sentence stringlengths 1 13.5k | labels listlengths 0 15 | doc_title stringclasses 84
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“Mary tax docs.pdf.lnk”, along with another clean Microsoft Office file, “R&P Sales Summary.docx”, are included in an archived file labeled “2022 tax docs.zip”. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Running the link file triggers the download and execution of “doc.pdf” from “hxxp://datacenter11[.]myftp[.]org/notepad/”. | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The “doc.pdf” is actually a VBA file that uses PowerShell to pull and run “hxxp://datacenter11[.]myftp[.]org/met/a[.]mp3”. | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
While the “a.mp3” is not available for investigation, OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) indicates that the XWorm malware is likely delivered to the victim’s machine. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
XWorm From the evidence that FortiGuard Labs accumulated during our research, we have high confidence that the 2022%20tax_documents[.]zip file we initially analyzed delivers the XWorm. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
XWorm is a commodity RAT (Remote Access Trojan) reportedly sold in underground forums for $30 to $150. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
XWorm supports typical RAT functions, such as taking screenshots, keylogging, and taking control of a compromised machine by abusing Virtual Network Computing (VNC), a technique infamously known as Hidden VNC (HVNC). | [
"T1056.001",
"T1113"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
XWorm can also encrypt files, essentially acting in a similar fashion to ransomware. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Here are screenshots of a recently cracked version of XWorm v3.1: Figure 5. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Leaked cracked version of XWorm v3.1 Figure 6. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Some of the functionalities supported by XWorm v3.1 Figure 7. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Download page of the cracked version of XWorm v.3.1 Going back to the first example, “2022%20tax_documents[.]zip”, we found that it was hosted on the open directory “www[.]farmaciasmv[.]com/citrix/”. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
We also found another page on the same domain likely used for phishing hxxp://farmaciasmv[.]com/sharefile/citrix/2022%20taxes[.]html. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The files involved in this attack were submitted to VirusTotal. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
We don’t believe victims just wander into such malicious sites by accident. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Based on our experience, they were likely lured via malicious links in spam emails. | [
"T1204.002"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Manual interactions are required up until the files inside the zip file are extracted, and the link file is manually run. | [
"T1204.002"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The basic security practice of not opening files from unknown sources can prevent infection and the damages that follow. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Dual Malware Wielding Another tax-related attack FortiGuard Labs came across is an image file named “TaxReturn2022.img” (SHA2: 6658d4b14f0093a2fccd2f57b5bf9fa18d09cda5d42036f280b41e5beb1ff2fe) that contains the following files: | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
TaxReturn2022.pdf.lnk (SHA2: 180a79cff5ef91ecd744a35b2e433d0a4aae0e4d3b87c40e8e51f5ca02aac4d6) TaxReturns2022.pdf.lnk (SHA2: fa862d43a85a9ea6f046f3edc743b897bba86348c04b8d62ba6eb27f951edf55) TaxReturns2022.zip (SHA2: c4599d4270ba8ef58fb8f1219ecff864acd83145c368ada9406a341d6f4a4fbf) | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
We were able to locate another file, “TaxReturns2022.iso” (SHA2: bb7138a106ee2e0a384896316679c750e3287b51fc16a5e65ccd1e44911162d6), that contains identical files. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Figure 8. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Contents of TaxReturn2022.img Figure 9. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Contents of TaxReturns2022.iso Unfortunately, the infection vector for both files has not been identified, but the likely attack avenue is an email containing malicious attachments and links. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The TaxReturns2022.zip file within both archives is password-protected with an unknown password, and its contents cannot be extracted. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
As with the previous example, “TaxReturn2022.pdf.lnk” has a PDF icon. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
However, it’s a link (shortcut) file, as seen in Figure 4. | [
"T1204.002"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Manually executing the lnk file triggers the download of wed.hta from hxxp://179.43.175[.]187/pqpf/ and saves it as %USERAPPDATA%\wed.hta (SHA2: 0cbaf95b9d4df27442d753dc4cb600eda0a7ecb95e4071f380f69f5f3c89adb1). | [
"T1105",
"T1204.002"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The downloaded file is an HTA web file containing VBScript code for the next action and a lot of junk code. | [
"T1027"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
It eventually runs: powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
UnRestricted [powershell code This PowerShell code is designed to execute whatever was downloaded. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
In this case, it downloads “TaxReturn2022.pdf” from hxxp://179.43.175[.]187/pqpf/, saves it as %USERAPPDATA%\TaxReturn2022.pdf, and opens it. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Unfortunately, this PDF file is a clean decoy file that also requires an unidentified password to open. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The PowerShell code sets the following registry entry to open the downloaded PDF file every time the computer boots and adds the HIDDEN file attribute to the file: | [
"T1547.001",
"T1564.001"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\iXqrVo = | [
"T1547.001"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
[location of downloaded PDF file] | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
This behavior led us to believe that the threat actor behind this attack relies on templates and uses them without really knowing what they are because there is no valid reason to open a decoy PDF file at every startup, and adding the HIDDEN file attribute is usually reserved for executables and DLLs. | [
"T1564.001"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The script then sleeps five seconds before downloading and executing whatever has been downloaded. | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
In this case, it downloads TCywxTOvZk.wsf from hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/ and saves it as %USERAPPDATA%\TCywxTOvZk.wsf (SHA2: 351b0514feaa6a2fc21af25ad7c6c9bed93e38ef896d3fb6c8633924d8615e2d). | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Note that part of the IP address masked as the directory is accessible. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
TCywxTOvZk.wsf has only three meaningful lines of code out of almost 2840 lines and downloads and runs hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/no[.]txt (SHA2: d7c63c4d488918aa09fcbd2012d041ed440377af51a87e757c40df3725b1eb07). | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
no.txt contains VBScript code that downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/j[.]png (SHA2: 460d093a55b930e733c60575f82183cd0edd52ec6b927cdb4a93dc5da7f0ac9c), which is a PowerShell script that creates the following files: C:\ProgramData\Document\py.ps1 C:\ProgramData\schtasks\Microsoft.bat C:\ProgramData\Doc... | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The .ps1 file contains two PE files (stored in $apprun and $appme). | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
It uses 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe' to reflectively load $apprun, which then loads $appme, which was identified as an ASync RAT variant that connects to the attacker’s Command-and-Control (C2) server located at nulled2nd[.]camdvr[.]org:6666. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
We also found another .lnk file (SHA2: c0a59b28919282b3c45a9619410ea95e35f86dbf43266e6f9a25b94f5948018b) hidden in TaxReturns2022.pdf.iso (SHA2: ee1299f4e56c7f5af243df63192f1c7574152c0600edc49c37b9f8b703da02f2). | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
This link file goes through the same infection chain as the previous one: | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The link file downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/xa[.]hta xa[.]hta downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/qDxcmqPPmI[.]wsf qDxcmqPPmI.wsf was not available at the time of the investigation. | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
However, OSINT led us to find the next action. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
qDxcmqPPmI[.]wsf downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/no[.]txt no[.]txt downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/j[.]png j.png creates py.ps1 and x.ps1. | [
"T1105"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
It also creates and runs Microsoft.bat Microsoft.bat runs py.ps1, which eventually installs Async RAT on the compromised machine Curiously the attacker left the hosting location of the malicious files wide open. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Figure 10. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Files hosted on the attacker’s open directory | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The directory contains a few files whose names are associated with Adobe Acrobat Reader DC. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
This indicates that the threat actor also leverages Adobe as a lure to install the AsyncRAT variant. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
readerdc64_en_l_cra_mdr_install_update.exe[.]lnk (SHA2: 653fcea661d8f7d996210dcdbcad110f0dcca8e7bbc906bb0a4d12e3ab674483) readerdc64_en_l_cra_mdr_install_update[.]exe (SHA2: 1b012d01c86be5d68959504d362c52170b27d726cf2943e2e0250506a29c765a) – this is a legitimate Adobe Acrobat Reader DC installer. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
reader64[.]hta (SHA2: 3b2e776ab44a711a52de88b02c007897eed137b62ecc7fb51bbb3089941bda1a) readerdc64_en_ka_cra_mdr_install_update[.]wsf (SHA2: d2f0995f9184170386360d5eb5990e38a289052e6a15706613c9568a207da7d7) AsyncRAT contains features designed to steal information from compromised machines and a clipper feature that mon... | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
But however potential victims end up with the “TaxReturn2022.img” and “TaxReturns2022.pdf.iso” files on their system, users still need to manually mount them and run the fake PDFs to trigger the infection chain. | [
"T1204.002"
] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
A little caution can go a long way toward protecting yourself against tax-related malware. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Conclusion The attacks covered in this blog are the tip of the iceberg. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Attackers make every attempt to scam taxpayers for financial gain and data exfiltration for future attacks. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
In the end, those looking to save a dime, in this case, from Uncle Sam, often find that greed endangers them in the cyber world. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
For additional information, please refer to the “Tax Scams/Consumer Alerts” alert issued by the IRS for other tips on protecting yourself from tax-related scams. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Fortinet Protection FortiGuard AntiVirus detects the malicious files identified in this report with the following signatures: JS/Agent.7593!tr JS/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
GDRU!tr LNK/Agent.1eb5!tr.dldr LNK/Agent.3aad!tr.dldr LNK/Agent.412e!tr.dldr LNK/Agent.9982181!tr LNK/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
BF20!tr LNK/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
FF8D!tr PowerShell/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
E67B!tr VBS/Agent.5247!tr.dldr VBS/Agent.9FA6!tr VBS/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
E67C!tr.dldr VBS/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
XAO!tr VBS/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
YNQ!tr VBS/Agent. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
YNY!tr.dldr W32/PasswordProtected.829D!tr The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Customers running current AntiVirus updates are protected. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service detects the download URLs cited in this report as Malicious and blocks them. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Due to the ease of disruption, damage to daily operations, potential impact to an organization's reputation, and the unwanted destruction or release of PII, etc., it is essential to keep all AV and IPS signatures current. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
If you believe this or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your organization, please contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team. | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
IOCs File IOCs: Network IOCs | [] | Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large |
Executive Summary Black Basta is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in April 2022. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
However, evidence suggests that it has been in development since February. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The Black Basta operator(s) use the double extortion technique, meaning that in addition to encrypting files on the systems of targeted organizations and demanding ransom to make decryption possible, they also maintain a dark web leak site where they threaten to post sensitive information if an organization chooses not... | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Black Basta affiliates have been very active deploying Black Basta and extorting organizations since the ransomware first emerged. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Although the Black Basta affiliates have only been active for the past couple of months, based on the information posted on their leak site, they have compromised over 75 organizations at the time of this publication. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Unit 42 has also worked on several Black Basta incident response cases. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The ransomware is written in C++ and impacts both Windows and Linux operating systems. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
It encrypts users’ data using a combination of ChaCha20 and RSA-4096, and to speed up the encryption process, the ransomware encrypts in chunks of 64 bytes, with 128 bytes of data remaining unencrypted between the encrypted regions. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The faster the ransomware encrypts, the more systems can potentially be compromised before defenses are triggered. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
It is a key factor affiliates look for when joining a Ransomware-as-a-Service group. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Palo Alto Networks customers receive help with detection and prevention of Black Basta ransomware through the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security services such as WildFire). | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
If you think you may have been impacted by a cyber incident, the Unit 42 Incident Response team is available 24/7/365. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
You can also take preventative steps by requesting any of our cyber risk management services. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Table of Contents Black Basta Overview Black Basta is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that leverages double extortion as part of its attacks. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The attackers not only execute ransomware but also exfiltrate sensitive data and threaten to release it publicly if the ransom demands are not met. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
The threat actors behind the ransomware deploy a name-and-shame approach to their victim, where they use a Tor site, Basta News, to list all of the victims who have not paid the ransom. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Although the Black Basta RaaS has only been active for a couple of months, according to its leak site, it had compromised over 75 organizations at the time of this publication. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
At least 20 victims were posted to its leak site in the first two weeks of the ransomware’s operation, which indicates the group likely is experienced in the ransomware business and has a steady source of initial access. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
It is also possible that this is not a new operation but rather a rebrand of a previous ransomware group that brought along their affiliates. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Based on multiple similarities in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) - victim-shaming blogs, recovery portals, negotiation tactics, and how quickly Black Basta amassed its victims - that the Black Basta group could include current or former members of the Conti group. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
Unit 42 has observed the Black Basta ransomware group using QBot as an initial point of entry and to move laterally in compromised networks. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
QBot, also known as Qakbot, is a Windows malware strain that started as a banking trojan and evolved into a malware dropper. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
It has been used by other ransomware groups, including MegaCortex, ProLock, DoppelPaymer and Egregor. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
While these ransomware groups used QBot for initial access, the Black Basta group was observed using it for both initial access and to spread laterally throughout the network. | [] | Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware |
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