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What are some encryption algorithms that are currently in use by secure websites, by operating systems, or by Secure USB thumb drive manufacturers. I am trying to do research on differences in speed on algorithms that are currently used. I know security is a debatable factor, but I am not concerned with that. I just want to know what some of the common algorithms that are used today are.
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I understand that a block cipher can be made to act like a stream cipher at the cost of "losing versatility" of the block cipher for the sake of performance. I don't understand what I'd be losing.
For example, AES GCM mode is a block cipher that acts as a stream cipher, however I get
Integrity (the message can't be modified without me knowing)
Streaming (the whole object doesn't have to be loaded into RAM for encryption/decryption.)
other features ...
Question
What would I be losing when AES is in "block" mode vs "stream" mode?... (this question isn't supposed to be AES specific, but it's what I'm familiar with)
What are some real world examples of a block cipher being used where a stream cipher is less than ideal?
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In SSL, the client generates a pre-master key from random data from itself and also the server. It then encrypts this with the server's public key, sends it to the server and then both client and server generate a master key from this.
Why not have the client generate the master key and send that to the server?
My initial guess is to prevent the master secret from ever going over the wire in any shape or form. But I don't see how that is any safer than having the pre-master key sent over the wire if a Man in the Middle has observed the entire handshake (and thus knows the cipher used, and the random data sent by both client and server).
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Let's assume the same message is encrypted many times, each time with a different IV but the same key. Do we reach a point where just knowing what that message is gives us a plausible attack by which we can discover the key?
The closest thing I see to this is a side channel attack mentioned on the Wikipedia page requiring over 200 million chosen plaintexts, and presumably side-channels can be closed as they are discovered, negating this particular weakness.
Aside from that, it seems that it might be unwise to re-encode the same message many times, if a weakness were to be found then such a scenario might be the first to be exploited, but I was just wondering if there was anything we were currently aware of along those lines.
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This question is a bit broad, but I'm hoping someone can point me in the right direction. I administer a small LAN at work with 15-20 machines on it. They are running Windows XP - Windows 8 and I have a Linux based NAS for backups attached as well.
In the past, every user was highly trusted and my main concern was making sure files were easily accessible. I did things like grant "Everyone" full permissions on the root of each drive. Now, we are bringing on some semi-trusted personnel that I don't want to have access to "everything" on every computer in the network. So the questions are:
How can I effectively restrict access to certain areas?
How can I allow the trusted users to still easily access restricted content?
How can I secure the Linux backup?
How can I protect the network against disgruntled employees who may still have access?
I've tried some Googling, but I'm finding information mostly about protecting against external threats. Any pointers are greatly appreciated. Thanks.
Update:
My first step has been to remove the "Everone" group from the NTFS permissions for sensitive files. This effectively protects them from access, but it is also a pain. I would like to be able to authenticate (via a password maybe) to gain access if needed. I've come across Windows Active Directory which might be what I'm looking for, but it looks like a beast to try to learn and implement. Am I barking up the wrong tree here?
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I'm mainly server sided. I haven't worked with JS that much before.
My coworker was talking about BeeF and how it basically controls the victims browser just by a simple xss attack.
I was wondering how it's possible. Javascript only executed when the user is on that page correct? So when the user leaves that page, how can they still be controlling their browser if the JavaScript isn't running? Because BeeF documentation says the malicious javascript checks for commands every once in a while but it's not possible if the user isn't on that page with the malicious javascript.
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In the past recent years of mine, I have been doing a lot of DLL injection with a few indie games and MMORPGs. I fully understand how to do it, and how it works for allowing these games to work not as the developer's intend them to.
If I am able to compromise these games so easily and fast, what keeps me from doing it to the Windows itself in general?
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Let's say Alice, Bob, and Mallory all live together in a house.
Mallory decides to go on vacation, but before leaving, she decides to play a game with Bob and Alice. She makes two claims:
She has installed hidden cameras inside the house.
She has remote access to the cameras.
Mallory challenges Bob and Alice to find the cameras and then leaves for vacation.
Bob and Alice conduct a casual visual search throughout the house, but do not find any cameras.
Based off the search, Bob assumes that Mallory is lying about the cameras. Alice is not convinced that Malory is lying, so Bob wants to prove it.
He decides to attempt debunking Mallory's second claim.
To the best of his knowledge, there is only one wireless router installed inside the house. Bob gets on his laptop and gets a command line running.
# iw dev wlan1 scan | grep -B 4 SSID
He runs this iw command several times and notices that only one SSID is found consistently. This is the SSID he knows his router uses.
He then tries to find the gateway address of the router.
$ netstat -rn
Kernel IP routing table
Destination Gateway Genmask Flags MSS Window irtt Iface
0.0.0.0 192.168.1.254 0.0.0.0 UG 0 0 0 wlan1
169.254.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.255.0.0 U 0 0 0 wlan1
192.168.1.0 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 U 0 0 0 wlan1
Bob's networking knowledge is limited and his knowledge on cameras is even more limited, but he assumes that in order to remotely access the cameras, Mallory would have to have opened ports for those cameras.
# nmap -v -A 192.168.1.254 | grep "open port"
Discovered open port 443/tcp on 192.168.1.254
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.1.254
Discovered open port 49152/tcp on 192.168.1.254
A quick google search shows that port 80 is for HTTP and port 443 is for HTTPS, but Bob is unsure what port 49152 is for. It seems nmap is also unsure what the port is used for:
49152/tcp open unknown
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at http://www.insecure.org/cgi-bin/servicefp-submit.cgi :
SF-Port49152-TCP:V=5.21%I=7%D=3/28%Time=53362E24%P=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu%r(FourOhFourRequest,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(GetRequest,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(
SF:HTTPOptions,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(RTSPRequest,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(RPCCh
SF:eck,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(DNSVersionBindReq,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(DNSStat
SF:usRequest,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(SSLSessionReq,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(SMBPr
SF:ogNeg,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(X11Probe,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(LDAPBindReq,5,
SF:"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(SIPOptions,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(LANDesk-RC,5,"\*\xce
SF:d\0\x03")%r(TerminalServer,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(NCP,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%
SF:r(NotesRPC,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(WMSRequest,5,"\*\xced\0\x03")%r(oracle-
SF:tns,5,"\*\xced\0\x03");
Questions
What can Bob do to verify whether or not this is the port Mallory is using to remotely access the cameras?
Bob is also worried that he has not considered any wired internet connections. He is wondering if it's possible that Mallory hired a security company to install the cameras and that Mallory accesses the cameras remotely via the security company's website.
What else can Bob do to convince Alice that Mallory is lying about her second claim?
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I'm not entirely sure if this is the right place to ask this, and I'm also slightly fuzzy on how the p2p system works, so correct me if I'm wrong.
I've been looking into the practical implications of decentralized P2P networks, and there's a few issues I've noticed, generally relating to the security side of things. First, as stated in this post, I can forsee that problems would arise with MITM and spoofing attacks, so I'm not sure what the best practice is. For instance, let's say a node A sends data to node B, and then B relays that info to C, what is stopping B from spoofing, sniffing or modifying the data? Also, wouldn't it be a huge risk on the part of all nodes to open the ports for a P2P connection in the first place? Is there some possible way for the nodes to communicate directly without opening extra ports? I'm mostly just wrapping my head around how anyone would implement this securely.
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I have seen advice that I need to close all unused ports, and disable any unused services in order to secure my servers. How can I prove, beyond any doubt, to my client that I have done this?
I need to accomplish this in a realistic amount of time, using realistic resources, so please also let me know if there is no such method and why. Please also assume I am using both Linux and Windows servers, and that these are kept up-to-date with the latest patches.
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While I was away from my home I needed to do some work on a java program so I booted a friends netbook(windows 8) I had with me and finished most of the works I needed to do there. Tho when I returned home I realized that the netbook didn't have antivirus, firewall and nothing security wise turned on which made me worry.
I now want to transfer these files(.java) to my main ubuntu desktop system but I am worried that something might have hidden itself inside the files header and other places, is there a way to verify the integrity of the files or a way to safely transfer the code they contain without accidentally transferring anything malicious and since these files are actually going to be compiles and put on production I'm double worried about that.
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I looked at my logs from amazon ec2 instance and found the following lines:
94.177.121.102 - - [29/Mar/2014:08:50:52 +0000] "XGET /web-console/ServerInfo.jsp HTTP/1.0" 501 418 "-" "-"
94.177.121.102 - - [29/Mar/2014:08:50:52 +0000] "XGET /jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor HTTP/1.0" 501 415 "-" "-"
I looked at http status codes and 501 means.
501 Not Implemented
The server either does not recognize the request
method, or it lacks the ability to fulfill the request.[2] Usually
this implies future availability (e.g., a new feature of a web-service
API).
I checked that such files and even parenting directories do not exist in my /var/www and therefore I do not understand why it shows 501 and not 404.
I googled about these particular names (ServerInfo.jsp and HtmlAdaptor) but did not find anything that I can properly understand.
I found also similar issues in my error.log file (due to stupidity I truncated the logs...).
Do not know if this is helpful, but nothing was installed on the server except of git and some updates.
Does this sound like an intrusion or am I overreacting? What can these 501 means (wiki explanation are not really helpful to me)?
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In order to be HDCP compliant, a source can only output HDCP-encrypted digital HD content.
However, is the opposite true for HDCP sinks? In order to be HDCP compliant, should a sink only accept to reproduce digital HD content when it's HDCP-encrypted?
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No idea if this is right place to ask.
In my country, by law, all ISPs are required to block certain websites. People can not access such sites. But, through proxy websites every one can access blocked websites. I guess the flow is My PC ---> My ISP ---> Proxy ---> Website and then it returns back the same path.
If all the Internet resources are requested through the ISP, then why can't they detect a disallowed website being requested via a proxy site?
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# aircrack-ng output-01.cap
Opening output-01.cap
Read 31484 packets.
# BSSID ESSID Encryption
1 00:11:22:33:44:55 SSIDHERE WPA (0 handshake)
Choosing first network as target.
Opening output-01.cap
Please specify a dictionary (option -w).
Quitting aircrack-ng...
#
Q: So if there is "0 handshake" in the capture file, then it means it will be impossible to get the password for the WPA test network?
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I've recently purchased an SSL certificate, and it says that it's limited to three servers. Surely if I have the key and certificate on multiple servers (more than 3), the SSL will still be valid? Can someone clarify why/how vendors can limit this? An example of one is 123-reg's 123-SSL (which is a resell of AlphaSSL).
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So you can use msfpayload or msfvenom to add a payload to an existing exe, most people online seem to use reverse shell. But I was wondering if you could include a custom exe of your own design as a payload. For example, I have "evil_notepad.exe" that I want to add a payload "showanalert.exe". When opened, "showanalert.exe" will be run.
I tried using the command: msfvenom -p generic/custom -f exe -k -x notepad.exe PAYLOADFILE=showanalert.exe >evil_notepad.exe
Which seemed to work, but caused the program itself to crash when run.
(Which also makes me feel I have made a mistake somewhere.)
Any ideas?
EDIT: Also tried using STDIN for "custom payloads" but whatever I try is apparently an "invalid custom payload"...
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Suppose a site allows connection to be established with HTTP or HTTPS .If you establish a connection to http://www.example.com or https://www.example.com then all further link's on the page displayed will have HTTP or HTTPS correspondingly. I understand that an attacker can degrade your HTTPS connection to HTTP using MITM and then can takeover your account but i want to know that can it pose any other threat other than this ??
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I have a server in my computer for testing purposes, accessible from the outside.
I was reviewing the access.log file, and I saw
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:01 +0100] "HEAD / HTTP/1.0" 200 -
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 209
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php5?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 210
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 213
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php.cgi?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 213
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:03 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php4?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 210
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:49 +0100] "HEAD / HTTP/1.0" 200 -
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 209
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php5?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 210
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 213
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php.cgi?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 213
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:51 +0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php4?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1" 404 210
I have searched it, and this seems an Apache PHP Remote Exploit attack.
Decoding those parameters, I get
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:01 0100] "HEAD / HTTP/1.0" 200 -
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 209
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php5?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 210
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 213
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:02 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php.cgi?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 213
89.187.33.50 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:39:03 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php4?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 210
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:49 0100] "HEAD / HTTP/1.0" 200 -
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 209
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php5?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 210
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 213
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:50 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php.cgi?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 213
78.102.105.47 - - [29/Mar/2014:03:43:51 0100] "POST /cgi-bin/php4?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off -d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions="" -d open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -d cgi.force_redirect=0 -d cgi.redirect_status_env=0 -n HTTP/1.1" 404 210
I use
Apache 2.4.7.0
PHP 5.4.26 (as Apache Module)
Windows XP
Questions:
Since I use php as an Apache module instead of CGI, and the http code was 404, I think nothing bad happened, right?
What was the attacker trying to do (or, if he was successful, what did he do) to my system?
Note I am not asking how to protect against those attacks because that is covered by Protect against POST //cgi-bin/php attacks?
|
Say I'm making a snapchat clone app for Android and iOS. Let's say that I get a snapchat from Baz. I want to pre-download the audio for this snapchat. However, as the developer, I want to secure this audio from being viewable outside of the app.
I've been thinking of encrypting it using AES with an IV and key that are both generated from a pseudo-random function that takes the user's unique ID as input. However, if an attacker found out that this was the way we encrypt our files, and had access to our PRF, he would easily be able to decrypt it and store it permanently. The thing is, I don't have enough background in cryptography or android programming to tell if that's really a concern or not. The attacker has to learn a lot about our cipher in order to break it, but he could gain pretty much all of that from looking at the unobfuscated source of our app.
Is my suggested approach cryptographically secure? What other, better or simpler approaches could I take to solving this problem?
|
I'm trying to wrap my head around the Application Data record that carries secured traffic. I understand TLS/SSL is a "authenticate-then-encrypt" protocol, which means an HMAC is calculated over the Plain text, and the resulting digest is appended to the message. Finally, the whole packet is encrypted using the negotiated cipher.
I also know that the first three fields of an "Application Data" record are:
Content Type (0x17 to indicate Application Data)
Protocol Version (0x0301 for TLS1.0, et al)
Record Length (length in Bytes of encrypted content)
Given the following (simplified) "Data"
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: helpme.com
What would the resulting encrypted packet look like, and what parts would be encrypted, and what part would be Hashed?
Please use the following (again, simplified) illustration to make answering this easier:
01 | ContentType | ProtocolVersion | RecordLength |
02 GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
03 Host: helpme.com
04 | HMAC | Padding |
My best guest from reading through RFC 5246:
Lines 01-03 are included in HMAC
Lines 02-04 are included in Encryption
Any help is appreciated.
|
When it comes to blackbox pentesting of a Wordpress site, the first thing to come to mind is WPScan [http://wpscan.org/].
While pentesting some sites, I faced a common issue i.e it shows that Wordpress SEO 1.14.15 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting Attack. Output is given below:
| * Title: WordPress SEO 1.14.15 - index.php s Parameter Reflected XSS
| * Reference: [http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/123028/][2]
| * Reference: http://osvdb.org/97885
But when following the link http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/123028/ , it shows that attack can be executed with
But the main problem is when I tried to inject several XSS vectors, the results were not positive. I was not able to find any XSS in above url. There is proper output encoding, a snapshot is shown below:
So my question is:
Do you have any method to bypass this and execute an XSS?
Do you have any other tool or resources through which I can do better blackbox testing of Wordpress?
|
On a typical desktop (with no listening services such as Apache, SSH, ...) it seems to me, the browser is the most exposed application and a potential security compromise (and even more so with Java and Flash plugins. And judging from the constant security updates, this seems to be correct.
I am therefore wondering whether I could run Firefox (Iceweasel) as a different user from my logged in martin account, such as nobody. Even if Firefox had a critical bug, the worst that could happen to me is that files owned by nobody would be compromised.
Is this actually doable? Would this have any disadvantages? Is it really the bulletproof solution I imagine it to be?
How would a Firefox window owned by nobody access my display?
Is there perhaps a better way to make Firefox more secure (i.e. jail)?
I am using Debian Wheezy and LXDE Desktop environment.
|
I received a message from google saying they had prevented a hacking attempt. However I then received messages from friends saying that they had received spam from my gmail account. If you go to the security tab of gmail it lists
"Application/device sign-in attempt (prevented) London (UK)"
The email from Google also lists an IP address which I am not sure I can post here. Is there some way to get information on whose IP address it could be? For example, if it is an office or a mobile or a home IP address?
|
I have some Truecrypt volumes stored on my USB drive and I would like to know if they are safe from being cracked by the FBI or any government agencies? Some people say Full Disk Encryption will prevent the FBI from snooping through your files but I would like to know if Truecrypt volumes are just as safe and can provide enough protection from your files being accessed. I know about dictionary attacks, bruteforce attacks, and cold boot attacks. But with a strong password be enough for the FBI not to get into my files? Also, how do I prevent a cold boot attack on a Truecrypt flash drive volume? Some say making a volume itself is not safe and government agencies will still access your files and you should use full disk encryption instead, but I wanna know if that is the case or not. Thanks.
|
For how long ISPs keep record of Internet usage?
Do they keep record of every page we visit?
In what form do they keep such records (remote IP, URL, page title, headers, etc.)?
Is it possible for an employee working at ISP to monitor an individual customer's Internet usage?
|
I'm looking for an online training lab for pentesting/hacking and security.
I've found one at hacking-lab but it's seems troublesome to work with and it has some issues on VPN server authentication.
Someone knows about something similar?
Or something like Hackademic RTB1 and RTB2?
I wish for more resources to learn with.
thx in advance.
|
I was just wondering about the implications of Sky's new revelation of a so-called 'shield'. Is this actually even a security feature or just an advertisement stunt for Captain America? I can find very little information on this (maybe I am looking in the wrong place) but it seems this is just a URL filter that all ISP's employ anyway.
Is Sky just giving users a false sense of security or is this actually a next-gen security product of some kind?
|
I am working on web application security auditing.
I was going through various checklists & methodology.
I found one interesting stuff in a document.
Type - Configuration Management
Security Testing - After logout, I created a dump file of my chrome browser and opened it in winhex editor. Used search feature of that tool and inserted "pass =" in order to find password. I found username and password shown in hex with that tool.
My question - Is it a vulnerability of an application?
I was also seeking for a solution. I thought if a developer could reset the variable after immediate login, it can eliminate this vulnerability. Am I right ?
|
I typed in my IP into my address bar and my router admin page came up. Is this safe? How can I disable it? It's Linksys Smart Wifi
|
I want to develop two Android apps that will communicate via intents (on the same device).
When the two apps transfer confidential data, should they encrypt it?
Or does the Android OS guarantee (or at least try to guarantee) that intent data is not seen by anyone but sender and recipient?
Of course, let's suppose the user always selects my app as the receiver of the intent.
Let's also say that both apps are installed, that should prevent namespace hijacking.
|
What is "period" in the context of pseudo-random number generators? For example when someone says "The Mersenne Twister has a 2^19337−1 period" what does it mean? I would appreciate a simple as possible explanation as possible.
What exactly is meant by "state" of a PRNG? On wikipedia I found "The sequence is not truly random in that it is completely determined by a relatively small set of initial values, called the PRNG's state, which includes a truly random seed."
|
Also, the name of the actual virtualhost is going through unencrypted or not?
|
If its 14 then it splits it to 7&7, but how about 13 characters? 7&6?
How does it work?
|
I have a scenario in which I have two computers with static IP addresses running under common proxy. And let's say computer A is blocked from accessing certain site, let's say Facebook and another computer B is not blocked.
Is there any mechanism I which allows to access facebook from computer A? If we can do something such as making request to A and then from that making request to Facebook server through common proxy.
I know that I can bypass proxy, but that is not the solution I wanted. Please help me if you have ideas, I simply wanted to learn the methods in such scenario.
|
Let us say that we have a computer with a fully encrypted disk. If it gets infected with malware, does this make it more difficult to use a LiveCD or other rescue option to clean it or restore it? It seems to me that one would have to decrypt the volume before cleaning, which feels like a lot of work.
|
To see the users that are connected to the machine and they're pass hashes with Whosthere.exe, do I have to run it as an administrator?
|
I was thinking about how security on my Linux server can be increased and came up with this question: If most intrusions are performed by gaining remote access to machines, would it be possible and sensible to restrict admin user or maybe even root login by a hardware device? Meaning that it wouldn't be possible to log in as root if, for example, a certain USB device is not attached to server. Would that make sense or maybe even increase the complexity more than security?
The server is being administrated without any remote access/SSH.
|
According to this blog PAN number should be hashed using a "secret salt". What they are doing is basically H(Message+salt). The reason you need this "secret salt" is because PAN numbers are limited to certain amount of numbers, which makes bruteforcing dead easy.
I was wondering if a keyed-hash (HMAC) would not be more approriate in this case rather than using a secret salt?
If a keyed HMAC is used, can the same secret be used for all PAN numbers or should it be unique for every single PAN? (so use multiple secrets)
|
The paper Cryptanalysis of the Random Number Generator of the Windows Operating System describes some problematic aspects of the Windows CSPRNG. However the paper was written in 2007, and looked at the version of the generator present in Windows 2000. Are the problems described still issues in more recent Windows (7 or 8 for example)?
|
Is IIS and ASP vulnerable to the same Host Header Attacks we have seen on Apache and Nginx? Specifically the attacks that use the HTTP Host Header to reset a password or implement web-cache poisoning. These specific attacks use the SERVER and HOST variables.
Any insight or help is greatly appreciated.
|
Let's say the attacker got the username and the hashed password. How can he use it when authenticating to some service in its domain with for example NTLM?
How can he send the request as the compromised user? What tools and techniques should he use?
|
My understanding is that with the WebRTC peer-to-peer data API, communications between peers are encrypted via a modified form of SSL. Where are the keys for the peer-to-peer SSL connection generated, though? On the original web server that unites the peers, or on the peers' computers?
Update:
Also, assuming that the JavaScript delivered to their browsers is not already siphoning off their data, I'd like to know if the original uniting web server has enough information (keys, etc) to eavesdrop on the united peers encrypted communications, if the traffic was recorded, for instance.
|
I know this question is probably at risk of offending the guidelines but our IaaS provider was unable to offer us an anti-virus solution for our Linux servers. We are deployed in an enterprise cloud vSphere environment but it looks like a solution at the hypervisor level would not be available anyway since those anti-malware vendors that do offer a hypervisor solution leverage the vShield Endpoint Thin Agent and it only supports Windows guests.
So for the most part this means running an agent on the Linux server/guest. Here the vendors (e.g. Trend Micro) will list supported kernel versions. The problem here is that the supported versions will be older kernels that have had Important Security Advisories issued by Red Hat and we don't want to address one security concern by potentially increasing our risk elsewhere.
We have deployed IPS as a mitigating measure and harden our servers as well as submit our application to third-party penetration testing but we are required to deploy an anti-virus solution.
Note that on-demand scanning is inadequate. We are looking for an enterprise solution that provides on-access scanning, isn't dependent on kernel versions and updates to all servers can be automated (via an administrative/management interface that preferably runs on Linux as well).
McAfee's VirusScan Enterprise for Linux on the face of it looks like it isn't dependent on kernel versions. Their datasheet states the following:
Kernel module versioning—On-access scanning
on new kernels without the need to recompile
modules saves you time and effort when rolling
out new Linux kernels.
and:
Runtime kernel module—Automatically supports
the latest distribution, saving both time and effort.
On-access scanning without kernel modules
for kernels 2.6.38 with fanotify ensures Linux is
always protected even after kernel updates.
But the latest version of McAfee's VirusScan Enterprise for Linux (2.0.0) doesn't even support RHEL!
What enterprise anti-virus solution doesn't support RHEL?!
What is a well-meaning sysadmin to do?
|
i have a 64 gb micro SDXC memory card that has sensitive files on it and i want to completely erase it but i heard it was impossible to be sure that your data was erased because of wear leveling ? The manufacturer (SanDisk) doesn't provide special tool for a secure erase.
What if i delete the files then use a software like eraser to erase unused disk space, would this work ?
|
ASP.NET MVC provides default protection against cross site scripting. Just wondering, if PHP frameworks do the same?
|
we have a scenario for implementing SSO using x.509 certificates. A secure client will download a x.509 certificate (only certificate...no private key is available) upon user logs into the windows machine. Henceforth for all web applications, we would like read this certificate for authenticating the user. when we tried for reading the browser certificates(by configuring tomcat to request client certificate), able to read only certificates with private key. not able to read the x.509 certificate put up by the secure client.
Can somebody help me to read the x.509 certificate from server side? Or only certificates with private key alone could be used for this purpose?
|
The concept put forward by Docker and LXC seems to be, from a security perspective, a move in the right direction. Afraid of a MySQL zero-day? Run it in a Docker container and it won't be able to cause damage to the host operating system.
However, it's definitely not a silver bullet. What needs to be done to secure Docker and LXC containers? What are the attack models, and how can they be secured and mitigated?
|
I wonder if my setup can be risky. To give a good starting point for answers I would briefly sketch the situation
setup:
double boot system GNU/Linux and Microsoft Windows
GNU/Linux is on 2 partitions which are both LUKS encrypted using AES cipher with a considered "safe" block-chaining mode and keylength
Windows is not encrypted and distrusted anyway (I use it to run skype)
Latop computer (Lenovo Thinkpad) with a battery (if that matters to RAM or not)
The boot partition with GRUP and KERNEL is on a SD-Card not plugged while Windows runs. (Clearly it needs to be plaintext)
situation:
Generally work's done in Linux ( which can work with the encrypted partitions because I supply the key during the boot; no swap partition; yet an tmpfs for /tmp)
When I want to Skype I reboot the computer (having ejected the SD with the bootloader and kernel) and start Windows
I assume that in such a case the RAM is still absolutely readable and hence the key for decrypting and accessing the encrypted linux is still somewhere in the RAM? Additionally all the data of /tmp/ is initially still there?
An answer would confirm if this is reasonable to assume!
An even better answer would include (assuming the risk exists) ideas how to remedy this (at present I shutdown and take out the battery for 2-20 secs).
Maybe there is no risk, because Linux does overwrite the RAM at shutdown to avoid
a "cold boot attack" (as suggested in [this question][1])?
Also I thought I have additional risk as distrusted Mircosoft Software can help attackers to access my hardware and hence even without accessing directly my linux partition (by retrieval of the cipher-key via "cold boot attack") firmware can be changed to attack my system.
I am not paranoid about that (though it might seem) and aware that firmware has always been a "risky business" I just think that having the double boot I invite a constant update of this risk, while GNU/Linux in theory would make an update of potential firmware spy mechanisms much harder.
|
I just told my friend my Wi-Fi password, will he know what I am doing even though he does not connect to my home internet?
|
I have a question about how to properly set up full disk encryption on a server running virtual machines.
My setup is Windows 2012 with 2 VM's(Hyper-V) on it.
I was looking into using Becrypt for full disk encryption.
Would it be sufficient to run full disk encryption just on a host?
or should I run it on host and on each VMs?
|
I'm trying to see the actual point in implementing Perfect Forward Secrecy during Internet Key Exchange Phase 2, if it had already been used during Phase 1.
Quoting the IKEv2 RFC:
RFC 5596
3.3.2. Transform Substructure
[...] Although ESP and AH do not directly include a Diffie-Hellman exchange, a Diffie-Hellman group MAY be negotiated for the Child SA.
This allows the peers to employ Diffie-Hellman in the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, providing perfect forward secrecy for the generated Child SA keys.
Is there a real security incentive to implement this forward secrecy feature?
What is the risk it tries to cover?
My understanding is that, without PFS here, the Child SA (Security Association) keys are derived directly from the keys negotiated during Phase 1.
If an attacker gets his hands on the dynamically generated keys negotiated during Phase 1 (in memory or after breaking the involved cryptography), I cannot see why he could not get the new ones generated during Phase 2.
|
I have an AES string being produced with this class, the AesCryptoServiceProvider Class provided by Microsoft.
And I need to decode this encryption with Ruby's SSL::Cipher class .
The problem is that if one encrypts one with one, you can't decrypt it with the other.
An example of my VB.NET code :
Private Const AesIV As String = "!QAZ2WSX#EDC4RFV"
Private Const AesKey As String = "5TGB&YHN7UJM(IK<"
aes.Mode = CipherMode.CBC
aes.Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7
aes.BlockSize = 128
aes.KeySize = 128
Which produces this string :
p6SI3+hMRFRsQG5Vk+R1YdXv9EaCsfAuB0ZSsqkBcy83ki20U0bV5TZrwxJ0C4dlpSEJDwc7b5znd/8UNXEhcXV0m8tAms3lp4ZS2aUaSfc=
And then my ruby code does this :
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher::AES128.new :CBC
# ^ That's 128 bit block in CBC mode, it defaults to 128 key size
cipher.iv = "!QAZ2WSX#EDC4RFV"
cipher.key = "5TGB&YHN7UJM(IK<"
solution = cipher.update("p6SI3+hMRFRsQG5Vk+R1YdXv9EaCsfAuB0ZSsqkBcy83ki20U0bV5TZrwxJ0C4dlpSEJDwc7b5znd/8UNXEhcXV0m8tAms3lp4ZS2aUaSfc=")
> "\xAC\xF3J{Cw\x95\xD8\x0F'\xC2\xB4,\xF2\x8E\xFE\xC9\x95\xD7\xE6JcB7\v\xBA\xD8kP'\a\x80\x81\x00\xC1\xCC\xE4\x95\x9E_5Ws\xF9j\xDF\xAC\xBA\"K\xF2\xB7,\x7F4\n\r\xB2\xF5\xC7R\xCFn\x97B\x05\\\xE70\\\x11x\xFA\v\xA2k\xBE(\x1E\xEB*O$\xDCc\xD7\xBEfs\x99\xADD\xC0\x1F\xBB9"
solution << cipher.final
> OpenSSL::Cipher::CipherError: wrong final block length
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My main Question is:
Is it possible to create your own security packages?
[ NOTE: I enjoy teaching myself new skills for many different things. So please give me an answer in a 4th grade reading level. What I mean is that I won't have a clue what you're trying to tell me if the words are way to hard for me to understand. I have a hard time using a dictionary and understanding vocabulary words.]
-Thank you
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For my studies, I am required to do an investigation on a fictional criminal VMWare image. The image is suspected of participating in DDoS attacks and other illegal activities. On this PC TrueCrypt is installed. Along with TrueCrypt, The image has Mozilla Thunderbird installed with a OpenPGP security module.
I made a raw memory.dmp of the RAM memory in the image to perform analysis.
Using aeskeyfind I got several results.
michael@cf15:~/Documents/Volatility$ aeskeyfind memory.dmp
b4ce75c857163e668818d0d76c46bad2
ccf865429e42144a9dce839b036c3f7c
51c35f7f0b79e7d1e6d5345d2a291ac8
Keyfind progress: 100%
This command shows me that there are 3 AES keys present in the RAM. Using -v (verbose mode) I can see that they're all 128bits.
What exactly can someone undertake when they found these private keys unencrypted on the disk? As the OpenPGP asks for a 2048 RSA-key, I think the keys are connected to hidden TrueCrypt volumes.
Can a attacker use these keys to gain access to volumes without having the appropriate passphrase?
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I'm planning to set up a server environment with high security requirements on which i want to install an intrusion detection system (snort). Additionally, I think of running a vulnerability scanner (OpenVAS)
on a regular basis (nightly). My concerns are whether
a) wouldn't this render my ids reports during the scan useless and if so,
b) what can i do to prevent this?
I thought of disabling the ids during vulnerability scans, but i believe an intelligent attacker could
see these times as the perfect moments for undetected scanning on his own/attacking.
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I am currently looking at TPM (Trusted Platform Module) and wondering how does TPM offer platform authentication. Suppose a legal host is deployed on the cloud. How do I use TPM to assure that the host I am connecting to is that very host, rather than some other host that has the same configuration?
In principle, since that very host is equipped with TPM, whose Endorsement Key is unique, I can verify it via the public key of EK (Endorsement Key). For example, I can have TPM to encrypt a message with its private key of EK. And I decrypt it with the public key of EK. However, I looked up the documents, and didn't find any API to explicitly encrypt arbitrary message with private key of EK.
So, usually, how can TPM be used to perform such host authentication?
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Are there any threats against a web site that isn't running SSL but uses PGP to encrypt all information to the server (except session identifier)
The information flow is as such:
1. Session ID set on User browser
2. User selects a book from a list of books and submits it to Server
3. User submits Credit Card information to Server
4. Server displays downloadable book (link is randomly generated and temporary)
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Adding the AWS access key and secret key directly in app code is definitely not a good approach, primarily because the app resides on the users device (unlike server side code), and can be reverse engineered to get the credentials, which can then be misused.
Though I find this information everywhere, but am unable to find a definitive solution to this problem. What are my options? I read about the token vending machine architecture for temporary credentials, but I am not convinced that it is any better. If I can reverse engineer the secret key, then I can reverse engineer the code which requests for temporary credentials. And once I have a set of temporary credentials to access S3, I am as good as if I had the key. I can request the temporary credentials again and again, even if they expire pretty quickly. To summarize, if an app can do something, I can do the same as a malicious user. If anything, the TVM can be a bit better at management (rotating credentials, and changing key in case of breach, etc.). Please note we can put the same access restrictions on the secret key, as we plan to do in case of TVM temporary credentials.
Additionally, if Amazon doesn't want people to use the secret key directly in the App, why don't they block it in their SDK, and enforce TVM or the correct solution. If you will leave a path, people are going to use it. I read several articles like these, and wonder why?: http://blog.rajbala.com/post/81038397871/amazon-is-downloading-apps-from-google-play-and
Please help me understand if this is better, and whether there is a perfect (or may be good) solution available to this problem. I do get that TVM is more manageable (and much faster incident response once the credentials are compromised), but I am not convinced that it is more secure.
PS: This is mostly related to anonymous TVM, as users don't log in to our apps.
PS2: I am clear about the secure communication between TVM and app to get temp credentials, post the app registers. I am more concerned about what would prevent a malicious user from registering with a new UDID, and obtaining temporary credentials, and hence S3 access.
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I recently tried to do a MiTM attack on my network using ettercap.
I have a router, two windows 7 machines : Host A and Host B, and Backtrack on a VM.
In the ettercap window I added the router as TARGET 1, Host A as TARGET 2 then started Arp poisoning. When I checked the arp tables of Host B, I found that it was also targeted by the attack.
Any explanations? How can I exclude Host B?
Thank you.
EDIT :
After switching to Ettercap v0.8, the attack works correctly, only HOST B sees a spoofed router's mac address. Maybe it was a bug in the old version.
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What is the digital signature software? What it takes to digitally sign software?
I'm using the Kaspersky antivírus and the software I wrote, in Delphi, is flagged by the antivirus software due to lack of digital signature, as an untrusted software.
To use my software I need to go to the Kaspersky and set it as a trusted application.
Observing this article I see that the use of certificates is required:
Before you can get started, you'll need a code-signing certificate and associated private key.
Then immediately says I can generate a key in my infrastructure:
You can generate your proper code-signing certificate using your
internal Windows public key infrastructure (PKI) or you can buy one
from a commercial Certification Authority (CA) such as Verisign.
So, I ask:
How can I generate a certificate on my own infrastructure?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining a digital certificate?
What are the advantages and disadvantages to digitally sign software?
What is the difference between a certificate generated in my own infrastructure against a certificate obtained by a certifying institution?
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Is it best to create an application that allows a user to sign up with username and email at the beginning and password once you click the generated email sent to you or should the password entering be in place before you get an email to continue sign up process?
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Is it possible to use SecurID 2FA for Highly Privileged shared accounts? I am currently using CyberArk to vault passwords for privileged accounts. when I checkout a password, I would like to make sure that this account has to 2FA to the endpoint. the problem that I see is that all of my admins share these accounts. To me, that means that they also have to share a token. this is not possible, because they are distributed across the country, and a bad practice anyway. Can their individual tokens be mapped to other vaulted accounts so that they can 2FA to the endpoints? is there any other solution?
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I'm currently using nginx with the following ciphers:
ssl_ciphers HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!ADH:!RC4:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!DSS;
I would like to maintain compatibility to older browsers, especially also older mobile browsers and therefore not completely disallow SHA1.
How can I achieve that SHA256 is preferred over SHA1 for MAC (Message Authentication Code) and always used when possible.
I can i.e. force SHA256 to be applied by adding SHA256:!SHA: to my ssl_ciphers string but this would also disallow SHA1 completely.
With the ssl_cipher at the beginning it tends however to just use SHA1. Any recommendations?
Update 29.12.2014
Thanks everybody for the constructive inputs and discussion.
Even though I still think that the Mozilla page on Server side TLS overall covers the topic quite good - I would only recommend the Modern compatibility with the limitation that the DSS ciphers should be removed from it and explicitly disallowed (!DSS) as recommended in the comment by Anti-weakpasswords - thanks for spotting it.
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DSS:!DES:!RC4:!3DES:!MD5:!PSK
Interestingly ssllabs did not alert or down rate for this...
Further I prefer to use custom generated Diffie-Hellman parameters. Even though the standard ones are obviously considered safe. What are the OpenSSL standard Diffie-Hellman parameters (primes)?
openssl dhparam -check -out /etc/ssl/private/dhparams.pem 2048
increase that to 4096 for paranoia and fun if you like.
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I am having the following problem on both my android phone and on my chromebook. I'm running a website on an internal server (10.3.3.3) using nginx with a self-signed ssl certificate. Since it is just an internal server, I put the CN=10.3.3.3. All of our desktop machines work just fine (they give a warning about the certificate, but after we tell the browser to connect anyways, it works just fine). This is true of all browsers I've tried on the desktop machines (chrome, firefox, safari).
The problem is on my android phone and chromebook. On both of these, when I type in the ip address, I get the typical chrome yellow screen saying there is something wrong with the certificate. When I click "proceed anyways", it looks like it is trying to load, but the site never comes up. What do I need to do to get chrome on these mobile devices to work?
P.S. I did import the certificate into Chrome on the chromebook and it shows up under "Authorities".
As an interesting test, I downloaded a ChromiumOS virtual machine and it works just fine (gives cert error, but when I click proceed, everything works fine). I should have noted that the chromebook and the android phone are coming in over VPN, but everything else on the VPN works fine (ssh to the web server, etc).
The Certificate
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 9485437517293169565 (0x83a30b2a7d6c2b9d)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=XX, ST=XX, L=XXXX, O=XXXXXX
Validity
Not Before: Apr 2 12:41:40 2014 GMT
Not After : Apr 1 12:41:40 2016 GMT
Subject: C=XX, ST=XX, L=XXXX, O=XXXXXX
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
XXXXXXXXXX
Exponent: XXXXX
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Certificate Sign
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:10.3.3.3
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
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I've been following the FIDO standard (a consumer-friendly public-key system similar to SSH key pairs) and it appears that it's close to being complete: both Google and PayPal have been testing it internally for some time, the just-announced Samsung S5 is compatible, and Yubikey has announced that the next version of their Neo product will be FIDO compliant.
I am looking to revamp my personal op-sec in the immediate future and I want to make sure the security token I buy will be backwards compatible with the FIDO standard. The xNT implant and the next version of the NFC ring will both be utilizing NXP's NTAG216 NFC chip, which has some secure storage capabilities. The xNT project lead stated over email that the xNT sticks to NFC standards so it should be compatible, however, Yubikey has stated that their current security tokens will not be forwards compatible with the standard.
Does anyone have any special insight as to what is required of the hardware to implement the FIDO U2F standard (why wouldn't the Yubikey's be backwards compatible, for example) and whether the xNT implant is future-proof? I don't understand why they couldn't encrypt the public/private keys for U2F and store the decryption key on the Yubikey.
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Does http support encryption without https, akin to STARTTLS in smtp?
This may sound like a stupid question, but just think about it.
Banks require strong encryption, and cannot do business without it.
However, regular websites may not necessarily do so, but would benefit from casual encryption nonetheless, preventing many kinds of attacks, just as is the case with STARTTLS in smtp.
As such, for a regular web-site, if the browser is having any issues with ssl (be that protocol incompatibility, an underpowered mobile device, or an explicit preference of the user), it should just safely proceed without encryption without too much extra hassle.
Is there any extension of the HTTP protocol that would allow for encryption without explicit use of https? E.g. something akin Accept-Encoding: gzip and Content-Encoding: gzip? Or STARTTLS in smtp? If not, why not? Even WPA2 from WiFi comes to mind, which does do encryption, but doesn't bother with certificates or certificate authorities.
Basically, I'm thinking about something like the HTTPS-Everywhere extension, but which works automatically without the viral propaganda of the https:// address scheme -- without forcing people who don't want to be a part of it to be a part of it, like the https:// address scheme does, without dividing the address scheme, and without requiring the content provider to commit to always supporting https:// from thereon.
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I am dealing with a multi-step form, and I need to pass information from step 1 to step 2, then from step 2 to step 3, and so on.
Step 1 contains a membership number and ID number entry, as well as another identifier (3 fields to complete to identify the visitor). At this moment I use RIJNDAEL encryption to encrypt the data before passing through to the next step via hidden fields, but somehow, I am corrupting the data (it does not decrypt again). I will fix it, but:
My question: Is it really dangerous to leave these items unencrypted in the first place if you're using HTTPS?
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In a login system I'm doing, I'm using a per-user, per-device randomly generated cookie token. A part of the script looks like this:
// Generate current device's token
$token = substr(bin2hex(mcrypt_create_iv(200)), 0, 60);
// Include this device's token
$STH = $userDB->prepare("INSERT INTO devices (user_id, token, active) VALUES (?, ?, 1)");
$Res = $STH->execute(array($Id, $token));
if (!$Res)
throw new Exception("Couldn't store the device in the database");
// To keep users logged in between sessions
$Cookie->email = $email;
$Cookie->token = $token;
However, this implies that if the database was stolen, the attacker would be able to log in as anyone by changing the cookies. This is an issue I want to avoid. I know that sha256 is not valid for general password hashing. However, from the string this comes from,
$token = substr(bin2hex(mcrypt_create_iv(200)), 0, 60);
Is it secure to store a sha256 hash of the high entropy token in the database? Or should I be using the more expensive bcrypt, as with the passwords?
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It seems that every single banking & financial website that I have used logs me out after a certain period of time.
Are there a legal requirements or technical reasons for financial sites to do this? Or is this just their form of "security" to prevent others from accessing your account should you forget to logoff or secure your computer or device?
This is very poor user experience in my opinion. Google does not log me out after such a short period of time, and I feel that my Google account with 2-Step Verification and a legion of extremely intelligent engineers is far more secure than my banking accounts.
It seems I should be able to choose whether these sites log me out automatically, or if I may stay logged in for a reasonable period of time (30 - 90 days being common for other sites).
Edit:
I believe the selected answer is the most complete answer to the question, but none of the reasons seem to be good reasons for banks to end your session.
There are a couple of levels of risk associated with an attacker gaining access to your banking website session:
viewing your private (financial) information
modifying your account (this includes stealing money, locking you out, etc.)
This same situation exists on any website account, but for financial websites, and for most people, #2 is far more severe than for other types of sites.
I think a better solution than logging users out would be to:
default the session timeout to a short duration
allow the user to change the session timeout for his/her account
require re-authentication for actions that modify the account or move money around
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What is the risk of accepting an untrusted site security certificate in your browser if you're not entering any data, but merely browsing the site?
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Currently the default maximum key size is 4096. I know this can be changed by recompiling the software, and I don't mind doing that.
My problem is about compatibility issues. It makes sense that some implementation may not / may have trouble supporting 8k or 16k keys.
However, I've heard of sub-keys. I don't want my "day-to-day" encryption / signing keys to be incompatible with others. Its also likely that those sub-keys should have an expiration date.
A "master signing key" (ie your identity) should be safe enough for a lifetime, because ideally you don't ever want to change it, right?
I am considering using 4k keys for encryption and documents signing, and a 8k+ key as "master key". That means I will use my master key only to sign my owns keys, and other people's keys. That should be ok, as my gpg2 binary would support 8k+ keys. Is that a correct assumption ?
However, I also need other people signing my key. And that is when trouble could arise. Would a default implementation be able to sign a 8k+ keys?
Have a missed something? Would you consider that a good way to start using OpenPGP?
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I was looking to give out login information to a read-only mysql database (via phpmyadmin) to the public (the users of my program) to use for reference purposes on a production environment. Would I be risking anything on my side by doing so (assuming all privileges were locked down and the users could literally only read the database)?
Data like: License Validation (Verifying if a user has a license key purchased and if they do remove Copyright Footer) and Data Like: Chargeback or Fradulent Paypal User Emails
My only main concern is having the whole server compromised just because someone knows a username or password for the actual read-only database.
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I'm looking to purchase a wifi card to help me learn about wifi network penetration testing and other associated issues but I was wondering if there were any features of a wifi card I should look out to get the best in terms of ability. Or is there no real difference between the different models. The most important feature I can think of is sensitivity which is essential when it comes to picking up weak wifi signals from a distance.
There seem to be a lot of generic wifi PCI-E cards out there and most claim Windows compatibility but I use Kali Linux (the successor to Backtrack Linux) and so needs something that works with that with the minimum hassle.
If it makes any difference I run Kali Linux as a virtual machine under VMWare Workstation 10 on Windows 8.1 x86_64.
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My application is divised into two parts:
Javascript application as client
Server side API's (RESTFUL through Play!2.2 framework)
I expect users to be authenticated through Facebook's Oauth 2.0 client, especially with the Facebook Javascript SDK.
Once authenticated, users could call my various own apis, like POST /product etc...
Currently, I make use of a cookie-based token mechanism, implementing by this great plugin: SecureSocial.
Isn't a cookie anti RESTFULness? Perhaps not in this case, since I just store the access token... to be sent at each API call, like any other API KEY system would do, wouldn't it?
However, it forces me to use a persistence store (like memcached) to store the current cookie values corresponding to current connected users.
On the client side, each user store this cookie: "id: 12989348797024974..." (being a token sample based on many bits)
So, to sum up: I own a Javascript application (another project distinct from the server side) acting as the unique client of my Api's Server. I would not have currently other clients.
Should I stay with this cookie-based token that works great although the use of memcache (or other cache) or should I alter this strategy or even focused to another?
Thanks
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I am looking into php's max_input_vars setting
How many input variables may be accepted (limit is applied to $_GET,
$_POST and $_COOKIE superglobal separately). Use of this directive
mitigates the possibility of denial of service attacks which use hash
collisions. If there are more input variables than specified by this
directive, an E_WARNING is issued, and further input variables are
truncated from the request.
Basically I understand that this limits the amount of variables someone can send with POST/GET and truncates them if more are given (with warning raised).
What stays unclear is how someone can use post parameters to create
the possibility of denial of service attacks which use hash collisions
Also does it make sense to substantially decrease the number there. If for example in my application I never use more than 20 POST variables, can I change max_input_vars to say 30? If so, what improvements will I get?
If it makes a difference, I am using php 5.5.10 on apache 2.4.7
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i'm about to secure a webservice with client authentication. (apache2, mod_ssl, openssl).
from what i googled, i found that it's more common to have a ca, which signs the client certs, which will then be checked.
also i found that it should be possible with the help of the sslrequire directive (in the apache configuration) to check something i guess the issuer and subject DN's of the client cert, or would there be a better field for this, in order to check if the client has a certain certificate.
something like (pseudocode):
sslrequire issuer_dn='issuer_dn_from_client_cert' AND subject_dn='subject_dn_from_client_cert'
my question is: would that really work ? i mean, if an attacker would guess the issuer&subject DN's - couldn't he craft himself a valid certificate ?
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I have a ASP.NET MVC 4 application.
In some webpages or views, I have information displayed in table. Column values are rendered as links.
Problems:
1. When I hover over the link, it's URL is visible at the bottom of browser.
2. When I click on link, I show information for the resource requested in URL. (www.someurl.com/Employee/67 gives me information of employee with id = 67). Now, this URL is displayed in browser. If you change URL to www.someurl.com/Employee/88, it shows information of employee with id = 88 though the logged in user is not supposed to see information for employee id 88
These are serious security breaches.
I am thinking of following as possible solutions:
URL masking at application level
Base64 encoding of URL to shorten and obfuscate it, so that users can't just throw values in the URL.
@Html.AntiForgeryToken() and ValidateAntiForgeryTokenValidation mechanism
Is there better and more secure approach other than above to solve this issue?
Regards,
Suraj
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We are planning to develop a EHR/Billing Software and we are aware about HIPAA rules and regulations. Our current application architecture using a shared database with all client's(Provider/Practice) data.
I would like to know if HIPAA recommends in isolating database per client(Provider/Practice) - ie is a single database for every client a security breach of HIPAA rules and regulations?
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We have an eCommerce website hosted on a dedicated server. We get our PCI compliance report from Qualays and there is no problem with that.
However, now we want to test something new on Amazon's AWS environment. But the idea is that we will still use the same checkout setup done on our main site.
So my question is will it be a breach of PCI Compliance if we capture card details on Amazon's AWS environment and then pass it to other website through web-service call and then process it there. We will not save any card data on AWS platform at the moment.
The only reason for doing it like that is because we do not want to invest time in making a different checkout.
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I am looking to build a number of simple REST web services where:
they only need to be called by server-side clients (i.e. no mobile/javascript/desktop)
they are only accessible by HTTPS (no downgrade to HTTP)
clients will only be deployed to secure, trusted locations
clients will each have a unique API key
each service will hold a list of permitted client keys
When accessing a web service, a client will provide it's unique client key in each request body for authentication to that service.
Question: Is this simple approach sufficient to restrict access to the services to only known clients?
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Could someone please tell me why cryptographic algorithms are placed in the data-link layer for wireless networks?
|
I found an XSS vulnerability which is exploited by appending attack in the URL parameters.
For eg. the original URL site.com/?s=login&m=forgotten
And the attack URL site.com/?s=login&m=forgotten" onload=alert(966) bad="
Now I would like to prevent this attack. Can anybody help me?
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For an experiment, I'm trying to open a 2048-bit RSA encrypted mail on a image.
Using this fresh image, I made a memory dump and analysed the dump for RSA keys.
Now, several RSA keys have been found.
An example;
FOUND PRIVATE KEY AT 1048fb83
version =
11 8e 48 04 06 11
modulus =
02 01 00 02 02 00 02 03 00 02 04 00 02 05 00 02
06 00 02 07 00 02 08 00 02 09 00 02 0a 00 02 0b
00 02 0c 00 02 0d 00 02 0e 00 02 0f 00 02 11 00
02 12 00 02 13 00 02 14 00 02 15 00 02 16 00 02
17 00 02 00 e0 02 01 e0 06 20 03 08
publicExponent =
0e 08 00 04 08 0e 03 08
privateExponent =
04 06 11 8e 54 07 20 01
prime1 =
12 8e 40 0d 00 04 11 8e 48 1d 0e 1d 0e 1d
prime2 =
0e 09 00 02 11 8e 48 1d 0e 1d 0e 06 00 01 11 8e
48 08 07 00 02 02 1d 0e 1d 0e 05 00 01
exponent1 =
0e 0c 20 03 01 11 80 c8 11 80 c8 11 84 50 04 06
11 8e 5c 05 06 0f 11 8e 68 05 06 0f 11
exponent2 =
06 00 00 1d 12 8f d0 06 00 01 12 8e 60 08 06 00
00 0f 11 8e 68 06 00 00 0f 11 8e 6c 08 00 03 0f
05 0e 08 10 18 04 06 12 8e 70 05 00 00 12 8e 70
08 00 01 12 8e 70 12 8b 1c 07 00 01 0f 01 12 8b
1c 08 00 02 0f 05 12 8b 1c 0e 05 08 00 12 8e 70
04 0f 27 00 00 04 06 11 8e 78 05 00 00 12 8d c0
06 20 01 01 11 8e 78 05 20 00 11 8e
coefficient =
20 02 08 0a 08
How does one continue from here?
I got a encrypted OpenPGP message; and I need to decode it with my own private key.
I've read about CRT formats, etc. I'm looking to convert these RSA parameter values to a value that OpenGPG can read. (One block of text).
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Is there any program or method that allows encryption that can not be brute forced or is it just that any encrypted file can be decrypted by brute force?
|
What is a recommended way of handling CRLs in long-term electronic signatures (specifically the CAdES-A)?
The problem I see is in that CRLs are not protected against modification (they are plain text, not signed) and not even mandatory in CAdES-T or CAdES-A.
As such, they can be forged, and such forgery cannot be easily detected, if the used time-stamping authority (TSA) is no longer active. I cannot figure out a way of handling CRLs in a way that prevents any doubts about long-term validity of a documents time-stamped with CAdES-A.
The same problem I have with verification of trustworthiness of TSAs themselves, if they no longer exist.
A typical scenario that worries me is this:
An attacker may use his own (=untrusted) time-stamping authority to forge a (CAdES-T or CAdES-A) time-stamp of a document. No one will now able to verify whether this now unreachable TSA was trusted or not at the time the time-stamp seems to be issued. To create a semblance of credibility, the attacker may update the time-stamp with a valid time-stamp of a trusted TSA, and wait for several years. The time-stamp update is possible due to the fact that time-stamps may be issued automatically without verification of credibility of previous time-stamps.
On a similar principle, an attacker can use a revoked certificate of a trusted time-stamp authority. He may also attach a modified CRL from which he deletes the S/N of the used time-stamping certificate (which is possible as the CRL is not signed). This way, the attacker may create a series of time-stamps from different TSAs. It's possible that after 10 years at least one of the TSAs won't exist, and no one will be able to receive its correct unmodified CRL to verify validity of the time-stamp.
Unfortunately, long-term signature specifications do not treat these problems in detail, or rather they don't mention them at all. For instance in rfc5126, especially sections C.4.1.1 and C.4.3.
Edit:
(Another sub-question has been moved here.)
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I have been experimenting with the TPM on a Dell R710 (BIOS version 6.3.0). My goal was to detect changes to BIOS settings through TPM PCRs. The research I have done leads me to believe that BIOS configuration changes should be reflected in PCR value 01. However making alterations to the BIOS config such as changing the System Password, disable NICs, or changing the boot order did not affect any PCR value.
Another observation I made was PCRs 01, 03, 06, and 07 are all identical. The only way I was able to change any PCR was by changing the TPM security “On with pre-boot measurements” to “On without pre-boot measurements”. After changing that setting PCR 01 didn't change but PCR 00, 02, and 04 were changed to be equal to PCR 01.
What I gather from this is that the value being hashed for PCR 01 is probably 0 and therefor my platform isn't really measuring any BIOS settings for PCR 01.
Am I missing something or does it appear that the R710 doesn't measure the BIOS configuration settings?
Also if I am correct can anyone suggest a server platform that does measure the BIOS configuration correctly?
PCR with Pre-Boot Measurements/without Pre-Boot Measurements
00 A1.../5B...
01 5B.../5B...
02 42.../5B...
03 5B.../5B...
04 DE.../5A...
05 B7.../B7...
06 5B.../5B...
07 5B.../5B...
Update: Confirmed that the R710 does not do any measurements for PCR01. Too bad
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Is sqlmap still traceable when we use --tor --user-agent and macchanger?
For example:
sqlmap -u "[vulnerable_website_link]" --tor --user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" with macchanger.
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As we all know, Microsoft stops developing security patches for Windows XP very soon. If a bug in the kernel was to be found that would allow an attacker to take control by, say, sending a specially crafted UDP packet, this would not be patched.
But what if the system is a desktop behind a common NAT router and the only internet application is a browser? Exploiting any bugs will have to happen exclusively through the browser. By running the latest version of Firefox or Chrome, wouldn't the system be reasonably secure?
Of course no suspicious attachments should be opened, but that is the case with any system. Perhaps in XP you can ruin the entire system with a virus whereas on a 7 machine you can only mess with the user's account, but userspace contains enough juicy stuff that I wouldn't say this makes much of a difference on a single user system.
For now I see no immediate risk in running XP for another few months on a desktop when Google Chrome is the only internet connected application. It saves someone buying a new computer. I have already advised the owner not to do online banking on it (better do that on the newly bought work laptop), but besides that...
Did I miss anything obvious in my reasoning, or is XP secure enough for casual use in this case?
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My team currently uses ASP.NET with MS SQL Server for our software.
Security has only become important since I started, in which there is injection vulnerabilities everywhere.
Due to current integration with Oracle and MS SQL the business decision was never to use parameterized queries.
This of course has been an issue.
Implementing Find and replace along with whitelisting of parameters has reduced this issue strongly.
My only issue is, I have read a lot about unicode and other encodings being the cause of sql injection. I dont quite understand this.
Currently we sanitise everything like this:
Const pattern As String = "^[a-zA-Z0-9.=,:\s\\\/\']*$"
term = term.Replace("'", "''")
If Not Tools.ValidString(term, pattern) Then
term = String.Empty
End If
Public Shared Function ValidString(ByVal source As String, ByVal pattern As String) As Boolean
If source = String.Empty Then Return True
Dim params As Text.RegularExpressions.RegexOptions = Text.RegularExpressions.RegexOptions.None
Dim regex As New Text.RegularExpressions.Regex(pattern, params)
Dim match As Text.RegularExpressions.Match = regex.Match(source, pattern, params)
Return match.Success
End Function
Does anyone have an example where unicode/encoded injection could be used, or just a plain example where this regular expression would fail to prevent sql injection.
Thanks
UPDATE
Can I please not have answers related to standard SQL Injection. I am strongly familiar with this already.
ALSO please stop posting saying don't use string sanitisation. There is zero resources in the company to shift all queries to parameterised queries with ADO.NET while also building in logic for it to use ODP.NET if the client uses oracle. OWASP mention the use of whitelisting of characters if parameterising is out of question, so like in the regex, only few characters are allowed. I am not blacklisting characters, as this is stupid.
There is no compliance required for the data we hold. The security is for database integrity, as it would be a nightmare if content was changed.
Our software is a very large cloud application CMS and DMS in one, where 99% of the software is used internal, and only a minority is external and is only used for public review and commenting on the documents.
From my new understanding of Unicode injection. It can only occur if the data is being encoded before being placed into the query, and therefore unicode injection only really occurs in applications with globalisation of data. I am passing raw string fields straight into the string query after the sanitisation above.
Can I please only have an answer from an expert in injection, who can back up my claim that Unicode will not apply in my circumstance?
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While studying HTTPS and related transport layer security protocols(SSL/TLS), I came to know that HTTPS suffers from two complications - Web-Proxy and Virtual-Hosting.
I can understand how virtual-hosting could be the complication for HTTPS. This is because the underlying transport protocol of HTTPS (SSL or TLS) issues single certificate per IP/PORT combination so hosting multiple sites on single IP would really be an issue while implementing HTTPS.
However, I really don't understand how Web-proxy is an issue or complication with HTTPS ?
Anybody please clear the concept.
Thanks.
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http://www.troyhunt.com/2013/05/your-login-form-posts-to-https-but-you.html
My question is, if the threat is that someone controls your internet connection and can serve up bad login pages, couldn't the attacker just serve you a page like facebook.com instead of https://www.facebook.com?
Many sites just have a 301 redirect to their secure site, so I don't see what prevents an attacker from taking advantage of the victim who types in facebook.com and then serving up that page with a fake login form. Is the idea that the user would notice that there's no lock in the upper left corner?
I'm definitely not the expert in this, so I'm asking to just further my knowledge; I'm not trying to disprove anyone and just want to understand security better.
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I'm thinking of using SAML for sending authentication and authorization information to system. I plan to send roles and other information as authentication attributes in the assertion.
Does this sound like good idea or do I have to look into using XACML?
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I am seeing lot of IPSEC Authentication messages in eventlogs of Windows domain hosts. I was wondering if this - setting up IPSEC connections between domain workstations is a part of normal Windows behaviour?
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I'm trying to simulate a possible attack scenario for my studies.
I've got a image, which has a encrypted disk, encrypted by TrueCrypt (confirmed).
TrueCrypt is installed on the image itself too.
During a RAM analysis of the image, the attacker found a few keys using AESKeyFind.
A sample output is;
FOUND POSSIBLE 128-BIT KEY AT BYTE 35b880c
KEY: b4ce75c857163e668818d0d76c46bad2
EXTENDED KEY:
b4ce75c857163e668818d0d76c46bad2
ef3ac098b82cfefe30342e295c7294fb
ad18cfd21534312c25001f0579728bfe
e9257464fc114548d9115a4da063d1b3
1a1b1984e60a5ccc3f1b06819f78d732
b6153a5f501f66936f046012f07cb720
86bc8dd3d6a3eb40b9a78b5249db3c72
7f57cde8a9f426a81053adfa59889188
3bd6092392222f8b82718271dbf913f9
b9ab909a2b89bf11a9f83d6072012e99
f39a7edad813c1cb71ebfcab03ead232
CONSTRAINTS ON ROWS:
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
Assuming that there's no other software using encryption keys, how could a attacker access the TrueCrypt volume? Could he eventually crack the key to gain a plaintext password, or could he use this key as a key file to open the volume?
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I have an assignment to do for school which involves attack signatures (I have to do a service-specific IDS). Basically what I have to do is to generate signatures for some attacks with Metasploit on some programs, and then I must be able to recognise these same attacks.
Currently I am in the research phase, more specifically how to generate signatures of the attacks. Does anybody have any idea where I could find some good books/documents/articles for signature generation (methods, approaches....)?
I've already googled and looked in the first 40-50 pages of results and didn't find a lot of great resources. Are there any books dedicated to attack signatures?
Any help would be greatly appreciated!
Thanks!
Edit: I will give you an example of steps. Let's say my IDS looks at the log file in generated by an application( just as example).
1) In training(learning) phase, My IDS looks in the log file to generate signatures from the attacks
2) In detection phase, my IDS will look at the log files when the application is attacked, and try to match the content from the log file with the database that holds the signatures generated in the previous step.
My question is : how to generate the signatures What should I look at? For example, for the detection, I use FSA (Finite State Automaton) to express the steps of an attack (eg. ssh->open a file->read the file->upload file contents in the case of a hacker that makes a remote connection that reads a secret file and then uploads its contents)
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I need to move user cryptographic identity between several user devices. In the operating system I have only one option: use password-protected PKCS #12 to import the identity to the OS secure store.
I’m wondering how secure PKCS #12 is. Can the p12 file be distributed over the insecure channel? How secure is it compared to the solution where a fixed password is used for the p12 (just because the API requires that), but then the result is encrypted using the combination of PBKDF2 + AES-256 in CBC + HMAC.
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This is a part of curl's verbose output when connecting to the HTTPS site of Google.
* Server certificate:
* subject: C=US; ST=California; L=Mountain View; O=Google Inc; CN=www.google.com
* start date: 2014-03-12 09:38:30 GMT
* expire date: 2014-06-10 00:00:00 GMT
* subjectAltName: www.google.com matched
* issuer: C=US; O=Google Inc; CN=Google Internet Authority G2
* SSL certificate verify ok.
From this output is it possible to find out if a website using DV, OV or EV certificates?
I find that it is easy to identify EV certificates as their issuer: field contains either Extended Validation CA or EV CA. But how does one differentiate DV from OV?
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A PCI scanner of a client is current showing a potential path traversal exploit. The document root is set to /home/somefolder/somewebfoldername/
YET, visiting ourwebsite.com/manual shows the Apache manual. The same goes for ourwebsite.com:8443/manual
The exploit highlighted is: ourwebsite.com/manual/howto/ssi.html?..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F/etc/passwd%00
I don't see exactly how this would display the contents of passwd, but my actual questions are two fold:
1) Would deleting the contents of the manual folder solve this?
and 2) Is this just masking a larger problem? I thought that apache could never reach outside of the DocumentRoot?
TIA
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I downloaded Adblock plus on my computer, then went back to youtube (which was playing Vivaldi concertos), and all the ads were yet there. What gives? Is Adblock plus authentic?
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