Split (1)

train · 180k rows

instruction stringlengths 24 29.9k
This question is kind of asked already but it was asked with different context: VPN tunnel in VPN tunnel Connect through two VPN clients https://superuser.com/questions/763433/tunnel-in-a-tunnel-multi-vpn Say I am using DD-WRT flashed router which connects as a client to VPN server #1. If I setup my machine that's behind the DD-WRT router, using a software VPN client to connect to VPN server #2, will I get 'doubled' anonymity (i.e it's harder to get logs from several VPN providers)? Will such a setup work? Can I chain this (VPN-1 router behind VPN-2 router ... behind VPN-N) assuming that speed and latency is of no concern? UPDATE: just to clarify my question: did anyone try this setup? I would like to have some confirmation from the person who used such setup or something similar.
Using Nessus I'm scanning our internal network for vulnerabilities and exploits. I've found a large number of instances where SSLv2 is enabled and is as a result, being flagged as a vulnerability. I understand the limitations of SSLv2 and even the limitations of SSLv3 so I'm quite happy to proceed with disabling SSLv2 on our Windows 2008 R2 boxes. My question is that if these servers are not web servers and have no reason for clients to attempt to initiate a HTTPS session is it an exploitable vulnerability? Could an attacker still use a 'roll-back' attack and connect with SSLv2?
I noticed recently that ReCAPTCHA is using house numbers and street numbers as images for humans to decode. How ethical is it for Google to do this to this? Does it hamper privacy of an individual? TechCrunch has reported it way back in 2012, and Google had issued a statement, We’re currently running an experiment in which characters from Street View images are appearing in CAPTCHAs. We often extract data such as street names and traffic signs from Street View imagery to improve Google Maps with useful information like business addresses and locations. Based on the data and results of these reCaptcha tests, we’ll determine if using imagery might also be an effective way to further refine our tools for fighting machine and bot-related abuse online.
I'm reading through past exams for an information security subject and I came across this. #!/bin/sh #applications launcher X=$1 eval "$X" "Do you think the program is vulnerable to attacks? Explain the reason for your answer with an example." Simple program, obvious vulnerability. The only example I could answer with (unix programming skill = 0) is that the user input can contain unix commands to cause harm to the system, something like rm -rf / I would liken this to answering a question about SQL injection and using an example that says DROP TABLE *. It's a legitimate example of the vulnerability but its a boring example. Unix programmers/security experts. What are some more fun/creative examples for answering this question?
I am new to web programming. I read an article where they advised to use tokens as a hidden field in forms and match that token at the server end to detect non-legitimate requests. I am wondering what difference does it make, if an attacker uses an iframe to fetch a form,that form is going to have the token id generated at server and it should be matched.I went through article on owasp.org but it sounds too cryptic for me.
I am seeing this Snort alert show up multiple times a day, but my Google-foo is failing me, as I can not find any information about this alert on the internet. Can anyone point me in the direction for more information about this particular alert? Also, if anything in particular should be done? CRITICAL - (2 errors in snort.protocol-2014-06-12-04-47-09) - 06/12-04:43:47.771462 [] [3:29312:1] MISC TRUFFLEHUNTER SFVRT-1013 attack attempt [] [Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1] {ICMP} Thanks,
I have an app where users can enter credit card data and it is stored using a 3rd party toservice like BluePay or Authorize.net, I do not and will not save it in my system. Trying to get this point across to potential new customers is sometimes hard to do. I want to tell them that it is actually illegal to collect and then share credit card information, but is this actually a true statement?
According to wikipedia.org's article on X.509 certificates, "There are implementation errors with X.509 that allow e.g. falsified subject names using null-terminated strings Marlinspike Blackhat 2009 or code injections attacks in certificates." My question is... how do I create a CSR with null bytes within them? Here's a CSR that does have one in it: csr-with-null.pem -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIBSTCBtQIBADAQMQ4wDAYDVQQKDAVhYgBjZDCBnTALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEDgY0A MIGJAoGBALoqjrGPCxX2oWX8APXhB3dzKJAXWHKWSlMWDw1whCP+EpsdFY2pTq+D RnX8wRIP2yssIii/4FwsDxjcjlYMpSqYBPnEq3Lql/7LeW5ulLn4wk4Gnd4B55WP BLveMNCORZXtE5rNJISTRMHYZKp7sLOPFlE3Gb5G/o/rkxSqOKOPAgMBAAEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQEFA4GBAB0CX/T2wBTHHE6dcCFwzXsVkqkoewQbLjDLoAjCBy7nFrCI 6+kLPj7zcYi6f+Jg+OcFMl0Oat+2iO7OARSib3S0WyuAFpJQQwZIiG9RISy2HF1A jQPuWvOan1GsY74Dn0kac6BIaWlY0/9h/iIcl4BiUaFrW+xUinKGWofsdq8l -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- According to asn1parse the value corresponding to the organizationName has a length of 5 even though the "abcd" string displayed has a length of four. $ cat csr-with-null.pem \| openssl asn1parse -i 0:d=0 hl=4 l= 329 cons: SEQUENCE 4:d=1 hl=3 l= 181 cons: SEQUENCE 7:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :00 10:d=2 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE 12:d=3 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SET 14:d=4 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE 16:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :organizationName 21:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: UTF8STRING :abcd 28:d=2 hl=3 l= 157 cons: SEQUENCE 31:d=3 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE 33:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsaEncryption 44:d=3 hl=3 l= 141 prim: BIT STRING 188:d=1 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE 190:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha1WithRSAEncryption 201:d=1 hl=3 l= 129 prim: BIT STRING The thing is, there's a null byte between the ab and the cd. You can see it in an ASN1 hexdump or via cat -vET: $ cat csr-with-null.pem \| openssl asn1parse -i \| cat -vET \| grep ab 21:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: UTF8STRING :ab^@cd$ That CSR was generated with a library called phpseclib but I'd like to know how to generate similar CSR's with OpenSSL or some other more standardized tool. I tried this but it didn't work: openssl req -new -key privkey.pem -out test.csr -subj "/O=ab\000cd" That got me this: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIICVzCCAT8CAQAwEjEQMA4GA1UEChMHYWIwMDBjZDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB BQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKe9z81r0pvpqN98WinJVAphD0bRqi1W6OrEh9rx0DPO RILofZwLP11d8vot19VMHBqB+kQuhtWKc/2Te+F1fgy1NJjcF+tjErE038zMd4O6 sU7QiVuFKRceznaXiL2BKm5nCR5FBMj2gBu2WJ61mUKEkNYEvj7QtcMc/VUTYISq D2DFoGmSjgltCtUyMqaSGtS6f2fqHFBvxVwLBDm+XSYYLrEREk2PmM1RbFY1b9fO lKnrvRIN4X+RbqG9iF88Ax5T0L2/D1OjLD24eFY8m/ecrsMwxCAa9FL+oKIvT7M0 OGK+LWOkPpjKwegnppFYGOCEfLBDocSgD8z2AuV24usCAwEAAaAAMA0GCSqGSIb3 DQEBBQUAA4IBAQBmQwFqS8L4YO17hpTZTr/mKq0Mgzzf8PCI6d1OtRgKUM5LbFBX WqCJSUzSrkCGQdMdFA9l20jw91gxaeLiEDbAS+1I8agel/TD6Hic5457HjyGbPx4 usqm0/c1/JRreG/1dyh2K6/TFPIN8dN++dLohmZlRWZdIMC0D/KNls5M++DiWqw3 J5S24BWIC6FOUsAs5EImd30+s4wXcL+uqlRmyQVZ3C+JI8ZBl5HuIKCLmS2d3rhG /CBwlZHH4fyeYUpeWec6HUNjfvnJ8amDFyKPlbTgcSSEpXBBPGP4EJ+zrWFjZRe3 YDCxZ0RdBHjKsYzbJZDJEOe9YML5HqoXY1pr -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- ie. the organizationName is ab000cd - not ab\00cd.
We have a green (EV) SSL certificate for our site and images are fetched from the same domain (https). Currently we are planning to change the images domain (for performance issues) and put them in a different domain with a different ssl certificate. In order to reduce costs we are thinking if acquiring a standard certificate (not EV) for this CDN content (for the images). In that case our page will have an EV certificate but images would be fetched from a non EV certificate. Will this -mixing of EV and non EV certificates- remove our green status from the browser (like fetching content from http connection inside an https page)?
I have a mobile app which uses public key pinning to make sure that I only connect to servers from my CA. This works great with https, and it makes it so that nobody can really proxy my server and read the requests without going through some degree of trouble. A colleague came up with an idea that certificate pinning makes it so that POST requests aren't really as useful because we don't make requests unless the certificate/public key of the server we're talking to matches the pinned one on the mobile app. Therefore, people wouldn't be able to snoop the POST body at all. Is there any reason why GET would be less secure than POST for a case when public key pinning is present for mobile apps?
There seems to be a number of ways to secure web services. OAuth, API Keys, Tokens, WIF, etc. Since security is not my area of expertise, I am asking what is the best ways to secure public web services. Al least tell me what I should be thinking about to come to a standard way of securing the public web services.
I am currently using an LDAP setup. I am wondering if it is secure from Man-in-the-middle attacks or other vulnerabilities?
I have Kaspersky Internet Security 2010 installed on my Win7 computer. I assume it gives me enough protection for a software firewall(port security,tracking tcp,udp traffic etc.) Do I still need a hardware firewall for protection as well?
What are possible XSS vectors to this JavaScript code new Image().src = encodeURI('[user url here]'); Let's assume two cases: [user url here] is some string provided by user (with no validation) [user url here] is a valid url (validated by Django URLValidator) I'd imagine there are a lot of vectors for first case, ex. javascript:alert('XSS') But what about the second case? Are there any known vectors? UPDATE: The only vector I can think of is MIME sniffing attack
A 256 Bit ECC key-pair (256 Bit is supposed to be the length of the public key) generated with OpenSSL using this command from the manual: openssl ecparam -name secp256k1 -genkey -noout -out key.pem and the corresponding public key with: openssl ec -in key.pem -out public.pem -pubout The public.pem file contains a base64 encoded string, for example: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MFYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAoDQgAEdPzYnkmkF8oy+R+FcByIbyPBE2l6HHOJ mfZWtAaFZyIx9WPSzZTdyjmWlFqLvwaFlHu9OX9e7Snslfw7nneDIw== -----END PUBLIC KEY----- The public key consists of a point(x and y coordinate) and the curve used. When decoded, each coordinate is a 256 bit-long number and the key itself is by no means 256 Bit long. Is this correct? I'm aiming for the shortest possible public key length while preserving secuirty in my application and i don't understand why a suggested "256 bit public key" is more then double the size in reality.
I'm trying to implement a web app(lication), which allows to share data automatically with connected users. Data will be encrypted end-to-end asymmetrically on the clients. My first plan was to share the public key through the app itself, but then I realized that users need some verification that the public key is really from that user. Now I tell them to share the public key via email addresses they already know from each other. But there is still a security hole: How could users be sure that my application uses the public key of the recipient? I still could encrypt the message with my own key, intercept it and forward it with the recipient's public key. To withstand tests by security experts, I could do that only on specific users or at specific times. I'm at the point where I think that it's impossible to encrypt and share data securely in the same app. Thus users have to encrypt data in another app and copy it manually into the sharing app. Is there a workaround or does it boil down to trust? The small print Question "Sharing encrypted data" is similar to this, but I cannot access user's machines and the answers don't question the security of the public key sharing mechanism.
In an extremely interesting presentation at Puppet Camp London, Tomas Doran suggested a pretty radical approach for keeping everything automated by managing tons of Docker containers with Puppet. As a security-conscious person, I like the idea of Docker, as everything runs in its own LXC and I configure all services to run as non-root users. As a systems-administration-conscious person, I like the idea of Puppet management, as I can keep all configuration in a Git repository and even maintain different environments, all in version control. The advantage is also that I have tear-down-able (is that a word?) environments that I can theoretically rebuild from scratch without too much manual intervention. However, there are things I'd like not to keep in a Git repository, namely SSL certificates, database passwords, etc. How do organizations managing massive amounts of machines (like CERN) use provisioning services like Puppet and Chef while still maintaining security? Certain things seem easy, like enforcing permissions on files, but other things seem difficult, like installing SSL keys or SSH host keys, which requires manual intervention.
Larger key sizes are said to be more difficult to bruteforce; is there any reason someone would then decide to instead use a smaller key? Is there any negative effect in using a larger key size, such as performance, or poor compatibility with older versions of encryption/decryption software?
Can a video that was deleted from an iPhone 5c running iOS 7.1 be recovered? 1) the video was not in the camera roll 2) the video was deleted 3 weeks before seizure of device 3) app used to download/play video was deleted, re-downloaded and deleted again before seizure of device 4) no passcode locking device Is recovery of the deleted video possible? And if so, how likely?
Web is filled up with the recent decision by Facebook to track user browsing history like adage.com andNYTimes. How can a web application use browsing history which is local to that browser? Is it even possible to get browsing history from modern browsers like FF and Chrome? Historically, interest-based targeting on the social network hinged on users' own declarations of their likes and interests in their profiles, as well as Facebook pages they had "liked," according to Brian Boland, Facebook's VP-ads product marketing. Now, Facebook is using the passive data -- where users go on their PCs and phones -- to make its own ads smarter. Advertisers who want to reach Facebook users who are interested in camping, for example, will be able to reach that audience with greater accuracy. "There's just a more robust set of information that informs that you're interested in camping," Mr. Boland said.
I am working on a web project and I want to (as far as possible) handle user data in a way that reduces damage to the users privacy in case of someone compromising our servers/databases. Of course we only have user data that is needed for the website to do it's job but because of the nature of the project we have quite a bit of information on our users (part of the functionality is to apply yourself to jobs and sending your cv with it) We thought about encrypting/decrypting sensitive data with a private/public keypair of which the private key is encrypted with the users password but found some security and implementation problems with that :P the question is how do you implement user privacy and a protection against data theft on centralised web sever with browser compatible protocols while for functionality it is required that users can exchange sensible data? To give some additional insight: this project is not yet in production stage so there is still time to make things right. we are already doing some basic stuff like serving https enforcing https for sites that may handle sensitive data hashing salted passwords some hardening of our server and services on it encrypted harddrives to prevent someone from reading all client information after stealing our servers / harddrives but that's about it, there is besides the password hashes no mechanism that would stop/at least make it harder for someone who managed to get into (part of) the server to gain all data on all our users. Nor do we see a way to encrypt user data to disable our self from reading them as we need the data (we wouldn't have collected it otherwise) for some part of the website / the functionality we want it to provide. Even if we for example managed somehow (maybe with some javascript) that all data would get to us encrypted (by the client's browser) and we serve the client his privatekey encrypted with some passphrase (like for example his login password) we could not for examle scan user uploaded files for viruses and the like. On the other hand would a client side encryption at least with the browser/webserver concept leave some issues with security at least as we imagine it (you are welcome to prove me wrong) and seems quite like reinventing the wheel, and maybe as this project is not primarily about privacy, but rather privacy is a prefarable property we might not want to reinvent the wheel for it. I strongly believe I am not the first webdeveloper thinking about this, am I? So what have other projects done? What have you done to try to protect your users data? if relevant we are using django and postrgreSQL for most things and javascript for some UI ps: this article describes some other reasons we are hesitant about client side encryption
Are webmalwares capbale of performing browser hijacking attacks ? Has there been any famous webmalware that functioned this way ?
I'm black-box testing an application which uses java spring framework and MySQL in the back-end. When I insert a single quote (') in a text box field, the server returns a HTTP status code 500 Internal server error with the below error stack trace, org.springframework.jdbc.BadSqlGrammarException: StatementCallback; bad SQL grammar [select code, name, num_code from car where UPPER (code) LIKE UPPER('%'%') LIMIT 0,10]; So it's absolutely a SQL Injection. And because of that, I tried to delete a row in another table which sits in the same DB with the below payload: %'); DELETE FROM p_test WHERE t_id=1# which will in-turn change the query as: select code, name, num_code from car where UPPER (code) LIKE UPPER('%%'); DELETE FROM p_test WHERE t_id=1# %') LIMIT 0,10 Now a row must get deleted in the table p_test with t_id = 1, but it returns the HTTP status code 500 with below stack trace, [http-bio-8080-exec-7] ERROR c.q.j.e.r.CommonHandlerExceptionResolver - doResolveException going to resolve the following exception : org.springframework.jdbc.BadSqlGrammarException: StatementCallback; bad SQL grammar [select code,name,num_code from car where UPPER (code) LIKE UPPER('%%'); DELETE FROM p_test WHERE t_id=2#%') LIMIT 0,10]; nested exception is com.mysql.jdbc.exceptions.jdbc4.MySQLSyntaxErrorException: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near 'DELETE FROM p_test WHERE t_id=2#%') LIMIT 0,10' at line 1 If anyone has any idea please reply.
When I'm logged into my Google account, and I visit a web page that contains the Google Plus "+1" button, does a script have access to my name, even if I don't interact with the Google Plus widget?
Is there any way to make an "expiring" AES key? Here's scenario to give a better picture: Say Bob has some data which he would like to share with Alice. Alice has a public and private key, let's say RSA 2048. Say Bob dos not know Alice very well, she might not take care of her public and private keys (or may simply be "computer illiterate"), and given enough time, her public and private keys could get compromised. Bob encrypts some data with a magical AES 256 key that expires after a week. Bob uploads the data to a file sharing service. Assume that there is no way to delete that data from the file sharing service, i.e. files reside on the server indefinitely. Bob sends Alice an E-Mail encrypted using Alice's public key, in which Bob gives her the magical AES key to decrypt the data that he has uploaded to the file sharing service. Assume Alice never decrypted that file. (This is important in this scenario, explained later.) A year has passed since Bob shared that file with Alice. Alice has got her computer compromised and Mallory now has access to her computer. Mallory snoops through her computer finding her encrypted E-Mails, which he decrypts using Alice's private key, as she did not set a passphrase for her private key. Mallory downloads the file and tries to decrypt it using the magical AES key. Since more than a week has passed (a year to be exact), and the magical AES key has expired, Mallory is unable to decrypt the file that Bob shared with Alice. As Alice never decrypted the file, Mallory can not find any traces of the contents on Alice's hard drive. (We could simply assume she decrypted it onto a ramdisk, but Alice may or may not be "computer illiterate" so I went with not decrypting the file at all.) I know the above is a very specific scenario, but is creating a expiring AES key in any way possible?
We have an internal CA server for our domain located at http://cert_srvr.local.domain/certsrv/certrqxt.asp. This server runs Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services. When I went to the site, I was able to use a CSR that I made on a linux computer to request an advanced certificate issued to the DNS name of our web proxy server. I used the following command to create the CSR: openssl req -new -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.key -out csr.csr I think this is a security risk because my non-admin account credentials were passed through via NTLMv2 to the internal CA's Certificate Services site when I logged into it... and I was able to create a certificate as if I were the proxy server (IssuedTo: proxy-server.local.domain) even though I'm not. Since all workstations on our domain have the MS AD CS server's certificate in their trusted cert store, the cert I made could be used in a MITM attack by pretending my PC was actually the proxy server. This would have to be used in conjunction with a DNS spoofing or other type of attack to get clients to believe my computer was the proxy server, but it is still possible that the certificate could be misused for redirected SSL traffic to be decrypted by a MITM machine. Does this sound right, or is there no real security risk here?
I have resources in an application. Further I have a table holding all resources and for every resource what role is allowed to access it. I also have defined a Table holding all uses that are registered to my system and the roles they are allowed to play. My question now: Is this an ACL managed with roles (that could be also called groups)? Or is this a flat (core) Role Based Access Control? I do not really see the difference between these two. Thanks.
There is a server side script written in php(say backend_file.php) or coldfusion(say backend_file.cfm). Lets say, i am using Apache and I have a sample web folder (on my Localhost) like: backend_file.php index.php Is it possible to restrict access of backend_file.php, when directly hit from browser? However, index.php should be able to access backend_file.php? Note: index.php is accessible, by direct URL access. I mentioned index.php should be able to access backend_file.php, as it makes ajax post or get request to fetch information from backend_file.php?
I understand the details of RSA encryption/decryption in that a public key can be distributed in the clear since all it can really do anyway is encrypt data. I also understand that this public key can be signed with a different public/private key pair. This is great to validate that the key came from a reliable source and you are not encrypting your sensitive data with with a malicious public key so that an attacker could decrypt with the paired malicious private key. I also understand that it is important to rotate public encryption keys since after a number of uses, the private key becomes mathematically exposed with fewer computational cycles. What I do not understand is if you need to rotate your public signing key. It seems to me that after enough key rotations your private signing key would become exposed and then a malicious public encryption key could be signed by an attacker with the private signing key they have exploited. Issuing a new public signing key, however, becomes susceptible to a man in the middle attack. What piece of this am I missing?
Are VPNs/proxies (and VPN/proxy software such as Tunnelblick and Hola) legal in the U.S., assuming that you are doing legitimate activities on the Internet (i.e. nothing illegal)?
Recently, one of my client-server application started to disturb me with some very annoying "notifications". Basically, what happens is that the remote server sends a few packets to my client, which translates them into a message it displays in its interface. Thing is : these notifications really annoy me. Since these notifications are nothing vital to the client, I started to analyse my TCP streams coming from the remote server. I noticed an obvious pattern : every time the notifications pops up, 4 specific packets are sent to me. For instance : Flags [P.], seq 60:297, ack 1, win 257, options [nop, nop, TS val 108022880 ecr 914609], length 237 Flags [.], ack 6, win 257, options [nop, nop, TS val 108022891 ecr 915061], length 0 Flags [P.], seq 297:534, ack 6, win 257, options [nop, nop, TS val 108022891 ecr 915061], length 237 Flags [.], ack 11, win 257, options [nop, nop, TS val 108022904 ecr 915090], length 0 I observed the TCP communication for a while, and let several notifications appear. Here's what I noticed : The server always sends 4 packets when requesting the client to "notify" me. These packets are always organised in the same order : 237 bytes, 0 byte, 237 bytes, 0 byte. The rest of the communication between the server and the client doesn't follow any pattern (except when I repeatedly make the same requests to the client of course). Since I've been able to identify a pattern, I would now like my machine to detect it when it occurs, and block the associated packets before they reach the client. I have tried using the size as a blocking parameter using : iptables -I INPUT -p tcp -s [server-IP] -m length --length 237 -j DROP Unfortunately, I can stil see the 237-byte-long packets reaching the client... Is there any way I could be specific enough with iptables, in order to block this particular sequence, without shutting off the whole communication stream ? Edit : the Don't show disturbing notifications option does not exist in the client, that would be far too easy, wouldn't it ? These notifications are very much like ads.
Someone has been sending me these weird emails and I am starting to get curious about it. The latest one has an image of a broken image linking to this address... I wonder if you guys could help me figure it out. storage.googleapis.com/baleiao/Intimacao.zip
I have an idea to implement a account system using email and passwords for games. Im intending to have the account creation and forget password systems on a webpage. So if users will have to access the webpage in order to access those features. The users will login with those details in the game. For the account creation and forget password, I'm thinking of setting in my webpage server. While the account database will be stored with the game server which will also host the account's scripts. Im think that if i were to put my game server script path in the HTML form, the user will be able to know the location of my game server. Thus, for user who wish to hack my server will know the location. With that i was thinking, if the form points to a script in my web server, and that script will sent the data to my game server script. Does that mean the game server will only be comprise if my web server is hacked? Regarding to the user's email and password, I know that storing the password in plain text is not a good way. The recommended way was to encrypt it with a hash and salt. Im wondering if the encryption and salting should take place at the client side (HTML) or the server side(script at game server)? If it happens at the game server, i will have to send the password in plain text, ain't it? OR i could hash the password with MD5 or SHA-1 or SHA-256(etc..) at the client side and receive the hashed password at the server side and perform a second round of hashing with salting on the game server? The things i'm looking for in this question is about how secure for both my users and my server for this method of authentication.
I have Kali Linux installed in VirtualBox and would like to do an idle scan. For this I need to find a suitable zombie PC. I'm using the ipidseq script to find one. The script finds some IP addresses along with open ports. Unfortunately I executed the idle scan many many times with Zenmap( nmap -sl zombieip -p -pN targetip ) and always get the same response from Zenmap, that the port on the zombie IP cannot be used, "perhaps it's down or firewalled". My question is: should I continue trying, but with a script to automate the process, or could I be doing something wrong?
Socket.IO and WebSocket do not provide underlying connection information (like the certificate or public key of the SSL/TLS channel), and I'm trying to understand the reasoning. The context for this question is a side loaded web application that wants to query the certificate or public key of its underlying connection. The query would be used for certificate or public key pinning. Here, the side loading provides a trusted distribution channel so tampering with HTML/CSS/Javascript is not a concern or threat. Those who claim its not needed state (1) the platform performs checks so its not needed; (2) CSS or Javascript could use the server's certificate or public key to track users, so its a potential leak; and (3) its inefficient, so its not welcomed. I think there are a few problems with the arguments. First, we've seen a number of problems in the past, like Diginotar and recently Turkey tampering with DNS. The platform/browser did not detect the problems (sans Chrome due to pinning), so the browsers are not performing the correct checks. I understand the browser cannot know these things (its a "feature" or limitation in the security model), and its the reason I want the apps under my purview to do it. Second, malware wants to gather and egress data. So the most dangerous parts of the Socket.IO and WebSocket API are open and write. I doubt the ability to query a server's certificate or public key exceeds the risk of open and write. Third, I'm fairly certain there are better vectors for CSS or Javascript to track users or their browsing (like CSS tracking the color change on a visited link), so I don't consider it an immediate or high priority threat. If it is a threat, I feel the benefits of channel hardening outweigh the possible leak. (Especially in the post-Snowden era). Finally, regarding efficiency, I have to defer to Dr. Jon Bentley: "If it doesn't have to be correct, I can make it as fast as you'd like it to be". I imagine that includes all kinds of clever optimizations, like eNull when using TLS. Here's my closed-ended question: is it really considered a potential leak to allow Javascript to ask for the server's certificate? Does the fear of a "leak" of the server's certificate really outweigh the benefits of channel hardening and pinning? Here's the open-ended question: what don't I understand correctly or what am I missing? I feel like there's a major disconnect between what I want and expect, and what the folks writing the standards are willing to provide. For completeness, "web application" is the generic term and would cover, for example, Sys Apps, Hosted Apps, Chrome Apps, Packaged Apps, Installable Apps, etc. It would not cover other web apps, like Bookmarked Apps because that would require a fetch. Related: another good question on WebSocket security: Elaborate websockets security, but it does not discuss missing features.
I was recently asked by a friend of mine (outside the computer science field) if he can be successful in web-application pen-testing I took this as an excuse to ask a more comprehensive question. I personally found this question about career path quite interesting What are the career paths in the computer security field? Keeping in mind that there are people from majors like electric engineering successfully entering different security fields, what sort of college majors are required (or are acceptable) to enter a career in computer security? Before anyone views this question as "opinion-based" I would like to add that I need specific reasons regarding mathematics background, work ethic, and courses included in the major.
I have installed openVPN using the following link http://www.vpnbook.com/howto/setup-openvpn-on-ubuntu I would like to ask is it really secure . the password is available for everyone and the configuration files also are public so can I consider this a secure connection . and if not how i can make it really secure
I'm interested in doing my thesis on Firewall hole punching. Hole Punching: A way to exploit NAT to open a connection TCP or UDP between a Client and a Server. What I'm looking for is a reason this would be a valid research area, and how it would help for me to do research on this.
Imagine I have a Microsoft root offline ca running since half year, but suddenly I want to include it in my company hierarchy, resigning it with the company official root, But I need both continue running normally, issuing their own crls and all that staff. I am able to recover private keys from the hsm and move them to the other security world. Is that even possible? What would be the best way to act considering my case? Thank you!
I am using Windows XP Professional and what happens is that when I try to connect any gadget like a pen drive or a mobile through USB, all my data gets hidden and it shows a 1 kb file which is a .lnk file and if I try to find the target of that .lnk file it shows: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c start qfstynchuh.vbs&start explorer USB&exit Where USB is my file name. I tried doing research in regarding this and I got one idea of showing hidden files using CMD by changing to F:/ and typing this code attrib -s -h USB It successfully worked but again the files got hidden. I have the qfstynchuh.vbs file but when I open it with CMD it shows around 10000 lines of encrypted words. I can't paste this code here so the real code is in this link: http://hackinginjections.blogspot.nl/2014/08/qfstynchuhvbs.html I also tried deleting that file but again it appears and I tried changing and deleting all those codes and again saving it but nothing happens. If it comes to the anti-virus then it is not detecting and by the way if it detects it move this to chest and saves there. I am using Avast anti-virus. Please help as all my pen drives are getting infected and it is also infecting my friends' PCs who are using Windows 7.
I'm using the self-signed certificate, but I don't know how this protocol works. I connect two apps with a socket SSL and it works fine. The server is a Python app and the client is an Android app. I created the self-signed certificate with openSSL, now I have two files: the private key and self-signed certificate. The server uses all files but client only uses self-signed certificate. I found many pages explaining the protocol connection with signed certificate and CA, but none with self-signed without CA. Protocol with signed: Client Server ClientHello --------> ServerHello Certificate* ServerKeyExchange* CertificateRequest* <-------- ServerHelloDone Certificate* ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify* [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished --------> [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- Finished Application Data <-------> Application Data (This schema has been shamelessly copied from the RFC.) How about with a self signed certificate?
Which would be harder to crack: a password comprising of n characters randomly selected or a password comprising of x randomly selected characters repeated m times so that mx=n. For example: 9jtRf_ki&^tN4%^E3d^75HG As oppose to: u7Iu7Iu7Iu7Iu7Iu7I or: kL:@90kL:@90kL:@90kL:@90 As far as I can tell none of the above contain dictionary words and they all contain a good mix of keyboard characters, i.e the attacker would to try capitals, numbers, special chars etc. so they should be hard to crack. Why might the former example be harder to crack than either of the latter two? The intention is be able to provide password advice that renders brute forcing attacking really difficult but gives a human easy visual / muscle memory. For the purpose of the question assume the attacker is coming in blind, they have no knowledge of the pattern or whether or not a pattern would be used and there is no requirement that a password be a repeating pattern, it could be anything, though they do know that any character and any length is allowed for the password.
I would like to set up a computer at home (preferably running Debian, or some other flavor of Linux) to be used only for secure financial transactions. The idea is that, by strictly limiting what is done with this computer to a small set of operations it will be easier to keep it secure. I imagine that this is something that many people would like to do but I have not found a good set up of instructions for implementing. I can only find instructions/checklists for securing/hardening a general-purpose computer, which I figure should be more difficult than what I want to do, and maybe produce a less secure system. Maybe I have not hit on the right search terms? Any pointers would be appreciated.
For Windows-based systems, I have seen that changes to the Registry or System Directories are some of the things which are used to track if a machine has been compromised. Similar things must exist for other platforms- and I must admit that I am unaware of them. My curiosity here is that what are the best metrics which a security personnel may want to leverage (at the host itself or at the Network-admin level) to decide whether a system has been compromised, and do them in an OS-agnostic way? That is, these metrics should not change - irrespective of Windows, *nix, Mac, or handheld devices with Android etc.
As far as I know you can crack WPA2-connections if you have the four-way-handshake. Then your program calculates the PMK/PTK and you get the key for the network. But what is with a WPA2-network where you have to use your password and your username for authentication? Is this only possible in WPA2-enterprise-networks, and can you crack them, too?
I've recently had an encounter with the law, the details of which I won't disclose here since the case is still in court. They took my phone, naturally. I deactivated it as soon as I was released later that day and had another phone activated on the same number, since it's the only way most people can reach me. In addition to that line I have a separate work phone. Both are on the same carrier (Sprint), and I usually have rather poor cell phone signal at home. What makes me wonder is that my work phone (older HTC android model) gets signal more consistently, while my primary line (Galaxy S4) frequently shows a red X instead of any signal bars. Quite frequently since the incident occurred I have been unable to use my primary line for up to an hour or more while the work phone has good service. This is sometimes alleviated by restarting it. Is this any indication that a Stingray/IMSI device is intercepting my calls?
For an API request to my application, I store the data in the request object temporarily in an XML file before it is pushed to the database. Although the XML files are stored on a secured server at a firewall-protected data center, should I look to encrypt the data in the XML files to make it more secure? What are the best practices here?
I use to watch the status bar of my browser and note that when I visit a site many URLs are loaded like ajax[dot]googleapis or googlesyndicate[dot]com etc. These URLs are not accessible directly by pasting them in address bar. When I searched these URLs, I found that Google collects data through these sites about location, behavior, etc of users. So, I decided to block them. I use firefox and just found an add-on to block given/feeded URLs. I tried a couple of things like Ghostry etc. So now I want to ask that is it enough or I need some other software.. Thanks
I run a couple of websites, so I'm just wondering what is the appropriate use of clickjacking protection like the x-frame-options response header? What pages are susceptible to this kind of attack on my users?
If the information used to retrieve a card from the Paypal Vault, i.e. "credit_card_id" is stored in a database entry on our server, if a hacker is able to gain access to the server, does it really matter if the card information is stored on our server, or in the Paypal Vault? The information could be retrieved, or at the very least, used with malicious intent? Hypothetical question, of course.
I have been building a network application with a Client/Server model, where a central server handles multiple client threads. I did my best to ensure that no matter what context the program is run it won't deadlock as part of a security requirement. My question is about deadlocks and concurrency in a networked application serving multiple threads. A deadlock is effectively a denial-of-service, but can you actually exploit a deadlock to do anything malicious? Are there security considerations, other than deadlocks, that I must make when building a concurrent application?
I am using ActiveMQ and WSO2 for my application. I need to protect my queue to restrict posting of messages by anonymous users(I need to protect my queue with some password). I know, there is a Authentication plug in available in Apache ActiveMQ. But I guess, it is for restricting access to admin console. Any examples would appreciated. Thanks in advance.
The title says it all, really. I'm Alice, and I want to login to Gmail's web interface through my browser. Ike, the internet service provider, and Adam, the local network administrator, would like to know what my Gmail email address (username) is. Is there any conceivable way for things to happen so that either one of them could possibly learn it?
Is it possible to apply buffer overflow on code that was injected using DLL injection? For instance, if I inject a function foo() into the process, is it possible to call foo() using buffer overflow? If not, does that mean buffer overflow can only be used to call arbitrary internal functions?? Thanks
I'm attempted to eliminate a lot of the malicious traffic on my webserver as possible. In doing so I have performed a few tests and found that when my server is not listed on shodan there are no port scans or any attempts to break in. But once shodan indexes the server and relists it again we are flood with attempts. So to complete the project I need to block their scanning servers. Which netblocks and/or server addresses are they using? (note: this is not how to defend against scans as suggested by a few moderators this is a legit question on which servers that shodan/@achillean actually uses for their scans)
In Reverse Social Engineering the hacker deliberately sabotages a network, causing a problem to arise. That hacker then advertises that he is the appropriate contact to fix the problem, and when he or she comes to fix the network problem, the hacker requests certain bits of information from the employees or staff and acquires the information he or she was looking for. I would categorize RSE under technology, because I can't seem to come up with an example that is not based on technology. Can you come up with a RSE scenario that does not involve technology? What could be sabotaged? How will you justify your request for security information?
While studying X.509 certificates, I've found that authentication is safer if I associate/combine one or more certificates with each signed message (certificate + signed message). The receiver of the message would like to validate the certificate using the public key of the Certificate Authority and, once he has found the public key of the sender inside the certificate, he would like to validate message's signature with this public key. What I can't understand is: If I don't add the signature to the message, what could happen? Why it would be less safe?
Suppose one wants to setup a cryptographic protocol in which 2 parties communicate using an encryption scheme that produces encrypted messages indistinguishable from random data (the desired property) given that the adversary does NOT KNOW the key to decrypt the data. (end goals are undetectability and plausible deniability) Which component of the chosen cryptosystem provides this property? Is it the choice between using symmetric key encryption or public-key encryption? Or is it the choice of which block cipher operation mode you use that determines this property? This answer on a steganography seems to imply that choosing symmetric key encryption that gives you this property. Does this imply that if you choose public-key encryption you cannot achieve the desired property? https://security.stackexchange.com/a/44295/26338 My research has led me to believe that it is your choice of block cipher operation mode that gives you this property (choosing AES-GCM gives you this property for example). Which design choices do I have to make in order to achieve the desired property?
I use MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_256 in CBC mode using mcrypt in PHP. This supports key sizes of 16, 24 or 32. Is a key size of 32 more secure than a key size of 16 or 24? If it is, does it really matter or is it just a little bit better? And does a larger key noticeably impact performance in this case? Searching on Google or here on Information Security doesn't help me, I can't find an answer to this question. My guess is that a longer key is more secure and that it doesn't really affect the performance but I would like a confirmation (preferably along with some sources).
I am looking for enhancements of SHA1 when its compared to MD5. But I am not talking about just heap sizes. I am talking about different enhancements than heap size. Also, I think md5 is faster than sha1. It can be a difference between them. Are there any improvement sha1 and md5?
I am running windows 7 prof on a SSD (mSATA). My CPU i7-3610QM has AES-NI-support. I want to encrypt my SSD with truecrypt with AES. But I am really unsure if this is a good idea because of (a) the performance and (b) the lifetime of my ssd. About (a) I think, encryption works with 3 gb/s because of the AES-NI. So this should be fast enough for SSD-encryption, right? I heard, that using the full space of a SSD is a bad idea. Nevertheless, I did this. The full 120 GB are formatted currently as my system filesystem. Do I "destroy" my SSD with a full system encryption (so pre-booth-authenticatio is required)? What does happen with the first 100 MB marked in Disk Management with "System Reserved"?
I am researching about the weaknesses of WPA with TKIP. I have an idea that the AES-CCMP mode is better than TKIP, but what are the weakest points of TKIP? Also, I am wondering about the disadvantages of WPA TKIP. What are the disadvantages over WPA-AES?
I'm looking for tools that will audit a very simple Unix (Linux or BSD) installation, identify vulnerabilities, and perhaps give suggestions for fixing them. I realize that "penetration testing" can get pretty involved, and that there are many specialized tools for it, but I just want to test a minimal, dedicated home system (like the one I described in this earlier post), so I'm hoping to find tools that can do a reliable all-around security audit on such a simple system, perhaps after automatically running a collection (the larger the better) of standard tests.
I am capturing a pop3 netcat connection (port 110) using Wireshark, on Debian linux (Kali). After filtering packets with (tcp.port eq 110) I get few packets but once I R.Click on any and click "Follow TCP Stream" I get empty window! My question, is this a bug? (I found some ppl reporting it as a bug) or is this possible based on some conditions?? I tried to run Wireshark to analyze the pcap file, with root user and with limited user and the result is the same. On some other packets I still can get contents on the TCP Stream window though.
I'm interested in an encrypted offsite storage scheme, but I don't want to depend on the vendor for encryption. I have an idea for doing so by combining sshfs with cryptsetup/dm-crypt/LUKS, but I'd like to know if there are any obvious problems with this scheme. Essentially, Use sshfs to mount a remote drive Create a random encrypted volume via head -c 10MB /dev/urandom > volume Make a LUKS container with cryptsetup -y luksFormat ./volume Open the encrypted volume with cryptsetup luksOpen ./volume myvol Format the volume via mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/myvol Mount the encrypted volume mount /dev/mapper/myvol /mnt When done, unmount the encrypted volume, close it, and unmount the remote drive After everything is setup, I'd just use steps 1, 4, 6, 7. Anyway, again, I'm just interested in some kind of offsite encrypted storage scheme where I don't have to worry if my host is snooping or not. I'm interested if there are some possible issues with the scheme that I described above using sshfs combined with cryptsetup/dm-crypt/LUKS.
Powershell has a TrustedHost section that is configured like this: winrm s winrm/config/client '@{TrustedHosts="CorpServer56"}' What security is implied for CorpServer56? Is it just an ASCII name match on the host that is "trusted"? I'm concerned about someone guessing a trusted host, and faking that name in order to gain access to a computer.
I have a 1st generation iPad, and I usually use it for web browsing when I'm home. The 1st gen iPad can't run newer versions of iOS (I'm stuck with iOS 5). I went to a website that tells if your SSL client is good or bad. My iPad has a bad SSL client. I have a computer that I use as a personal home server. The server has a good SSL client. I was wondering if I could connect my iPad to that server, and then the server would encrypt the connections for me. What I want to do is to use the computer as something like a proxy server, and the connections between the iPad and my proxy could be unsafe, because I trust my home network, but the connection between the proxy and the web would be safely encrypted. I tried using the Squidman proxy server, but I went to that website again and it told me that the SSL client was bad. So I think that perhaps the Squidman proxy server doesn't do the whole encryption process, and it leaves this job for the iPad SSL client, which is bad. How could I have a proxy server that handles the SSL encryption?
According to OWASP: When a user authenticates to a site, the site should generate a (cryptographically strong) pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine separate from the session id. (emphasis mine) Why does the CSRF token need to be stored in a separate cookie if the session id is: a random value (a value the attacker cannot guess) stored in a cookie (a value the attacker cannot read) generated by the server (a value the attacker cannot write) Why not simply use the session id as the CSRF token? You'd still submit the value twice (once in the cookie, once in the form) and compare the values, but wouldn't use a separate cookie for the CSRF token.
I was wondering, what it means in the Heartbleed exploit. Let me explain. I'm trying to understand what does "hello" and "heartbeat" mean. Example: hello = h2bin("16 03 02 00 dc 01 00 00 d8 03 02 53 43 5b 90 9d 9b 72 0b bc 0c bc 2b 92 a8 48 97 cf bd 39 04 cc 16 0a 85 03 90 9f 77 04 33 d4 de 00 00 66 c0 14 c0 0a c0 22 c0 21 00 39 00 38 00 88 00 87 c0 0f c0 05 00 35 00 84 c0 12 c0 08 c0 1c c0 1b 00 16 00 13 c0 0d c0 03 00 0a c0 13 c0 09 c0 1f c0 1e 00 33 00 32 00 9a 00 99 00 45 00 44 c0 0e c0 04 00 2f 00 96 00 41 c0 11 c0 07 c0 0c c0 02 00 05 00 04 00 15 00 12 00 09 00 14 00 11 00 08 00 06 00 03 00 ff 01 00 00 49 00 0b 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0a 00 34 00 32 00 0e 00 0d 00 19 00 0b 00 0c 00 18 00 09 00 0a 00 16 00 17 00 08 00 06 00 07 00 14 00 15 00 04 00 05 00 12 00 13 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 0f 00 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0f 00 01 01") hb = h2bin("18 03 02 00 03 01 40 00") So, what does that mean? How did the attacker imagine that? I tried to translate that from decimal to ASCII, but I can't understand the result (the characters are not understandable). How is it constructed?
I pay my neighbors to use their WiFi. They have listed me as Guest with a separate password from theirs. Is there any way to prevent them from seeing the sites I've visited? My browser history clears automatically. Since they're in charge of the router, can they always see in real time what I'm browsing as I'm browsing? I'm assuming they won't be able to see where I've been since my history clears.
I am working on a project that incorporates real money into peoples accounts. Their accounts are stored in a MySQL database and inside it there is a column called "BALANCE". When the users send money through PayPal, the PayPal api will do a callback to my server which will credit that users Balance with whatever they sent through PayPal. The problem is, I plan on making the altering users balance part only accessible by my application. The way the balance is updated is by the URL just setting the method as a GET and setting the amount to whatever and it credits the balance. I do not want people to just be able to visit that callback URL and keep updating their balance fraudulently. What security would I be able to put in place that will only let legitimate balance changes occur? Sorry if I didn't explain this too well. If anyone has questions, I'll try and explain it better. Thanks.
I'm wondering if there is a place where I can find up-to-date information regarding ethical hacking with Ruby. I do find lot of Python information, which is OK, but I have 4 years of experience coding Ruby for DevOps/Sysadmin/networking related scripts. I'd like to learn more of Information Security, and will rather code my own penetration test tools using a language I'm more familiar with. If there's no other option I can dig into Python, but before I make that call I'd like to hear from others that use Ruby to create their own pen-test tools. EDIT: there is a subreddit for infosec ruby at: http://www.reddit.com/r/ruby_infosec/
I recently posted this question on Code Review and it was recommended that I ask you guys about it. Basically, this will be used to allow users to generate formatted content. It gets put inside of HTML tags, so I don't have to worry about an attacker breaking out of an attribute. If that's not clear, here's an example: <div> Generated content </div> Edit: I'm not inserting the content into an attribute, so escaping quotes isn't a concern. I know I still have to check for bad attributes inside the user-generated content, which is what a large portion of the script is for. I've established that I'm vulnerable to an attacker posting a malicious link or posting a tracking image, but that's something I'm willing to accept. I don't think you can prevent that without white listing URLs, which would also dramatically reduce the freedom users have. If there is a feasible way to fix this vulnerability, I'd love to hear about it. I've read the OWASP XSS cheat sheet, and I think I have all of those bases covered. What do I have to worry about outside of that cheat sheet? Did I miss anything on it? Is my code future-proof? Am I in way over my head? Should I just switch to BBCode or Markup? Current code
A few days ago, we found a lot of web pages on Google with the name of our web sites, for example http://website.com/public/our_agency_name.asp. Every day we find more of this kind of URL. Looking on the net, this seems to be a cloaking attack. When we click on one of the URLs, we see a page with a lot of keywords and our agency name. How is this done? Where is the problem? How can this be solved?
Say a smartphone does not have any (internet) data plans activated (no gprs, 3g data etc.). It just connects to the tower for calls. So is it technically possible for the carrier or law enforcement agencies to get into a phones' file system through the cell network alone? For sake of argument let's say the phone is an unlocked one with full access to OS. Eg: Firefox OS, Maemo (Nokia N900), Meego (N950), BB etc.
I'm doing a forensic analysis of a hard drive that I have imaged to a dd image. The image is a NTFS filesystem that I mount in my Windows system with FTK Imager in read-only mode. Then, I search in the mounted drive for a file but in the search appear files inside directories of my system. In the mounted drive D: there are links to my C: drive, for example, in D:\Users\All Users appear my users too! How can I disable temporarily these links in order to perform the forensic analysis of the NTFS filesystem?
Two-factor authentication is based on the notion of “something you know” and “something you have”. Is it absolutely necessary for having your mobile phone involved in two-factor authentication, which is used by all the big companies, like Google etc.? Instead of relying on a third-party device, why can't the existing alphanumeric text password be modified so as to provide increased security. What if a single factor authentication would provide the security as a two factor would do. I have developed such system, which basically combines a simple image-based challenge and normal text password in one step. Update from comments: The system locks the account if the text password is correct but the image number is wrong for 3 attempts. The account remains locked until original user unlocks it. In real-time, I will add a link where the original user can unlock the account by using a secondary email or mobile. The image number is a 2-digit number. On an average if the normal password length is 8 digits, then the total length would become 10 digits, making highly time consuming for brute force attack. Also I'm using a grid of 4x7, total 28 images, so user wont have any problem in finding his image The images are NOT same for different users, they are randomly selected by the system from large database of images while creation of account and the system requires the normal password to be at least 8 characters. Would this idea be acceptable in real-time situations?
When implementing Facebook login using oAuth2 (the Javascript version), I receive an access token back from the Facebook auth server. So far so good. The problem I have is that I want to implement a RESTful back end, where the user needs to authenticate on every request for accessing a back end resource, using a server generated token. What happens is that when using the standard login on my website (email + password), this token gets generated on the server by my own application and is then sent to the front end where it is stored (all transactions happen over https). So I thought about using the access token that I receive from Facebook to store it in my back end, if the user wants to log in using Facebook. This way, every RESTful request to the back end could be checked against this token. The problem however, is that the back end cannot check if the token received from the client is a valid Facebook access token (this is a Javascript client application, heavily relying on Ajax for all server communication). Even though I can write Javascript to only send the access token to the back end on successful authentication with the FB server, this process is not reliable as the Javascript is not protected. My question is: How can I safely store a token in my back end, after the user authenticated with Facebook? Please note that I am creating a Javascript application using Backbone.
How do I secure data at rest from unauthorized access, but still allowing my application to access the data using user authentication over HTTPS? My scenario is as follows: Login to application using ID and password (password is hashed using MD5) After authentication from the server, user uploads data to the server User can retrieve that data using the application All data transfer is based on HTTPS Data on the server is not encrypted My questions are: If I encrypt the data at the location on the server, how do I retrieve it using my client application? Is there any algorithm which allows data to be encrypted and the encrypted data to only be decrypted and retrieved when my application is trying to retrieve data? How do I keep that data secure from getting hacked if someone gets access to the server?
Is it possible to know when a file in a NTFS filesystem was deleted? For example, if you have the file in the recycle bin you have the metadata file that stores when the file was sent to the recycle bin. However, if the file was never in the recycle bin or the recycle bin was emptied, how can you know the timestamp of the deletion of a file? Although it were not possible to know the exact date and time, is it possible to have a date interval? EDIT: I know there are existing solutions that can be installed or configured to monitor deletion of files but I'm talking about the case you receive a HD and you have to do a forensic analysis of it. In that case you probably would have only what it is installed by default.
I ran metasploit's smart_hashdump module against my (2008r2) domain controllers, trying to find any accounts that may still have lanman hashes in place. These should have been disabled long ago. I'm just doing some cleanup before this years penetration testing and I wanted to find anything that had been missed. I'm a bit confused by the output I'm seeing. All of my accounts have exact same hash in that column - aad3bb43....404ee. I've seen a couple references to hashes beginning with aad3b43 being blank, but nothing about all these hashes being identical. I take it that this value corresponds to some kind of internal 'disabled' state? I just want to be sure I'm understanding what I'm viewing. EDIT: @Izsi - The 7 null bytes describes exactly what I'm seeing. We've long since had the lan man authentication level set to 5 and the don't use lm at next password change set so it isn't a matter of having no password set, or even a problem with a few users using short passwords. I mostly wanted to be sure that the uniformity was intentional. I work with password hashes fairly regularly and almost never see duplicate entries. It just plain looked weird. I didn't think about the lm hash not using a salt and a fixed password always returning the same value. Makes perfect sense now. Thanks a ton.
I have someone hacking my computer, this person lives in my home. I know I have a keylogger and a few other things that are making my computer vulnerable etc. My question is: how do I get rid of the keylogger? I have no cash to pay for antivirus software and even then their stuff is weak so I need to know how to fix this myself and maybe even be able to get info on how to build a lawsuit against this person. Any terminal commands info, how to document and what to document for proof of this, how to keep my Mac safe with more books that I can do myself.
Please Note: This question is slightly based on me being a tin foiled hat with the issues that has arisen from the leaks, documents, and questioning trust thanks to Edward Snowden. Thanks to adding my VPN service to my cellphone to improve security and stop "eavesdropping" of Verizon on my data and usage, I am questioning the trust with Twitter, Facebook, Google, and all of the major social networking applications and how they are keeping our data secure as we access their applications. There is no notice, information, or indication that they are using SSL/TLS within their applications for Android, Windows Phone, and iPhones. Is Facebook, Twitter, Google Plus, and other major applications have SSL/TLS enabled and coded into their phone/tablet applications behind the scenes?
Many organizations have webmail exposed to the world. These sites are often hooked up to AD for user authentication. Are there any specific security controls OWA (Outlook web app) has that would prevent or degrade an attacker's ability to lock out everyone once the userid pattern is known?
SMB/CIFS (file sharing, Windows environment) I understand when a client connects to a server there is a challenge/response system in place. However, once the client is connected that "connection" is authenticated. At this point, couldn't a man-in-the-middle(like) [or rather a network level] attack spoofing the connected session's IP and port submit arbitrary commands. Does the server consider the "IP:port" authenticated, or is there more to it?
I am told that you can tell if the log file (like from ripping a CD) has been modified by its checksum. How? How do you bypass this if you wanted to modify it?
When you install a program in Windows, I've always noticed you must allow it Admin (UAC elevation). However, now it can effectively do anything it wants! Unpack a service, deploy it as LOCAL SYSTEM, write in a rootkit even! All because I simply wanted to install a basic program I found on the web. Is there a better way to handle installers out there? Where it has limited rights?
The scenario is as follows: An application has a web interface through which data can be configured. The data to consider for this question is Users with a many-to-many relationship with Groups. Each Group has one or more Admin Users. Multiple Admin Users from different Groups can be logged in at a time. Consider the following use case: An Admin User logs into the web interface and chooses to see a list of Users in their Group. The Admin User selects a User to edit (e.g. change privileges). The Admin User is redirected to an edit page for a single User with the normal User's ID in a hidden field in the edit page. The Admin User enters a new privilege in the form and submits the form. The web application updates the normal User's privileges in the database. This aspect of the web application does not require performance optimisations, operations on the order of a few seconds is acceptable. It's naive to believe the normal User's ID can't be edited on the client side thereby allowing the Red Admin User of Red Group to change the privileges of a normal User of Blue Group (of which the Red Admin User is NOT a member). What can be done on the server side to protect the integrity of the ID of the normal User being edited? For the purposes of this question, assume that the Red Admin User has been correctly authenticated and is allowed to view the edit page of a normal User of the Red Group. I'm concerned here with the Red Admin User maliciously changing the hidden User ID of a normal User of the Red Group to change the properties of Users of other Groups. Specifically, this system is developed using Java EE running on a Glassfish server. I've considered the following solutions: Embed a cryptographic checksum incorporating the User ID as a hidden field in the edit form. An MD5 hash or similar would be inappropriate as the Red Admin User would just need to calculate the new hash. The hash would need to be derived from some server-side secret. Obviously the secret would need to be unpredictable and protected. Currently the system uses a stateless session bean to carry the ID of the normal User to be edited from the list of Red Group Users to the User edit page. I could change the session bean to be a stateful bean would would maintain the User ID to be edited within the server but I'm considering other alternatives. What other options should I consider to combat this particular threat? Subjects such as user authentication and secure transmission are outside the scope of this question.
Even if I choose 1 character for my password or 32 characters with numbers, letters, uppercase symbols etc. the bcrypted password will still be 60 characters length password. So does the password strength matter when using bcrypt?
Mercury is a really great tool for android pen-testing as well as android forensics. However, they stopped its development and now I get redirected to some product called drozer. Does anyone know where can I find mercury? I have googled for it but I didn't get any good results. I need to install Androguard, as Mercury is one of its dependencies.
On the face of it, PTO seems like a good idea in educating people about password security. On the other hand, if I were an attacker, PTO would be the first place I would start if I wanted to start collecting a list of plaintext passwords.
OBJECTIVE: We have a requirement to run active scan for detecting and monitor phishing websites for a particular brand. We want to be as real-time as possible. That would mean that using sites like Phishtank would not suffice. APPROACHES WE ARE THINKING ABOUT: We are thinking to do this based on some parameters including, but not limited to images, content, security certificates, etc. Are there any existing tools which can be worked upon or modified to run active crawling and enlisting the websites that match our phish pattern? Not sure if quite feasible or even possible - is to monitor public DNS Servers for new domain registrations (is this possible? How?) and crawl these websites, run our phishing detection algorithms. UPDATE: I am even open to ideas to achieve the above objective.
Apparently the new Dyer malware is bypassing SSL to swipe bank credentials. I read that it's using "process hooks" to hook the browsers and see the data BEFORE it is encrypted and sent to the bank server (using the keys from the initial SSL handshake). Can someone elaborate as to how this is achieved? and is this at the same threat level of a keylogger capturing your keystrokes or is it more covert and dangerous?
I am currently working on some WiFi related security issues, and something appeared to me. I have an Open WiFi network, to which a client connects. I try the Deauth attack from Aireplay aireplay-ng -0 0 -a 00:14:6C:7E:40:80 -c 00:0F:B5:34:30:30 mon0 However, this has no effect on the client nor the AP. But, then I use MDK3 which is a software using the osdep library from the aircrack-ng project. I do: echo 00:14:6C:7E:40:80 > myfile Then mdk3 mon0 d -b myfile -c 11 And it works instantly! I tried to use wireshark to see what MDK3 is sending but there is too much WiFi pollution around and I don't know what I am looking for, I can't figure out what to do with it. I would like to know if they are both sending Deauth frames, and if so, what is the difference between them ? Do I misunderstand the attack run by MDK3 and therefore, could you please explain it to me ?
I graduated last year from an Informatics and Security degree program. This program was taken in a Canadian college. It equipped me with the basic security knowledge in all fields; networks, systems including both Linux and Windows, web applications and so on. We had extensive hands-on experience on penetration testing, setting up services in Linux such as DHCP, DNSSEC, web servers and forensic tools. We also learnt how to audit Windows environments and how to learn basically any tool that has security intentions. Technically, this program gave me the understanding of security, governance and the technology. Now I work in a company where I am the only security guy in the company. I hold the position of IT Security Engineer. This is what I generally do: - develop and design Windows standards and GPOs upon best practices - set up and manage web-filtering and proxy solutions - implement and manage endpoint protection and spam filters - write security policies and standards for everything (web applications, network, physical security, password, acceptable use ...etc) - involve in designing the authentication mechanism via web, phone and in-person - suggest design in secure automation of daily business processes - helpdesk support when needed As you can see, it is a wide-range fields that I am working with. I feel that I am being overloaded and I am losing focus on which path should I take. My manager sent me to ISO27001 LI/LA training and I passed both exams. Hence, I am ISO27001 Lead Implementer and Lead Auditor certified. This training has taken me into the governance side of Security. I love security and all of its part, however, I believe I am still young and would like to keep doing technical stuff, as I will get to the governance/managerial position later in my life when gaining possibly CISSP, CISM and so on. Now I feel I can't be totally dependable in one major task. For example, I know how to build basic AD, DNS, Exchange, SQL, VM environments. I know how to perform basic penetration testing using Backtrack/Kali Linux and get the report done. I understand IPS/IDS technology but never had extensive hands-on with them. I am getting lost seriously. I don't believe I want to go with network security (CCNA > CCNA Sec > CCNP > CCNP Sec). I think I am also poor with Windows Security administration (PKI, Certificates, IIS Security ...etc). I also believe I don’t have the skills to be system/security admin, software security or database security administration or analyst, and not even a network security engineer. I am getting lost! The question; what do you recommend me to do? Which certification path would improve my skills? Do you believe what I am doing in my company now is healthy for my future and skills? I feel that I am giving all what I learnt from university, but I am not gaining knowledge, valuable knowledge. Please provide suggestions. Thank you.
We allow 4 gb space per employee in outlook mail exchange, beyond that the user has to create a pst file . That is the policy. We have given admin rights to all employees since there is a lot of travelling and site visits. Before an employee leaves the company, he always copies the pst files into an external drive. This is leakage of valuable information. Is there a way to prevent the pst files from being copied into an external drive/laptop? And if the need arises, only the IT admin should be able to do it. I am looking for some sort of encryption or exchange policy for this. Any solution is welcome. Thanks a million
I was kind of shocked when I just received my confirmation mail from the shop where I just registered myself: they sent my username (which is my email address) and the password I typed in. The password was not partially replaced with *s or similar; it was the naked, blank password I picked. This does mean people who can check the emails the shop sends could theoretically see my login data, does it not? I believe this is the first time I get a confirmation with my full login information so this seems really weird and somehow concerns me. Should it? From the fact that I received my password by email, I am guessing that the shop does not encrypt my password. Is this a valid inference?
We have a web-site, where each user has to log-in to access a private area. Inside the private area, there are some information about the user, a profile, including some sensitive information (home address, bank details, etc.) Naturally, we follow best practices here (strong hashing, SSL with the correct algorithms, check for weak passwords, etc...). We also offer an API base on OAuth for third parties. In this way the user knows what a registered application can access, the application does not have to store the user credentials, we can limit what the application gets... all the usual benefits. For example, the API can read the profile info, but the sensitive information is blanked out or omitted. The problem is: we have a third party application that decided that using the API was no good; instead, it asks the credentials, store them (in plaintext...), and then authenticates using a POST. And reads user info doing screen-scraping. It actually then uses only the "public" information, but it could access also those sensitive information we would like not to disclose. I am not particularly worried that the app will leak the user information (I think they did this way because they are sloppy/lazy, not malicious), but still this is less then desirable behavior. And it made me wonder: is there a way to handle this situation at the root? I want to tackle the problem in the most effective way, and I am starting to wonder: is there a way to let the user login ONLY through your page? To avoid that someone else authenticates using just a POST? To the best of my knowledge, you can make it difficult to do (using one-time ids in the page/headers, using client-side (Javascript) hashing, etc.) but there is no way to be 100% sure the post comes from "your page". But I am no security expert, so I may be missing something. And in any case, which is the best way to mitigate the problem, making it impractical enough (but with little or no burden upon the user - no captcha - which will not solve the issue, anyway)? EDIT: to be clear: I am not talking about solutions for "preventing" screen-scraping. We already have mitigations to make it hard (and others to make it even harder down the line) that will make this particular app desist. I am talking about the login process: what can you do to be sure the username and password came from your own form? One of the "selling-point" of OAuth is that you give your credentials to someone (google, twitter) you trust; indeed, you are redirected to a form on the "trusted" domain. Besides looking at the url, the provenience of the credentials is enforced somehow? If so, how?
How do I securely communicate my bank connection details (IBAN + full name) to an otherwise trusted person with email being the only connection? Obviously I wouldn't use (plaintext) e-mail since any person that ever gets access to either mine or the recipient's inbox will also have access to that data. What tricks do you use? Is there something like a trusted pastebin service with password-option and expiration date?
I want to select data from a MySql database on an iphone device. The method I seem is the easiest one is to connect to a php file with GET arguments and then return it as a string. Now I'm just wondering what are the chances that someone will find the IP-address and the file and use it from a place other than the app.

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