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PSYOP 10.pdf | various
sources, suggested elements of the deception estimate include:
Potential target decision makers, to include biographical data and
psychological profiles
Existing preconceptions about friendly plans, capabilities, and intentions
Target organization for systems of decision-making, information flow, and
com... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | t the commander wants the target to do, or not to do. Identification of the
deception goal must be accomplished as early as possible in the planning process so that
the deception plan has sufficient preparation and execution time to allow the target
opportunity to take the desired action prior to the execution of the a... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | is a
continuing action carried out by all echelons of command in activities such as cover and
concealment, individual combat, use of dummy positions and installations, and
decoys.”230
There are situations where active deception may not be appropriate, or where
deception should focus on supporting operations security a... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ision on when and how to implement deception rests with the commander.
3. Planning Methodology
a. DO
With the deception objective identified, the next step is the development
of the deception story. The story should be developed using the SEE—THINK—DO
methodology.232 Backwards planning with this methodology starts with... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ty. If these criteria are not met then the deception objective or
230 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: 1954, 38.
231 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Reference Book 31-40, 1-2.
232 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4, IV-1to IV-2.
83
target needs to be reassessed. For example, the target of the deception ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ting
perceptions, organizational decision-making processes, and schemata is vital to the
success of this phase of planning, as each of these influence the target’s decision-making
process (Figure 7, Chapter IV). Continuing the previous example, if the Republican
Guard commander is a coward then he may need to think U.S... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | get
to collect indicators. The available channels serve as a limit on the range of deception
techniques used to create the desired indicators—it is a waste of resources to craft an
indicator the target cannot see. Finishing the previous example, after assessing that the
Republican Guard commander is not a coward, it is... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ions or by denying the channels capable of conveying the real
84
indicators. The set of desired indicators are then woven together to create the deception
story. The deception story is the: “scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be
portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception.... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ption means is effectively limitless and is only
constrained by the imagination and resources of the practitioner. Deception means are
subdivided into three broad categories: physical, cyber electromagnetic, and
administration.
a. Physical
Physical means are those which activate the senses, principally the senses
of he... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rms of actions
as physical means. Behavior can be used to create the perception of a pattern in order to
condition the target to expect this pattern to continue; for example establishing a routine
233 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4, GL-3.
234 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, 1-52.
235 Headquarters, Depa... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | to note that not all sonic deceptions need to
employ mimicry. One method of sonic deception employed by the 4th Infantry Division
in Vietnam was the use of artillery fires to mask the sounds associated with infantry units
occupying night positions.238 Prior to the use of the fires, infantry units risked
compromising th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ors.239 Deception
activities within cyberspace include the transmission of notional documents as
disinformation, portrayals in the form of honeypot systems to bait targets into the
cyberspace equivalent of ambushes, and the use of camouflaging programs such as an
onion router or proxy server to provide cover for cybers... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of the Adjutant General, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division Artillery
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1969). http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/AD0505964,
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/AD0505964.
239 Cyber electromagnetic means replaces the traditional category of technical means in order to
includ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | resource for exploitation. These documents reveal a perfect template of what
right looks like, and if they include copies of official signatures provide a valuable source
of added credibility. Electronically disseminated notional documents can be used to
increase friction within the target organization by forcing verif... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | means also
include the creation of misleading documents; such as, doctored photographs, notional
orders, or fake identification.
One method for developing notional documents is to use existing
documents as the base. This expedites the work, and helps to ensure that the notional
document looks like a real document. The ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ute of
Technology, http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/21452/ (accessed February 25, 2012).
241 Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War, 140 – 143.
87
5. Execution and Assessment
a. Execution
The deception events needed to generate the desired indicators are
incorporated into a time-phased execution matrix in order... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ibious 2nd Marine Not earlier than Coordinate for
0001 5 Jan preparations for assault training event Expeditionary 28 February 1991 press coverage
1991 amphibious Force of training
operations
2 Not later than Iraqi forces focus Conduct training 1st Cavalry Not earlier than Coordinate for
0001 5 Jan defensive operations... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | mimicking XVIII Battalion
Jan 1991 preparation for Corps elements in
‘Hail Mary’ assembly area
4 Not earlier Iraqi forces remain Conduct feints and 1st Cavalry On order
than 0001 13 in defensive probing attacks Division
Feb 1991 positions against Iraqi lines in VII Corps
tri-border area Artillery
5 Not earlier Draw Ira... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | y the 2nd Armor Division so that the actual division
242 Daniel Breitenbach, “Operation Desert Deception: Operational Deception in the Ground
Campaign,” (Paper, Naval War College, 1991), accessed 24 May 2012,
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA253245. The date-time information in the table is notional for the
purposes of ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | y during its move, resulted in a very weak ruse.243 It is paramount that attention to
details be observed during deception operations, as a weak deception execution can result
in the target recognizing the deception and exploiting it in turn.
b. Assessment
One problem with accessing deception effectiveness is that some... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | miles away, where
the Special Troops were sending up their racket on heaters [loud speakers] and radios and
massing their decoys with the help of stagecraft and impersonation?”244
This is not to say measures of effectiveness are not necessary; rather,
measures of effectiveness should be tied to observable indicators t... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ion.
243 Gerard, Secret Soldiers, 153 – 156.
244 Gerard, Secret Soldiers, 334.
89
Collecting for deception requires a witting actor on the unit’s intelligence
staff. This actor serves several functions. First, the individual helps to ensure any
information requirements for the deception plan are included in the unit’s ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | eption indicators do not corrupt the friendly force’s understanding
of the situation.
6. Termination
At some point a deception operation will lose its utility; therefore, deception
operations need to have a plan for the termination of the deception. JP 3-13.4 provides a
list of possible termination triggers (Table 7). ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ng “transferred” to France in order to maintain pressure on German forces; the
last parts of FORTITUDE SOUTH were not terminated until early September 1944.245
245 Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign, (Woodstock and New York, NY: The
Overlook Press, 2000), 289 – 302.
90
Trigger Description
Successful... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Circumstances change where deception
may be less risky or more effective if
deception efforts are realigned
Deception compromise There is cause to believe the target is aware
of at least some aspects of the deception
plan
Table 7. Potential Termination Triggers246
B. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION
In addition to the detailed ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rbig
provide a set of deception success factors; while Dudley Clarke muses on deception
reflections. From these various sets of deception guidance, it is possible to synthesize
seven broad principles for deception practitioners247 (Table 8).
246 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4, IV-13.
247 Daniel and Herbig acknowledge the strat... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | and Folklore
(Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1980). Variations
included in Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-2: Battlefield Deception, 1-3 and
Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4: Military Deception, A1-A2; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual
3-13:... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 941 to 1945,”
memorandum included in Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East, 273 –
275.
92
1. Know the Target and Exploit Existing Perceptions
a. Understand the Target
Knowing the target is essential to successful deception as every target is
unique. British deception efforts in the Pacif... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | target’s existing perceptions
and to change the perceptions. Whenever possible, deceptions should seek to leverage
existing perceptions as is the far easier of the two endeavors. The anchoring bias
discussed in Chapter IV works against changing perception, as do several other cognitive
biases. The idea of using the tar... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | attempt to alter these views.”250 Reinforcing existing perceptions also leverages
confirmation bias as discussed in Chapter IV. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH during World
War II is an exemplar of using deception to reinforce the target’s existing perceptions. In
this case, the German command expected the inevitable invasio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | al Pershing used a convincing
demonstration supported by several pieces of disinformation to convince the Germans the
attack would come elsewhere. As a result, the German’s shifted forces away from the
point of decision, facilitating General Pershing’s success.251
c. Avoiding Windfalls
While the deception practitioner ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | oversight.”252 An
example of an unintentional mistake ruse occurred during deception operations in support
of the American Expeditionary Force’s assault on the Saint Mihiel salient during World
War I; General Pershing’s chief of staff left a crumpled sheet of carbon paper with the
imprint of a disinformation laden mem... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | eive Turkish forces of British intent to capture
Beershaba, Meinertzhagen developed a notional set of documents indicating the focus of
251 See Chapter VI for a detailed account of the deception in support of the St. Mihiel operation.
252 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-13, 4-10.
253 The Editors of the Army ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | , Meinertzhagen fled, and in his haste lost his haversack containing the notional
documents. Meinertzhagen took pains to increase the legitimacy of the lost haversack.
First, Meinertzhagen spattered his haversack with blood so it appeared he had been
wounded during the encounter. Second, in the days after the encounter... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of his work that one of
the cases against physical deception is the necessity to let too many people in on the
secret, increasing security risks.257 Similarly, von Greiffenberg admonishes: “If the
strictest secrecy is not observed all deception projects—even the smallest—are doomed
to failure from the very start.”258
H... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ssion was called off with minimal
bombing conducted. The short bombing mission put German forces on alert, rather than
256 John Ferris, “‘FORTITUDE’ in Context: The Evolution of British Military Deception in Two World
Wars, 1914-1945,” in Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Richar... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e cut the mission short.259
3. Utilize Flexibility, Variety, and Conditioning
a. Flexibility
Deceptions must be flexible and the practitioner ready to revise and adapt
the plan based on feedback from the target. For example, Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH
was expected to be terminated shortly after the Normandy landings as ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | hould employ variety, both in terms of indicators and
channels in order to increase the likelihood of the deception story reaching the target.
Reliance on a limited indicators or channels risks the indicator not being received by the
target. This can occur either due to noise disrupting the indictor, or if the target i... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s and channels. For example, in support of Operation
259 McRaven, Spec Ops, 131 and 154.
260 Hesketh, Fortitude, 241.
96
FORTITUDE SOUTH, the Allies used a number of indicators and channels to include:
several agents of the DOUBLE CROSS system, decoys and dummies to simulate units, radio
teams to portray units, and dis... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | example of conditioning is the Egyptian preparations leading up to the
1973 Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian Army undertook a series of training exercises on
its side of the Suez Canal, establishing a pattern of behavior. The staging of forces for the
war followed the pattern of the training exercises, lulling Israeli inte... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | and 1am. The railroad company complied in an effort to maintain
good will. After a while, Jackson requested all west bound trains run at the same time as
the east bound trains; again the railroad complied. Once the schedule was up and running,
Jackson used his detachments at Point of Rocks and Martinsburg to trap all t... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | xecuting the plan. For example, an infantry platoon conducting the
camouflage aspects of cover should maintain control of the plan at the platoon level.
Control of deception plans requiring external support, e.g., airborne jamming, should be
controlled at the level capable of coordinating for the support. This allows f... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | and
higher headquarters so that deceptive indictors do not contaminate the other units’
intelligence collection efforts. Additionally, coordination helps to ensure the deception
plan nests with and compliments higher and adjacent unit plans, and does not conflict or
degrade these plans. An example of poor coordinate o... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | tion and Cover Plans, 80.
264 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-13, 4-16.
265 Gerard, Secret Soldiers, 183 – 184.
98
5. Requirement for Target Action
For deception to succeed, the target must execute the desired action or inaction; to
merely change the target’s perception is to waste time and resources. This r... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | . Fundamentally it does not matter in the least what the
enemy thinks; it is only what line of action he adopts as a consequence of
his line of thought that will affect the battle. As a result we resolved the
principle that a commander should tell his Deception staff what he wants
the enemy to DO… while it is the duty ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | must be balanced with economy of force. Economy of force
dictates that the minimum resources necessary to secondary tasks in order to maximize
forces available for the main effort. Too many resources diverted to secondary efforts
may leave insufficient forces for the main effort; conversely, too few resources allocated... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rk: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 41.
267 Von Greiffenberg, Deception and Cover Plans, 80.
99
Eastern Front.268 The plan required significant resources for execution, but the supporting
commands successfully resisted tasking efforts, resulting in an ultimately unconvincing
deception.269
With regards to timing, two... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | from insignificant to potentially catastrophic. “Under certain
circumstances deceptions can produce effects exactly opposite to the planned objective. It
is therefore advisable to reflect how such a reversal can be detected in time.”272 The
famous example of a reversal was Dudley Clarke’s deception of the Italian forc... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | y amphibious assault from
flanking the lines. The lack of resistance in southeastern Kuwait allowed coalition forces
operating in this area to rapidly outpace other elements in the attack. This caused the
synchronization of coalition efforts to be disrupted; some initiative was sacrificed as units
268 Deception Researc... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | effort to regain synchronization. Additionally, the amphibious
demonstrations sparked the withdrawal of Iraqi forces more quickly than expected,
complicating the destruction of several key Iraqi elements.274
C. DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF IRREGULAR OPERATIONS
History is replete with examples of deception in support of conv... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ritical concern for unconventional warfare operations is security, especially
during the nascent phases of the campaign when the state holds a distinct force advantage
over the movement. Deception is a vital tool for maintaining the security of both the
forces working with the guerrilla force and for the guerrilla forc... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | or garrison. This technique requires
constant and detailed information; one must be fully informed about the
enemy’s situation, from the first preparations to the time of execution.276
274 Breitenbach, “Operation Desert Deception,” 22 – 24.
275 While cyber warfare and humanitarian assistance are not normally included i... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | re campaign in order to allow the special operations force and the
guerrilla force to move amongst the population like Mao’s fish.
The adoption of Afghan sartorial and grooming standards by special operations
forces elements during the opening phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM served two
purposes. First, the standard... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Warfare and Special Forces Operations suggests another
method of deception in support of security:
False rumors and false information concerning guerilla strength, location,
operations, training, and equipment can be disseminated by
counterintelligence through clandestine nets. Facts may be distorted
intentionally to m... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | upport of subversion can be used to introduce friction to the
regime’s decision-making process through the use of ambiguity increasing measures.
Slowing down the adversary’s OODA process is as effective as increasing the speed of
277 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces
O... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ency through intelligence gathering.279 For example, a pseudo-operation might be
designed to lure in supporters and potential supporters of the targeted group for the
purposes of intelligence collection and nuanced influence activities. Care must be
exercised with pseudo-operations as they thread a fine line with perfi... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | d to fix cells of the network in time and space for targeting
by directing the cell to attend a meeting. The effectiveness of this approach depends on
the nature of the insurgent group; a strict hierarchal structure will be more susceptible
than a loose-knit structure. Likewise, disinformation about friendly collection... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | dge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2008), 23.
281 Lawrence Cline, Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), accessed 20 April 2011,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=607, 12.
103
Deception for the... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | . The resultant purge of
misidentified “agents” greatly weakened the organization and allowed the British to reach
favorable terms for a ceasefire.282 Additionally, since there is an inverse ratio between
security and efficiency, deception for subversion can be used to cause the target to
increase security measures to ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | opular support for the host nation government and the U.S. mission
would be catastrophic if the true nature of the operation were revealed.
3. Stability Operations / Humanitarian Assistance Operations
Deception operations in support of stability operations and humanitarian
assistance operations are probably most approp... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ” (Master’s thesis: Naval Postgraduate School),
accessed 4 January 2010, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA401353, 3 – 5.
283 J. Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem,”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 1 (1989): 17.
104
4. Counterterror... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | st terrorist groups, and could prove quite
useful at creating and exploiting internal inefficiencies and weaknesses of terrorist
groups. For example, disinformation spread via rumors that there is an informant within
the terrorist group could be spread in areas where the terrorist are suspected of operating
in order to... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ing initiative. First, the Israeli aircraft masked their
approach behind the signature of a regularly scheduled aircraft. Additionally, the Israeli
commando force portrayed Ugandan military forces through the use of Ugandan
uniforms and a Mercedes disguised to look like a Ugandan staff car. These techniques
sowed confu... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the form of
spoofed emails could be used to prompt any manner of actions by the target. Pseudo-
operations in the form of websites portraying adversary websites can be used for
disinformation, intelligence gathering, or influence operations. On the defense, ambiguity
increasing deception can be used to protect sensitiv... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | succeeds, at least to some degree.
Indeed it should be emphasized that deception may succeed even when one or more …
causes for failure is present.”286 Despite this assertion, the report provides eleven reasons
why a deception may fail. These reasons were derived from an analysis of Allied and
Axis deception failures ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | sticated
to be received or too simplistic to be believed
286 Deception Research Program, Deception Failures, Non-Failures, and Why, 45 – 46.
106
Unreasonable expected result
Target unable to react in the intended manner even if deception considered
credible
Inadequate time for the deception process to run its cou... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the channels available the target, or a failure to revise
the plan after discovering the channels were insufficient. While no deception plan is
perfect, proper adherence to the information requirements and principles laid out in this
chapter can reduce the risk of deception failures.
287 Deception Research Program, De... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | d second to reinforce the idea that deception has been
of great utility for the U.S. military throughout its history.
A. REVOLUTIONARY WAR – BATTLE OF TRENTON
January 2, 1777 saw George Washington trapped against the banks of the
Delaware River outside Trenton, New Jersey by a superior British force under General
Cornw... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ritish in Trenton jumpy. When
Cornwallis and his men arose the next morning to quash the rebellion all they found was
an abandoned camp with piles of fresh dirt and smoldering fires.
The fires and work crews served as demonstrations; and the cannon fire as a feint
in order to reinforce Cornwallis’s perception that Wash... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s so tight that “no one
below the rank of brigadier was privy to the plan; officers who were quartered in outlying
farmhouses awoke the next morning to find the army gone….”290
Deception Objective (DO) British forces do not impede withdrawal
Deception Target General Cornwallis
Deception Story (THINK) American Army prep... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | victory occurred during the Civil War. Major General
Magruder was tasked with preventing the largest Union army yet assembled from
reaching Richmond. To achieve this objective, Magruder utilized a number of deceptions,
including the use of soldiers portraying deserters to feed General McClellan
disinformation exaggera... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | imulated cannon to the casual eye. In McClellan’s perception, the Confederate force was
larger and better equipped than his, and so McClellan delayed his attack for over a month
while he assembled the forces he felt necessary for the attack. This delay allowed ample
289 Richard M. Ketchum, The Winter Soldiers, 1st ed. ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | back to the Army of Northern
Virginia lines; Richmond was safe.291
Deception Objective (DO) Union forces do not press attack until after arrival of Army of
Northern Virginia
Deception Target General McClellan
Deception Story (THINK) Confederate force too large to attack without significant Union
reinforcements
Deceptio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e Confederate defenders under General
John Hood. Unable to crack the nut that was Atlanta via siege, and unwilling to mount a
potentially disastrous frontal assault, Sherman resorted to deception and the indirect
approach.
The deception used by Sherman was a feigned withdrawal. Prior to 26 August,
Sherman ordered his m... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s of the Army Times, The Tangled Web, 15 – 17.
111
4th Corps in order to prevent the defenders from noticing the corps’ movements.293 After
midnight on the 26th, in a move reminiscent of Washington at Trenton, Sherman’s force
began a near silent withdrawal under the cover of darkness. The withdrawal was not
discovered ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | aintained
tight security until seizing Jonesborough, south of Atlanta. By 2 September, Atlanta was
in Union hands.296
Deception Objective (DO) Confederate forces fail to react to flanking maneuver
Deception Target General Hood
Deception Story (THINK) Union forces have retreated in defeat
Deception Events (SEE) Portraya... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e fort,
Forrest arranged a parley with the fort’s commander, Colonel Wallace Campbell. During
the parley, Campbell was provided with a seemingly impromptu tour of the Confederate
camp. Unbeknownst to Campbell, as he completed the tour of a campsite, many of the
293 William Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | counted
again. Artillery pieces were similarly shuffled around, so Campbell was presented the
image of a Confederate force four times its actual size. Rather than risk his men against
this overwhelming force, Campbell surrendered the fort without further bloodshed.297
Though Forrest could have reduced the fort through... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ysis of Athens, Georgia
C. PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION – RAID ON PALANAN
By February 1901, the United States had lost over four thousand Soldiers in two
years of combatting insurrection on the Philippines island of Luzon, with no end in sight.
The leader of the insurrection was Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo fought a classic ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the location was the information that there
were only 50 rebel troops guarding Aguinaldo.299 While Funston wanted to act on the
297 Dunnigan and Nofi, Victory and Deceit : Dirty Tricks at War, 124 – 125; John Weyth, Life of
Lieutenant-General Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers,
... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | escape.
Funston, not willing to let the opportunity to strike a hard blow to the insurrection, turned
to deception.300 Funston in his memoir states:
So the only recourse was to work a stratagem, that is, to get to [Aguinaldo]
under false colors. It would be so impossible to disguise our own troops
that they were not e... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e outfitted with the weapons and uniforms of the insurgents. Funston and the four
American Soldiers accompanying him were dressed as privates and pretended to be
prisoners of the disguised Macabebe force. In addition to the disguises, Funston carried
several pieces of Lacuna’s personal stationary with his forged signat... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | is letting his guard down and allowing the band into his camp.304
Shortly after Aguinaldo’s capture, he ordered the end of the insurrection. Of the
operation, Aguinaldo opined: “It was a bold plan, executed with skill and cleverness, in
the face of difficulties which to most men would have seemed insurmountable.”305
30... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the Senate floor for committing a war crime. Indeed, but current
international law, Funston would be accused of perfidy for allowing the Macabebes to
attack while wearing the enemy’s uniforms.306
Deception Objective (DO) Allow entry of Funston’s force into Aguinaldo’s camp
Deception Target Aguinaldo and rebel forces e... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ions,
there are times when this is impossible. For example, when the true objective is already
perceived by the adversary to be the objective, reinforcing this perception would be—to
say the least—counterproductive. In these cases, deception can be used to change the
target’s perception. General Pershing’s use of decep... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 125 miles southeast of Saint Mihiel, with the deception goal of the German High
Command shifting resources from Saint Mihiel. On 25 August, 1917, a French liaison
officer informed the American press corps—off the record—that the American objective
might be further to the South, perhaps the German town of Mulhouse that... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | were seen around Belfort marking out locations for supply depots,
field hospitals, and artillery positions. To create the impression of troop movements, radio
sets from the 91st Infantry Division were used to mimic the transmissions of the VI Corps.
The military preparations were reinforced with civil-military operatio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | n in the trash, Conger took a walk, and the German spies on the hotel
staff did their part stealing the carbon.
In response to the deception, German High Command moved three divisions from
Saint Mihiel to reinforce the Belfort Gap. With German perceptions changed and
behavior suitably modified, Pershing’s 12 September ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | erman High Command
Deception Story (THINK) American Expeditionary Force plans on attacking through the
Belfort Gap
Deception Events (SEE) Demonstration – Major General Bundy
Demonstration – reconnaissance parties
Disinformation – leak to press
Disinformation – Colonel Conger memorandum
Portrayal – 91st Division creatin... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ais so that
the German forces located there would not react to the Normandy landings. Fortitude
South consisted of two phases. During phase I, the objective was to cause the German
forces to make faulty troop dispositions by convincing German High Command that Pas
de Calais was the true target for invasion, with a targ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rimary elements of FORTITUDE SOUTH were a simulated command and
disinformation transmitted via the DOUBLE CROSS agents. The First U.S. Army Group
[FUSAG] was a real headquarters without forces. General Patton was assigned as the
FUSAG commander as part of the deception plan. FUSAG simulated and portrayed an army
group ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ities of FUSAG was fed to
German intelligence through the DOUBLE CROSS system.311 Additional indicators were
308 Hesketh, Fortitude, 384.
309 Whaley, Stratagem (2007), 376 – 377.
310 Hesketh, Fortitude, 174 – 185.
311 Hesketh, Fortitude, 174 – 185. Agents GARBO and BRUTUS were the primary channels used.
117
presented b... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | lan could be executed. The objective of Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH
II was “To contain the maximum number of enemy forces in the Pas de Calais area for as
long as possible.”314 As elements notionally assigned to FUSAG arrived to reinforce the
Normandy beachhead, local German commanders quickly realized the Pas de Calais
... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | y (THINK) Pas de Calais is the primary target of Allied efforts, the Normandy
landings are a diversion
Deception Events (SEE) Simulation – Decoy and dummy equipment
Simulation – Radio traffic
Portrayal – Assigned units
Demonstration – Assignment of Patton as FUSAG Commander
Disinformation – plans fed through DOUBLE CRO... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | purpose built unit specifically
intended to conduct deception operations at the tactical level. The unit consisted of a
Headquarters and Headquarters Company; the 603rd Engineer Camouflage Battalion
(Special); the Signal Company (Special); the 402nd Engineer Combat Company
(Special); and the 3132nd Signal Company (Spec... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ional stories; all to be picked up by the German agent networks operating behind
Allied lines.318
The techniques implemented by the 23rd played a vital role in operations
throughout the campaign in Western Europe by depriving German intelligence of the true
picture of Allied force dispositions. In particular, the 23rd ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | r
the radio deception was such as to indicate their presence as a reserve in
case of extention [sic] of the German counterattack through
Echternacht.319
The surprise arrival of two divisions of reinforcements broke the back of the siege
of Bastogne.320
317 Official History of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, 2 – 3... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | al units
Termination Trigger Arrival of the 4th and 80th at Bastogne
Table 16. Deception Analysis of Operation KODAK
3. Operation WEDLOCK
In 1943, Joint Security Control—the staff element of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
charged with coordinating U.S. strategic deception—directed Lieutenant General Simon
Bolivar Buckner Jr... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | onsultation with Admiral Nimitz. Nimitz
assumed command of the strategic aspects of the deception, while Buckner retaining
command of the tactical aspects. Nimitz also accelerated the target date for the assault to
15 June so as to provide cover for Operation FORAGER, the planned real assault on
Saipan. The revised dec... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | d.322
321 Katherine Herbig, “American Strategic Deception in the Pacific,” in Strategic and Operational
Deception in the Second World War, edited by Michael Handel, 260 – 300, (London: Frank Cass, 1987),
266.
322 Herbig, “American Strategic Deception,” 266 – 267.
120
In addition to the notional forces, WEDLOCK included... |
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