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PSYOP 10.pdf | otection, with only one mention of concealing trench works in the defense to set the
stage for an “ambuscade.”14 The 1910 edition eliminates much of the discussion on
perfidy and wrongful deception, and increases the mentions of surprise and concealment.
However, discussion of deceiving the enemy is limited to cryptic ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | espondents.18
The 1923 edition breaks from the preceding editions, representing the hard
learned lessons of World War I. The manual introduces the concept of
counterinformation, that is, the measures designed to prevent the adversary from gaining
information on friendly capabilities, dispositions, and plans. Counterinf... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | l Funston’s use of enemy uniforms during the Philippine Insurrection.
14 War Department, Field Service Regulations.1905, 102.
15 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1910 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1910), 76.
16 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | river crossings.21 While still insignificant in the context
of the entirety of the manual, the inclusion of deception concepts indicates some lessons
learned during World War I, such as General Pershing’s use of deception during the
offensive against the Saint Mihiel salient, were taken to heart.22
B. WORLD WAR II ERA... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | operations manual, now FM 100-5: Tentative
Field Service Regulations: Operations, establishes deception’s role in support of surprise,
stating: “The effect of surprise is dependent on… the effectiveness of the means
employed to deceive the enemy of our own dispositions and intentions.”23 The cover
aspect of deception ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a
19 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1923 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1924).
20 War Department, Field Service Regulations. 1923, 77.
21 War Department, Field Service Regulations. 1923, 118.
22 See Chapter VI for further discussion of the Saint Mihiel deception operation.... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | re, the manual states:
The attack [emphasis in original] on the enemy is made by surprise
obtained by deception and ambush…. By feint and demonstration… by
spreading false information, the attacker attempts to mislead the
enemy….26
In the 1941 edition, now FM 100-5: Field Service Regulations, the term
counterinformatio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ingenious and
resourceful in the use of tactical stratagems [sic] and ruses often will find methods of
deceiving or misleading the enemy and of concealing his own intentions.”28 Of note is
the inclusion of several examples of deception techniques: e.g., feints, demonstrations,
fake concentrations, and dummies. However,... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ncorporation of deception across the manual, there are two notable
25 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations, 42.
26 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations, 1939, 228 – 229.
27 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations of Operations, ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on partisan
warfare, which replaces the 1939 section on guerrilla warfare, is devoid of deception.
Second, in opposition to the overall tenor of deception as a useful tool, the manual seems
to undercut the utility of deception in the offense stating:
The degree of surprise attained is dependent in a large measure on t... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ield Manual of Military
Intelligence Counterintelligence expands the guidance of FM 100-5 with sections on each
of the aspects of counterintelligence. Though the section on tactical measures—feints,
demonstrations, and ruses—is unfortunately a verbatim repeat of the section in FM 100-
5, the counterintelligence manual ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ill act on the assumption the enemy has been deceived.
FM 21-45: Basic Field Manual of Protective Measures, Individuals and Small
Units, published in 1942, provides further guidance on concealment at the Soldier and
unit levels; as well as, reinforcement of the vital necessity to protect military information.
Notably, ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ur pockets for letters, memoranda, orders, souvenirs, or keepsakes
which might disclose your organization.32
Additionally, while cover at this time is coupled with deception, the War
Department and later the U.S. Army have published a separate manual for camouflage
since at least 1940. Despite being treated separately ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on, to surprise, to mislead the enemy, and to prevent him from
inflicting damage upon us. Concealment includes hiding from view,
making hard to see clearly, arranging obstructions to vision, deceiving and
disguising, and deception involving sound.35
C. POST WORLD WAR II THROUGH VIETNAM
While the 1944 edition of FM 100-... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | sibly
reflects the shift of deception proponency from the Joint Security Control to the Army
32 War Department, Field Manual 21-45: Basic Field Manual of Protective Measures, Individuals and
Small Units (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 137.
33 War Department, Field Manual 5-20: Engineer Field Manual ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rations Division. The lack of detail on the execution of deception is
perhaps best explained by a training memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Army
Field Forces to the commanders of the Armor, Infantry, and Artillery Centers. This
declassified memorandum reveals the intent of the Army to keep the lessons learned... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | l Warfare
was established in 1951, cover and deception were not included in the scope of the
office’s operations.39 In 1954, proponency for deception was assigned to the Ground
General School, specifically to the Aggressor Center at Fort Riley, Kansas.40 This
decision was the General Staff’s halfhearted response to a r... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | th the apex of discussion of deception activities within the capstone
document and the beginnings of deception’s dismemberment. This iteration of FM 100-5
38 Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Strategic and Tactical Cover and Deception Training
(Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, 1948).
39 Alfred Paddock J... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nFormat=1f , 1-3.
41 U.S. Department of the Army. General Staff, G-3, “Combat Deception,” (1954), Photocopy from
U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.
14
separates active deception from counterintelligence into a distinct three page section on
“combat deception” that includes subsections on the importance... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | n from the security aspects of cover. Furthermore, while deception is
still considered a tool of surprise, a new principle of war, economy of force, admonishes
that deception—along with limited attacks, retrogrades, and the defense—is only to be
used in non-critical areas in support of the concentration of forces at th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ctively placing it, and therefore detailed deception guidance, out of reach of much of
the force. As a consequence of the manual’s publication, the 1962 iteration of FM 100-5
truncates the section on military deception to two paragraphs on the utility of deception
that close with a reference to FM 31-40. At the same ti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ield Manual 100-5: 1954, 47.
44 Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders no. 20 (Alexandria, VA: Department of the
Army, 1955), www.armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/go5520.pdf.. The aggressor cadre was a permanent
opposing force designed to provide realism to Army training exercises. The aggressor cadre was equi... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | The 1968 version of FM 100-5,
Operations of Army Forces in the Field repeats the short section on deception and a
reference to FM 31-40. However, missing from this edition of FM 100-5 is any reference
to dedicated deception units as combat support elements; instead, tactical cover and
deception is listed as a task of e... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | from the company to division
level, with the stated intent of encouraging commanders to include cover and deception in
their planning process.50 In 1973 an update was drafted but not published. Currently none
of the editions of FM 31-40 are available for examination, though an idea of their
contents can be drawn from ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ashington, DC: Department of the Army, 1959), 55 – 57.
47 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1962, 39.
48 This shift occurred prior to the still classified 1965 U.S. Army Combat Development Command
report titled “Army Requirements for Tactical Deception.”
49 The official changes are noted on the ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | anning consideration of target
reaction, which demands a thorough understanding of the target:
Success of cover and deception is dependent on the ability of the deceiver
to predict the probable enemy reaction. The staff charged with the
deception planning must be able to think as the enemy does and not react
as a frien... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | get.
The probable enemy reaction depends on the commander. An uncertain
commander may react to deception while a steadfast veteran commander
may ignore all but exceptionally convincing efforts. Some commanders
may be overanxious, others overcautious; if possible, we should know the
characteristics of the enemy commande... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | amouflage aspect of deception, the 1959 edition of FM 5-20
represented the pinnacle of the linkage between camouflage and cover and deception. In
the manual’s discussion of the nuclear battlefield, the manual explicitly states the role of
camouflage in both denying information and deceiving:
The best means of reducing ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | f the Army, 1959), 3.
17
Additionally, FM 5-20 emphatically bound camouflage to deception via the very
definition of camouflage: “Camouflage is a French word meaning disguise and is used to
describe actions taken to mislead the enemy by misrepresenting the true identity of an
installation, an activity, or an item of eq... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | anged from “deceiving” to “disguising.”55 Though
deception was still discussed in the manual, to include a chapter on decoys, the concept
of camouflage as an element of deception was thoroughly expunged. The divorce of
camouflage from deception was reciprocated on the deception side of doctrine. The 1969
TC 30-1 listed... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ample, the following guidance is given for the offense: “If a smaller
force is to concentrate superior combat power at the point of decision… commanders
must employ surprise and deception as well as the full mobility of the force.”56
Furthermore, one of the basic tasks of the covering force in the defense is to deceive... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e section on desert
warfare, the manual states, “using deception is a primary means of obtaining success.”58
However, despite the relatively complete integration of deception into operations, details
on how to execute deception activities are again absent. Oddly, no mention is made of a
deception manual within the body... |
PSYOP 10.pdf |
list of major functional areas alongside maneuver, intelligence, and fires.61 In addition,
deception is listed as a reason for offensive action, and discussed in depth in the sections
on defense and retrograde operations.62 Furthermore, echoing General Eisenhower’s
admonishment, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 states: “A... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1976, 5-10.
58 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1976, 14-10
59 The reference to FM 90-2 is bizarre given FM 90-2 was not published until two years after this
edition of FM 100-5. FM 31-40 (1967) was the current deception manual at the time of p... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | retrograde operations see: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1986, 158.
63 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1986, 53.
64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1986, 53.
19
as electronic warfare activities that support the overall deception plan.65 In... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | term actions of corps or lower units within the battle area.”67 Though
this “How to Fight” manual is rather simplistic, its release marked the beginning of a
military deception renaissance within the U.S. Army. Of note however, the 1978 field
manual severs the connection between deception and the term cover, though it ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | underpinnings of deception as well as providing detailed
guidance on the planning and execution of deception at both the tactical and operational
levels of war. This manual was designed to address what the U.S. Army considered to be
a shortfall in deception integration:
Today, commanders use little deception in planni... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1978), 1-1.
68 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-2: Battlefield Deception (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 1988), 1-0.
20
Without having access to the editions of FM 31-40 for comparison, the 1988
edition of FM 90-2 represents the strongest presentati... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ong the principles of war, deception is absent from security, and relegated to a mere
factor of surprise; furthermore, economy of force demands force allocations for tasks
such as deception be measures so as to not detract from the ability to mass at the decisive
point.69 Deception is not listed as a combat function; r... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | planation for the marginalization of deception lies in the shift of the
strategic equation with the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union left
the United States without a peer competitor, and thus without the need for indirect
approaches to compensate for numerical inferiority and vulnerable lines ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | erceived balance of power.
21
The stated reason was that the manual “no longer represents valid Army doctrine.”72 In
1998, an unofficial military deception planner’s guide was published with a SECRET
classification, again putting the tenets of deception outside the reach of a majority of the
force. Additionally, since ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 3-13:
Information Operations replaced FM 100-6 in 2003. Though FM 3-13 provides more
discussion on the integration, planning, and execution of deception than FM 100-6, the
level is still far below FM 90-2. Furthermore, FM 3-13 has fallen out of favor itself and is
no longer in synch with ADP 3-0, limiting the manual’s... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | hich restates the definition of
military deception; gone is the guidance to refer to a deception field manual because the
1988 version of FM 90-2 was phased out without replacement. As with the 1993 FM 100-
5, the term deception is present, but the concept is not.
The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 sees deception, now categori... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | sed 2
January 2012, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA339425.
73 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 2001 (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 2001), 4-14.
22
Deception. For the first time since 1914, the concepts of feints and demonstrations—in
fact, the very words—do not appear withi... |
PSYOP 10.pdf |
of the Army’s “Doctrine 2015” program. APD 3-0, weighing in at a concise 32 pages,
does not mention deception at all, and relegates all inform and influence operations to
three uses of the term without elaboration or mention of external references.
The 1990 edition of FM 5-20, renamed FM 20-3: Camouflage, further redu... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Camouflage, Cover, and Decoys; at
the joint level CCD means Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception [the Army refers to
the joint version of CCD as JCCD]. Further, whereas the 1990 edition includes deception
in the interrelated tasks supporting survivability, the 1998 edition removes deception.
While essentially ignori... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | erations, Change 1 (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 6-19.
75 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 20-3: Camouflage, 1993
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-1.
76 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 20-3: Camouflage, Concealment, and
Decoys, 1999 (Washington, DC... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of deception as an operational concept.
However, the level of emphasis is cyclic, with peaks occurring during and immediately
after World War II, and during the late 1970s through 1980s. Conversely deception
integration is at its weakest prior to World War I, and since the end of the Cold War.
Furthermore, the only ti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | iques, and Procedures 3-34.39:
Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-17.6A (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 2010), iv.
78 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004), 1-49; (Army) 1. Pro... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | n from the longitudinal survey of deception within U.S. Army
doctrine, deception is consistently mentioned; however, the degree of emphasis and level
of guidance varies significantly over time. The variance in deception emphasis has driven
deception authors to propose numerous explanations as to why the U.S. Army does ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 80 A third reason cited is the over-classification of
deception post-WWII has had the unintended consequence of removing deception from
consideration by the force. Fourth, various authors have pointed to the perception within
Western culture that deception is immoral as reducing the desire to embrace deception’s
worth.... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | this explanation it is necessary to first analyze the styles of
war to see if there is a variation of deception emphasis between the styles, then examine
79 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy, Indiana University Press paperback ed. (Bloomington IN: Indiana... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of a role, of deception in the U.S.
Army is an understanding the two warfighting styles employed by the U.S. Army. On one
end of the spectrum is cumulative destruction, which includes what Hans Delbrück and
Russell Weigley refer to as the strategy of annihilation, and what Basil Liddell Hart and
Edward Luttwak call at... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ecause successful
application of the cumulative destruction approach is rooted in the ability of a force to
effectively inflict greater net damage on the enemy force, the approach is dependent on
an overall force superiority. Even if an inferior force can achieve a series of tactical
victories, the additive effect of t... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | within this thesis is solely in the context of emphasis
on deception; any evaluation of the superiority of one style of war over the other is beyond the scope of this
work.
82 The terms cumulative destruction and systemic disruption are used because the various authors have
used the term attrition with diametrically op... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | MINDSET: National Styles in Warfare and the Operational
Level of Planning, Conduct and Analysis (Pontiac, MA: C&L Associates, 1980).
26
control) which leave the enemy paralyzed and unable to react effectively. The exemplars
for systemic disruption are the German blitzkrieg, most forms of guerrilla warfare, and
the AirL... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | as a toe-to-toe fight with government
forces from a position of inferiority invites defeat. For example, during the Tet Offensive,
the Viet Cong attempted to shift to a cumulative destruction posture resulting in the
destruction of the Viet Cong as an effective fighting force.
Cumulative Destruction Systemic Disruption... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ”85 to perceive and affect enemy
weaknesses
Orientation Interior focus on processes to achieve External focus to identify enemy
maximum efficiency of tasks weaknesses and limitations
Force Design Systems and formations designed for Systems and formations
all-around capabilities – infrequent, designed for specific enemy... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | cKitrick,
and James Reed (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 88 – 100.
27
Cumulative destruction and systemic disruption as described above actually
represent a false dichotomy for the sake of analysis. In practical application, pure
expressions of either approach do not exist. Rather, all warfighting... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he most effective and efficient application of superior firepower.
Because of this inward perspective, there is less effort given to understanding the enemy
to the degree needed for effective deception. Conversely, systemic disruption oriented
forces are more focused on the external since victory is achieved through th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | estruction, the emphasis of deception decreases, and
conversely, as the force leans towards systemic disruption, the emphasis of deception
increases.
Clausewitz’s On War and Jomini’s The Art of War are considered the pillars of
the cumulative destruction mode of warfighting. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Basil
Liddell H... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | pkins University Press, 1984), 103.
88 Edward Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters 8, no. 4 (1983), accessed 14 July
2011, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/1983/1983%20luttwak.pdf, 13.
89 Luttwak and Canby, MINDSET: National Styles in Warfare, 20 – 21.
90 Luttwak and Canby, MINDSE... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ed. Several authors
mention the evolution of Napoleon’s warfighting as the exemplar for this relationship. As
Napoleon’s armies grew in power and capability, Napoleon transitioned from a reliance
on cunning and misdirection to a reliance on force.91 Weigley, in his classic, The
American Way of War, states as his premis... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | al Adams: “I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters. The officers drink,
A [sic] long and moderate war. My toast is, A [sic] short and violent war.”93 John
Adams’ desires are frequently reflected in U.S. Army doctrine. For example, FM 100-5
(1939) states:
The ultimate objective [emphasis in original] of all military... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of War, xxii.
93 John Adams, Abigail Adams and Charles Adams, Familiar Letters of John Adams, and His Wife
Abigail Adams during the Revolution. with a Memoir of Mrs. Adams (New York: Hurd and Houghton,
1876), 305.
94 War Department, Tentative Field Service Regulations of Operations, 1939, 27.
29
Additionally, FM 100-5 ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | de of the
spectrum, U.S. Army doctrine tends to embrace Clausewitz’s positions on the execution
of war. As a result, Clausewitz’s disdain may have an impact on deception’s place in
doctrine. Clausewitz writing about craft and cunning stated: “The fact remains that those
qualities do not figure prominently in the histor... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | d for the historic record as the “bias of a
professional soldier for whom the conflict of force with force and the destruction of the
enemy on the battlefield were the principle instruments in the art of war.”98 Handel
suggests that Clausewitz and Jomini’s diminishing of deception and trickery in war was a
result of th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | amer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs, 100.
99 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War : Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd rev. and expanded ed.
(London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 216.
30
Regardless of the reasoning at the time behind Clausewitz’s diminishment of the utility of
deception, his work continues to i... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ance between
opponents, the stronger force can rely on its strength to overcome the opposition. J.
Bowyer Bell states:
Power and capacity, as in real life, can make deception unnecessary.
Napoleon, as the power of his armies increased, relied more on force and
less on cunning and misdirection. In an invasion of a small... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s a
systemic disruption approach, there is a trend whereby the level of emphasize on
deception within U.S. Army doctrine waxes and wanes as the perceived and actual
balance of power shifts (Figure 2).
100 Handel, Masters of War, 225.
101 Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 251; A similar opinion is stated in Secret S... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | se is reflected
by the inclusion of sections on counterinformation and surprise in the 1923 Field Service
Regulations. Similarly, during World War II the Axis was seen as an existential threat,
and deception reached a crescendo. Post-World War II, the United States operated from a
position of parity during the Cold War... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | used on cumulative destruction while still
leveraging the value of systemic disruption.
32
of the Airland Battle doctrine.103 Second, the 1976 National Intelligence Estimate on
Soviet military capability included a second assessment which painted the Soviet military
as superior to the United States military in both nuc... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | el.104
Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate addendum reassessed Soviet intentions,
painting a picture that the Soviet Union was a far greater and imminent threat than
previously recognized. This radical re-estimation of Soviet capabilities and intentions
shifted the perceived balance of power, placing the U... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ERT STORM. The 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5 see the U.S. Army
doctrine at the apex of systemic disruption.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was left without
a peer competitor. As a result, the balance of power shifted decisively in the favor of the
United States, alleviating the pe... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Hopkins University Press, 1984),
328.
104 Team "B", Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View (Washington, DC: Director of Central
Intelligence, 1976), accessed 16 April 2012,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000278531/DOC_0000278531.pdf, 47.
33
B. PROFESSIONAL OFFICER CLASS
Goldhamer suggests an interesting a... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | porting Goldhamer’s assertion stating:
Not all soldiers are fond of practicing deception. Some American combat
commanders in World War II instinctively resisted using deception,
preferring to charge straight ahead like the old-style cavalrymen they
were…. Others… simply preferred conventional battle as a route to honor... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ngthen in
peacetime the nation’s position vis-a-vis a potential enemy by misleading
him and weakening his present and future powers of resistance. Such
measures require close coordination of military and political leadership, a
cooperation less likely to occur given the professional soldier’s distance
from the foreign ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | diers, 7
107 Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs, 103.
108 Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs, 104.
34
C. OVER-CLASSIFICATION
A third potential explanation for the dearth of deception in U.S. Army doctrine is
the over-classification of deception. While security is essential for the executio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | and Infantry Centers on the subject of training
cover and deception. The cursory introduction to strategic cover and deception was
restricted to confidential level with no questions authorized and contained the comment:
“The security classification of this whole subject [strategic cover and deception] is and
probably w... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 962 edition.
In addition to the classification of doctrine, the classification of the actual
deception operations negatively impacted the institutional memory of the force. The
mission of 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, a purpose built deception unit in World
War II, was not declassified until 1996.110 With the infor... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 0 National Army Security Agency Association, “The 23rd Headquarters Special Troops (World War
II)” accessed 1 January 2012, http://www.nasaa-home.org/23rdhqs.htm.
111 Bell, “Toward a Theory of Deception,” 251.
35
classification of both deception doctrine and historic examples of deception placed an
extremely high barri... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a virtue within
American life as expressed by maxims such as “Honesty is the best policy,” and the
apocryphal tale of George Washington and the cherry tree. The idea of the American
military as moral paragons is also frequently present in official and unofficial military
guidance and writings. For example, General Dem... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | hat is right, regardless
of the cost. We are all volunteers in our willingness to serve and to place
others’ needs above our own. As shared values, our calling cards are Duty,
Honor, Courage, Integrity, and Selfless Service. Commitment to the rule
of law is integral to our values which provide the moral and ethical fab... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 24 February 2012, http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-
02/022312120752_Americas_Military_POA.pdf, 3.
113 J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, Cheating and Deception (New Brunswick, NJ Transaction
Publishers, 1991), 45.
36
Colorado accused Funston of violating the rules of civilized warfare.114 Colonel Funston
was also t... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | anization as immoral
the view is not a serious impediment to the execution of deception. Rather, the attitude of
Ulisse Guadagnini seems to hold more sway: “Moral considerations have validity only in
civilian life and should not interfere with preparations for war.”117
E. CONCLUSION
The primary explanation for the unde... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | r tasks
will seek to perform them.” Second, due to availability bias, people will think and act in
ways familiar to them.118 Allison and Zelikow in Essence of Decision present a model for
organizational behavior that suggests the behavior is linked more to standard operating
procedures and established doctrine than to ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 1905, 214.
117 Quoted in Waldemar Erfurth, Surprise, trans. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg,
PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), 51.
118 Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, "Propositions on Military Deception," in Strategic
Military Deception, eds. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. H... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of deception have been separated under difference
proponents, such as camouflage under the U.S. Army Engineer School. The lack of a
stable proponency with deception as its central focus further undermines the integration
of deception into U.S. Army doctrine three important ways. First, the frequent changes of
deceptio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e U.S. Army Combined
Arms Center, the deception cells were dropped in order to support the emerging
requirement for unmanned aerial vehicles.120
119 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,
2nd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc, 1999), 143 – 145.
120 Nelson, ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ral theory of cheating.”122 Bell and Whaley’s theory of deception
is elegant in its simplicity. The theory categorizes all deceptions into two interdependent
sets: showing the false and hiding the real. These categories are further subdivided into
six categories. Hiding the real is divided into the categories of maskin... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | llusion the target interprets as reality, causing the target to act in the
desired manner to achieve the deception goal and thus the strategic goal.123 While Bell
and Whaley’s theory provides a neat and tidy structure for the taxonomy of deception,
one weakness of the theory is that it does not delve in the cognitive p... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | g and Deception, 45 – 74.
39
particular note are his comments on the prevalence of preconceived ideas on the
battlefield, and the role of doctrinal and technical innovation in achieving surprise.124
1. Deception Defined
According to Random House Webster’s, deception is “something that deceives or
is intended to deceive... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | is concept of deception ignores the ideas
of deception by omission and deception by selective truth. Furthermore, the definition
makes no mention of the target of the deception. In the definition’s defense, the concept
of gaining a competitive advantage is important. Deception in military operations is not
undertaken f... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nt. The first deficiency with the
current doctrinal definition is that “induce” is an imprecise term for what deception does:
manipulating the enemy’s decision-making process. Second, the best deceptions rely on a
foundation of truth to reinforce and support the falsehoods, an idea the definition seems
124 Michael Dewa... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | imate: Soviet
Capabilities for Deception by the Central Intelligence Agency: Director of Central Intelligence, Soviet
Capabilities for Deception (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1957), accessed 30 January
2012. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:artic... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | eption, a
modified definition of deception can be crafted:
Deception is the deliberate misleading of a target into taking actions
prejudicial to the target’s interests by manipulating the target’s decision-
making processes through the communication of true, manipulated,
distorted, and/or falsified information.
This re... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of a deception can be the target
taking no action at all, e.g., the failure of a regime’s security apparatus to breach a special
reconnaissance element’s cover or the German armored divisions remaining in place at
Pas de Calais during the opening phases of Operation OVERLORD. The interaction
between the practitioner a... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | discussion on biological deceptions see: Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, Unweaving
the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 78. For
a discussion on the requirement for intent in human deception see: Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D.
Feehan, "The Intent to Deceiv... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | that deception and lies are not
equal; however, this still leaves the proposition that lies are a subset of deception.130 For
example, Daniel and Herbig’s model of deception has lies and the act of lying subsumed
by deception (Figure 3). The definition of deception used here requires injury to the
target or advantage ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | lm and Feehan, The Intent to Deceive, 152; This work presents an in-depth parsing of what
it means to lie and what it means to intend to deceive.
130 Chisholm and Feehan provide another illuminating example attributed to Immanuel Kant: “For
there are types of intended deception that cannot properly be said to be cases ... |
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