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If I have a Live USB Linux stick and I plug it into a computer which is not connected to the internet and boot the computer using the Live USB stick. How secure is this interms of not leaving any traces of work I do via the Live USB stick? i.e. will any traces be left on the host computer once the computer has been switched off and the Live USB stick has been removed? I basically want to store passwords on the USB stick Live USB. If it's possible to encrypt the Live USB and store passwords on it. That should mean that I can use any computer to check my passwords by first disconnecting the computer from the internet? I understand I can do this with a spare computer which is never connected to the internet, but that would be a whole computer, and I'd rather not carry a full computer with me. If it's a usb stick, then I can use any computer which I know is disconnected. So I just wanted to make sure that no traces are left of my passwords on the host computer.
I am reading the documentation for Kentico where it describes using hashes to validate query strings EX:http://localhost/KenticoCMS8/cms/getfile/2d003444-9a27-43c9-be97-4f5832474015/Partners_logos_silver.aspx?latestfordocid=75&hash=eee41e027bd45142fd1f44d173d61950f34d6e98f4e35018fda70542322adc77&chset=013bca78-6bf2-42ac-8959-b8bbbeb0a8e8 Documentation https://docs.kentico.com/display/K8/Query+string+hashing I am making an assumption: On it's own hashing a query string and including it as part of the string is not useful. Anyone who knows the algorithm (published int he help doc)could simply generate the hash from his new malicious query-string, and include it as part of the request. The added protection that Kentico uses is a static salt that is included when hashing the query-string. This should make generating your own hash not as simple. My question is how difficult would it be to solve this salt? An attacker could easily generate many different query strings They would know the input, the output, and the algorithm. Could they simply figure out the salt? And if they know the salt, can they then without any difficulty generate their own query-strings?
I was going through some CLIENT side defenses against reflected XSS e.g. XSS auditor(chrome), IE8 XSS Filters, NoScript. They use regular expression and other sophisticated techniques. Why didn't they use any simpler idea? My question is- why don't we store what ever is going to server as parameters and if these parameters are reflected in HTML response then discard it or encoded it. Simple idea. I feel there may be false positives but not very convincing ones. Any input?
My question is pretty similar to : https://stackoverflow.com/questions/5487757/using-hmac-sha1-for-api-authentication-how-to-store-the-client-password-secure. Basically, I want to write an API for my service that allow a user to log into it and grants them access to the rest of the API calls. I want the API to be hooked into with any technology, Android or IOS apps, or web clients. Ideally, the login sequence would not share the password in cleartext even it was over SSL/HTTPS. I want to form a login authentication that can work over HTTP and than adding SSL/HTTPS adds an extra layer of security. I don't want SSL/HTTPS to be my only layer of security. I was reading about HMAC authentication and this seemed like what I want to do because the shared secret is never sent over the wire. But the issue with this is it requires the client to save the shared secret, which doesn't work so well in an application because then it does not allow them to log out and log in to another account on the same device. Is there any way I can implement login authentication without sharing the password over the wire or at the very least, sending it over the wire not in cleartext and with SSL/HTTPS. Let me know if I need to explain more. Thanks!
I am writing a web backend/api for an iOS application using Node.js and MySQL. In my database I have a table for posts. I would like the posts content to be encrypted. Let's say I'm using this AES for encryption. I would like to be able to safely encrypt and decrypt data on the server. Data sent back and forth to the client will be unencrypted, but sent over HTTPS (is this a good idea)? My Questions: How should I generate the keys? Should they be random strings? Where should I store the keys since there is going to be a different key for each message. Adversary Model I would like to protect against someone who already has access to my server running the https API (written in Node.js) and has access to my MySQL DB. I would like to project against that person being able to decrypt the encrypted data in that table. So it is important that even if they have lots of encrypted data, and how the encryption works still cannot decrypt the data.
I've been trying to figure out a way to efficiently bruteforce on Windows, but the method I currently have isn't very efficient. I did some profiling and found out that on average it can go through 274,080 attempts per minute, which would amount to a worst case scenario of 18 hours to crack one 6 character password with no special characters. Is there a way to attack more efficiently than this? #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <math.h> #define WIN_32_LEAN_AND_MEAN #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 #include <windows.h> #define USERNAME "Johnny" #define LENGTH 6 #define MINIMUM 'a' #define MAXIMUM 'z' double NumberOfPermuationsOfString( int length, char minimum, char maximum ) { return pow( ( maximum - minimum ) + 1, length ); } FORCEINLINE int NextPermutation( char ** buffer, const size_t length, char minimum, char maximum ) { int i = 0; for ( i = length - 1; i >= 0; --i ) { if ( ( *buffer )[i] != maximum ) { ++( *buffer )[i]; return 1; } else ( *buffer )[i] = minimum; } return 0; } int Bruteforce( char ** buffer, const size_t length, char minimum, char maximum ) { size_t result = FALSE; size_t i = 0; HANDLE htoken = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; timerMod( TIMER_START ); do result = LogonUser( USERNAME, ".", *buffer, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &htoken ); while ( !result && NextPermutation( buffer, length, MINIMUM, MAXIMUM ) ); if ( !result ) return 0; CloseHandle( htoken ); return 1; } int main( ) { char * buffer = malloc( LENGTH + 1 ); if ( !buffer ) showStandardError( "Allocating memory", TRUE ); memset( buffer, 0, LENGTH + 1 ); memset( buffer, MINIMUM, LENGTH ); printf( "Bruteforcing with %0.lf password permuations...\n", NumberOfPermuationsOfString( LENGTH, MINIMUM, MAXIMUM ) ); if ( Bruteforce( &buffer, LENGTH, MINIMUM, MAXIMUM ) ) { printf( "Success! Password : %s\n", buffer ); return 0; } else return 1; return 0; }
Correct me if I'm wrong: When encrypting a file, GPG creates a one-off AES encryption key and encrypts that key using RSA. This is supposedly to take advantage of AES's superior performance when handling larger amounts of data. If that's true, then why is gpg --encrypt so much slower than, for example, p7zip's AES-256 encryption?
I have a standard forum, currently plagued with bots. In the registration agreement, I included the following text: SPAMBOT OWNERS, YOU HEREBY WAIVE ALL YOUR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY. ANY AND ALL INFORMATION YOU OR YOUR BOTS LEAVE, INTENTIONALLY OR ACCIDENTALLY, ON THESE FORUMS CAN AND WILL BE EXPLOITED. YOU HEREBY ALLOW US TO HACK YOUR COMPUTER(S), INTERNET CONNECTION, ETC. While I doubt the spammers will ever go to the FBI (their IPs are all in Russia), I want to know how legal it is to hack them. After all, they did agree to it.
I am creating a portal where users can send private messages (PMs) for a very large audience. So I want to encrypt the messages and store them in the database. But I do not want to ask the users for new keys. So here's what I have planned: A randomly generated symmetric key will be allocated to every pair of users, which will be stored in the database using their passwords in an asymmetric scheme. Using this symmetric key, I intend to encrypt all their messages. So, even if either of them changes their password, I won't have to encrypt all the messages using the new pair of keys. Also Alice and Bob will not be notified of their shared symmetric keys. This solves my problem of changing passwords and users do not have to set new keys. But is this an overkill? Is there a better way to do this?
Read some of the stuff here regarding wiping disks and securely deleting files. From what I've understood, after deleting (not securely) files they become part of the unallocated(free) space of the HDD. So if I want to securely delete the deleted files should I wipe the free space only or by keeping this link in mind What's a good secure file deleter take image of the C drive and then wipe the entire drive and finally restore the image?? Disk: 500GB magnetic platter drive. OS: Windows XP Filesystem: NTFS Please help
I've been learning about Cyber Security and how to protect myself online after reading some books on the subject and I want to know how much Information i've handed out to companies.
I have a general question how asymmetric schemes are usually implemented. Typically, there is a parameter in an asymmetric scheme which limits the message length. For example the modulus in RSA. I know that asymmetric encryption is usually used to encrypt a symmetric key and the actual message is encrypted with the latter. But how are asymmetric schemes usually implemented? Only allowing small messages up to the limiting parameter (explicitly having symmetric keys in mind), or allowing arbitrary long messages (which would need some mode of operation, etc.)
There are some software that states that can crack WPA networks, however that is not an easy task as the initialization code for WPA2 uses a four-way handshake to properly initialize all of the vectors that are used in the actual encrypting. So in order to properly break it you need to sniff the traffic that gets sent back and forth during a session initialization. However, because this is a WiFi it's not uncommon for packets to not be sniffed properly. So you should be aware that you may have to initialize the connection more than one time. Again, see the link I posted. As for not knowing the carrier frequency there are a few ways to approach the issue. As the link pointed out they suggest getting an antenna. This is the best option when you're doing anything with WiFi. However, if you have reason to believe the access point is on a standard frequency discovering it could be as simple as an App on a smartphone to search for networks. But if you're doing this with any kind of frequency you should get an antenna and look for some guides on how to interact with it; they're all over the place. Another approach would be to look at the client. Since you asked this question on an RE forum I'm assuming you have access to at least one of the access points so you can attack it from that angle and try to trace what happens when the connection is initiated. Now If I try to protect my network, bacause neighbours didnt want to make a deal to get one internet account, and also I could not get a key easily, but have to wait like 6 hours. What software or method have you used that acctually works?
Is my computer vulnerable to someone who knows my modem's MAC address and my public IP address? What kind of vulnerabilities would this imply? Could they actually get access to my computer just with this information?
I've been reading for a while but yet do not properly understand how is BGP filtering used to prevent "attacks" such the recent Indosat's problem. Do not copy&paste Cisco's site, I have read all that information already.
I analyzed PDF, and extract javascript code. But javascript code is encrypted. I can't decrypt it. Please advise me. javascript code \040\040\040\040\146\165\156\143\164\151\157\156\043\164\151\157\156\040\163\167\050\051...
I'm trying to write Iptables rules for a small web server. Almost every source I've encountered recommends to allow loopback access to the web server, but doesn't explain why this is necessary. What's the purpose of this configuration, and is it really secure?
It is interesting to observe, that Tor exit nodes with out-of-date OpenSSL implementations can themselves be affected by the Heartbleed bug. Can Heartbleed expose a Tor user's IP address merely by exploiting the vulnerable Tor exit node, or would all relay servers in the chain have to be vulnerable as well (and simultaneously exploited), and the entire chain of requests 'decoded' piece by piece to unmask the original user's IP address? In other words, how robust is Tor anonymity from the Heartbleed bug? (In terms of IP address)
I am looking for mod_ssl configuration which protects against common attacks like Breach, Beast and Crime. I already disabled gzip to avoid Crime but I'm unsure about the others. RC4 should only be available to mitigate Beast. Furthermore I am looking for a proper forward secrecy if possible. This is a part of my current SSL vhost SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 SSLHonorCipherOrder on <Location /> SetEnv no-gzip </Location> SSLCipherSuite "EECDH+AESGCM EDH+AESGCM EECDH -RC4 EDH -CAMELLIA -SEED !aNULL !eNULL !LOW !3DES !MD5 !EXP !PSK !SRP !DSS !RC4"
I'm a masters student in computer science who works part time with my own company as a consultant. My lastest project is based on my bachelor thesis which handles everything except the security. The application will be audited by a much larger company than those who hired me and one requirement in the audit is dual layer of security on all channels. The first layer will of course be ssl/tls. As for the second one I've come up with the following. HTTP Digest Access Authentication - for credential exchange DHKE - to create a shared secret that afterwards is used to transport an AES key. RSA - to digitally sign the response from the server to ensure that there is no man in the middle. My first thought was to use RSA to securely transport the key. But I thought that I could reduce the overhead by using DHKE instead. Correct me if I'm wrong. The protocol would work something like this: Client-> (username + public information for DHKE) -> Server Server-> (B from DHKE, salt for HTTP digest, AES key encrypted with DHKE secret) -> Client (Whole message signed with server private key) Client-> AES(Hashed information for HTTP digest) -> Server Server-> AES(Session token) -> Client Once the session is initiated all messages will be encrypted with the AES key. I am probably overthinking this and missing a lot of details and I would greatly appreciate some advice. Kind regards Johan Risch
I'm pen-testing a Windows 7 machine, and have access to a limited remote shell. I can see there's a vulnerable SMB service running on the machine's loopback, but it's not available externally. Is there any way I can run a metasploit exploit over the session I already have, to access this service? Thanks!
One of the extremely valuable functions of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip is its ability to seal a private key under the hash of the code that will use it. This means that one can create a private key which can only be read by a a piece of code that hashes to a certain value. By using this technology, we can essentially emulate a smart card in software: we can create a private key that can never be read; it's only possible to ask the hardware to sign a message using this key. To me, this seems to be a huge step forward in IT security. Primarily this seems useful for mobile devices, which are used for payments. Bitcoin wallets, for example, seem like an obvious use for this technology. ARM chips include a feature called TrustZone. Does this technology allow doing the above -- sealing a private key under a code hash?
Is there any available tool which can check kernel 3+ system call table for modifications? Also I want to know, is there any automated general tool to check Linux for unknown rootkits? Not like rkhunter etc. which is mainly signature based, I want something like GMER for Linux, check for code modifications, kernel hooks, function hooks, etc.
JavaScript based OAuth exposes the client ID of the application and it trusts only on the domain requesting the access token. The domain name can be forged with a DNS hijack (or a virus affecting /etc/hosts). Then why is JavaScript based OAuth supported by Google, Facebook for clients not using HTTPS? Or am I missing something?
I recently generated some custom Diffie-Hellman parameters which are basically just long (in the below case 4096 bit) primes. Those are then used in the key exchange process. I used the following command: openssl dhparam -rand – 4096 Now I really wonder what OpenSSL actually does if I do not generate these parameters on my own. As the generation took roughly 2 hours it cannot be something that is generated on the fly - at least not of equal strength? So I wonder, is there a standard configuration or what does OpenSSL actually do in this case? (I couldn't find much clear and helpful information yet) I also wonder how much the increased security actually is comparing the standard with self generated primes, what is the difference in length of the primes. Thanks Update 15.06.2015 Looks like it makes sense to generate your own DH params: Bruce Schneier - The Logjam (and Another) Vulnerability against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Though pretty interested, I'm everything but an expert in Information Security, please redirect me to any helpful resources if my question is stupid or correct me if my assumptions are wrong. When reading through the Keepass Security page it seemed to me that the workflow of generating the password that's actually used to encrypt the kdbx file from the user-entered password (assuming no keyfiles or Windows user account is used) is as follows: Take user-entered password and hash it (SHA-256) Generate random password/retreive it from kdbx file Encrypt the hash from 1 N times using the key from 2 Hash the output of 3 using SHA-256 again Then, the output of 4 is the key to be actually used to encrypt the database. What I'm wondering about is: Why the hassle with the key stored in plain and encryption? Why not just omit steps 2 and 3 and hash the user-entered password N (or maybe C*N, with C being the time relation between AES-encrypting and SHA-256-hashing) times? I'm pretty sure I'm overlooking something important here and I'd be grateful if you could enlighten me.
I want to implement the following requirement. In an online Bank Transaction, a User wants to send an amount of $1000 to an Account A. I want to see that the request is going unmodified to Banking Server. So, I am using a Proxy Server as Fiddler n Client Side where the user enters Account and Amount information. Upon clicking submit, the proxy will reconfirm the Account and amount details before it sends to Server. So, I want to achieve this using Fiddler on client side. Is it possible with Fiddler? Or Is there any better Proxy that can do what I want? kindly let me know. Thanks,
Introduction: I am in the process of building a web-based game that requires user authentication. The vast majority of other gaming sites utilize the typical username/password method for authentication of users, however, knowing that gamers are typically lazy folks, I have thought about using a new kind of authentication that would instead profile each users computer using parameters such as local IP address, network hardware address (MAC), installed system font names, OS type and version, among other hardware and software properties in order to attempt to create an adequately unique and difficult to impersonate fingerprint that will be tied via hashes stored in a database to a given user account. Question: Are there any obvious pitfalls to authenticating users in this manner? Would this, plus a basic pin number, be enough to protect user accounts from being hijacked by other computer-dextrous users? This idea originated from this project: https://panopticlick.eff.org/index.php?action=log&js=yes
I've noticed that when extracting password hashes from a domain controller (using Elcomsoft proactive password auditor) sometimes I'll get LM and NTLM hashes and other times I'll only get NTLM hashes. I note that the NTLM + LM hashes (the accounts that contain both sets) are recovered orders of magnitude faster than the hashes that are only NTLM. I'm curious as to why this is the case? I understand that LM is the older and weaker of the two, but I don't understand why both LM and NTLM are being stored in these scenarios? More importantly, given that it appears that NTLM hashes exclusively are the safer option, how can I enforce NTLM only and remove existing LM hashes for users?
Let's say I know a guy is selling an SSL cert at a very low price, assume they will generate a real and valid cert for me, since I need to submit my CSR to them and they pass to the CA, are there any risks involved in buying cert from them technically? Second question is: given a cert, are there any methods I can know from whom the cert was bought? (Besides asking the CA) Update: I mean the reseller is selling well-known SSL (Comodo Positive SSL) at a very cheap price, e.g. 10-20% than reseller such as namecheap, but I need to submit CSR and buy from them instead of Comodo, so I need to know the risk.
E.g.: XORing the candidate against stored then comparing against 0. Do I need to worry? (my question is much in the same style as this question: Does bcrypt compare the hashes in "length-constant" time?)
I've been getting a lot of failed connections lately, namely from Facebook and now Google (German site works, French does not). This happened to other sites as well but these two are the kind you expect to work smoothly. Does anyone have a reasonable explanation for this? I have OCSP validation active on Firefox, i.e. when the OCSP validation fails the certificate is treated as invalid. Additionally, Firefox uses OCSP stapling. An example error below: Secure Connection Failed An error occurred during a connection to www.google.fr. The OCSP server experienced an internal error. (Error code: sec_error_ocsp_server_error) The page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the authenticity of the received data could not be verified. Please contact the website owners to inform them of this problem. Alternatively, use the command found in the help menu to report this broken site. Some of the websites where I detected the problem (HTTPS): Facebook; Google France/Spain; Wikipedia; and Youtube. [Edit] The first time it lasted between 30-60 minutes; and I am still getting this every once in awhile but only at home. At work it rarely happens (different ISP there btw).
I plan to create an application for secure instant messaging, now I don't know whether or not I want to implement the encryption by myself. This project is also mainly for educational purpose so I wouldn't mind a bit of extra work. My 'vision' is that every device that registers for my service generates a RSA-2048 keypair. The public key is then stored at the server and exchanged when the device (user) is being added as 'friend'. When a session is created I would perform a ECDH key exchange for Perfect Forward Secrecy and then agree to a AES-256 symmetric key. The server stores this AES key in a database together with a SHA-1 hash for identifying it at future session reconnects until a new key is negotiated. Not to forget a nonce against replay attacks. Is there a lot more I would have to think about when creating a secure protocol? Thanks in advance, conFusion
My college wireless network has a firewall blocking all outbound ports except 443 and 80. The wired network, however, has none of these restrictions. I can connect to HTTPS sites (obviously). On my server host, I forwarded port 443 and wrote an IPTables rule to redirect it to 22. From home I can connect as well as using 3g/4g and on the wired college network. I can SSH into the machine on port 443. However, when I am in the wireless network, I cannot. I will be trying an SSH over SSL tunnel, and though it would solve problems on, say, a laptop, I'm not sure if I'll be able to make the proper configurations on my phone. My theory is that there is DPI or some kind of filtration other than just outbound ports. Thanks guys!
I have a sql injection in my site and im using sqlmap but when i try --os-shell it says cannot write file due to permissions . now is it impossible to write a file to the server?
I read the What is the difference between SSL vs SSH? Which is more secure? , and it mentions there is the possibility they can be affected by similar attacks. Now that the heartbleed thing is out, is the ssh used in python through Paramiko affected by this?
Does anyone know how to fingerprint an IPS ? is there any tool available to do the job? I want to detect snort in my network . Would appreciate any kind of help.
I wonder how Shodan crawls internet-connected devices and adds them to its database. I know Google, for instance, finds new websites by following links in websites it already found, but that strategy won't work with internet-connected devices because they don't link to one another. What method does Shodan follow?
With the release of heartbleed how does one protect themselves with closed source networking hardware like cisco? Especially hardware with VPN variety. Would it be best to replaced such systems with opensource hardware setups such as pfSense or OpenWall?
Well, actually I know that the risk is that somebody from an external network could access IPs and hostnames of the machines on a local network, but I am struggling to understand if this is it or if there is something else. If the devices on the local network are all behind NAT, what would an attacker do with just a simple list of local IPs and hostnames?
What are the benefits of storing known_hosts in a hashed form? From what I read, it is supposed to protect the list of servers I am connecting to, presumably in a scenario where my account has been compromised (and known_hosts file stolen) If my account were indeed to be compromised, having known_hosts hashed would be very little consolation. An attacker could see from my bash history to which servers I am connecting. And also from my .ssh/config where all my servers are listed. Are there any benefits that I am missing in my description here?
example4.php?id=id=2-1 I came across the above injection and I can not figure out why(how) does this work and what's interesting is it returns all the records from the database. Anything guys? educate me Thanks
I am in a situation where I would like to encrypt audio and text files for an application I am working on. I did some looking around and from what I have seen the Rijndal encryption algorithm would work well for this. I found an implementation that uses .NET's RijndaelManaged class here. In my site, I will be accepting audio files from customers and generating text files from them. I would like to encrypt both of these files while they are on my servers, this way if a malicious user is able to access the file system they will not be able to access the contents of the files. From what I understand, it is very easy to screw up encryption, so I was hoping to get some opinions on whether the encryption example that I linked to is an effective way of encrypting files? Are there any potential weaknesses in this example? If so, suggestions on how to make this example more secure?
We are in the process of setting up a PCI compliant server (with Firehost's help). We are using MongoDB as our primary database. I am having some concerns about the encryption, though. Are there any advantages of Field-level data encryption over Disk encryption (maybe with something like truecrypt)? Which would be the preferred choice for a PCI compliant MongoDB database server?
I received an email to the email address listed on our website (it's a generic info@ourcompany.com to help "weed out" spam, whereas each employee has something like andreas@ourcompany.com to which I manually forward any "real" email that comes in through the website.) I received the following email (with actual names replaced with placeholders): Dear Sir, We are the department of Asian Domain Registration Service in China. I have something to confirm with you. We formally received an application on April 14, 2014 that a company which self-styled "Some Other Corp. Ltd.". were applying to register some "ourcompany" Asian countries top-level domain names. Now we are handling this registration, and after our initial checking, we found the name were similar to your company's, so we need to check with you whether your company has authorized that company to register these names. If you authorized this, we will finish the registration at once. If you did not authorize, please let us know within 7 workdays, so that we will handle this issue better. Best Regards, Some Fake Person The email is "plain" (no attachments, no embedded images, just some basic HTML), the email address is "normal" and not consisting of random characters. Is this a common email scam; and if so, what is their motive?
We are a vendor that provides software to the healthcare industry, and our application is locally hosted on customer infrastructure. As such, we are provided with VPN access in order to be able to provide support for the software. Given the risk that a member of staff could see HIPAA protected information, almost all of our customers insist that each user be given their own unique credentials and passwords. This can cause havoc trying to remember usernames and passwords for each site that an agent has to connect to. Have any of you come across this problem before, and how do you manage this among your teams? Short of writing them all down and locking them in a safe except when they are needed, I'm not sure of the best way to manage this. I've been researching things such as LastPass, but it appears to want plugins to try and insert passwords. Any thoughts much appreciated.
To clarify, my question isn't on how to protect myself from phishing. What I'm curious about is how exactly software can identify whether or not a website is designed for phishing, ignoring word identifiers/scanners to looking for spam/phishing sounding material.
If I am working writing a text document in a text editor (say notepad or MS word, or ...) then I can save the file and the encrypt this file. I can then try to erase the original file by overwriting it (using proper software). From what I understand there is a small (?) problem doing this because copies of the file might be made elsewhere on the hard drive. (I understand that parts of the file might also exist in the memory, but for this question I would be interested in what happens on the hard drive) I was wondering if this problem can be avoided by using a portable version of the text editor running of a USB key and saving the file to the USB key only. That way one can physically carry the USB key around which offers some security. My question is if this is correct. When using a portable program on a USB key, is it common that the programs saves (backup)copies of the file on the hard drive? More generally: Is there a value in using portable programs on a USB key?
According to OWASP you can prevent CSRF in a ASP.NET application if you include the SessionID in the ViewState. From the article: Viewstate can be used as a CSRF defense, as it is difficult for an attacker to forge a valid Viewstate. It is not impossible to forge a valid Viewstate since it is feasible that parameter values could be obtained or guessed by the attacker. However, if the current session ID is added to the ViewState, it then makes each Viewstate unique, and thus immune to CSRF. Is including the SessionID even necessary if you are using encrypted ViewState? How could a malicious user generate a valid encrypted ViewState?
I often use cat on the console to view the contents of files, and every now and then I accidentally cat a binary file which basically produces gibberish and system beeps. However today I've encountered a situation where the output from the cat utility got redirected to the console input so I got stuff like this: -bash: 2c: command not found -bash: 1: command not found -bash: 1: command not found -bash: 112: command not found -bash: 112: command not found -bash: 1: command not found -bash: 0x1: command not found -bash: 2c1: command not found -bash: 2c: command not found -bash: 1: command not found -bash: 1: command not found -bash: 112: command not found -bash: 112: command not found -bash: 1: command not found -bash: 0x1: command not found -bash: 2c1: command not found -bash: 2c1: command not found -bash: 2c1: command not found -bash: 2c1: command not found ... ... This got me thinking that a specifically crafted binary file could create quite a mess on the system?!... Now I do realize using cat recklessly like this is not particularly smart, but I would actually like to know what is going on here. What characters produce the effect of suddenly dumping the content on standard input... Note: I was in Mac OS X terminal while doing this, I've actually called diff -a to compare two firmware rom images and print the differences out(I thought there would be just a few bytes of differences but there where almost 8 MB of differences printed to the screen) Later I tried, on purpose, to cat one of the files and got the same effect like I've pasted here. - UPDATE - - UPDATE - - UPDATE - I've posted this here late at night yesterday and this morning I tried to replicate the behaviour and I can not. Unfortunately I can not be sure if some escape characters caused the gibberish from the binary to be executed on the console automatically or if at the end of the cat I just got a bunch of characters left(as If I've pasted them) on the command line and I've probably pressed enter accidentally to get a clear line... When I try to cat the file in question now I get this when it completes(scroll right to see): D?k(Fli9p?s?HT?78=!g??Ès3?&é?? =??7??K?̓Kü<ö????z(;???????j??>??ö?Ivans-MacBook-Pro:FI9826W-2.11.1.5-20140121 NA ivankovacevic$ 1;2c1;2c1;2;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c;1;1;112;112;1;0x1;2c1;2c;1;1;112;112;1;0x1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c My actual prompt is: Ivans-MacBook-Pro:FI9826W-2.11.1.5-20140121 NA ivankovacevic$ Where: FI9826W-2.11.1.5-20140121 NA is the current working dir. As you see it was camouflaged in the binary gibberish and I might have pressed enter reflexively or something. This in itself is a bit wrong of cat because obviously my prompt might have been even better "camouflaged." But it is less serious than I initially thought. Although I'm still not 100% sure that it did not execute automatically last night when I tried, because there was also another peculiar thing that happened last night, before this. I've called cat on another very similar file that caused Terminal app to quit with: Exception Type: EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV) Exception Codes: KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS at 0x00007fcb9a3ffffa Now I'm thinking that maybe a combination of these two events have caused the auto execution of gibberish on the console. But I can not replicate that behaviour again. The files in question are firmwares for a Foscam IP camera, here are the links: International site: http://foscam.com/Private/ProductFiles/FI9826W-2.11.1.5-20140120.zip And then the file inside: FI9826W_app_ver1.11.0.40_OneToAll.bin calling cat on that one will cause Terminal to quit. US site: http://foscam.us/downloads/FI9826W-2.11.1.5-20140121%20NA.zip and then the file: FI9826W_app_ver1.11.0.40_OneToAll_A.bin cat-ing that one will cause that paste of 1;2c1;2c1;2;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c1;2c.... characters on the command line
I'm generating a public PEM-format key from a private PEM-format key. I noticed that if I change a few characters near the end of the private PEM that the public PEM generated from the modified private PEM is exactly the same as the result from the unmodified private PEM. For example, this private PEM -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQCAAZXj8YAEQya8jF8l6Hy56BcRBgplxPd8ZM5LIAWm0w1k/CgB gvrI28W+5orOyqST2gC4EBEGmLw9s3NC8McL3qqFIQvd6SpWzCJEiI9n+wCkJLYf 715t6BwZo8F82AdqRHwL1lL0T4JeakgcFO5zno2l/NYKpZtS78vIq2F8pwIDAQAB AoGAIAdFh+lPTMG4mYjN7eBEBQgrbVkDlP85pWhbrbRvdZRtT41APVCWi1diHSf2 J1PQ5iWv9F4gxHPG9fFGr8MrKk+jCM0/rDJsN7yC1yiSerS9zNvoSWu4D1cizRn2 ZOFi+TJZVHAoVvuh1vJdsFLkDmfoXelR6v6ojQxp6IftblECQQD7W4F92yHVIkRt ZEz5TMYxtFF2d5uwi6XA/1MDuWpK0dK20a7DUGmgQ8faNfSZ/Dr1JmLx0OK/+Ocg 5HnzNo5NAkEAgl7Wa/Lr0TUH5h4L3SsJ1aeYUC6CbzJHBpNTvhuC7YEcs0AJL2k3 qYSM8VpU7q9iGHvfQhnKH9eBXlQbJBt4wwJBAJ1Pj6Ns2afCYoD0HRiJbCD/cVxr Tw0W2Q4IvbO+/z8EQpQYdv/V+8VJpnJzAjq9GUkEVThyOvdal4yGcaw9oKECQC8V /a+jXxSCaMXuGC7bOoQWMebTxXxP1mNDlr1UxmbteOYsvKSJBfeNzjHlhENoyK87 HhmLovr5JNpi2iKiYW0CQDyniRLXCyBVayJd3QkuMFKVNUuOytXUFWNXTpLA1Nbb 2K+leKb2KSyyEmRFC2X+QwF9ZBP1C3b0lgBBlBVbpWQ= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- and this private PEM -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXAIBAAKBgQCAAZXj8YAEQya8jF8l6Hy56BcRBgplxPd8ZM5LIAWm0w1k/CgB gvrI28W+5orOyqST2gC4EBEGmLw9s3NC8McL3qqFIQvd6SpWzCJEiI9n+wCkJLYf 715t6BwZo8F82AdqRHwL1lL0T4JeakgcFO5zno2l/NYKpZtS78vIq2F8pwIDAQAB AoGAIAdFh+lPTMG4mYjN7eBEBQgrbVkDlP85pWhbrbRvdZRtT41APVCWi1diHSf2 J1PQ5iWv9F4gxHPG9fFGr8MrKk+jCM0/rDJsN7yC1yiSerS9zNvoSWu4D1cizRn2 ZOFi+TJZVHAoVvuh1vJdsFLkDmfoXelR6v6ojQxp6IftblECQQD7W4F92yHVIkRt ZEz5TMYxtFF2d5uwi6XA/1MDuWpK0dK20a7DUGmgQ8faNfSZ/Dr1JmLx0OK/+Ocg 5HnzNo5NAkEAgl7Wa/Lr0TUH5h4L3SsJ1aeYUC6CbzJHBpNTvhuC7YEcs0AJL2k3 qYSM8VpU7q9iGHvfQhnKH9eBXlQbJBt4wwJBAJ1Pj6Ns2afCYoD0HRiJbCD/cVxr Tw0W2Q4IvbO+/z8EQpQYdv/V+8VJpnJzAjq9GUkEVThyOvdal4yGcaw9oKECQC8V /a+jXxSCaMXuGC7bOoQWMebTxXxP1mNDlr1UxmbteOYsvKSJBfeNzjHlhENoyK87 HhmLovr5JNpi2iKiYW0CQDyniRLXCyBVayJd3QkuMFKVNUuOytXUFWNXTpLA1Nbb 2K+leKb2KSyyEmRFC2X+QwF9ZBP1C3b0lgBBlBVbpWdddddddddddddddddddddddddQ= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- both result in the same public PEM being generated: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCAAZXj8YAEQya8jF8l6Hy56BcR BgplxPd8ZM5LIAWm0w1k/CgBgvrI28W+5orOyqST2gC4EBEGmLw9s3NC8McL3qqF IQvd6SpWzCJEiI9n+wCkJLYf715t6BwZo8F82AdqRHwL1lL0T4JeakgcFO5zno2l /NYKpZtS78vIq2F8pwIDAQAB -----END PUBLIC KEY----- I thought that changing one character of the private PEM would result in an entirely new public PEM. Am I missing something, or can some characters in fact be modified without affecting the public PEM result? The JavaScript library I'm using to generate the public PEM from a private PEM is rzcoder's node-rsa, which uses Tom Wu's jsbn crypto library.
I recently got homeland on a humble bundle and I've been getting really interested in Information Security so i want to keep learning and the best way i find is to listen to Audio books or podcast while drawing\walking\sleeping. I've listened to Homeland and SnowCrash, i know the Cryptonomicon has an Audiobook but the one i found has a voice I don't really like.
I am trying to see the heartbleed bug in action with my OpenSSL server application. My server uses the OpenSSL library - openssl-1.0.1b I successfully connect with s_client (openssl-1.0.1b) to my server. The SSL Handshake is through. Now, I type 'B' to send in a encrypted Heartbeat to the server. But the server closes the connection with Alert. The s_client dumps the following info: HEARTBEATING TLS 1.0 [length 0025], HeartbeatRequest SSL routines:SSL3_READ_BYTES:sslv3 alert bad record mac:s3_pkt.c:1256:SSL alert number 20 However if I were to type in some other data, it gets treated as application data and is processed by my server. And another thing to note is that the same s_client successsfully exchanges heartbeats with www.yahoo.com Why could my server not accept heartbeat message even though in server hello it mentioned that it supports that extension? Edit(Update) One thing that I hadn't realized was that the SSL library was actually TurboSSL, Cavium's port of OpenSSL to use the hardware accelarator. With this I see the error that I mentioned. When I use the plain OpenSSl library, it worked fine!. Heartbeats were being sent from server.
I am staying in Thailand right now on a "long holiday" to do some work on my laptop. A few weeks I noticed that at the condo where I am staying, sometimes I am redirected to ad sites. I researched it and learned there may be some problem with the wireless router's security (the model, TD-W8961ND, has a known vulnerability). I can find the router at 192.168.1.1 but no passwords work. I believe the attackers may have changed the password. Just yesterday, the attacks got severe and most websites would redirect to a fake site to "upgrade flash player" (malware file). I tried to get the router replaced but when it came back from the ISP, it still has the same problem. So it looks like the router is still configured to redirect to malicious addresses. My questions are: 1) What is the likelihood that financial information conducted over SSL could have been affected during this breach? Passwords? I normally don't fall for these traps but since I was using a compromised router for 2 months, it's possible they got me somehow. 2) I am now using a secure OpenVPN connection and no longer experiencing any problems from my router because my requests are all going to the VPN server first. If I stay connected via VPN, am I still vulnerable to problems exposed to me by this router? (Let's assume there's no way I can actually fix the problem). 3) Or, does anybody know if there's a way to force-reset the router back to admin/admin so I can log in and look at the security settings and patch the vulnerability? Regards, Grey
It seems to be generally accepted the same password should not be used for different sites or devices. How different should passwords be? For example +_^gum<JW1 and +_^gum<JW2 are very similar. Does it matter what the passwords are used for, for example having two e-mail accounts with similar passwords may be poor security but would having an e-mail account and encrypted USB device with similar passwords be better? What if two or more passwords follow a pattern or relation? For example applesorangesbannansand pottatoescarrotsturnips I have read that all passwords should be random. This is ideal but not feasible. It is most difficult to remember and password managers may not be a viable option (for example password to memory stick you carry with you). It has been stated that computers should not be used to create random passwords. Some devices it's very hard to type long complex passwords in, such as smartphones.
I have installed Tor on my Mint computer, but how do I determine if Tor is working? When I visit http://whatismyip.com, my old IP is shown. Should it not be a different IP when I'm using Tor? Here is some information when I run netstat -ant | grep 9050 tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:9050 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
We are using heartbeat for high availability of httpd. In httpd we are using openssl of version 0.9.8 but about heartbeat i dont much about that but while search in google some sites are sayong that if u use heartbeat we are affected with heartbleed. what should i do?
How does DPI basically identify SSL data traffic? Just by the number “443” in port section or the SSL traffic has some other particular properties other than “443”? Thanks in advance,
Is there a way to attack SHA-3, GOST, and WHIRLPOOL hash functions?
I have an application that runs in mobile devices and connects to my server via HTTPS. At times the connection fail because the device has a date set in the past (before the 'valid from' date on my certificate). I can change the application code running on the mobile devices and also can change things on server side, how do I fix that? I'm investigating 2 possibilities: Pick the current date from the server response and change the client application to use that to validate the certificate ( I know the date is available at least from the "Date" http header). Can I / should I interfere in the validation process like that? Try to buy a certificate valid since 1/1/1970 (which is the date some of the mobile clients assume) and up to 1 year from now. Do you see potential issues in that? Any other options to go around this?
Yesterday, I woke my computer up from sleep mode (it had been on all day while I was at work). And my browser was open to an email account that was not mine. Is it possible that someone hacked my WiFi and then used my computer to visit websites on my computer? If it is, is there a way to detect when someone had access to my WiFi (were he didn't belong to be) and is there a way to detect if they had access to my computer? Is this is something that would be relatively easy to do, or would only really experienced hackers be able to do so? Also, would they have to be physically near my house?
I have a school project where i am supposed to implement a Kerberos based infrastructure (AS, TGS and resource server). It is already done and working, but i started thinking about how to protect the Authentication Server against DDOS and although is not a project requirement, i am very curious about how it should be done. The Authentication Server receives the username and password in order to authenticate a user, what countermeasures should be implemented to avoid an attack? Thank you.
I'm working on an application which allows a moderator to edit information of user. So, at the moment, I have URL's like http://www.example.com/user/1/edit http://www.example.com/user/2/edit I'm a bit worried here, as I'm directly exposing the users table primary key (ID) from the database. I simply take the ID from the URLs (for ex: 1 and 2 from above URLs), query the database with the ID and get user information (of course I am sanitizing the input - ID from URL). Please note that I'm validating every request to check if moderator has access to edit that user. Is what I'm doing safe? If not, how should I be doing it? I can think of one alternative i.e. have a separate column for users table with 25 character key and use the keys in URLs and query database with those keys. However, What difference does it make? (Since key is exposed now) Querying by primary key yields result faster than other columns
I recently got a magnetic card reader that plugs into my computer because I was bored. I decided to scan my ID and bank card through it and I was surprised to see my ID number/bank card number show up plainly on the screen. Therefore, can you load a custom value onto a blank card (say, another number or SQL injection string) easily with off-the-shelf equipment? And do these attacks occur frequently?
So with my knowledge of Tor, I know that exit nodes are where packets escape the Tor network and enter the "traceable" internet; ie. you can link an attack to an exit node but not the source of the attack within the Tor network. If I notice my server is getting attacked by exit nodes, can identifying as many exit nodes and blocking their IP addresses be enough to stop exit node attacks? Is identifying as many exit nodes as I can and taking measures against them a feasible countermeasure; or do the exit nodes shuffle around/mutate/change too often that, no matter what, exit nodes will continue to attack me?
Are there signatures for malicious JavaScript codes as they exist for other viruses/worms/trojans developed in other programming languages ? If so, are these JavaScript malware signatures defined the same way as they are defined in other "standard" malwares ? I ask this because I need to download some signatures of known JavaScript malwares for a harmless test on my 'anti-malware' like script programmed in Python.
The cert for our public facing site is about to expire soon. Our site is entirely http. The site runs on SharePoint, and with SharePoint working with NTLM, the credentials that are passed over the site are done so securely (not in plain text). This is for users going to the site and making basic changes (text/images). Once they are authenticated, they edit the site on http. So, is there any need for us to renew our cert? Thanks
How can I create a password, which when directly hashed (without any salt) with md5 will return a string containing the 8 characters "SALT ME!". The hope is that a naive developer browsing through his user database will see the "hash", realize the insecurity of his application, and eventually make the world a better place for everyone. Md5 outputs 128 bits, which is 16 bytes. If I had a 16-byte message, getting the original plaintext password would be equivalent to a pre-image, which to my knowledge is practically impossible. However, I'm only looking for 8 specific bytes in my hash. Is obtaining such a password feasible in day-timeframes on a typical computer? If so, how can I compute such a password?
I've read through How do I deal with a compromised server? and have followed the steps to cleaning-up/mitigating any future damage. I'm just wondering if there are any post-clean up steps that are considered "best practice", such as: Informing the customers of the infection and clean up submitting the shells/infected files to any security firms reporting details of the exploit used to any security firms investigation/reporting of attacking ip address I'm not sure if any of this information could be helpful to them or not, so currently I've just been meticulously record keeping.
I am a software engineer with an interest in expanding my knowledge in the security field. In addition to security.stackexchange and OWASP, I am currently reading the book "The web application hacker's handbook". My question is; based on your experience(s) what are worthy security certifications for a software engineer to pursue? (certifications where you learn a good deal and that could be in high demand by employers in the near future).
I have a function that returns random unguessable keys with the following characters: a-z A-Z 0-9. I have set the key length to 10 and I am using that for my form tokens to prevent CRSF and I will be using the same function also to generate email confirmation keys. My question is if that will be secure enough to use? The form tokens will be tied to a user session, and the email confirmation keys will be stored up to 24 hours before destroyed. Other than that I will not keep a log of them. I have noticed there are a lot of sites that use extremely long confirmation keys with a length of about 30-40 characters. In my eyes that looks way overkill.
On Android applications now some applications say that they want access to things such as speaker or camera "at any time without your confirmation". I wasn't sure if this meant that it does not require your overt permission each time to access that resource, or if it meant that it can literally access that resource whenever it wants. I'm not quite sure what to make of it and it seems like a clear security violation if apps can be given such access. What are peoples thoughts on this issue or does anyone know exactly what these permissions actually mean?
I'm creating a web API in .Net for a web application. I'm wondering what the industry standard for login authentication is. I know that most people believe that sending cleartext username/passwords over SSL is enough security, but I don't want to place all of my trust that SSL won't be broken in the future and I'm a firm believer in security in layers. How else can I add more layers of security to my login authentication besides SSL and cleartext usernames/passwords? Client side encryption? Challenge-response?
(Sorry I know this is a complete noob question and at the risk of posting a somewhat duplicate topic. I have a basic understanding of public/private key, hashing, digital signature... I have been searching online & stack forum last couple days but cannot seem to find a satisfactory answer.) Example: I am surfing on open wifi and I browse to for the 1st time. Server sends back its SSL certificate. My browser does its thing and verifies that the cert is signed by a CA that it trusts and all is well. I click around on the website. BUT! Question: Can someone actually please explain to me in a simple way how does my browser actually verify that the server certificate is legitimate? Yeah okay so on the certificate itself it says it is issued by, say "Verisign" but what is the actual cryptographic magic happens behind the scene to validate that it isn't a bogus certificate? I have heard people explain "SSL certificates are verified using the signing CA's public key" but that doesn't make sense to me. I thought public key is to encrypt data, not to decrypt data. So confused... appreciate it if someone could enlighten me. Thanks in advance!
I've heard that using encryption outside military use has been illegal for a long time in the USA. However, I've also heard that when the regulation was updated, limits were put on encryption strength (such as key size by common algorithms such as AES). Is this last statement true?
I am new here, and have poked around the site looking for an overview of which hash algorithm to use on the web and why. It seems to be the consensus that SHA-256 or other SHA-2 family algorithms are the best because they do not have the collisions that MD5 and older hash techniques have. I'm wondering if SHA-2 family techniques are less supported on the web because of other reasons besides security, such as ease of implementation or speed of execution. On a website that is already protected by the encryption of an SSL certificate via TLS/HTTPS the data (i.e. a password) is already being encrypted anyway (putting aside the recent issues with Heartbleed). So perhaps more priority has been given to algorithms that are easier to implement rather than more secure? It still seems sketchy to use MD5 on the web, i.e. for password hashing. Which hashing algorithm is best for the web and why?
Looking at this previous question, the answer suggests that using a GET request to retrieve a CSRF token in order to make a POST is a legitimate method of preventing CSRF attacks. I have two websites, and a form is used to communicate between them -- a login form. These two sites are on separate subdomains, and the form itself on Site A is: <form method="post" action="https://siteB.com/login">..</form> Site B requires a CSRF token to be sent in via a hidden input, so on page load, I make a JSONP call to //siteB.com/getCSRFToken, which sends back the valid token. I use javascript to insert the hidden input element into the form, the user is none-the-wiser, and the form submits properly. Are there potential security implications to doing this? SiteB is an Express-backed Node application, so I am just using their CSRF middleware to handle generation/expiration.
I have huge problem with my router: Sagem F@st 3202. Here are some Security log events: Inbound Traffic | Blocked - Default policy | TCP XX.XX.XX.XXX:80->XX.X.XX.XX:51707 on ppp0 [repeated 3 times, last time on Apr 23 02:32:08 2014] Inbound Traffic | Blocked - Spoofing protection | IGMP 192.168.4.1->224.0.0.1 on eth2 Inbound Traffic | Blocked | Packet invalid in connection, tcp reset attack is suspected: TCP [repeated 2 times, last time on Apr 23 02:35:02 2014] The events repeat all the time during last 24 hours. Could you help me to identify the attack? It would be very helpful to define the attacker. Is it possible that it's some kind of wardriving? Is it a random or planned attempt?
In order for a Heartbleed attack to happen and for someone to grab the SSL private key and even spy they have to be on the local network with a router, switch or server, correct? Or can this be done to any server directly over the internet? I always thought packet sniffing had to be done locally
I want to implement a challenge-response login authentication for my web application. My understanding is that the server has to send back the password salt for the user so that the user can calculate the password hash on the client side and then send it back to the server to compare and check if the user is authenticated or not. I know this type of authentication is vulnerable to dictionary attacks because the attacker can see the password salt in plain text and brute force attack the server with that password salt. As always, layers of security is best so I would also add SSL to the equation so the attacker would have to break SSL as well as brute force the password with the salt. Is there ways I can improve upon this, I have look into SRP (Secure Remote Password) but it seems really complex whereas challenge-response can provide just as much benefit.
After some half-good script kiddies found out about this exploit or DDoS method, they have been doing it like crazy to websites, game servers, and now my home servers which allows me to work on some of my client's websites and different projects for people. My ISP is calling me, complaining about it and how it is using up a lot of their bandwidth. They are complaining that they are going to shut off my business plan service if it does not stop. Also, all of my home servers run Fedora 17, PHP 5.5, Apache 2.6, MySQL 5.5. How can I patch or block this method of attack?
I'm trying to understand the DUKPT (Derived Unique Key Per Transaction) system used for PIN devices, but I'm getting hung up on the IPEK. This blog post has an image where the sequence is: BDK (Secret) IPDK (Generated, used, then thrown away) Future Key (Generated, used in devices) One-Time encryption key (Generated, used to transmit data) I know that given a Future Key and the transaction counter (which is also included in the transmitted data), the correct One-Time key can be generated to decrypt the data. What I'm failing to understand is why the BDK isn't used to generate the Future Key directly. Why go though the IPDK?
Is there a general name for this sort of cryptographic protocol? If so what sort of assymetric/symmetric encryption functions tend to be used for this protocol?
What would you think about military strategist who is publishing full plans for all of important infrastructure? I think that person will be stupid. Can be this analogy case with OpenSource? Here is one possible scenario of attack on OpenSource systems in near future: Say, there are enemy goverment with big budget of money and all needed resources. They create supervirus which traverse throught internet and look on what type of opensource software some server uses. Then they download sources for this software and automaticaly find vulnerabilities to attack on this servers and then uses this server to attack on other servers. They can also use metainformation like records in version controls systems about changes in sources (for discovering errors like Heartbleed bug) They can also build database about quality of sources produced by concrete programmer and then concentrate on changes maded by more fallible programmers. By having full access to sources and metainformations they can use many other techniques to increase probability of finding vulnerability. I thing this type of attack is improbable today, but what in future? From strategic point of view it is good idea to build your civilisation on systems with public plans without any control who is viewing this plans?
For example today there are ".codes", ".farm" and ".vaijes" newly available. How do big companies like google, facebook, twitter, .. keep sure that they are the first who register their name on the new domain? Is there any contract they have with the domain registrar?
I want to make sure that the dynamic link libraries used by my application can't be replaced with other libraries of the same name, in order to inject malicious code. Therefore, I thought about creating a fingerprint of the DLLs before releasing new application versions. The application would then validate the fingerprint before the DLL is loaded. Would this provide good protection in the above scenario? Regarding the hash function: I'm not sure whether or not to use MD5, or one of SHA algorithms. I know MD5 isn't safe to collision attacks, but it is safe against preimage attacks. Against which attacks should I protect the libraries (using fingerprints)?
I was thinking about a situation to avoid session sharing or hijacking, validating the IP the user logged in against the ip that is accessing any page after log in. It was working until I figured it's possible when the user are coming from other network and someone from inside the same network copied (or hijacked) the cookie to another machine. After you copy a cookie from a logged session to another machine, the other machine can access the application without login because the session id is ok and the IP (when comes out to the internet) is the same. Is there any way we can avoid it? I was thinking having the cookie encrypted using SSL by the server sharing the key as it does for SSL connection. In this way only the right client would have the right cookie value. (Here I'm not talking about connection with SSL but encrypt the cookie. The SSL will be used encrypting the content as usual). I didn't find anything about this yet. I would say the question is more like "How can I create a encrypted cookie based on each client and the server is the only one who can decrypt the cookie". If I just encrypt it on server, based on my encryption key, it will be the same encryption to every user and it will keep being copied.
I would like to install Metasploit on an hardened OS. For this purpose I chose Mavericks just because I'm able to harden this OS pretty far. I would like to install Metasploit with MacPorts because until now, all the best security tools I needed were correctly manageable with MacPorts through 4 different versions of MacOS X (Snow Leopard, Lion, Mountain Lion, Mavericks). (This installation challenge is part of a baptism by fire.) I already did this installation on previous versions of this OS. I also already found pretty good references to install Metasploit on MacOS X: Install the Metasploit Framework on Apple Mac OS X Guide to Installing Metasploit 4 and Armitage on Mac OSX Lion How To Install Metasploit Framework In MacOSX Unfortunately none of these answer to my search, and none lead me to a successfull installation. Do you know a correct and tested receipe to install Metasploit on Mavericks + MacPorts?
I'm currently learning IKE and IPsec for an exam. I have a lot of information on how Security Parameter Indexes (SPI) are used in both protocols, but I'm having some problems figuring out the coherence. First, in IKE, both parties share their SPI with the respective other party. I guess these will be the both SPIs used for the two Security Associations (SA), because each SA is only unidirectional, is that right? Then, in the IPsec chapter, things start to get more complicated. Reading different sources, I have a theory how this works exactly, but I'm not sure if my theory is right. RFC 4301 says: SPI: An arbitrary 32-bit value that is used by a receiver to identify the SA to which an incoming packet should be bound. [...] In IKE, each party shares an SPI with the other party. Does this mean, that the SPI a party sets is the SPI used for the incoming SA, not the outgoing one? This would explain another question I have regarding registrating a new SA in the SA-Database (SAD) SAD_ADD is used when IKE already knows which SPI it wants to use for an SA. SAD_GETSPI is used to get a non-used SPI (here the SAD returns a non-used SPI, because of course it knows which SPIs are used and which aren't). Additionally it already inserts an incomplete SA. The SAD_UPDATE is then used to to set the missing SPI to the previously inserted SA. Additionally my notes say that the initiator uses the SAD_ADD method while the responder uses SAD_GETSPI and SAD_UPDATE. This would make sense, if the responder is the one creating an SPI, and the initiator only adds this SPI to his database. This only has to be unique for him together with the responder's IP address. Is my theory right? However I don't understand why the SAD_UPDATE method is used. For me this sounds redundant: SAD_GETSPI: "I want to insert an SA x, which SPI can I use? Answer: Here is an unused SPI: y. Additionally, I have already inserted x in my Database, just tell me which SPI I should insert." SAD_UPDATE: "Please update SA x, set SPI to y."
Here at OU=PKI we've been requested to issue a certificate with CA capabilities to install it in our reverse proxy, so that it could issue trustable certificates for every single web. (SSL ending) Currently it is signing them with an own non trustable Bluecoat certificate. So the browser warns you each time Should I just allow an external software to issue as many trustable certificates as they want? What are the best practices in this case? Thank you!
I'm using SourceTree (a Git GUI) which uses PuTTY as SSH client. I need to push some code into a repository for which I need to tunnel through SSH to do so. The trouble is, the repository and SSH authentication server are on separate servers. Hence, I need to login to one server and then push to another one. I was given the following config file but I don't know how to use it with PuTTY: Host login HostName login.nets.*******.** Host zeus HostName zeus.nets.*******.** ProxyCommand ssh login nc %h %p 2> /dev/null #ProxyCommand ssh login -W %h:%p ForwardAgent yes IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Several systems rely on using UID of smart card for identification/authorization. For example database stores list of smart card UIDs and corresponding privileges. Given that today there exist cards where you can write any UID you want and thus emulate say Mifare classic UID for example, what are practices of using smart card UID for authorization? In other word fear is if I use Mifare Classic UID for authorization, someone may purchase some Chinese card, where you can assign any UID you want - and hence holder of such card, can impersonate original holder of my Mifare Classic. Are there ways to overcome this? How (or do at all?) people use smart card UID for authorization?
I would like to know if the connection in my office is filtered, because i cannot access Faceboook neither Youtube but i can access google with no problems, but Tor i can access all the websites. i would like to know some details about the filtering software used in my office network. is there any type if filtering that cannot be bypassed even with Tor ?
The company I work for has a few OpenVPN servers used by over 200 employees. The servers were deployed a few years ago using the default easyrsa settings and now we want to upgrade to stronger encryption and authentication. Is it possible to change the 1024-bit CA seamlessly, like issuing a 2048-bit CA and sign it with the old one?
Which SSH server (compatible with Debian Wheezy) has the fewest (if any) exploitable security bugs?
I am using a form token to prevent CSRF attacks. Those tokens are stored and tied to a user's session. Now I want to refresh the token only every N minutes or hours so that the user's don't experience any usability issues like the browser Back button not working properly. My question is, what would be a good time period before refreshing the user session token?
As I was going through Crypt::SSLeay, preparing it for the next release, I noticed the following code, written way before my time, ... int rand_bytes_read; static int bNotFirstTime; char buf[ 1024 ]; ... if(!bNotFirstTime) { SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); SSL_load_error_strings(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); SSL_library_init(); bNotFirstTime = 1; } /**** Code from ..., 10/3/2002 ****/ /**** Use /dev/urandom to seed if available ****/ rand_bytes_read = RAND_load_file("/dev/urandom", 1024); if (rand_bytes_read <= 0) { /* Couldn't read /dev/urandom, just seed off * of the stack variable (the old way) */ RAND_seed(buf,sizeof buf); } First, it seems to me that the correct way to check if RAND_load_file succeeded is to check if bytes read is equal to bytes requested. Leaving that aside, it is my understanding that SSL_library_init does seed the PRNG from /dev/urandom if it is available, and from other sources on Windows etc. Is there a reason to try to re-seed the PRNG every time a new context is created (SSL_library_init is only invoked the first time)? Is using the contents of a stack variable an acceptable way to provide randomness? OpenSSL's Wiki states: Initialization OpenSSL will attempt to seed the random number generator automatically upon instantiation by calling RAND_poll. RAND_poll seeds the random number generator using a system-specific entropy source, which is /dev/urandom on UNIX-like operating systems, and is a combination of CryptGenRandom and other sources of entropy on Windows. Be careful when deferring to RAND_poll on some Unix systems because it does not seed the generator. See the code guarded with OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS in rand_unix.c. Additionally, RAND_poll can have negative interactions on newer Windows platforms, so your program could hang or crash depending on the potential issue. See Windows Issues below. PS: Crypt::SSLeay provides support for Perl's LWP::UserAgent to communicate over HTTPS. It is no longer used by default, but it is maintained so as not to break older setups.
I have a list of 30 websites I have scanned. I need to pull out a report for each individual website. Is it possible to do? Right now I am just running a report and getting the results for all 30 and it just comes out in a huge chunk of data I dont have time to sift through.
I have a desktop WPF application which authenticates with Dynamics CRM 2011. I ask for the username and password of the user and use them to connect to Dynamics CRM 2011 using CrmConnection.parse("url={2};Username={1};Password{2}",CRMServerUrl, Username,Password). This class then connects to the CRM Server using the provided credentials (authenticated against Active Directory). The conundrum I'm struggling with is that part of the design of the application is that authentication to CRM is only needed once. Any authentications past the first one should happen automatically using the credentials the user previously entered (And yes, the user can change these in the app if needed). This means I need to store passwords, but I cannot hash them. Currently, I use the methods suggested by Jon Galloway in Encrypting Passwords in a .NET app.config File. A coworker recommended this. I read some other questions on this matter, but some of the concepts like derived keys, hardware encryption or sending a derived value are either total blind spots to me or are not possible within the design constraints. What are my options?
In DTLS 1.2 RFC 6347, section 4.2.6: CertificateVerify and Finished messages have the same format as in TLS. Hash calculations include entire handshake messages, including DTLS-specific fields: message_seq, fragment_offset, and fragment_length. Is this the case for DTLS 1.0 as well? Cause I can't find info particularly for CertificateVerify in the specs for DTLS 1.0 How's the signature hash generated in DTLS 1.0? I tried hash all the message (Handshake layer) received from ClientHello to the one before CertificateVerify (Either with or without the cookie exchange) and it fails to do a verification on server. Did I miss any step?