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As my computer is currently set up, I have 3 AV's: AVG (paid), Malwarebytes, and Spybot S&D. I think that each one of these serves a purpose: AVG gets your real malware - Trojans, Worms, etc. and provides real-time protection, Malwarebytes gets adware (which AVG misses with alarming frequency), and Spybot gets spyware (which the other two have missed on occasion) and tracks. This setup has worked well for me, especially since only one AV provides real-time protection. However, I also know that multiple AV's generally don't serve much of a purpose (as implied in this question: Is there a way to use multiple firewalls / antivirus for penetration testing? , and said outright in another one I can't find). Am I justified in having all three of these on my computer, given that each one catches things the others don't?
SSL implementations have been discussed a lot lately, due to Chrome's potential of switching off NSS (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ML11ZyyMpnAr6clIAwWrXD53pQgNR-DppMYwt9XvE6s/preview?pli=1&sle=true#) and OpenSSL with Heartbleed. What are the major factors preventing someone with tons of resources (e.g. Google) from implementing a new SSL library that is more easily auditable/maintainable to ensure security in the future? I understand an SSL implementation may be a huge project in itself, but other people have implemented clean room implementations before (e.g. BouncyCastle in Java). So surely someone with enough resources would have the ability to write from scratch, and it would be cheaper than trying to audit and maintain something like OpenSSL.
I have a web site where users can enter some text into a textbox and that text is immediately rendered in a div using javascript (strictly front end). If a user enders something like this: This is my text<script>alert('test');</script> It will render that content in the div and show the alert. When the user saves the record everything is HTML encoded when it gets to the server and then saved to the database, so there is no stored XSS vulnerability. My question is if the act of rendering the contents of the textbox on the client side could pose any kind of threat? If so, what could a malicious user do?
I recently looked at my local credit union bank and they said that their site is not vulnerable to heart bleed. However, I have used my credit card in many websites such as grubhub, amazon, some charity organizations, so the credit card data can be exploited. I want to have some expert opinion before I act? PS: I looked at What should end-users do about Heartbleed? but couldn't find what I was looking for.
Are intruders in a local network able to mask their local IP in any way? Could they 'hijack' another local IP and perform scans and exploits from there?
Related to, of course, the heartbleed vulnerability, I've been reading the news about the worst case scenario for this attack being the extraction of the SSL private key, because, of course, this would allow the attacker to decrypt all traffic to and from the compromised server, including [probably, depending on forward secrecy] any traffic that's been captured and stored somewhere. This got me thinking, assuming the worst case scenario, that your Heartbleed vulnerable server had echoed back memory containing your private key... how would the attacker be able to differentiate it from other memory contents, or uninitialized memory, or what have you? Is there a header/footer, or a telltale pattern in the key data itself? I know some RSA Key forms (PEM/base64) have headers/footers in the file (-----BEGIN FOO BAR KEY----- and -----END FOO BAR KEY-----), though I'm having trouble imagining those strings loaded into memory. Is it maybe given away by having something recognizable using a pointer to it? It doesn't seem like something you can brute force (trying every X bit combination of memory content against 64 KB of memory seems like it would generate an astronomically large number of permutations). So, how's it done? How is a cryptographic key in memory recognized as a cryptographic key? And in a related question, is the answer different or the same for a symmetrical crypto key? (such as you might extract with a cold boot attack against a system using full disk encryption, for example.)
I just got a software update openssl-1.0.1e-37. I believe it is a patch for HeartBleed. Given that it was widely reported that versions up to 1.0.1f are vulnerable, how can I verify this patch on my server without resorting to an external checker?
I was wondering if there currently exists a Content Management System that supports PKI and client certificates for website authentication instead of username/passwords. If not, what's a good place to start on developing a site that uses this authentication scheme? Is it possible with Python and Django?
From what I understand, all it takes to enable PFS on a webserver is adding ephemeral cipher suites (ones that use DHE and ECDHE for the key exchange) to the list of cipher suites used in SSL/TLS handshake. I'm aware that some older web services and crypto libraries do not support these cipher suites. But besides that, all modern browsers support PFS. Enabling PFS does not prevent older, incompatible browsers from working in case some users can't or refuse to upgrade. So, what's the issue here? Why don't more websites implement Perfect Forward Secrecy?
I am trying to write an application is rails. Which is more like a api application so that when a user gets redirected from his application into mine I would like to authorize him and start a session for his own. This session must be open till he leaves my application. How can I do this?
the lastpass.com/heartbleed tool states that my server is most likely vulnerable and that users should wait untill my cert has been replaced. It seems that they check for certificate creation date, but i re-keyed my certs which means that they are newly created with a new key but still have the old information like the original creationdate from 2013. Is there a way to check if a certificate has been rekeyed? EDIT (clarification): If you have access to both certs you can tell the difference and compare it to the cert you see in the browser, but that's not possible for normal visitors to the site. If I browse to a website I want to be able to check if the cert has been replaced or re-keyed.
Everywhere I go, people tell me the private keys need to be kept away, possibly even locked into a safe. Then how come Firefox and other keystores expect you to give them a private key? Firefox is a client, it shouldn't need this right?
More and more evidence seems to be surfacing that the Heartbleed vulnerability leaks the private key portion of the SSL certificate in use. As such this can actually mean that if an attacker was also able to passively monitor SSL traffic, when they get hold of this key, they could decrypt an unlimited log of SSL data, potentially accessing thousands of user's sensitive data. But I had thought that such implementations as Perfect Forward Secrecy were supposed to defend against this by utilising a symmetric key that meant the revealing of the SSL private key would still be insufficient to decrypt recorded SSL traffic? How widespread is the use of Perfect Forward Secrecy and if not-so, is this trivial to setup in an HTTPS context?
We have two severs sitting under one load balancer. We run PCI scans on those two servers. Now, when we started, we only had 2 websites running from these two server. But the business is growing and we have around 10 more sites on these two servers. Do I have to get the PCI scans of all these websites separately, or will it be sufficient to have the PCI scans of server boxes?
(1) As it is possible to extract the secret key from a SmartCard using laboratory equipment, I wonder if there is any (new) way to protect against this sort of security breach? Does it affect all kinds of SmartCard? (2) Do eToken/ crypto-token resist such key-extraction attacks? Would the PIN lengh make any difference? (3) Is there any alternative available (similar to smartcards) with better security that is secure also when the attacker steals them?
I have started Firefox in an Ubuntu terminal, and now I see these messages during browsing: "No permission to use the keyboard API for http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net" I mean... WTF? Why does Google Ads or DoubleClick need to have access to my keyboard?
Basically, I'm testing a local network, on which I'm able to use ARP spoofing. I now want to try and infect one of the Windows boxes on the network with a backdoor. I could inject an iframe into their HTTP traffic, or a JavaScript redirect, or something to that effect, to get the file to download. However, I'm wondering if there are other methods to do this - which wouldn't be so obvious to the end user and require quite so much interaction from him/her. In other words, which tools would let me look for the next .exe file downloaded and replace the contents with my backdoor executable or any other vectors you can think of?
In hearing about the Heartbleed vulnerability, I went to https://www.openssl.org/source/ to download the latest patch, but was quite surprised to find that the security certificate for that site has not been refreshed since the exploit was discovered ("not valid before" date is Tuesday, August 30, 2011 5:30:50 AM CT). So, how can I be sure what I'm looking at is the true OpenSSL site and not an impostor who stole their certificate (even before the exploit was revealed). In other words, I downloaded https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.0.1g.tar.gz, which that same site claims to have an MD5 of de62b43dfcd858e66a74bee1c834e959, which it does, but is that the right fingerprint for that patch? Or am I downloading something malicious that has a new backdoor coded in it? UPDATE: Following suggestion from @Lekensteyn, I verified that the PGP signature provided for that download was valid and signed by key 0xFA40E9E2, which seems to be the key of Dr Stephen N Henson <steve@openssl.org> (which the the website agrees with). But to be super-sure, I'm assuming I can't trust the website right now. What other ways can I get faith that the 0xFA40E9E2 key is the one that should be signing that release? Does anyone have an OpenSSL download from the 0.9.8 branch (that was not compromised by Heartbleed and would be old enough to have been distributed before the exploit), that they can verify is signed by that same key? Concern: I found this notice of an update to the OpenSSL website, just before the exploit was revealed (April 2), and the change to the site was to mark Dr. Henson's key as expired, and add 0xFA40E9E2 as his new key, but that key was created back in 2005? So it's a new key to identify Dr. Henson, but then that's the key they chose to sign this super-important patch to Heartbleed? Does that seem off to anyone?
According to articles such as the following, it's apparently possible to check logs for heartbeat requests matching the payloads described in the Heartbleed exploit. Is this something that any server operator can check for in their own logs (at the server level, any standard Linux distribution)? If so, which logs should be checked, and for what pattern?
I admit that while I'm a programmer, my crypto/security knowledge is fairly basic. I understand that the potential of leaking private SSL keys is cited as one of the most serious effects of the Heartbleed bug. My question is, how can an attacker actually use the private key? Heartbleed.com states that: These are the crown jewels, the encryption keys themselves. Leaked secret keys allows the attacker to decrypt any past and future traffic to the protected services and to impersonate the service at will. "Decrypt any past and future traffic" is clear to me, assuming the attacker has (or has had) means of sniffing the encrypted traffic. But I can't quite grasp how they can "impersonate the service at will." The way I understand it, to impersonate the service, the attacker would need a way to divert traffic to their site, or pose as a man in the middle. And I believe both of these are quite difficult to accomplish (at least when no unsecure network like public Wi-Fi is involved). Is this correct, or am I missing something? So, perhaps a different way to phrase it: if I, as an end user, type in https://someorotherdomain.tld into a browser's address bar (and there's no certificate problem), how likely am I to be talking to someone else due to someorotherdomain's private key having been heartbled?
It's been a while since I studied key distribution, so I may have some fundamental misunderstanding.. From what I remember, man in the middle attacks can't occur during cert distribution because the cert being distributed is protected by a higher level cert's key. The root keys are distributed on cd with the OS making them very unlikely to be forged. But with heartbleed, isn't it possible that even the root level private keys were compromised? How can you safely distribute new keys electronically under these circumstances?
The OpenPGP specification (RFC 4880) describes, page 34, the different capabilities that an OpenPGP key may have; including: 0x20 - This key may be used for authentication. In GnuPG, one of the most popular implementations of OpenPGP, it is possible to generate [sub]keys with the authenticate capability (using the --expert flag). Okay, great, I know have a key which has the four capabilities – Encrypt, Certify, Sign, Authenticate (ECSA). Now what? I am curious about that Authenticate capability. Is there any real-world use for authentication OpenPGP [sub]keys, other than not using them and export them as SSH keys instead?
Pretty sure that browsers are compromised most often through their plugins, at least, that's what I keep reading. So, then, does that mean the browser itself has vulnerabilities, and the plugins are just the vector to get at the browser's vulnerabilities?
What Causes an Operating Systems ISO image to become Corrupted? I found an ISO image of windows 7 off the internet and now when I use windows 7, its extremely slow. What causes this? I cannot boot up the computer anymore from a CD disk. I want to remove the windows 7 from the computer and replace it with a clean copy of Windows 7.
I want to develop an Android app that may contain sensitive personally identifying information (national ID number, phone number, etc.) among other data that will be stored in an Android phone. Let's say that this data will be kept on the phone, which is offline most of the time, and has a very small and not so frequent time-window to send the data to a remote server. I want to secure (encrypt?) this data so that in a situation where the phone is stolen, someone with tech knowledge cannot root the phone, access the app storage and access the information. The data doesn't need to be decrypted on the phone, so it can be sent encrypted to the server, but the server needs to be able to decrypt it there. What are the options here? Are certificates or public/private keys suitable for this, or they are too faulty? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each solution?
I'm running Ubuntu x86_64, and want to upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.1.f. wget <openssl latest> tar -xzvf openssl.tar.gz cd <openssl dir> ./configure --prefix=/usr make In the console output, I get the following error: collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
Does HTTPS retrieval, among its other effects, sign a document? I'm asking in hopes of understanding in more specific details what TLS accomplishes. I will try to elaborate my question, as follows. Suppose Bob retrieves a document message.txt from Alice using HTTPS. In the course of this retrieval, Bob also stores into a zip file named packets.zip the relevant network communication (TCP packets, and similar) that Bob sees. If Bob presents packets.zip to Dan, can Dan expect that with high probability Alice sent message.txt? By this I mean to ask, is packets.zip in effect a copy of message.txt that is cryptographically signed by Alice? When Bob no longer has an open connection to Alice and Bob presents packets.zip to Dan, is Bob thereby revealing any secrets of Bob's or Alice's to Dan? I expect that Bob is not. If packets.zip constitutes a signed copy of message.txt, when does the signature become invalid? Is it valid until and unless the relevant certificate is revoked?
I have a number of apps on my smartphone that store the passwords - facebook, mail, etc. So say the phone is lost or stolen and the finder decides he wants my passwords - what can he do to get them, and how safe is my data on the phone? Is is doable to bruteforce the password given that the password is not super complex (say 6-digit) ? Are there ways to find the password without bruteforcing? Can a phone's (internal) memory be read without entering the password ? How hard is that ?
A friend of mine recently got her Gmail account "hacked" because of a weak password (the same as her login..). While sanitizing her account, I removed the forwarding of her emails to one email address (let's say booba123@outlook.fr). I typed the scammer's email in a search engine, and I found one domain name which seems to be related to him/her. The Registrant, Administrative contact, and Technical contact use this email address, and the postal address is filled with plausible data. Are these informations reliable ?
I realize that this may be more of an opinion type question, but I see a lot of questions on ethics in this forum so I hope mine fits in. I was reading a BBC article about Heartbleed, and in the article it references couple of sites that can test other websites for presence of Heartbleed vulnerability. The sites' stated purpose is to help users see if a site that they use is currently vulnerable (e.g. test if the site I'm about to purchase from is vulnerable to Heartbleed), which in itself is a good thing. However, they're essentially sending an attack against a target for which they have not obtained a permission to do pentesting (since any user can test any site they wish). Does this not, by itself, violate ethical boundaries?
After I learned last week that the login data of some of my accounts was leaked, I had to change my passwords for more than 30 sites. That was tedious! As luck would have it, some days later we learned about Heartbleed. Oh great, now I’ll have to do all this again (and for even more sites now). Then I read the question on SU: What's an efficient way to change my 200+ account passwords? I wonder: Can there be a secure way to allow users to "automagically" change their passwords for different services? (assuming a "traditional" site that saves username and password, so no OpenID or alternatives) Would it be a good idea for sites to offer some kind of API to change the password? If such an API would be standardized, users using a password manager could select all sites they want a new password for, and the password manager could set a new randomly created password for each of those sites.
I want to protect my passwords for free and store them on a machine that might get stolen but have the passwords very securely backed-up in the cloud, again for free, and minimize the total lifetime inconvenience of password management system changes and minimize the risk of transcription errors that might result from porting. Some systems deviate from the usual 2-tuple access allowed by a user name and password. For example, for some systems I would store a 3-tuple because an email address may be allowed as an alternate user name. Others have a 4-tuple to allow for a password hint and secondary password. The diversity of systems has me preferring that the password file be free-format text. My solution has been to cut-and-paste my free-format text file into CryptoTE and then encrypt the file using my ubuntu user password and upload the encrypted file to Google Drive (manually). My criteria are satisfied because CryptoTE is free for personal use Google Drive is free and uploads via SSL Google Account has a 2 step authentication that allows a level of security that I feel is very secure and yet still has convenient recovery protection Google is too large for it's business plan with respect to Drive to be often disrupted in a lifetime. It is certainly going to be larger than any pure-play password protection company for a long time. CryptoTE has a free-format text GUI that is devoid of formatting that might cause the contents to be hard to port I can migrate from a free-format linux text file to CryptoTE via a cut-and-paste I can migrate from CryptoTE via a cut-and-paste if that is ever going to be necessary because of the introduction of features that I might forget to eschew in the event I might someday use Windows on a daily basis, I can migrate using 'todos', or migrate back using 'frodos', and be comfortable because both line delimiting standards are decades old and likely to persist. (This step is probably unnecessary if CryptoTE for Windows exists, but why be married to CryptoTE if you don't have to be.) unlike some encrypting text editors CryptoTE does not leave un-encrypted temp files somewhere on the drive Other than 1 - using a file password that is not the same as my ubuntu password, and 2 - obtaining and maintaining (or freezing) my own source code that does what CryptoTE does, and 3 - remembering to upload, what should I do to make this more secure or better in any aspect, while still meeting my criteria? Issue 1 is not a big deal because I can just use a good password for my CryptoTE file. Issue 3 is not a big deal because the probability of a computer being stolen is low. If a computer is stolen the worst case is that a cloud backup is one or two versions old if I forgot to upload the latest. Issue 2 is the only one that worries me, however this is not a prohibitive issue. It will not be a worry at all with a little one time effort. I note that Google Drive has an ugly user interface that might have the user accidentally sharing files but the interface might get better with time, and in the meanwhile, at least it is CryptoTE protected.
According to this heartbleed mass test, Stack Overflow is vulnerable whereas google is not. I use my Google ID to logon to Stack Overflow (and some other sites). Do I need to change my password? In other words, is it the account that determines safety, or the service used?
How can I implement a cryptographic hash function using the block cipher? I was wondering whether I can use AES in cipher block chaining mode to achieve this.
This may be a unwise question, but I'll ask anyhow. I have been analysis relatively a bit about the Heart Bleed vulnerability, and I'm curious as to whether it only affects web applications or could affect any routers?
Our old computer is getting replaced, and I want to secure the new computer right from the get go. So I figured if I install something like VirtualBox first thing, I could then create one very powerful VM for my family to use. My old computer was plagued with viruses and trojans and rootkits that i couldn't pull out of the hardware, and I didn't want it to happen again to the fresh PC hardware. My thinking was, that if something went horribly wrong with the VM, I could just restore a backup of the VM. In that way, the PC's hardware is spared. Is this a viable security measure? ---Addition So, I know that the resulting VM will be weaker than the actual computer. I am betting on the fact that the host will be healthy/not crippled by malware to make up for the loss. I'm not the only one who will be using the computer, and the rest that would use it are casual users/unsafe on the internet. So, the computer will almost certainly be compromised. By having all the users use the VM, I am hoping to preserve the strength of host; as in, keep the malware on the guest. If I restore the VM to its clean form, I can wipe out the malware no? I am meaning to keep the host clean.
In a discussion about the recent OpenSSL information disclosure vulnerability, the subject of OpenSSH being vulnerable came up. While OpenSSH is not vulnerable due to the problem lying in the TLS handshake, it opened discussion for the security of OpenSSH on FreeBSD. Theo de Raadt had this to say: ... as long as you aren't using FreeBSD or a derivative (hint: Juniper), you are fine. That's the only place I know of an OpenSSH hole. This coming from someone in his position is worrisome. I don't know if this is a stab at the FreeBSD project, or if he is privy to some inside exploit of the OpenSSH implementation on FreeBSD. Since the person in question doesn't believe in public disclosure, I am wondering what steps people have taken to mitigate this possibly huge security flaw, if it exists at all.
In the comments to this question it is mentioned that even after a backup recovery malware still can persist. Do I understand that correctly? How is this possible? If Acronis True Image is used to make a backup of a disk would restoring a clean backup guarantee the removal of any malware? For example when recovering is the master boot record rewritten?
I would like to use Gladman's algorithm to create AES encrypted data in JavaScript. I use the Crypto-JS library, but its performance is horrible. PBKDF2 is terribly slow, so I switched to another library (SJCL) which seems to be over a lot faster. Crypto-JS has a special Gladman mode to give the same result as Gladman's file encryption library (C code). The SJCL doesn't have it, but is constructed pretty modular. It includes PBKDF2, a low-level AES encrypt method, CTR mode, HMAC and SHA1. Seems like all ingredients are there. I also have the source-code of CTR-Gladman from Crypto-JS. It seems like Gladman uses AES in CTR mode with HMAC-SHA1 used for authentication. It seems that the counting function just results in a 32-bit block that represents the blocknumber. Can anyone confirm if this is correct?
I had generated the CSR with OpenSSL. Do I need to regenerate a new CSR with no vulnerability due to OpenSSL in order to obtain a new certificate from a CA?
in the hybris of leaked ssl-private-key everybody cries for new certs and new keys. my question: how would one generate a new and valid ssl-cert with the private key from my website? our certs are usually domain-validated, meaning that ssladmin@domain.com usually gets a ntoficiation on issued cert-requests p.s. i'm not talking about how agencies would do this, but a hacker that possibly obtained the private key
I'm considering moving to a password-management strategy based on supergenpass or something similar. This is an alternative to other password managers where instead of having a database of passwords encrypted on your master key, your password for any individual site is a hash of your master key + the site's domain name, e.g. if your secret key was "hunter2", your password for google would be sha-256("hunter2google.com"). As far as I can tell, the advantages over a traditional password manager are: No encrypted database which has the potential to be found and decrypted No risk of losing your database, as long as you know your master key and the algorithm you will always have access to all your passwords No hassle with sharing your database across devices. This scheme is decentralised, and you can use it across multiple devices trivially. And the disadvantage is that you're sharing a poorly-salted hash of your master key with every site you use this scheme to log into. But if your master key is sufficiently complex, reversing its hash is impossible, right? Is there anything I've missed? Is there a more substantial security difference between these two password-management strategies?
If I understand correctly the hearbleed vulnerability, only the heap of the OpenSSL process can be retrieved by an attacker (or part of depending on the memory allocation type that is used). Then, how comes the OpenSSL process keeps in memory what it has encrypted/decrypted previously ? It seems obvious that given the sensitivity of the OpenSSL process, there should not be any data kept in memory for longer that what's strictly needed, something like a "need to know" principle to ensure that the impact is kept at a reasonable level if the process is compromised. I understand this sensitive data has to be put in memory to be communicated to the above layer/service (e.g. http server in most cases), but once it has been transmited it should be immediately removed, right ?
I am working on a vein pattern recognition project based on SURF algorithm and euclidean distance. I have completed my program to find the maximum and minimum distance between vein features and find a match exactly when there is an identical image. i.e max and min distance between two images is zero. In this case, how would I find my FAR and FRR. Will it be 0% or am I missing a big concept here? Even if there is a slight variation it wouldn't match in which case, I guess I need to have a threshold value to compare to. I have calculate the max and min distance between all combination of images with the same hand, with different hands. In this case, how do I computer the FAR and FRR. This is my first biometrics project and it would be helpful if I am directed to any resource that would help me in this.
I analyzed the TLS (1.2) handshake and I didn't manage to understand the message after the Change Chipher Spec Here it is: It is called "Encrypted Handshake Message" by Wireshark and it is sent by the server to the client and vice-versa. What is the content of this message? It should be the Finished message but what is its specific content? I also noticed that the length is different for every different ciphersuite, so, is this length specified somewhere?
"The fix for this bug is simple: check that the length of the message actually matches the length of the incoming request." Why do we even have the client report the length at all? If we can know the length of the incoming request, can't we just infer the length of the message from that? (This is a programming and protocol design question.)
I wanted to use sharable plugins for an application. However, the plugins were extremely time critical, so I wanted to distribute them as C libraries. Now, these are not guaranteed to be safe (the programmer could user system calls or cause segfaults). Then I had this idea: The application puts its source code through a parser which defines what is allowed - not by making restrictions (subtractive), but by enabling features(additive) - then outputs the code, and finally, this output is compiled using an ordinary compiler. How safe would this be? (Compared to using no parser in between, or using a scripting language, like e.g. python)
In my opinion, it should be possible to forge DNS reply so it doesn't include DS/RRSIG/... parts for any request, thus bypassing DNSSEC validation of resolved domain. Is DNSSEC system immune to this kind of attack? Does Unbound with locally stored DLV and ROOT anchor files make any difference?
I use Linux, and even though I'm not pretending my system is virus-free, it's generally accepted that even an aggressive firewall is not a requirement. I want to install Windows 7 on a machine which I will use strictly for playing games. Browsing on it may even be discarded, if necessary. So, for the two to three hours a week I'll be using the OS - making it effectively a console - do I really need anti virus software, or can I do without the annoyance of advertisements, scans etc.?
Read about the vulnerability and decided to check out the site. Receiving a response from the php code was surprised. Look at the screenshot. Perl-script: http://pastebin.com/rL0XkewP Hackers have already got down to business?
I was reading some blog posts about the Heartbleed vulnerability (who's not nowadays) and was thinking about the following. Situation A If I would use a regular SSL/TLS connection the handshake will determine a key to be used for the session which is exchanged over the Internet, and is encrypted with the private key of the certificate on the server. Situation B Again I'm establishing a SSL/TLS connection, but this time with Perfect Forward Secrecy used as handshake. In my understanding, the used key for the session only resides on the server and client and is never exchanged over the internet. All the traffic in both situations is monitored and stored. But useless because we don't know the private key. But what if we could have obtained the private key, say for instance via a heartbleed-exploit? Is it right to say that: In situation B the stored encrypted data is useless, because the used keys are ditched when the session ends and is'n part of the intercepted data. And The data captured from situation A is completely decryptable.
What are major DNS services offered that aren't state-controlled. Better yet, why can't we take Bitcoin's model and create a truly decentralized system with P2P DNS? I see potential reasons behind P2P DNS: Logistical nightmare Endless domain registration Much like shift from ipv4 to ipv6
I found the file /WEB-INF/web.xml on a domain I'm associated with. The XML file contains: <database> <jndi-name>jdbc/mysql</jndi-name> <driver> <type>com.mysql.jdbc.jdbc2.optional.MysqlConnectionPoolDataSource</type> <url>jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/[domainWasHere]</url> <user>[userWasHere]</user> <password>[passWasHere]</password> </driver> </database> Could this be vital information in the wrong hands?
So we now know who wrote the bad code (Robin Seggelmann). And we have an idea of why it is needed: Why does TLS need an explicit heartbeat protocol? We can also understand why the client supplies the length: Heartbleed: Why does the client supply the length of the message at all? But who proposed the form of the ssl heartbeat? Could there be some nefarious input from the NSA in the hopes that someone would code it the wrong way and leave it vulnerable for easier snooping? I've heard rumors that they added flaws to several encryption schemes (if I could quote which ones and where I would), could this be yet another way they introduced insecurity in their desire to have a copy of everything? I know this sounds like I might be wearing a tinfoil hat, but given the lengths they have gone to since 9/11, this does not seem out of the realm of possible.
In the past month I've seen a better grade growth in sites that have clickjacking scripts that make you like the webpage or the Facebook site's Page when you click anywhere on the page. I have even seen sites that have this for "on Page close". I am curious if there is a way to protect myself from such scams. Turning JS off is not a solution or stay logged out of Facebook.
Today when I visited drive.google.com, I was auto-directed to http://drive.googe.com/router.php After clicking on "Exit Now" on that page I was redirected to http://globalreward-zone.sweepclam.eu/home.html Is this some kind of scam? How to avoid this? I'm running Firefox on Win7.
I'm employed as a consultant at a big tech consultancy. I recently noticed a major flaw in their website, they send my login credentials in plain text over HTTP. I verified this by doing a outbound packet capture and lo and behold there were my credentials plain in view for anyone to see. What's worse the credentials were sent back over the wire once again in plain text if the login failed. On the upside, they're not affected by heart bleed because they don't even allow HTTPS traffic... I have read Reporting vulnerable sites and similar but I believe this question is a bit different as first of all I'm personally affected and forced to use the site regularly as I'm employed by the company owning the site (albeit not responsible). I have informed the IT department and got a response in the form We have prior to your e-mail contracted a security firm that has done an extensive pen-test and among other things found your reported vulnerability. We're assessing the situation and will take action shortly. Which to me means: Hi we know we're leaking your passwords and we might patch it up in the coming months or maybe next year. Meanwhile, why don't you go down to the church and pray that no one empties your paypal account. Motivated by the fact that I could just park my cellphone on wifi outside their office with wireshark running to grab the credentials of most people in the office. To me, their response is not good enough. Further more, all they need to do is to force HTTPS for all traffic as a stop-gap. This doesn't take more than a few hours for a system administrator who knows what they're doing. And it doesn't have a negative impact other than some performance (provided they have patched OpenSSL if they're affected). My question is, how do I get them to first enable HTTPS for all traffic immediately and then inform all affected parties that their username/password credentials may have been compromised and that they need to change them at all places they use that combination. Without loosing my job. For the record, yes, I have changed my passwords already. And I had a random 128bit password to their site to begin with because I got a feeling it was dodgy from first sight.
I am planning on creating a text file to store my passwords, so I only need to remember 1 password (at the moment, I have about 20 long/complex passwords in my mind, and am worried that I might forget 1 or more of them). If I create a text file, store the passwords in that text file, move that text file to a usb stick, and encrypt the usb stick with EncFS. If the usb stick gets stolen, how secure is the usb stick? If the method above can be secured further, how would I do that? I'm guessing no solution exists at the moment to prevent brute force attacks from future possible quantum computers. If no, I am looking for the next best solution.
It is fairly easy to detect the heartbleed exploit if it all happens over cleartext, which it seems most things are doing for the time being. However, I believe that there are some heartbleed exploits occurring after encryption because the RFC allows (and suggests) that heartbeat requests be sent encrypted. From RFC 6520: A HeartbeatRequest message can arrive almost at any time during the lifetime of a connection. Whenever a HeartbeatRequest message is received, it SHOULD be answered with a corresponding HeartbeatResponse message. However, a HeartbeatRequest message SHOULD NOT be sent during handshakes. If a handshake is initiated while a HeartbeatRequest is still in flight, the sending peer MUST stop the DTLS retransmission timer for it. The receiving peer SHOULD discard the message silently, if it arrives during the handshake. In case of DTLS, HeartbeatRequest messages from older epochs SHOULD be discarded. As it states above, a HeartbeatRequest SHOULD NOT be sent during handshakes. It is my assumption that many exploits today are being sent during the handshake in order to be more efficient. If so, what does a HeartbeatRequest during the handshake look like in comparison to a HeartbeatRequest after it is encrypted, and how can we monitor for and detect post-encryption Heartbleed exploits on the network (not on the endpoint)?
I've heard that ISPs provide some kind of protection; using NAT and firewalls, to prevent hackers from using tools such as nmap to attack customers from over the Internet. What other technologies are being used by ISPs to secure their customers and what are the limitations of this security?
How can I encrypt my bash shell script on Linux server The shell script contain credentials of other servers for remote access. The problem is I do not want others with same level of access to view the shell script, modify it or get credentials. Is there any way to encrypt my shell script? My Initial research let me into Shell Encryption Utility known as SHC - Shell script Compiler.But tons of information is available on this utility that it can be circumvented what other choices do I have?
A VPN is a Virtual Network that is used to hide IP address of the attacker. A Hotspot Shield is also used to change IP address which hides the origin IP. What is the difference between VPN and Hotspot Shield? What is more secure to use?
Received: by 10.182.241.38 with HTTP; Sat, 15 Mar 2014 14:09:36 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <294B46790F860A4B9790B42606DFA3E4E4E5AE@MAHEXMB02.thrivehosted.local> References: <294B46790F860A4B9790B42606DFA3E4E4E5AE@MAHEXMB02.thrivehosted.local> Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 14:09:36 -0700 Delivered-To: stevedunn2@gmail.com Message-ID:
Is a DOCSIS modem only authenticated by the CMTS by a MAC address or are there any other AAA techniques? In that case, how do I prevent other customers from spoofing my modem's MAC address? Cable Modem Initialization Wallchart published by Cisco in 2005:
Watching at TLS 1.2 traffic using Wireshark, I figured out that in the Application Data record, the 64-bit sequence number in some connessions is sent and in others not. Does it depend on the Cipher Suite?
My team currently uses ASP.NET with MS SQL Server for our software. Security has only become important since I started, in which there is injection vulnerabilities everywhere. Due to current integration with Oracle and MS SQL the business decision was never to use parameterized queries. This of course has been an issue. Implementing Find and replace along with whitelisting of parameters has reduced this issue strongly. My only issue is, I have read a lot about unicode and other encodings being the cause of sql injection. I dont quite understand this. Currently we sanitise everything like this: Const pattern As String = "^[a-zA-Z0-9.=,:\s\\\/\']*$" term = term.Replace("'", "''") If Not Tools.ValidString(term, pattern) Then term = String.Empty End If Public Shared Function ValidString(ByVal source As String, ByVal pattern As String) As Boolean If source = String.Empty Then Return True Dim params As Text.RegularExpressions.RegexOptions = Text.RegularExpressions.RegexOptions.None Dim regex As New Text.RegularExpressions.Regex(pattern, params) Dim match As Text.RegularExpressions.Match = regex.Match(source, pattern, params) Return match.Success End Function Does anyone have an example where unicode/encoded injection could be used, or just a plain example where this regular expression would fail to prevent sql injection. Thanks EDIT: There is no compliance required for the data we store. But still we would like to prevent injection. Parameterised queries are not an option and would require years of work with the little resources we have and the size of the CMS we have developed. We have a couple of clients with oracle DB's using our CMS for internal work (not exposed to public) and that is why there was no parameterised queries form the start.
RSA (the company) devises and publishes the public key cryptography standards. In those standards, PKCS #7 is a standard which defines how to encrypt and sign messages using PKI. PKCS#7 defines a format to store the public key certificates alone whereas PKCS#12 defines a format to store both public and private key pairs. The list of file extensions for PKCS#12 was (.pfx and .p12) which I believe both are same. My doubt is around PKCS# 7 certificate file extensions. I have many file extensions like .p7,.p7a,.p7b,.p7c etc. Is there a difference/significance between these file extensions? If there is, what is that? Harvested whole internet unable to find the useful info to know the difference. So came here to see if anybody knows the same.
I hope this is a good place for this, but I am looking to be safe while sharing my ASP MVC project. If a page was designed with a membership provider is is possible to share this project with out leaking information about your membership provider? From my understanding it would be very difficult for another developer to work on the project without this piece.
A file is encrypted and placed on a secure FTP server. An MD5 hash is taken of the file and also placed on the FTP server. A userlogs in to the server and downloads both files, however, the hash fails to match the archive. In this case, what basic goal of a cryptosystem has failed? I have been trying to answer this question. Would anybody be able to hint me out on this? i've tried numerous Google searches.
Currently working on verifying and signing a file via GNUPG, given that I've already signed a file, given the clients the .sig and public key, is there a way for a client to verify the file without downloading any additional software? Currently using Cryptophane from GNUPG http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/frontends.html
I'm developing a REST application using the Spring Framework, as as part of the requirements, we have to secure the different functions of the system to different user roles (pretty standard stuff). My current method of determining the roles for the currently logged in user is that every time they call a REST url from the frontend, I am adding a Base 64 encoded string to the request header. This string when decoded resolves to their username and a bCrypt generated password hash in this format username:hashedpassword. I'm slightly concerned that this is not secure, even though the request will be made over a secure HTTP connection, because it could give a potential hacker access to at least the users username. They couldn't get the password because that is just a hashed value, but they could use that hashed value to call the REST API successfully. How can I secure this system properly? Do I need to add in a session token or some kind of randomly generated key for the session? My followup question is then how can I do that RESTfully? I was thinking that I could generate (using bCrypt) a hash that represented the username:hashedpassword together on login, save that to the database and check against that whenever a REST call is made. When the user logs out, just set that to null. Rinse and Repeat. That way any potential attacker would only get a single bCrypt string that wouldn't expose the username, but they could still use that string to call the REST API.
On a Linux system, is it at all possible to detect unknown keyloggers? Keyloggers which are new and haven't made it to any detection software's database?
I always hear that one time pad'ing something is so great because you won't know if you've successfully decrypted the data. I understand the idea that you can XOR any bits just the same as any other bits and you won't inherently be "alerted" to the fact that you used the right bits, but is this not true of any other encryption algorithms/concepts? For instance, if you try to brute force data that was symmetrically encrypted in SSL/TLS (which is NOT a one time pad), I imagine you won't know if your brute force attack actually found relevant results unless you check those results against something you were looking for (metadata, valid PDF, valid Word, etc.) So, if what I said is true, then what is the advantage of a one time pad? Is it simply the length of the key used (the fact it has to be as long as the data)?
Say my home router uses an OpenSSL version that is vulnerable to Heartbleed and I have the admin page enabled and accessible from the outside (even though I never use it). What can a hacker do? Could he for example read any traffic on my router or could he maybe get access to the admin page? As I understand now, it can only read memory from the same process, so as long as I don't log in myself, there is not much interesting data there. However, from this answer I understand that there seems to be something with mmap that might make it possible to read memory from a different process. Quoting the quote from that answer: However, if mmap is used, all bets are off. Any memory not in use could be allocated for mmap. This is what the most of the attacks against Heartbleed will target. EDIT: This question asks about specific routers, their software version and which ones would need patching. The answers there are very different from what I'm looking for here. Also the answers here are not really applicable for that question. I actually read that question and the answers before posting this question and at that time didn't even feel like it was similar enough that I had to mention it in my question. The difference lies in the fact that this question more addresses what the specific risk is to ordinary people with home routers while the other question is more focussed on which routers are vulnerable and how to patch them. Hence I don't think this should be marked as duplicate.
Below is a screenshot from the paper "Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols" by Martin Abadi and Roger Needham. I can't see what's wrong with the protocol and what the fix achieves. Help please? It's driving me crazy.
We are using 'crypto.js' in our application. Since 'crypto.js' uses open SSL ,are we vulnerable to heartbleeding attack? If yes, what can we do to prevent it?
Is there a way to DDOS my web app through jMeter? Can anyone DDOS with a simple PC? I couldn't find any answer here. I would appreciate if anyone could help me out.
I know forwarding ports can add some security risk, but if I forward a port to a computer, say running linux, would it add a security risk to all computers on my network or just the one?
The facts: A friend put his phone number (and possibly the IMEI) for his android device into some kind of hacking PC software that promised to (and actually did) extend his Whatsapp account that was about to expire. We all know Whatsapp uses your number as user-name and the device IMEI (reversed and md5-hashed) as password. Certainly his account was compromised: someone would have been able to steal all his account data. This is why I completely deleted his account and uninstalled the app. Disclaimer: I've read the security.stackexchange.com question What is the risk of leaking IMEI / IMSI numbers over a network but it's related to mobile device privacy and installed applications. Now, my concern is: Is it now possible to "clone" his device and possibly being claimed as responsible for misuses that he clearly didn't do? According to this source, should be possible.
Are there any programming languages that are designed to be robust against hacking? In other words, an application can be hacked due to a broken implementation, even though the design is perfect. I'm looking to reduce the risk of a developer incorrectly implementing a specification. For example Heartbleed would not have happened if the language used could guard against a Buffer Over-Read. SQL Injections might not happen if there was a language enforced way to encode/decode HTML data Sensitive data can be saved to Pagefiles in some languages where low-level controls of securely erasing memory aren't available. Pointer issues/overflows occur more often in C when compared to managed code Numerical rounding errors can occur when using the developer uses the wrong datatype for the wrong data Denial Of Service attacks might be reduced if the app is correctly is multi-threaded Code signing may reduce the threat of runtime security issues (link, link) Question Is there a language that addresses many or most of these issues? It's acceptable for the language to be scoped for a particular use-case such as WebApps, Desktop, Mobile, or Server usages. Edit: A lot of people addressed the buffer-overflow issue, or say that the programmer is responsible for security. I'm just trying to get an idea if there exist languages whose main purpose was to lend itself to security as much as possible and reasonable. That is, do some languages have features that make them clearly more (or less) secure than most other languages?
So, I know rolling your own security is ill-advised, but for simplistic things like communicating with a home server, say, updating a grocery list, is a custom protocol fine? It won't be doing anything that needs to be secured, so it seems fine in that sense, but I guess someone could reverse engineer packets and send bogus grocery lists... but then "bogus grocery lists" seems hardly an issue. So, are simplistic protocols not carrying sensitive data still a hazard to create and use? --- Clarification Kk, so if the data does not need protecting, simplistic custom protocols won't keep the data secure, which is fine for "worthless" data; but how about the server/client that implements these protocols? Will the use of breakable protocols create insecurities on those implementing the code to support them?
Whilst testing a server I discovered a botnet. I have the executable downloaded to the server and decompiled the file to get the strings from it. My question is what would the next logical step be and how best to further decompile the evil httpd file? Also what would be the right thing to do (I.e. take over the botnet and shut it down or report it to someone?)
As you already know, due to the heartbleed bug, we need to perform re-keying on our web servers (>10), before I do that, I want to check if my proposed strategy is a proper way or not a. Generate a new CSR, submit to Godaddy to re-issue the cert b. Install the cert and key on web server, and restart as fast as possible My questions: Are there any steps I have missed? In step (a), when the new cert is re-issued, I assume the old one is revoked, but before the new cert is deployed, are there any risk during that time, the client check the revoked cert and experienced error? Will the client (desktop/mobile) cache the revoked cert? And it will fail to communicate for my new private key even after I have installed the new cert?
Some firewalls (like the first figure in 13.1.4 in http://doc.m0n0.ch/handbook/examples.html) allow user to specify source port in a firewall rules. But in a TCP connection, the source port is randomly selected from 1024 - MAX. So my question is, why we need to have a source port field in a firewall rule? And we can see that some other firewalls do not provide a source port field in their rule format (e.g. http://www.fwbuilder.org/4.0/docs/users_guide5/global-policy.shtml) Thank you!
Would an encrypted connection be able to bypass a firewall? A firewall is working on layer 1-4 of OSI model, the encryption and decryption is done in presentation layer (layer 7 of the OSI model). Can encryption may bypass a few rules?
Is it possible to use running SSH agent to decrypt some data (supplied as a string or read from file)?
I have been in a discussion lately with our security team, and I want to get an answer from this group. Currently our security policy states that domain accounts will lock out after 5 failed attempts. This goes for all domain accounts, including service accounts. To be clear, I refer to a service account as an account used by applications to authenticate and "run" as that user. I see a big problem with allowing service accounts to lockout, it creates an easy DoS for that service. Any rogue employee who knows the account, can simply fail 5 login attempts and the service will stop as it can no longer communicate with databases, and other servers. I have locked out accounts setting up a new server and having an extra space at the end of the password. I ask, given the risks, why should service account be allowed to lock out after x number of failed logins?
I'm trying to understand the file format of the secring.gpg file. I couldn't really find any official documentation of the file format so I decided to create a new key-pair and use the S2K (string-to-key) function simple S2K, which basically means that the entered passphrase is only hashed once with the specified message digest algorithm. So I created the new key-pair using the command: gpg --gen-key --s2k-digest-algo MD5 --s2k-mode 0 I was able to verify that the key was created with the right specs by using: gpg --list-packets secring.pgp The partial output is: :secret key packet: version 4, algo 1, created 1397496587, expires 0 skey[0]: [1024 bits] skey[1]: [17 bits] simple S2K, algo: 3, SHA1 protection, hash: 1 protect IV: 06 8a d3 02 e9 df 49 8a encrypted stuff follows The 'hash: 1' should mean that MD5 is used and simple S2K means hashed once, no salt. You can find this information in the RFC 4880 Section 3.7. I used the passphrase 'test' which should result in the MD5 hash '098f...b4f6'. The problem is I am not able to find this hash in the secring.gpg file. I used a HexViewer and was able to find the string FE 03 00 01, which means (following the RFC): FE = initiate the algo specs 03 = symmetric cipher (CAST5) 00 = simple S2K 01 = MD5 Which also confirms that the right spec is used. Something that made me curious is that I found this string twice (for the master and the sub-key, I think). But still there should be somewhere my hashed passphrase. Am I not understand something? Or am I looking in the wrong place?
I've been developing a small CRUDish Ruby on Rails application on my free time for a non-profit organization. The app is already running in a small scale in Heroku. Lately I've been thinking about open sourcing the application. There are many pros for this, eg. I already know a couple of possible contributors, and even my employer has shown interest in supporting the project in a couple of ways if it would be open source. Normally I wouldn't hesitate with this kind of possibility at all, but the problem here is that the application stores at least somewhat sensitive information about people using it. I have a fear that as the project is small, and after all will always have just a limited amount of developer time and resources, open sourcing it would attract more malicious hackers than actual contributors. I don't want to harm anyone, and especially not the targeted users of the app, so even the slight increase in propability of a data leak worries me. When thinking sensibly, I understand that As the app is very small, there is a very limited possibility that someone would actually try to attack it RoR gives me quite good and real-life-tested environment to build on top of Security through obscurity is mostly regarded as non-sense IMHO pros of open sourcing overweight the cons I don't want this to became another discussion about Open Source vs Closed Source Systems. However to relief my mind, I'd like to know what can I realisticly do to minimize the possibility of an attack. So far at least these things have wondered through my mind: Use the latest Rails version, and apply all security fixes as fast as possible Purchase an SSL certificate and enforce HTTPS connections so that all data that users enter will be transferred encrypted Encrypt data at the database with a key stored in Heroku config vars. However I'm not so sure about this one, because after all, I have to trust Heroku, and as far as I understand, this would help only in cases where the actual database would be compromised. Or am I mistaken here? Beg some security company to make an audit to the application for free (as there is no $$ involved) What else could/should I do?
I've seen a number of articles on the heartbleed vulnerability that suggest testing your site to see if it was affecting using Filippo Valsorda's testing page which can be found here: https://filippo.io/Heartbleed/ When I put the URL to my site into here it says everything is good. Is this sufficient for determining if one's site is vulnerable or should I be doing something else?
I'm only taking about security against bruteforce attacks. I assume that most crackers start at a and go up to zzzzzzz for as long as instructed (so it could be zzzzzzzzzzz if told so in the programming), as randomly guessing, storing the list of guesses, generating a new random guess, checking it against the list of old guesses and trying if it hasn't been guessed would be inefficient. Also, ZZZZZZZZZZ is very unlikely to be in a dictionary attack. Using that logic, wouldn't ZZZZZZZZZZ be the most secure password out of all passwords that are 10 or less characters?
I want to develop an extension which will stop an user from proceeding to any banking site (configurable by user) if a proxy like paros is seating in between sending fake certificate to user. My extension will compare the certificate presented from an external different source (XHR) with the one presented by browser and not allow user to proceed further in case of check failure. Recently, chrome has started detecting proxy and gives user-friendly error messages to "proceed anyway" or "back to safety". Once you accept the risk and click "proceed anyway", Chrome won't ask you again for the same website. I want to achieve effect similar to HSTS sites (completely blocking navigation in case of SSL validation error), but with flexibility to manage my own list. I studied the webRequest (https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/webRequest) and DeclarativeWebRequest APIs but was unable to find anything exposing SSL certificate validation process. In nutshell, something similar to Perspectives addon in firefox but with my own way to trust certificates in Chrome. Google has proposed a draft API couple of years back (https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/developers/design-documents/extensions/proposed-changes/apis-under-development/webrequest-ssl-hooks), yet to be made available. Any workaround is appreciated. Thanks in advance.
There are many fields on a certificate revocation list (CRL) like Algorithm, Parameters, Issuer Name, This update date, Next update date, user certificate serial #, etc. While I understand the purpose of most of the fields, of what purpose is the field "next update date on a certificate revocation List?
Let's assume a service-oriented architecture (SOA) with hundreds of services. The services are completely isolated – what is behind their APIs is an implementation detail. Different services can have different security policies – i.e. who can access the service. For example, a service can be fully public, accessible to a subset of employees, accessible to a subset of other services, etc. Some services may even have that specified on the API level, for example a public service with some internal API calls (is that a bad idea?). How should the infrastructure interconnecting the services reflect the security policies? Are there any standard approaches to this? Is it known how Amazon does it - they surely must have an automated solution? I googled a bit but didn't find any good resources on this. Links are absolutely ok as answers to this question :)
I have snort configured to log unified2 in my snort.conf file and am using barnyard2 to parse the unified2 results. It works, except I can seem to figure out to pull the event reference (xref) out of the data. I have my reference.config file with the different URLs and the sid-msg.map file has all the signature ids and the references within them, but can't seem to map them. I put the output to CSV to test and tried many different keywords, but no luck. Any ideas? snort.conf ... output unified2: filename snort.u2, limit 128 ... barnyard2.conf (I've tried every word that I though might be the reference ID keyword, but nothing works) output alert_csv: /var/log/snort/csv.out timestamp,msg,srcip,sport,dstip,dport,classname,event_reference,xref,Xref,ref,event_xref,xref_uri
I'm working on a website that allows a current user to invite another individual to be friends by typing in the non-user's email address. The non-user would then receive a custom registration url by email which would, when used, automatically connect the two users, giving each access to the other's private information. The custom registration urls will be somewhat protected by use of cryptographically random nonces (i.e., site.com/very-long-random-nonce), hopefully protecting against replay attacks or people simply guessing someone else's registration link. My concern is that, if the email should be intercepted in transit, the interceptor could gain access to the inviting user's private information. How can I ensure that only the intended recipient will receive and use a custom registration url?
How do I avoid nginx processing a request with an undefined server name using the https protocol. The following configuration makes this work for normal http requests. It resets the connection for requests with empty host headers which equals to server_namein the nginx configuration: server { listen 80; server_name ""; return 444; } Updated for clarity: The server does however serve html of the default ssl supporting server block when a request over https is sent with an empty host header. How can this be avoided? I would like to achieve the exact behaviour as for http requests with an empty host header - no html served, connection reset (return 444). What would be the proper way to block such https requests and achieve the mentioned behaviour for https connections as well? (I would like to avoid using the proper SSL cert for this as this may just hint spammers at the real server domain.) Update 13.03.2015 Putting an haproxy in front of nginx with the setting strict-sni solved my issue completely.
Is it possible for a site to host malware such that if a certain page is accessed, Firefox is made to send additional GET requests? I'm seeing traffic for attacks coming from me that I haven't done. --- clarification "I" am sending SQL injection strings, when really I am not; ajax can do this?
Not really computer related, but I hope someone has the answer. How do people decode messages from an Enigma machine? I understand that if you knew the rotors, rotor positions, and plugboard the message was encrypted with, you could decrypt it, but how did other Nazis know those settings? They must have had to have a secure way of passing them around.
I have a SMTP server where all the users (for an unrelated reason) will have public keys tied to their username and registered with the server. I want to add a non-standard extension that uses these existing keys for authentication. My understanding of the SSH key based auth is that the server encrypts a random number and sends it to the client, the client then decrypts the number and sends it back to the server. The user is considered to have succeeded only if the original number and the number returned by the client match. I think there's also negotiation of a session key in there somewhere but that won't be necessary for my purposes. Assuming that the asymmetric key algorithm (elGamal in this case) and the random number generator are both secure, are there additional intricacies of the SSH auth model that I need to take into account? Additionally does this violate the "don't roll your own" principle? All the components aren't home made and their composition is at least an imitation of a well trusted standard, but it does seem to be going further that sticking a library in and calling it a day.

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