming an very likely emergent piece of threat actor tradecraft. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
Darktrace DETECT’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allowed it to recognize that the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ represented a deviation in the SaaS user’s expected behavior. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
While Darktrace RESPOND, when enabled in autonomous response mode, was able to quickly take preventative action against threat actors, blocking the potential use of the application for data exfiltration or other nefarious purposes. | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
AppendicesMITRE ATT&CK MappingReconnaissance:• T1598 – Phishing for InformationCredential Access:• T1110 – Brute ForceInitial Access:• T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsCommand and Control:• T1105 – Ingress Tool TransferPersistence:• T1098.003 – Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles Collection:• T1114 ... | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
5.62.60[.]202 (AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o.) • 160.152.10[.]215 (AS37637 Smile-Nigeria-AS)• 197.244.250[.]155 (AS37705 TOPNET)• 169.159.92[.]36 (AS37122 SMILE)• 45.62.170[.]237 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)• 92.38.180[.]49 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A)• 129.56.36[.]26 (AS327952 AS-NATCOM)• 92.38.180[.]47 (AS202422 G-Co... | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
https://darktrace.com/blog/business-email-compromise-to-mass-phishing-campaign-attack-analysis[4] https://darktrace.com/blog/breakdown-of-a-multi-account-compromise-within-office-365 | [] | Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI |
StellarParticle is a campaign tracked by CrowdStrike as related to the SUNSPOT implant from the SolarWinds intrusion in December 2020 and associated with COZY BEAR (aka APT29, “The Dukes”). | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
The StellarParticle campaign has continued against multiple organizations, with COZY BEAR using novel tools and techniques to complete their objectives, as identified by CrowdStrike incident responders and the CrowdStrike Intelligence team. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
Browser cookie theft and Microsoft Service Principal manipulation are two of the novel techniques and tools leveraged in the StellarParticle campaign and are discussed in this blog. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
Two sophisticated malware families were placed on victim systems in mid-2019: a Linux variant of GoldMax and a new implant dubbed TrailBlazer. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
Supply chain compromises are an increasing threat that impacts a range of sectors, with threat actors leveraging access to support several motivations including financial gain (such as with the Kaseya ransomware attack) and espionage. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
Throughout 2020, an operation attributed to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) by the U.S. government was conducted to gain access to the update mechanism of the SolarWinds IT management software and use it to broaden their intelligence collection capabilities. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
This activity is tracked by CrowdStrike as the StellarParticle campaign and is associated with the COZY BEAR adversary group. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
This blog discusses the novel tactics and techniques leveraged in StellarParticle investigations conducted by CrowdStrike. | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
These techniques include: Credential hopping for obscuring lateral movement Office 365 (O365) Service Principal and Application hijacking, impersonation and manipulation Stealing browser cookies for bypassing multifactor authentication Use of the TrailBlazer implant and the Linux variant of GoldMax malware Credential t... | [] | Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign |
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