context stringlengths 58 1.13k | citation_a dict | citation_b dict | case_id int64 475 12.5M | label stringclasses 2
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Accordingly, insofar as the district court's enhancement of Davila-Rodriguez's sentence as a career offender under SS 4B1.1 involved determinations that he had prior convictions, these determinations did not implicate the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker line of cases. Moreover, to the extent that Davila-Rodriguez's argument ca... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "431 F.3d 744, 749",
"parenthetical": "holding that, \"whether a previous conviction is a 'crime of violence' is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [SS 4B1.2]\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2005) (h... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 1274, 1277",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in SS 2L1.2(b",
"sentence": "See United States... | 1,052,188 | a |
However, finding that the unchastity category applies to both genders equally avoids any need to examine the serious equal protection clause problem that would otherwise exist. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 89, 99",
"parenthetical": "\"prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.\"",
"sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by ... | 3,945,600 | a |
However, finding that the unchastity category applies to both genders equally avoids any need to examine the serious equal protection clause problem that would otherwise exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.\"",
"sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitut... | 3,945,600 | b |
However, finding that the unchastity category applies to both genders equally avoids any need to examine the serious equal protection clause problem that would otherwise exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.\"",
"sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitut... | 3,945,600 | b |
Seventh, while the defendants fault the government for failing to explain the specific reasons for disbelieving them, it is Defendants' burden, not the government's, to make a "substantial" showing that the departure decision was irrational. Normally the general statement of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer that... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 255, 259",
"parenthetical": "holding that it was not error to deny a motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding a defense motion to compel the government to file a departure motion where, among other things, \"the FBI questioned [the defendant's] candor____\"",
"... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 1332, 1339",
"parenthetical": "the defendant was not entitled to reduction of the sentence for substantial assistance where, among other things, the prosecutor told the district judge that \"the assistance ... turned, out to be unreliable.\"",
"sentence": "See also... | 47,473 | a |
1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "503 U.S. 140, 149",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); se... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 508, 508",
"parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA ... | 11,235,881 | b |
1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 508, 508",
"parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA ... | 11,235,881 | b |
1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 508, 508",
"parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA ... | 11,235,881 | b |
1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "503 U.S. 140, 149",
"parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); se... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion prov... | 11,235,881 | b |
1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion prov... | 11,235,881 | b |
1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion prov... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions",
"sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy... | 11,235,881 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance bannin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "118 Ariz. 357, 359",
"parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease... | 3,520,519 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance bannin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 P.2d 1357, 1359",
"parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain stripteas... | 3,520,519 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance bannin... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "177 Ariz. 94, 100",
"parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain st... | 3,520,519 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "865 P.2d 138, 144",
"parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain st... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance bannin... | 3,520,519 | b |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "118 Ariz. 357, 359",
"parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease... | 3,520,519 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "576 P.2d 1357, 1359",
"parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain stripteas... | 3,520,519 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "177 Ariz. 94, 100",
"parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain st... | 3,520,519 | a |
P 19 We disagree. Although the ordinances at issue here apply to persons who are nude in a public place, fundamentally the Scottsdale Code permits such conduct, rather than bans it. As the Scottsdale City Council noted in "findings" it enacted with the ordinance in 1993, "some activities" associated with sexually orien... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "865 P.2d 138, 144",
"parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain st... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92",
"parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds",
"sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning... | 3,520,519 | b |
Inherent in the concept of constructive knowledge is what an objective examination of the facts would reveal to a reasonable person. See Black's Law Dietionary 876 (7th ed. 1999) ("Knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law"). In other words, rather than r... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "139 Vt. 485, 485-86",
"parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"",
"sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "154 Vt. 76, 81",
"parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused",
"sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, ... | 240,902 | a |
Inherent in the concept of constructive knowledge is what an objective examination of the facts would reveal to a reasonable person. See Black's Law Dietionary 876 (7th ed. 1999) ("Knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law"). In other words, rather than r... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 A.2d 1264, 1267",
"parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused",
"sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "139 Vt. 485, 485-86",
"parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"",
"sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is... | 240,902 | b |
Inherent in the concept of constructive knowledge is what an objective examination of the facts would reveal to a reasonable person. See Black's Law Dietionary 876 (7th ed. 1999) ("Knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law"). In other words, rather than r... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "154 Vt. 76, 81",
"parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused",
"sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, ... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "431 A.2d 1239, 1239-40",
"parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"",
"sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t... | 240,902 | b |
Inherent in the concept of constructive knowledge is what an objective examination of the facts would reveal to a reasonable person. See Black's Law Dietionary 876 (7th ed. 1999) ("Knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law"). In other words, rather than r... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 A.2d 1264, 1267",
"parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused",
"sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "431 A.2d 1239, 1239-40",
"parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"",
"sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t... | 240,902 | b |
. The supreme court has applied the holding of Delgado-Santos even where the statement is made under oath. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "witness, who was subpoenaed to appear before prosecuting attorney, was put under oath and required to testify before court reporter in nonadversarial setting",
"sentence": "See also Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991 (Fla.1993) (witness, who was subpoenae... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior statement made under oath to prosecutor and deputy in presence of court reporter",
"sentence": "See State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306 (Fla.1990) (prior statement made under oath to prosecutor and deputy in presence of court reporter)."
} | 7,474,224 | b |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not su... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | 228,027 | a |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not su... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | 228,027 | a |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not su... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | 228,027 | a |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not su... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | 228,027 | a |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of... | 228,027 | b |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of... | 228,027 | b |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | 228,027 | a |
There is a wealth of cases addressing jurors' use of dictionaries. Courts have almost uniformly found no prejudice to the defendant when the dictionary definition did not vary from the ordinary meaning of the words or from the meaning contained in the trial court's instructions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where ... | 228,027 | a |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original",
"se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 F.3d 549, 554-55",
"parenthetical": "termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA\"",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"require... | 3,702,783 | b |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "454 F.3d 549, 554-55",
"parenthetical": "termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA\"",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"require... | 3,702,783 | b |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 1282, 1286",
"parenthetical": "termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requir... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original",
"se... | 3,702,783 | a |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 1282, 1286",
"parenthetical": "termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requir... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496... | 3,702,783 | a |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original",
"se... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553",
"parenthetical": "describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the em... | 3,702,783 | b |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553",
"parenthetical": "describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the em... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496... | 3,702,783 | a |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 373, 383",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original",
"se... | 3,702,783 | a |
Implicit in the case is the suggestion that Green-well's defective notice would have been excusable had she provided follow-up certification as requested. In the instant case, Harlingen's counsel conceded at oral argument that Saenz could not have been required to certify an absence after she was terminated. In fact, t... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5",
"parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 F.3d 373, 383",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b... | 3,702,783 | b |
Rules 32.2(b) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a petitioner may only file a successive, untimely PCR petition based on claims that fall within the exceptions to preclusion set forth in Rule 32.1(d)-(h). Absent an applicable exception, which Petitioner does not assert, Claim 11 is now ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "149 F.3d 931, 931",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's conclusion that petitioner did not have an available state court remedy for claim that had never before been presented to the state courts despite opportunity",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding no available state court remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a",
"sentence": "See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no available state court remedies and noting that petiti... | 3,785,714 | b |
Unfortunately for Hall, the failure to object to the recommendations and decisions of a magistrate judge is one instance we have held waiver of appellate review results. The purpose of this waiver rule is to promote efficiency between the district and appellate courts, so that district courts have the opportunity to ni... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 734, 742",
"parenthetical": "sandbagging problem identified in Thomas may be cured with adequate notice to the district judge of the contested issues",
"sentence": "See Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d at 598 (citing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.E... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "843 F.2d 1015, 1017-18",
"parenthetical": "holding the rationale of Thomas requires waiver to apply to each issue not included in an objection",
"sentence": "See Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d at 598 (citing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)); Loc... | 3,463,261 | b |
P 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times' nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times' re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 14, 14",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden f... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 Ariz. 332, 335",
"parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the... | 5,715,334 | a |
P 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times' nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times' re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 14, 14",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden f... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "690 P.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “b... | 5,715,334 | a |
P 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times' nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times' re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 Ariz. 14, 14",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden f... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting \"as soon as practicable\" under the federal Freedom of Information Act's (\"FOIA\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squ... | 5,715,334 | a |
P 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times' nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times' re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 P.2d 1198, 1198",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burde... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "142 Ariz. 332, 335",
"parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the... | 5,715,334 | a |
P 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times' nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times' re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "690 P.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “b... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 P.2d 1198, 1198",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burde... | 5,715,334 | b |
P 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times' nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times' re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting \"as soon as practicable\" under the federal Freedom of Information Act's (\"FOIA\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squ... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "852 P.2d 1198, 1198",
"parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"",
"sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burde... | 5,715,334 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2667, 2667-71",
"parenthetical": "applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors' prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutin... | 4,149,171 | a |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment s... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2667, 2667-71",
"parenthetical": "applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors' prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate... | 4,149,171 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2667, 2667-71",
"parenthetical": "applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors' prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law p... | 4,149,171 | a |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24",
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scruti... | 4,149,171 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment s... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24",
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scruti... | 4,149,171 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24",
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scruti... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law p... | 4,149,171 | a |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76",
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment sc... | 4,149,171 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76",
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment sc... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment s... | 4,149,171 | a |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76",
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment sc... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law p... | 4,149,171 | a |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutin... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting... | 4,149,171 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment s... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting... | 4,149,171 | b |
Further, First Amendment scrutiny is not eliminated simply because burdened speech occurs in the course of conducting one's business as a professional. Even in cases involving speech that is spoken only in pursuit of one's profession, the Court has applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law p... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny",
"sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting... | 4,149,171 | b |
In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 657, 657",
"parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 F.3d 733, 748",
"parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definitio... | 3,515,558 | a |
In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 657, 657",
"parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a pla... | 3,515,558 | a |
In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 657, 657",
"parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a pla... | 3,515,558 | a |
In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 474, 501",
"parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 F.3d 733, 748",
"parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definitio... | 3,515,558 | a |
In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 474, 501",
"parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a pla... | 3,515,558 | a |
In order to show a causal connection, Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to hire him "because the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 474, 501",
"parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"",
"sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a pla... | 3,515,558 | a |
See 1 Leonard B. Sand, et ah, Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal, Instructions 6-9 (flight), 6-11 (false exculpatory statements) (2002). So in this case, in which other evidence plainly established that Cassese had placed the charged DPRC stock purchases, a rational jury could reasonably infer from his effort t... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "387 F.3d 201, 209",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that defendant's attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906-07 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that de... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 902, 906-07",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant's knowledge of and intent to participate in a criminal conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence, \"including] acts that exhibit a consciousness of guilt\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Go... | 1,280,437 | b |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surpri... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that ... | 10,738,731 | b |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surpri... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that ... | 10,738,731 | b |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surpri... | 10,738,731 | a |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "505 N.W.2d 299, 312",
"parenthetical": "standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that empl... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that ... | 10,738,731 | b |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 539, 547",
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process a... | 10,738,731 | a |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surpri... | 10,738,731 | a |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surpri... | 10,738,731 | a |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surpri... | 10,738,731 | a |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given th... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "505 N.W.2d 299, 312",
"parenthetical": "standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that empl... | 10,738,731 | a |
Because the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate governmental purpose under the takings analyses, it satisfies this deferential rational basis test for equal protection and substantive due process purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 539, 547",
"parenthetical": "constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process a... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289",
"parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause",
"sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given th... | 10,738,731 | b |
In light of the above, Petitioner Casas is not entitled on collateral review to reliti-gate issues raised on direct appeal, absent an intervening change in the law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "417 U.S. 333, 342",
"parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 5, 6",
"parenthetical": "\"We note that certain other claims raised in the SS 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir.1... | 5,877,093 | a |
In light of the above, Petitioner Casas is not entitled on collateral review to reliti-gate issues raised on direct appeal, absent an intervening change in the law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 5, 6",
"parenthetical": "\"We note that certain other claims raised in the SS 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir.1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (holdin... | 5,877,093 | b |
In light of the above, Petitioner Casas is not entitled on collateral review to reliti-gate issues raised on direct appeal, absent an intervening change in the law. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "901 F.2d 5, 6",
"parenthetical": "\"We note that certain other claims raised in the SS 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir.1... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law",
"sentence": "Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (holdin... | 5,877,093 | b |
. The declaration was submitted to the Court on March 6, 2001, together with Shipley's supplemental brief. As in Euromepa, we rely on the parties' declarations to this Court to analyze the foreign law issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "154 F.3d 29, 29",
"parenthetical": "relying on \"the affidavits and other material submitted by the parties\"",
"sentence": "See 154 F.3d at 29 (relying on \"the affidavits and other material submitted by the parties\"); cf. Jacobs v. Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc., 230 F.3d 565... | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "230 F.3d 565, 567",
"parenthetical": "relying on briefs and affidavits that the parties submitted in response to the Court's request for supplemental briefing",
"sentence": "See 154 F.3d at 29 (relying on \"the affidavits and other material submitted by the parties\"); cf. Jaco... | 11,092,812 | a |
He contends that requiring Simeis to disclose this information will chill Payden's relationship of trust and confidence with Simeis. This argument is unpersuasive. The mere disclosure by defense counsel of information that is adverse to the defendant does not affect counsel's ability to represent the defendant effectiv... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "534 F.2d 719, 731",
"parenthetical": "where client makes his attorney a witness to the crime by giving him money, the client may not invoke the sixth amendment to bar the attorney's testimony at trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilson, 571 F.Supp. 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y.... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "571 F.Supp. 1417, 1422",
"parenthetical": "not an infringement of sixth amendment unless legal strategy would be disclosed",
"sentence": "United States v. Wilson, 571 F.Supp. 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (not an infringement of sixth amendment unless legal strategy would be ... | 3,754,260 | b |
In particular, the ALJ noted that Woods has consistently reported doing well on her medications since the alleged onset date, with no psychotic symptoms or significant disturbance in her mood. While Dr. Fontaine's notes do indicate that Woods is stable for the most part when she is medicated, that is not inconsistent w... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "564 F.3d 943, 943",
"parenthetical": "treating physician's opinion that claimant was disabled was not inconsistent with the fact that her \"schizoaffective disorder was in remission,\" because physician's notes \"do not indicate that [physician] believed she was sufficiently stab... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 707, 712",
"parenthetical": "\"We also believe the Commissioner erroneously relied too heavily on indications in the medical record that Hutsel was 'doing well,' because doing well for the purposes of a treatment program has no necessary relation to a claimant's abi... | 4,240,316 | a |
. An overwhelming majority of those courts have held that such logs are not testimonial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 55, 60",
"parenthetical": "records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nont... | 3,742,316 | a |
. An overwhelming majority of those courts have held that such logs are not testimonial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "726 N.W.2d 176, 184",
"parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine wa... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 55, 60",
"parenthetical": "records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial... | 3,742,316 | b |
. An overwhelming majority of those courts have held that such logs are not testimonial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 P.3d 55, 60",
"parenthetical": "records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "900 So.2d 615, 617",
"parenthetical": "a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are... | 3,742,316 | a |
. An overwhelming majority of those courts have held that such logs are not testimonial. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "900 So.2d 615, 617",
"parenthetical": "a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nont... | 3,742,316 | b |
. An overwhelming majority of those courts have held that such logs are not testimonial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "726 N.W.2d 176, 184",
"parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine wa... | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "900 So.2d 615, 617",
"parenthetical": "a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial",
"sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are... | 3,742,316 | a |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 Md. 469, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which cou... | 5,738,363 | a |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "345 Md. 469, 469",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. ... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a... | 5,738,363 | a |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which cou... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S... | 5,738,363 | b |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S... | 5,738,363 | b |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which cou... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 30, 30-31",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S... | 5,738,363 | b |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "392 U.S. 30, 30-31",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S... | 5,738,363 | b |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which cou... | 5,738,363 | a |
One circumstance that may justify a more intrusive search is when the initial pat-down reveals a potential weapon. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"",
"sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a... | 5,738,363 | a |
The LMRA, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs actions involving "contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' 9 U.S.C. SS 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration c... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1580085, at *1",
"parenthetical": "confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA",
"sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. §... | 4,344,079 | a |
The LMRA, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs actions involving "contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' 9 U.S.C. SS 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration c... | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1580085, at *1",
"parenthetical": "confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA",
"sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. §... | 4,344,079 | a |
The LMRA, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs actions involving "contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1580085, at *1",
"parenthetical": "confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA",
"sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. §... | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' 9 U.S.C. SS 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration c... | 4,344,079 | b |
The Debtor alleges the court erred in denying discharge under section 727(a)(4)(A) because undervaluation of an asset is an insufficient basis for denying discharge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "114 B.R. 794, 797",
"parenthetical": "Undervaluation of assets which are otherwise properly listed in a debtor's schedules is not sufficient to warrant a denial of discharge",
"sentence": "See also In re Wines, 114 B.R. 794, 797 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990)(Undervaluation of asset... | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "41 B.R. 816, 819",
"parenthetical": "Failure of the debtor to properly value two automobiles on his schedules was an insufficient ground for discharge since the automobiles were disclosed on debt- or's schedules to the Trustee who was afforded an opportunity to make an independen... | 377,810 | b |
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