context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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|---|---|---|---|---|
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust admin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v.... | 7,849,131 | b |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v.... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust ... | 7,849,131 | a |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust admin... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v.... | 7,849,131 | b |
The Board has jurisdiction over appeals from certain agency personnel decisions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. SS 7701(a), which provides that "an employee ... may submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation." This makes a petitioner's... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that as an individual with a probationary position in the competitive service, the petitioner was not an \"employee\" and, therefore, the Board had no jurisdiction at all over her appeal",
"sentence": "See Pervez v. Dep’t of the Navy, 193 F.3d 137... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the protections of 5 U.S.C. SSSS 7511(a",
"sentence": "Specifically, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513, for purposes of appealing a removal action, a petitioner must be included in one of several possible ca... | 1,006,894 | b |
Moreover, we affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the indemnity claim because the underlying action plainly is not covered by the policy in light of these two coverage exclusions. As we have been informed that the underlying action has settled, there is no further information to be gleaned that could giv... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 87... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts allege... | 4,214,434 | a |
Moreover, we affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the indemnity claim because the underlying action plainly is not covered by the policy in light of these two coverage exclusions. As we have been informed that the underlying action has settled, there is no further information to be gleaned that could giv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 P.3d 714, 716",
"parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 87... | 4,214,434 | b |
Moreover, we affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the indemnity claim because the underlying action plainly is not covered by the policy in light of these two coverage exclusions. As we have been informed that the underlying action has settled, there is no further information to be gleaned that could giv... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "877 P.2d 80, 84",
"parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 31... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts allege... | 4,214,434 | a |
Moreover, we affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the indemnity claim because the underlying action plainly is not covered by the policy in light of these two coverage exclusions. As we have been informed that the underlying action has settled, there is no further information to be gleaned that could giv... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "877 P.2d 80, 84",
"parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 31... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 P.3d 714, 716",
"parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify",
"sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the... | 4,214,434 | a |
. In addition, on plain error review, the Ninth Circuit has noted, without deciding, that the plain language of Subsection 3(B) "would seemingly apply to the facts of this case because it contemplates using a computer to entice or solicit a third party -- the 'person'-- to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the m... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "390 Fed.Appx. 849, 852",
"parenthetical": "acknowledging that a \"persuasive case has been made that the commentary [of application note 4] is at odds with the plain language of the [Subsection 3(B",
"sentence": "United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2012)... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "697 F.3d 1141, 1145",
"parenthetical": "declining to decide whether the plain language is inconsistent with the application note and upholding the enhancement on the ground that the district court did not commit plain error",
"sentence": "United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3... | 4,184,768 | b |
Similarly, in the context of accounting malpractice, the Texas Supreme Court held that a cause of action for' negligence based on the accountant's use of the cash instead of the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes did not accrue until the Internal Revenue Service had assessed a tax deficiency. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "756 S.W.2d 299, 302",
"parenthetical": "liability in Stowers action accrued when final judgment was rendered in underlying suit regardless of pending appeals because final judgment placed insured at risk for paying it",
"sentence": "Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 158 ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "417 S.W.2d 150, 158",
"parenthetical": "holding that cause of action for malpractice \"did not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed\" because \"[p]rior to assessment the plaintiff had not been injured.\"",
"sentence": "Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 158 (Tex.1... | 12,125,577 | b |
This circuit's precedents adopting the Cohan rule, however, are clear that the rule does not obviate the need for some proof of entitlement to a deduction in the first place. The finding of the Tax Court that Sparkman failed to establish such an entitlement eliminates the requirement that the Tax Court estimate what th... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "829 F.2d 828, 831",
"parenthetical": "summarizing Cohan as standing for the proposition that \"a court should allow the taxpayer some deductions if the taxpayer proves he is entitled to the deduction but cannot establish the full amount claimed\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 874, 879",
"parenthetical": "noting that, under the Cohan rule, the trial court \"may not be compelled to guess or estimate ... even though such an estimate, if made, might have been affirmed\"",
"sentence": "See Edelson v. Comm’r, 829 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir.1987)... | 3,328,871 | a |
Competing movants maintain that groups formed for the purposes of amassing the largest losses should not be considered to have the largest financial interest because these groups epitomize the type of lawyer-driven litigation reviled by the PSLRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 356760, at *2",
"parenthetical": "refusing to designate a movant group of three individuals lead plaintiff because \"their decision making requires either (a) levels of coordination, negotiation, and collective action which far exceed that which would be necessary of... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "67 F.Supp.2d 803, 815-16",
"parenthetical": "denying lead plaintiff status to the Alsin Group, which contained eighteen investors who had no relation to one another, and deeming such an amalgamation of random people \"inconsistent with the definition of group intended by th... | 1,361,490 | b |
This court previously determined that the circumstances under which a narcotics search warrant is executed implicate a unique risk to police officers, and opined that "[t]he fact that the premises were being searched under a warrant for heroin, a very dangerous drug, gave [the police officer] the knowledge that dangero... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 S.W.2d 110, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "304 Minn. 481, 485",
"parenthetical": "upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics",
"sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 485, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (1975) (upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived ... | 10,736,033 | b |
This court previously determined that the circumstances under which a narcotics search warrant is executed implicate a unique risk to police officers, and opined that "[t]he fact that the premises were being searched under a warrant for heroin, a very dangerous drug, gave [the police officer] the knowledge that dangero... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 S.W.2d 110, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 N.W.2d 91, 94",
"parenthetical": "upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics",
"sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 485, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (1975) (upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived a... | 10,736,033 | b |
Finally, comparison to other statutes and judicial decisions supports the interpretation we adopt today. Congress has often explicitly included a required mental state in other hoax statutes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "416 F.2d 874, 877-78",
"parenthetical": "holding that the crime of \"knowingly and willfully\" threatening the President required only that the threat be made under circumstances where \"a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom\" ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 1080, 1084-85",
"parenthetical": "applying objective reasonableness standard to presidential threat statute, 18 U.S.C. SS 871, and re-affirming Roy",
"sentence": "See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that the crime of “knowingly a... | 6,053,851 | a |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638",
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "830 F.2d 628, 634",
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, ... | 10,514,798 | a |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638",
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631,... | 10,514,798 | a |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638",
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L... | 10,514,798 | b |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638",
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L... | 10,514,798 | b |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "830 F.2d 628, 634",
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, ... | 10,514,798 | a |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) ... | 10,514,798 | b |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631,... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) ... | 10,514,798 | b |
Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"",
"sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631,... | 10,514,798 | a |
Accordingly, the terms of Settlement Agreement I unambiguously evidence a mutual agreement to terminate the lease on November 30, 2000, effectuating a legal surrender of the leasehold interest and cancel-ling all covenants thereunder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 U.S. 389, 389",
"parenthetical": "requiring a \"mutual agreement between the pax*ties\" to extinguish the leasehold interest",
"sentence": "See Beall, 94 U.S. at 389 (requiring a “mutual agreement between the pax*ties” to extinguish the leasehold interest); see also Checkers... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "864 F.2d 1346, 1346",
"parenthetical": "stating that surrender requires \"an agreement ... whereby the lessee surrendered the premises and the lessor accepted the premises back, both intending thereby to terminate the lease and cancel all the covenants and obligations thereu... | 3,567,156 | a |
"[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habe-as corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Despite having had every opportunity rais... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "568 F.2d 830, 840",
"parenthetical": "noting that petitioner had full and fair opportunity to raise claim in state court, on appeal, and through coram nobis procedure",
"sentence": "See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1977) (noting that petitioner had full and fai... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 129, 134",
"parenthetical": "\"[0]nce it is established that a petitioner has had an opportunity to litigate his or her Fourth Amendment claim (whether or not he or she took advantage of the states procedure",
"sentence": "See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840... | 3,660,042 | a |
Based on our recent precedents, admission of those statements as lay opinion testimony was error. However, the District Court later qualified Agent Sparks as an expert in the investigation of drug trafficking based on his "training and experience on hundreds of investigations." Aug. 13, 2001 Trial Tr. at 17649. Because... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "640 F.3d 358, 366",
"parenthetical": "agent's improper lay testimony was harmless error where agent would have qualified as an expert",
"sentence": "See Moore, 651 F.3d at 61 (that Agent Sparks “might have qualified as an expert” ameliorated prejudice from improper opinion... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "651 F.3d 61, 61",
"parenthetical": "that Agent Sparks \"might have qualified as an expert\" ameliorated prejudice from improper opinion testimony",
"sentence": "See Moore, 651 F.3d at 61 (that Agent Sparks “might have qualified as an expert” ameliorated prejudice from improper ... | 4,279,293 | b |
The BAP properly affirmed the bankruptcy court's order granting the trustee's surcharge motion because the surcharge was calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor's misconduct, and was warranted to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 B.R. 549, 556",
"parenthetical": "a surcharge should be calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor's misconduct",
"sentence": "See Latman, 366 F.3d at 786 (recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surchar... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 786, 786",
"parenthetical": "recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtor's exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under Bankruptcy Code",
"senten... | 4,189,671 | b |
"Endnote i," however, reads: "Until the Plaintiff's discovery requests regarding the appropriate collection manuals are fulfilled, the Plaintiff is unable to identify to the Court the precise regulations." (emphasis added). Even assuming that the IRS failed to follow procedures contained in the Internal Revenue Manual,... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1998 WL 233750, at *2",
"parenthetical": "failure to follow guidelines in IRS manuals does not constitute a violation of a provision or regulation of the Tax Code and is not actionable under SS 7433",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gonsalves v. IRS, 975 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1992)... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "975 F.2d 13, 16",
"parenthetical": "SS 7433 does not permit taxpayers to sue the government for violations of internal IRS policies like those in the Internal Revenue Manual",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gonsalves v. IRS, 975 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (§ 7433 does not permit taxpa... | 11,474,526 | b |
It is true that the interference here was greater than that in Morrison, for in Morrison, the defendant reported directly and immediately to her attorney about the government's conduct and did not say anything incriminating. Even so, Morrison requires that a defendant point to specific ways in which his trial was compr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Ki... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "639 F.2d 206, 210",
"parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United State... | 10,549,848 | a |
It is true that the interference here was greater than that in Morrison, for in Morrison, the defendant reported directly and immediately to her attorney about the government's conduct and did not say anything incriminating. Even so, Morrison requires that a defendant point to specific ways in which his trial was compr... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 6... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Ki... | 10,549,848 | b |
It is true that the interference here was greater than that in Morrison, for in Morrison, the defendant reported directly and immediately to her attorney about the government's conduct and did not say anything incriminating. Even so, Morrison requires that a defendant point to specific ways in which his trial was compr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Ki... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 6... | 10,549,848 | a |
It is true that the interference here was greater than that in Morrison, for in Morrison, the defendant reported directly and immediately to her attorney about the government's conduct and did not say anything incriminating. Even so, Morrison requires that a defendant point to specific ways in which his trial was compr... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668",
"parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Ki... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial",
"sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 6... | 10,549,848 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 905, 913",
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commerc... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568",
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians t... | 65,440 | b |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568",
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians t... | 65,440 | b |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568",
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568",
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 905, 913",
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commerc... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | 65,440 | b |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "734 F.2d 905, 913",
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commerc... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
First, while Defendant asserts a lack of jurisdiction, Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating why the Indictment on its face does not invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in sel... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor i... | 65,440 | a |
However, this would produce an absurd result that is clearly contrary to the objectives of the juvenile justice system. Hence, such a construction also would violate a well-established rule of statutory construction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "31 P.3d 180, 182",
"parenthetical": "\"we must be mindful of the effects of our interpretation and should avoid statutory constructions that lead to absurd results\"",
"sentence": "See People v. Haghshenas, 31 P.3d 180, 182 (Colo.App.2001) (“we must be mindful of the effects of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "928 P.2d 771, 774",
"parenthetical": "although trial court's noneompliance with mandatory deadlines in special sentencing statute deprived court of authority to impose sentence pursuant to that statute, the noncompliance did not result in a divestiture of jurisdiction",
"s... | 6,997,331 | a |
When we grant a prisoner like Bryant relief under the savings clause for an argument that he is legally innocent of his sentence and not actually innocent of his offense, we sidestep the clear command of Congress. To file a second or successive motion based on actual innocence, the prisoner must have "newly discovered ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "715 F.3d 284, 296",
"parenthetical": "\"A sentence is not a conviction for an 'underlying offense.'\"",
"sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies unde... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "713 F.3d 1346, 1346",
"parenthetical": "\"[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].\"",
"sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal... | 4,200,084 | b |
When we grant a prisoner like Bryant relief under the savings clause for an argument that he is legally innocent of his sentence and not actually innocent of his offense, we sidestep the clear command of Congress. To file a second or successive motion based on actual innocence, the prisoner must have "newly discovered ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "715 F.3d 284, 296",
"parenthetical": "\"A sentence is not a conviction for an 'underlying offense.'\"",
"sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies unde... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "657 F.3d 1190, 1199",
"parenthetical": "\"McKay does not even suggest, because he cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convic... | 4,200,084 | b |
The reasoning underlying Monessen was that prejudgment interest is a part of damages, which are "inseparably connected with the right of action" under FELA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is \"directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,\" from costs and disbursements, which \"are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury\"",
"sen... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "243 Minn. 1, 7",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"costs and disbursements\" are a \"procedural element\" separate from the concept of \"just compensation\" under the Minnesota Constitution",
"sentence": "See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguis... | 6,899,969 | a |
The reasoning underlying Monessen was that prejudgment interest is a part of damages, which are "inseparably connected with the right of action" under FELA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 N.W.2d 900, 904",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"costs and disbursements\" are a \"procedural element\" separate from the concept of \"just compensation\" under the Minnesota Constitution",
"sentence": "See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is \"directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,\" from costs and disbursements, which \"are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury\"",
"sen... | 6,899,969 | b |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1157, 1165",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal's property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent's conduct\"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. De... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1157, 1165",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal's property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent's conduct\"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 F.2d 1157, 1165",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal's property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent's conduct\"",
"sentence"... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. De... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. ... | 5,269,852 | b |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. ... | 5,269,852 | b |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. De... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. ... | 5,269,852 | b |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. ... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. De... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (... | 5,269,852 | b |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. De... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller's instructions, the seller ratified the agent's acts when the seller read and signed the agreement",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 115... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. De... | 5,269,852 | a |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller's instructions, the seller ratified the agent's acts when the seller read and signed the agreement",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 115... | 5,269,852 | b |
However, if the principal authorized the agent's acts, or otherwise acquiesced in or ratified such acts, the agent will not be held liable to the principal for the losses resulting from those acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his ag... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller's instructions, the seller ratified the agent's acts when the seller read and signed the agreement",
"sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 115... | 5,269,852 | b |
The purpose of the analysis is to balance the interests of the nations whose law might apply. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "345 U.S. 582, 582",
"parenthetical": "\"to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved\"",
"sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "\"Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.\"",
"sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928 (“to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by as... | 288,204 | a |
The purpose of the analysis is to balance the interests of the nations whose law might apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "632 F.2d 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "\"Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.\"",
"sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928 (“to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by as... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "73 S.Ct. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "\"to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved\"",
"sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at... | 288,204 | b |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | 11,163,555 | b |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23",
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below i... | 11,163,555 | a |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | 11,163,555 | b |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23",
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | 11,163,555 | b |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | 11,163,555 | b |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23",
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below i... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | 11,163,555 | b |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any... | 11,163,555 | a |
Thus, while we disagree with the trial court's assessment of the applicability of subsection (a)(5) and, for the same reason, (a)(8) , for the reasons discussed below, we find termination is appropriate under subsection (a)(1). We may, of course, affirm the trial court on grounds other than those specified in its opini... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper ba... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23",
"parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below i... | 11,163,555 | a |
To the contrary, they simply served as predicates for the subject litigation. Notably, in respect to the ADA claim, defendant's counsel should have known the basic principle of law that as a precondition to initiating a federal discrimination lawsuit, plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies, and t... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "235 F.3d 763, 768",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC stands as an essential element of Title VII's statutory scheme, and one with which defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply.\"",
"sentence": "See Francis v. City of ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2002 WL 1033833, at * 5",
"parenthetical": "claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing ADA claim in federal court",
"sentence": "See Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir.2000) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC s... | 11,429,089 | a |
When drafting that written sentencing opinion, the Court relied on all of the information in the record at that point. The information reviewed and relied upon by the Court included a detailed PSR, which, in practice, generally represents an integral part of a sentencing judge's understanding of a defendant's backgroun... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "614 F.3d 227, 227",
"parenthetical": "noting that the presentence report and other materials \"typically paint an accurate picture of the defendant and his crime\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Labbe, 588 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.2009) (“No doubt most sentencing ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 139, 143",
"parenthetical": "\"No doubt most sentencing judges have formulated a tentative sentence after reading a [presentence report].\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Labbe, 588 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.2009) (“No doubt most sentencing judges have formulat... | 3,977,254 | b |
Courts in this district have also expressed a preference, albeit in dicta, for joining IDEA fee claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 113, 122",
"parenthetical": "noting that bundling fee applications would \"reduce the number of individual lawsuits and ultimately save the parties and the Court time and energy\"",
"sentence": "See Abraham v. Dist. of Columbia, 338 F.Supp.2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2004... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though the plaintiffs point out that some courts in this district have expressed in dicta a preference for joining multiple IDEA fee litigation claims in a single case, nothing in those decisions suggests that such a preference permits the joinde... | 4,276,984 | a |
Courts in this district have also expressed a preference, albeit in dicta, for joining IDEA fee claims. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though the plaintiffs point out that some courts in this district have expressed in dicta a preference for joining multiple IDEA fee litigation claims in a single case, nothing in those decisions suggests that such a preference permits the joinde... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 F.Supp.2d 50, 55-56",
"parenthetical": "endorsing \"actions that include multiple fee requests\" because \"while each fee petition will be considered separately, combining them in one complaint avoids burdening the Court with multiple actions\"",
"sentence": "See Abraham v.... | 4,276,984 | b |
In Insurance Company of North America, we held that California law, not federal common law, applied to a determination of whether theft by an employee constituted "wilful misconduct" under Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21",
"parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87",
"parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., c... | 9,413,111 | a |
In Insurance Company of North America, we held that California law, not federal common law, applied to a determination of whether theft by an employee constituted "wilful misconduct" under Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagree... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21",
"parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing w... | 9,413,111 | b |
In Insurance Company of North America, we held that California law, not federal common law, applied to a determination of whether theft by an employee constituted "wilful misconduct" under Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21",
"parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagree... | 9,413,111 | a |
In Insurance Company of North America, we held that California law, not federal common law, applied to a determination of whether theft by an employee constituted "wilful misconduct" under Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21",
"parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagree... | 9,413,111 | a |
In Insurance Company of North America, we held that California law, not federal common law, applied to a determination of whether theft by an employee constituted "wilful misconduct" under Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21",
"parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing w... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10",
"parenthetical": "relying on Ninth Circuit definition of \"wilful misconduct\" in affirming district court, which \"applied] U.S. federal law\" and found that the airline crew's \"wilful misconduct\" caused the plane to crash",
"sentence": "Ins. Co... | 9,413,111 | a |
In Insurance Company of North America, we held that California law, not federal common law, applied to a determination of whether theft by an employee constituted "wilful misconduct" under Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "78 F.3d 664, 667-69",
"parenthetical": "relying on federal standard of \"willful misconduct\" in determining whether Article 25 applied",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusio... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21",
"parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply",
"sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing w... | 9,413,111 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made... | 743,797 | a |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which us... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which us... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 S.C. 537, 538",
"parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate revie... | 743,797 | a |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 S.E.2d 765, 767",
"parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate rev... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made... | 743,797 | a |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which us... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which us... | 743,797 | a |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "275 S.C. 537, 538",
"parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate revie... | 743,797 | a |
We conclude appellant waived review of this issue by failing to object prior to the jury's verdict. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "273 S.E.2d 765, 767",
"parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate rev... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity",
"sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserv... | 743,797 | b |
Rather, in DeBoom, we were careful to note the difference between the discriminatory discharge causa tion standard and the "higher" causation standard of claims such as tortious discharge. We have frequently compared tortious discharge under common law and retaliatory discharge under the ICRA, as the two have tradition... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "584 N.W.2d 301, 301-02",
"parenthetical": "stating high causation standard for tortious discharge and comparing to Hulme, a retaliatory discharge case under the ICRA",
"sentence": "See Teachout, 584 N.W.2d at 301-02 (stating high causation standard for tortious discharge and co... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "178 F.Supp.2d 961, 979",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Iowa Supreme Court has consistently sought guidance in its common-law retaliatory discharge cases from its decisions involving claims of statutory retaliation, which further demonstrates that the Iowa Supreme Court would ana... | 12,334,063 | a |
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