instruction stringlengths 24 29.9k |
|---|
I was wondering ... when I upload a file to, say, Dropbox, does anybody personally check it to see what it is?
Say I upload a copy of my Blu-ray movie to cloud storage ... will anyone check, and could they possibly tell law enforcement that I uploaded a digital copy online?
Or is it all 100% automated, and nobody actually looks at anything, leaving the process entirely to software and hardware with no human intervention?
Some guy told me that he stores tons of illegal movies, games, etc. online in cloud storage encrypted and nobody can find out what he has there since he encrypted it offline and then uploaded the encrypted block of data online.
If I were to upload copies of my movies (so that in case I lose the actual disks and not wanting to fill my hard disk up with so many gigabytes of data) online, should I be concerned with anyone checking the files one-by-one? Or am I thinking in the stone ages here?
Because IF nobody did check personally what's hosted on your cloud storage/etc., like Box.com where they don't even know where your files are hosted and nobody watches them/checks it, isn't this illegal haven? If nobody checks it,
you could have anything there as long as nothing calls for analyzing, correct?
Box.com claims that they host your data cross virtual servers, other companies' servers, etc. In that event your data is flowing around all over the place and nobody is actually "watching" or "checking" to see what you uploaded, meaning I could post, say, a video of someone I murdered (kidding) online and nobody without any lead would know this because the file would not be checked on their side.
PS: I don't mean "check" as in determine file format, etc. I mean check as in actually seeing what a file is, contains, such as viewing a photo, video, sound, text file, etc.
|
Hear me out ... On TV shows like Criminal Minds they make it out to appear that any encrypted files can be easily decrypted, even without a key. The character, Garcia, just simply "pushes some buttons" and the file becomes decrypted almost instantly, even without any key, etc. I know that the show is not a good example of REAL WORLD events, but unless they're making a mockery of encryption I can't see why they'd make viewers think it's so easy just because they're F.B.I., as if that makes them magically capable of anything without knowledge.
But here's my point ... An encrypted file is bits; just bits that are garbage unless made back (decrypted) into what they originally were. Isn't it possible, in theory, to work through each byte and try to figure out what it originally was without a key, brute-force, etc.? Why not?
I mean there might be some possible way to determine what the original data may have once been by analyzing data directly yourself using some mathematical, logical, or other pattern first-hand, maybe? Doesn't there have to be some kind of strategy or pattern that can enable one to reverse the data manually?
|
I'm in a situation where I need to calculate a hash of the result of the password in plain text plus some random chars representing a session. The gained hash will be compared to another hash that is received by the opponent. The problem is, that I only get the full hash from the opponent which can only be regenerated (or rebuild) with the plain text password.
What is the best practice in this situation? I thought of a algorithm such as AES for saving passwords in a persistent storage to decrypt it later but since I'm operating with the plain text passwords, it might not be very secure and another aspect would be the fact that I operate with sensitive information at this point. Salting seems also impossible.
|
I'm kind of tired of the password managers that are available around... I need one that's open source, that works on OSX, that lets me store .pem files and that I can trust.
As I haven't found one, I thought it could be an interesting project for me to work on. I'm going to use AngularJS just b/c it's a technology that I want to start using and this project seems like a good fit.
My idea would be to have a dumb backend that took care of the login / registration and CRUD operations of the passwords (with tags to make the search easier)... but all the encryption / decryption should be performed by the browser.
The only thing that I'm not quite sure is how safe the private key is on the browser... Can different plugins / addons access to it when I load it into OpenPGP? is the private key stored as is on memory when OpenPGP is using it?
I've seen there are quite some other plugins using this, but I'm not exactly sure how good this would be.
I guess I could just have a different profile, or a browser I don't use with this... how good of an idea is it?
|
I'm building a backend for the mobile app with a public-facing HTTP API endpoint. Despite being publicly visible, this endpoint is only meant to be used by my app, i.e. I don't want people to send random requests to it using wget or anything similar.
My idea was to configure a SSL/TLS on my server, thus making the API only available over HTTPS and enforce a client certificate check on the server. Every copy of the app will have the (same) client certificate bundled with it.
Note that I'm not doing this for the purpose of a user authentication, just for limiting access from sources other than my app.
Is is a valid solution? It appeals to me a lot because of how simple it is. Are there any obvious flaws with it? How likely is that the certificate will be unbundled from the app and used for malicious purposes?
|
Imagine alice posts her public PGP key on her website and bob encrypts a widget with that public key then sends it to alice over Tor. If alice's key is widely and publically available and an attacker were to keep a map of key => identity, wouldn't the attacker, if operating your entrance node, be able to correlate the IP of the sender to alice's identity by identifying the key it's encrypted with (even if she's using Kali Linux for anonymizing her IP - I assume that doesn't completely hide your identity if someone cares enough to know)? I assume here that a Tor server can identify a sender that is not likely a Tor server by simply keeping track of common sender IPs or by other clever means. Does the Tor protocol somehow protect from this? Have ways been explored to separate the identity of the public PGP key from the data it encrypts?
|
I have seen that x.x.x.255 is reserved for broadcasting. Is it only work for broadcasting to the computer which connected to the same router? Can I broadcast to public IPs?
|
I have some questions about how the fingerprint function is performed.
First of all, I have some knowledge about cryptography. However it seems to do not be good enough to understand hundreds of pages with vague or incomplete information.
Questions:
I am trying to know how to compare the fingerprint appeared when the Firefox warns about a self-signed certificate, showing the fingerprint in MD5 and SHA1.
I am doing this because, in spite how beautiful and short they could seem, fingerprints really are not useful in all if you have the self-signed certificated (all the string) and not the fingerprint. Then, how can you know that such fingerprint shown by Firefox is that which matches the real fingerprint of your self-signed certificate?
As far as I figured out, .crt file has the certificate (shown in base64).
If, for example, I Export the Equifax Secure CA from Firefox's Certificate Manager, and I execute this command:
$ openssl dgst -sha1 BuiltinObjectToken-EquifaxSecureCA.crt
SHA1(BuiltinObjectToken-EquifaxSecureCA.crt)=**e05110ddb9bcb9e47818ea6e955cc6ba78ec6627**
$ openssl dgst -md5 BuiltinObjectToken-EquifaxSecureCA.crt
MD5(BuiltinObjectToken-EquifaxSecureCA.crt)=**54b6604a82d90ebdb9a8a3c544bb77f1**
…there are shown the two fingerprints (SHA1 and MD5).
However, when from the same Firefox client I select such Certificate, and click on 'View', what the Firefox's Certificate Manager shows this other two fingerprints:
sha1: D2:32:09:AD:23:D3:14:23:21:74:E4:0D:7F:9D:62:13:97:86:63:3A
md5: 67:CB:9D:C0:13:24:8A:82:9B:B2:17:1E:D1:1B:EC:D4
Why are they so different?
Maybe this question will drive us to open another post. If that was the case, I would open a new post with so.
If I understood correctly, the Certificate is the Public Key signed by someone (in this case by myself, and in other desired cases by a Certifying Authority) and adding some other functional and relevant data (such as domain-name, email-address, etc.).
The Certificate is send by the Server to the Client (except those self-signed certificates pre-installed at the Client site, mainly from some sort of Certifying Authorities from the highest levels of the hierarchy).
Then, my question. The fingerprint shown when some certificate is downloaded at the Client side from the Server: is this fingerprint the digest of the Public Key, or the digest of the Certificate itself?
The configuration of some Servers to allow Secure Connexions (those working over SSL: https, ftps, smtps, etc...), are including some directives at the SSL configuration to show to the Server which Files it shall use.
For example, the Apache2 HTTPS Server could include these three directives:
SSLCertificateFile - digital certificate (eg. your_domain_name.crt).
SSLCertificateKeyFile - private key (eg. your_domain_name.key).
SSLCertificateChainFile - intermediate (eg. DigiCertCA.crt), [OR SSLCACertificateFile]
To know the fingerprint that Firefox will show when the user is accessing this Server, on which files do I have to apply the commands shown at question 1 and obtain the fingerprints from? To the file specified at SSLCertificateFile, or to another file which only has the Public Key and is not included here?
Attending the above question. I am the administrator of that HTTPS Server with a self-signed Certificate, and I want to install to my Web Browser the Certificate, avoiding so to my Browser to download it (and in turn, avoiding any Main-In-The-Middle attack - some one giving me another Self-signed Certificate), which file do I have to 'Import' to my Web Browser? Is this last file generated by the Server or is directly the specified file at SSLCertificateFile directive?
NOTE: I am asking this last question, because at the SSLCertificateFile directive, for example, you can specify a .pem file, instead of a .crt file. And the .pem file, as I checked in my own Web Server could contain the Private Key as well (something to do not be sent to the Web Browser). What, in fact, shows us that applying the fingerprint to the .pem file, the result would be different than such shown by the Web Browser, when it warns about a self-signed Certificate.
Thank you all of you!! and sorry for the long question, but I have found a lot of pages talking about the same information, infinite times, and no one has anything about this matter.
I feel this is an odd thing, since thousands of administrators are using cryptographic tools, and there is an important point that they do not discuss: the fingerprints. At the moment, I believe that when they see the warning of a self-signed certified, they simply accept the exception without checking anything. And I think so, because there are not information discussing this specific matter on the Internet (I think - an important one, if not the most).
|
Ten years ago, we opened our building's front door with a badge. Five years ago we paid public transports with an RFID card. Today we pay for our bread with the same system and tomorrow we would probably be able to authenticate ourselves with something similar.
Basically, an NFC tag is only a physical support, just as a DVD is. It is easy to imagine how it can be protected against malicious alteration or prevented from being read (i.e. understood) by an unauthorized third party.
However, to prevent it from being cloned as-is (even if encrypted) seems impossible to me.
What prevents me from creating kind of an ISO image of the NFC credit card of my customers, writing it on a blank tag and then using it to buy my cigs?
|
Specifically talking about walkie talkie radio networks. Suppose there is a group of up to 16 persons, each equipped with such a unit. Typically, one person will be talking with one another (one-to-one), or one person will be broadcasting to all the others members (one-to-all). The goal is to secure and authenticate all the communication between them.
I thought about the following:
1) Each user will have a predefined public/private key (e.g. RSA).
2) There will be a predefined symmetric key (e.g. AES-128 bit).
Voice streams will be divided into 128-bit segments. Each segment will first be encrypted using AES 128, then hashed using SHA-256, and the hash will be encrypted using user's private key, and this signature will be sent along with the encrypted message. The reciever will first hash the message, and then decrypt the signature using any of the 16-1 public keys he have. Ideally, one of them will 'work', authenticating the message. Then he proceed to decrypt the message.
Is there any "clear" vulnerability in this protocol?
P.S. I am aware of other used protocols, e.g. P25, but will prefer to implement my own.
|
I am reading "Hacking The Art of Exploitation" book . i have read till chapter 2 programming but most of it has gone above my head . I want to learn basically cryptography , network security and web security . Which book should i read or should i just skip the first four chapters and go to the chapter 4 network security ?
I know that i am a noob in this field but i am eager to learn and prefer to learn it without joining any course.
|
How would I report an international security vulnerability which could cause a lot of damage?
I am asking how & where I would report this vulnerability, not now to create a simple vulnerability. :)) so & I am trying to trade it to free someone.
|
I have software installed on my computer that has encryption capabilities. This is the case both for things like VPN/SSL, and also GPG. I don't really use GPG (there are not that many people I can use it with), but I have it in case I want to send sensitive information of one kind or another. I know that the US has export control laws about encryption software - should I be concerned about taking my computer with me abroad, if I have software installed on my computer that includes encryption capabilities, even if I don't plan on using it?
|
I'm working on a security project. I have sensitive data that I would like to store in OS X's keychain. I'm able to add the data programmatically into the OS X keychain by using RHKeychain. But after doing a lot of research, it appears that OS X keychain data can also be accessible (1, 2, …) by malware.
Is OS X keychain data accessible by malware?
If Yes, what is the best approach to secure OS X keychain data?
What is the best approach other than the OS X keychain?
|
I want to invoke a custom assembly that uses protected services (like DirectoryServices, etc...) with reporting Services. On the web, I see a recurring example of configuration (inspired by this article) to do just that. Here it is
<CodeGroup
class="UnionCodeGroup"
version="1"
Name="SecurityExtensionCodeGroup"
Description="Code group for the sample security extension"
PermissionSetName="FullTrust">
<IMembershipCondition
class="UrlMembershipCondition"
version="1"
Url="'installation folder'\Common7\IDE\PrivateAssemblies\MyCustomAssembly.dll" />...
Now, something doesn't feel right. I don't know much about CAS, but it seems to me that the configuration above is risky. The custom assembly doesn't appear to be signed and I'm thinking maybe it could be possible for an attacker to replace it with whatever malicious assembly or for a careless developer on MyCustomAssembly to wreak havoc the system, even unintentionally (FullTrust).
Is the configuration above safe in production? If not, what are the risks and how can we do what i'm trying to do in a safe way? I'm thinking of things like using Assert in the custom assembly and granting it just the necessary permissions, giving the assembly a strong name, etc... but not sure how to do it...
|
Is there any way to implement encryption/decryption using ECC, like RSA does? For example, say some user wants to send a message containing a symmetric key to user X. Then, in RSA, I could just encrypt the symmetric key using X's public key, and only X can decrypt using his private key. In my particular application, it's important that the receiver does not know the sender's public key.
However, in ECC (at least using OpenSSL), I've only seen support for signing and DH.
I've done some research on ElGamal encryption, but I think I read that the encrypted message is doubled in size. I would like to use 256 bit ECC to encrypt a 256 bit plaintext to a 256 bit ciphertext.
Thanks in advance to anyone who can help.
|
Rebooted my rMBP late 2013 recently, and saw a set of SSL errors (unable to verify certificate) across a wide range of sites (google, gmail, mubi, medium) and also in the Calendar app as it tried to connect to Google. Never seen this kind of thing before -- any reason for concern?
|
I understand that copyright holders can identify illegal filesharing over BitTorrent by simply taking part in the sharing process and noting IPs of peers.
But how do they detect illegal downloads from file hosters?
|
Someone can suggest me a real situation in which is better to use MAC (Mandatory Access Control) instead of DAC (Discretionary Access Control) or RBAC (Role Based Access Control)? And in which DAC is better than the others? And in which RBAC is the best?
I know the theoretical notions, and I know that RBAC is better in situation in which we want to assign the rights not to the people, but to the specific job. I know also that MAC and RBAC is better in situation where we want to avoid that an user can manage the rights.
|
I recently hacked into my router which runs BusyBox v1.9.1. I want to edit some files in my web GUI interface which will allow me to get hidden options in it. I'm trying to edit a .js file and replace it via FileZilla (I also hacked FTP through setting the default router directory as ../..), and when I upload the file in the router, it says: 553 Error: Read-only file system. How could I fix that through SSH or FTP? (Telnet seems to be broken.)
Also, how can I set a default command to execute when I SSH into a server in PuTTY? In Linux it works for me when I do "ssh admin@192.168.1.1 /bin/sh", but when I try to do it on Windows through PuTTY it disconnects me directly after I log in.
EDIT: okay, here goes:
rootfs on / type rootfs (rw)
/dev/root on / type squashfs (ro)
none on /dev type tmpfs (rw)
/proc on /proc type proc (rw)
none on /var type tmpfs (rw)
none on /tmp type tmpfs (rw)
none on /mnt type tmpfs (rw)
usbfs on /proc/bus/usb type usbfs (rw)
/dev/nandflash on /upgflash type ext3 (rw,data=ordered)
none on /html/help type tmpfs (rw)
/dev/sda1 on /mnt/usb1_1 type vfat (rw,fmask=0000,dmask=0000,codepage=cp936,iocharset=cp936,shortname=winnt)
note:the last one is my 4GB flash memory, i need it connected always to the router because it helps me see the router's filesystem by doing a small exploit by adding ../.. to the usb1_1 directory that's created in upgflash file in my router's filesystem.
|
Suppose I do an online shopping they are asking me to enter my card details like four digit number(whatever related to that) and they are asking me to enter the PIN number too.
If I enter all this things, Can't they get all keystroke from me through Javascript and crack my passwords, card details etc ?
I surfed for safety tips on online shopping, few article suggest to check whether it is a secured session layer supported website Means SSL, Here I have one more doubt SSL is used for Secure Transaction Between Client Browser and server so there won't be any intruder to pretend to me or some attack, what if the server person itself capture this details and make a duplicate card or something and they get all money etc?
If I use money transfer from other service like for example (paypal,stripe) then it is completely fine because they use OAuth but What if it is for internet banking? I'll be shopping through my bank account. Shop Website server can crack my passwords etc right?
|
I'm trying to decrypt my router's root password, since I only have access to a simple admin account that doesn't have root privileges. Here is the passwd file:
0:F.bCrWv/Oxp6.:0:0:root:/home:/bin/sh
nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
derp:heooPbcMgdldo:0:0:ftp user:/mnt:/bin/sh
I only want the identification of the first hash only. The purpose I want root in my router for is to setup a TFTP server to upload a new filesystem to my router and the reflash it into the router. If you could also provide me a method so that I crack the hash after identifying it, that would be great.
|
Similar to a default password list for network appliances, it's conceivable that application layer passwords are default from training materials given to a developer.
In fact, I have discovered applications that have an authentication system largely unchanged from the corresponding SDK.
Is there a repository of usernames, passwords and even private keys & certificates that are given to users when following an online training, or similar SDK?
|
In my page admins-only section is very responsive, so I have to use both server and client side templating.
Obviously server side templates are stored outside of web-root and routing takes care of loading them. However now I need to GET a bunch of templates for javscript part.
One approach is to put client side templates in web-root, therefore they can be easally grabbed without even touching my frameworks routes. There is not any sensitive information really hidden in thouse templates alone.
But it feels bad to leave them public. The only way to avoid this I could think up is to make a separate route for each template. Make sure admin is logged in and then do "echo file_get_contents('template.twig');"
However hitting DB for each request to log in is slow, and maintaining a bunch of file_get_contents is a nightmare. I'm looking for a good solution. Or simply leave them public? (I am using PHP, Twig and Twig.js)
|
Setup
PC running Wireshark, connected to the network wireless (if OS variation is an issue, use Wireshark on Linux).
Another device connected, wireless, to the same LAN.
Wireless network uses WPA2 encryption
Question
Using Wireshark on my PC, how do I capture ALL packets, sent and received, by the other device on the LAN?
Example
I want to use Wireshark, running on Debian, to capture all YouTube packets coming and going to and from an Android device on my same network.
|
I need to design a self service portal for renewing, revoking, and unrevoking a certificate and have come up with the following rules*:
Renewal
Certificates have a short term validity and need to renewed quickly, so most renewals will be automatically approved. Zero knowledge proof is sufficient for the CA to issue a renewal.
The CA has the option to require a password after X renewals, or excessive renewals within a short period of time.
Revocation
Only the authorized owner of a certificate can revoke a certificate using a password that was previously assigned
If a certificate is lost, in the possession of another user, then allow "good samaritan" revocation. If that user presents a zero knowledge proof to the revocation service, the CA revokes the certificate
Revocation automatically revokes all certificates with the same public key, (it's possible to renew a key with or without the same public key)
Unrevocation
If the certificate was revoked by the user, and not a "good samaritan", then it can be unrevoked using the same portal username and password that previously revoked it.
"good samaritan" unrevocations will not be permitted.
Question
Are there any other process flows, threats, or risks to this process I should consider for these three aspects of certificate management as described above?
*Note: This is not for an X509-based system, different crypto primitives and features apply; though some concepts are probably transferrable
|
Boxcryptor https://www.boxcryptor.com is not Open Source. Can I trust this? Is it secure? No government backdoor?
Because there is no alternative for OS X and iOS.
|
I have a website that has an smtp server open on port 25. There is no outbound functionality on the smtp server. We just parse attachments from our users, then 'queue' the email in a dummy queue. So essentially we drop the email after parsing it.
I've been noticing some weird traffic in the logs lately. Basically, I'm getting a bunch of intermittent requests to send email to a specific recipient, call it john@blah.com. The from address will be some random name, with the domain being the same domain as my websites url. So, things like joe@mysite.com, jim@mysite.com, kenny@mysite.com, etc.
I looked at the actual data that they are trying to send, and it's just a line of garbled crap like, 'xdf dznfsdf vsswu lfndfg qsdf'. Same thing with the subject line, just a line of garbled crap.
Also note that the requests are from different IPs, and if I look them up, I just get random locations like Russia, China, Australia, Qutar.
So, I'm trying to figure out the intention of the person doing this. I thought maybe they were trying to use me as a relay to send spam, and that would have made sense if there was actually a spam message in the email body, rather than just a line of random chars.
I also thought that maybe they're to find email addresses from people in my company, which would explain why the sender is somename@mysite.com. The only thing is, it doesn't look like they're using a true dictionary of names. It seems to be a small subset of the same names (like maybe 10-15 different ones being sent in no particular order)
Anyone have an idea what they may be up to?
|
I have used Burp Suite Penetration testing tool in my computer to intercept requests.Assume that I am using Smart Phone. So Is it possible to intercept my smart phone requests into my computer?
|
Egor Homakov made a nice writeup (Cookie Bomb or let's break the Internet) on how to crash CDNs and other websites with cookies.
Although this is a user/browser-side DOS, I'm wondering how one would stop this on the server-side.
|
Is there any way other than Meterpreter to pivot into the network? If yes, then please guide.
I already know about Meterpreter, just want to know manual methods other than this.
|
I encountered a data storage service with rather weird access policies. There're "folders" with "files" and each "folder" can have either of the following permissions:
anyone in the world can enumerate and read the files
anyone in the world can read the files (knowing their names in advance or guessing the names)
a valid access token is required to read a file
Those access tokens are generated using a procedure that is only available to registered, logged in and authorized users only - those can cause a token generation and get a link (with an access token) that they can send or publish to anyone and then anyone can use that link to access an individual file for some period of time and after that time the token expires and those random people can longer access the file unless they obtain a new link with a fresh token.
The anomaly I see is that when a "folder" has "anyone can read the files" permission set then anyone can access any file using an URL like
https://storage.example.com/files/specific_file.jpg
but if he uses a link with an expired token like
https://storage.example.com/files/specific_file.jpg?accessToken=someExpiredToken
then he cannot access the file. This doesn't make much sense, does it? If I can open the door without a key it means the key doesn't matter so I can just as well use any key.
Are there any use cases in which the model described above (access granted without key but denied with a wrong key) does make sense?
|
Truth or bald-faced lie: the cheap $50 router you can pick up at your local electronics store for your home broadband Internet connection is actually a pretty effective firewall. Why or why not?
How does Network Address Translation (NAT) increase firewall effectiveness?
|
Given a specific SSL/TLS connection, I would like to know what is the proper way to launch a parameter renegotiation, asked from client side.
Are they any requirements from the previous handshake in the parameters established?
What is the exact structure of the first message sent by the client asking for the renegotiation?
What are the next messages exchanged then by the server and the client. If they are different from an usual handshake, in what way?
Thank you in advance for your answers
Additional questions after Thomas Pornin answer :
A. Regarding the RFC 5746
I now understand a bit better how it works, however I still don't catch why renegotiating parameters are an issue when a MITM launches it, according to your link rfc5746#section-1. What interests has a MITM to ask for a renegotiation, since he won't know by any way the secrets exchanged, (in particular the pre-master secret [PMS] sent during the ClientKeyExchanged).
Once the renegotiation is done, the MITM has no way to decrypt the incoming messages sent from the client/server.
I see only 2 possibilities during the renegotiation for exchanging the PMS :
either the MITM provides his certificate to the client, so that the client encrypt the PMS with the MITM certificate. In that case, the client easily detects it, since it's not the certificate he is waiting for ;
either the MITM forwards the server certificate, but in that case the MITM won't have any way to decrypt it, and decrypt the following exchanged messages, since he won't have recovered the PMS.
So where is the security issue allowing some renegotiation by the protocol ?
B. Regarding the structure
You underlined that there was no defined and precise structure given by the RFC. How did OpenSSL team figured this out then? What structure did they choose?
|
Let's take a chat system, where any user can create a channel with a password protection. Thus, other users may only join using the channel password.
This password is therefore known to every person inside the channel.
Should this password be hashed in the database? This would mean that the application is not able to show the password (e.g., if one user forgot it).
Personally, I don't see a reason why the password should be hashed, because when setting the password, it's absolutely clear that other people will need to know it.
|
When I try to visit some websites with HTTPS , I get the error that the
SSL is self-signed and that the SSL is only valid for another domain, and that SSL is actually invalid.
If the SSL is valid only for other domains(Error code: ssl_error_bad_cert_domain) what should I do? Stay to Http or go Https. Also can you explain my what is actually happening when I get that error.
Also when a certificate is only self-singed (Error code: sec_error_untrusted_issuer), I prefer HTTPS over HTTP, is what am I doing better?
|
Just trying to get some general sense about the security on internet now-a-days.
There are so many websites I go and comment on different things. If some comments are political and they don't like, I am afraid, they will trace me back.
So just wanted to know few basic things
Is it possible for any website (example-www.cnn.com) to trace me
back based on my comment in their website. (If I have used a fake
email id)
Is it possible that my ISP can trace me if they want?
Whats the best way I can browse and post my opinions fearlessly. I mean using proxy, vpn all those things.
If someone can put some light on these concerns, i would be very obliged.
|
If you use a client like mutt to access your mail, you probably know that it doesn't support 2-factor authentication. It still prompts only for a password - either your account password or, in the case of Gmail, possibly your application-specific Gmail password.
My concern is that attackers can work around Gmail's 2-factor authentication by logging in through a client like mutt. While we can set application-specific passwords, we can't do that for every single client that exists, right? And yes, if someone has one's password, then the game is already over; but 2-factor is supposed to be an additional line of defense, and this appears to undermine that additional defense.
Is this a real threat? What is the recommended way of dealing with it?
|
What are the operations made by malware to hook the auto start extensibility points in order to be able to run at the startup of the computer that runs Windows operation system ?
|
I've been a developer for quite some time, and as part of my on-going learning process I've learnt how to spot and remedy broken (and insecure) code written by others. Recently, I've found myself digging through random projects, and noteing down security issues that I've spotted, ranging from XSS, to SQLI, insecure up-loaders to full blown arbitrary command execution issues, and I've found myself wanting to be a bit more organised.
In my occupation, we make heavy use of Jira, and other such organisational tools, but I can't help but think Jira is not only a bit TOO feature-ful for what I want to keep track of. Information I'd want to track would be along the lines of 'Target Identification->Vulnerability Definition->CVE Assignment->Resolution/Disclosure tracking'.
Are there any open source projects out there that you - as security researchers - use to keep track of your discovered vulnerabilities, and their progress through their discovery/disclosure life time? Is there a gap in the 'market' here - could the sector benefit from a tool made to make the life of the security researcher easier?
Looking forward to any opinions you all want to throw about..
|
Preferably with a vanilla Linux kernel i.e. not using SELinux or grsecurity?
Lately there has been a case of in-the-wild UNIX server malware:
https://www.virusbtn.com/virusbulletin/archive/2014/07/vb201407-Mayhem
that takes advantage of LD_PRELOAD to implement a hidden userspace trojan. I'm thinking it would be good to bar limited users from messing with shared library paths, if possible.
(I would go further, e.g. grsecurity/trusted path execution, but that is not practical at the moment.)
Is there any way I could reliably do this?
Edit: what I meant above is that, normally, any user can use LD_PRELOAD to inject any library into any executable that they can run, and that is not setuid or setgid. This is a known mechanism for creating hidden, persistent malware. Is there any way I can prevent a given user from using LD_PRELOAD at all?
|
I am looking for some opinions on using free AV for meet PCI requirement 5. The way I read this for version 2.0 is that it's entirely possible for a client to meet their AV needs with the modern free versions.
With the expansions 3.0 it appears that sites will need a full blown AV product unless there is a product out there which has the policy controls ( I don't know of any free ones).
Anyone have clients running free AV and meet this for 2.0 or 3.0?
|
I am writing a User Management system that has to include a change of password utility. We don't front end hash passwords (hopefully we will soon). As a result passwords are passed over https in the clear whenever a user is edited or his password is changed. Is there any difference in using "PUT" vs. "POST" requests in this use case. I would typically use "PUT" because it is a replacement/edit but I know for authentication the standard is "POST"
|
You could imagine a web app that serves subtly different versions of a page to each user. For example, it might encode the identity of the user in the images it serves. This would be a per-user watermark. On a private site, the consequence would be that if any image were leaked, it would be possible to identify the leaker from the watermark.
More sinisterly, the watermarks could be added using steganography, so the variants appear the same to the naked eye. Users would not be aware of the watermarks, and it could only be detected if two users collaborated to compare downloads (their files would have different hash sums).
Is there a name for this idea? Has anything been written about its feasibility or implications? Are there any examples of software that does it?
Edit: My example discussed images, but text documents could also be watermarked, perhaps by inserting invisible zero-width characters. With that method, the watermark would be lost if the document were printed and scanned. However, another steganographic algorithm might hide information in spelling mistakes, or by replacing words with synonyms. That kind of watermark would survive being printed and scanned, or even being transcribed by hand.
|
I know that AES-GCM mode does not need padding, and its output are exactly the length of input data plus the tagging. But I am a little bit lost, as AES itself is block cipher, it could only operate on input of multiple of its block size, than when the input is not exactly multiple of its block size, what kind of data is added to fulfill AES's block requirement? I could not find any information regarding this.
|
Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) is one of the newest encryption schemes to challenge RSA cryptography. What problem does ECC seek to fix compared to RSA? Would you have any qualms with using ECC to encrypt sensitive material?
|
I'm writing a small protocol that relies on a DH handshake, generation of a shared secret, and subsequent AES encryption/decryption using that generated secret. I want to add a built-in test message after the handshake to ensure both clients are able to communicate properly (in addition to a CRC). Is building a small "TEST123" -encrypt-> ciphertext -decrypt-> "TEST123" into the protocol a security vulnerability, since someone now knows the ciphertext for some given plaintext?
|
I don't have the ability to determine/recover the master password for a production system that uses zip 2 archives. However, I need to be able to add new files to existing encrypted archives. There are various tools out there that can 'break' the zip 2.0 encryption with a known-plaintext attack, which allows recovery of the contents. However, I am not interested in recovering the contents.
Since these tools recover key's 0-2 (3x 4-byte key triplet) per the zip 2.0 appnote (scroll to nearly the very end), in theory would it then be possible for those tools (or a modified open source zip utility that can write encrypted zip 2.0 archives) to initialize the keyset with the known-to-decrypt key triplet, generate a 12-byte 'random', and then use these values to add additional files to the existing archive?
The goal, in layman's terms, is to add 06_14.dat, 07_14.dat, 08_14.dat, etc. to a backup file that the backend system can read.
Note that simply adding unencrypted files won't suffice - the system uses a hardware token for the encryption/decryption key (which is why I can't possibly recover it) AND it tries to decrypt each file individually using the logic: 1) lists archive; 2) sorts by the above names where the first 2 digits represent the month 01-12 and the second 2 digits represent the year for 1997-2014; 3) and then tries to extract the NEWEST file first - bail upon first decryption failure. If the current file that it wants to decrypt/decompress, matching the ##_##.dat signature, isn't encrypted then it bails too.
More specifics of the system shouldn't be necessary, but the reason this issue has occurred is because our front-end system that shared the symmetric key (and auto-appended the .dat files for us) has passed on to the otherworld where obsolete hardware goes once it malfunctions.
I'm open to possible solutions to the problem, but just a lively discussion on whether this is feasible/practical/etc. is more than enough - I'll build the solution if this line of reasoning appears possible.
|
For the second time in 8 weeks, one of my American Express (AMEX) card numbers was stolen. I do use the card online, but only at reputable (and SSL/TLS enabled sites). I use it in the real world, too, although nowhere shady. While AMEX's fraud prevention is good and they detected the attempted fraudulent usage, it's quite a hassle when they have to issue a new card. I've got several things set up to auto-pay, so I have remember all of them, log into their sites, and update my payment info.
I know that chip-and-pin cards are finally coming to the US in the next year or two. But i the meantime, what can I do to protect my credit card number better while still being able to use it? For online transactions, I wish I could set up one-time numbers, but AMEX no longer offers that service. Anything else I can do?
|
A company whose services I'm trying to integrate uses this protocol:
An AES key is embedded in an Android library.
To authenticate itself, the library sends a SHA1 hash of the key over plain HTTP.
The response contains an RSA public key encrypted using the same AES key.
A temporary AES key is generated on the client.
The temporary AES key and the sensitive data are encrypted with the RSA key and sent over plain HTTP.
Their excuse for not using HTTPS is that they believe they'd have to pay for a signed certificate on every mobile device they support rather than just on their server. They also believe that HTTPS adds too much network overhead for use on mobile devices. Oh, and their system is "more secure than HTTPS" because they're using longer AES keys. Did I mention this is being used for credit card processing?
I'm trying to convince them that this is utterly insane. Can anyone point me to a clear, concise explanation that's intelligible to PHBs? (Or which I could bring to the unemployment hearing if I get fired for rocking the boat?)
|
We run scraping jobs on behalf of users. We use webkit-gtk as browser to do the scraping. Each job is executed as a separate process
So as not to mix user data we have isolated following data per user.
Cookies
Flash cookies
Cache files
HTML 5 storage
Do I need to worry about any other types of files that normal browser sesson will save? The "browser" does not have any other plugins apart from flash. Browser does not save any password and auto form fill is disabled.
|
As a part of work, I've come across content sniffing, and i understand web apps can be vulnerable to xss because of it. There is another post, regarding content sniffing and xss, but didnt quite answer my question, or maybe i just misread it. content sniffing will read the file to try and determine what type of file it is. If there are malicious html tags, they may be rendered.
So say i go to www.xyz.com, it loads, (using chrome for this example), i right click --> view page source, copy the page source into an html file, save on my desktop, added a xss line within the page. I reload in chrome and page loads with the typical alert box. Now, because the modified html was loaded from my desktop, is this not a xss vulnerability on the website's end?
|
I find it hard to believe that the majority of Windows system files aren't signed. I don't know whether my disbelief comes from naivety, or because Windows is used within secure environments worldwide and thus one would expect a certain level of care. (Does signing files show care? Probably not.)
But I imagine this lack of signing is the reason why the revocation status of signed runtime binaries aren't checked. Thus, one could have a signed binary which has been specifically revoked for whatever reason, and Windows doesn't care and will let it run. I have tried to enhance this functionality by using AppLocker.
From the website, Microsoft state (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee619725(v=ws.10).aspx):
However, if a certificate was allowed and then revoked, there is a 24-hour period before the revocation takes effect.
Whether this statement refers to "allowing" and then "disallowing" an app using AppLocker certificate rules, or the actual revocation status of the AppLocker binary, I'm not sure but I certainly can't get it working.
This commentary leads me to the question: Shouldn't all vital system files be signed and their CRLs checked before execution (along with specified business app binaries)? Are there software products which will enforce these kind of policies?
|
I want to design and implement an epayments system (I will not be handling credit card payments). The system will have a RESTful API. I am already familiar with RESTful servies, and have built a few in my time.
However, this time round, security is of paramount importance and I want a system that is as robust against external attacks, as anything out there (e.g. Paypal).
The way I see it, there are two points of attack:
The physical machines (servers) and the network they reside on
Attacks via the exposed RESTful API (man in the middle attacks, snooping etc).
Paypal, which is a model of what I want to replicate, provides a RESTful API, using OAuth etc, so I know it is possible to provide a secure RESTFul API to sensitive data.
So my question basically decomposes into the following two questions:
A. What technologies/practises are employed by companies such as Paypal, to ensure that their machines are not hacked or compromised?
B. Is OAuth the way to go to present a secure interface to the world? - or can this be improved?
|
We have application which will be in iframe. Partner sites can use our application - put iframe in their sites.
Partner site has users with money, who will use our application in iframe to buy items. Iframe needs communicate with partner site.
For example user buys item. Our app creates a record about sold item in database.
Then it sends request to partner app - so the partner would know that his user bought an item, and could reduce his money in the account.
User does not have to login to our app, it only has to login to partner application - parent site and use our iframe as logged in.
How is this done in secure way? I know there is site which does that without visible tokens in ajax requests, so there is probably some session in the child app. Session, not requiring username and password.
I would like to get some tutorials with schema. Tried to search but not even sure how to make keywords for such question.
Update
What about this, are you seeing what could be potentially insecure? :
When partner page is loaded, there is iframe and in get parameter token is passed to iframe, like <iframe src='www.shop.com?token=12345'><iframe>
Iframe on load in server side - requests new token from the partner site passing as parameter the token which is in url as $_GET parameter.
That way the token in the iframe url get parameter becomes invalid, so even when user see it, he cannot do anything.
New token which is received in iframes server is saved in session.
So now from client side - when client buys and item in iframe, he does not need to pass token in request, because it is in session.
Iframe server when receives request, does buy item and send request to partner server info about buying item, so the partner could reduce the money. In this request token is is passed to partner server from session.
Partner server recognizes the user by token and reduces his money in the account.
|
Firstly, I welcome a better title for this question. I admit I'm a security novice.
I'm trying to determine whether I have malware and what that malware may be doing. Using Wireshark, I see several suspicious streams, including addresses ending in .ln and .ch that send all data encrypted. When I run whois it always times out, unless I specify explicitly the whois server to use (this is itself suspicious to me), so I've resorted to using an online client at http://whois.domaintools.com/.
One stream that is more consistently present goes to lga15s42-in-f21.1e100.net, every few seconds, and is sending over TLSv1.2. Packets are often of fixed sizes (60, 107, 125) but are sometimes larger and not repeated sizes.
~The whois entry for 1e100.net is particularly suspicious to me.~
Scratch that. I had invalid entry by mistyping the domain. Actual entry is for Google, Inc, which greatly reduces suspicion of this traffic.
Amended question, since the traffic would seem to be going to Google: why is Google sending this info over TLS on a non-standard port? Is that basically the way they should send background queries? It is annoying because to a security novice (or for that matter, not a novice), such traffic adds noise. I would be happier if such queries went over clear-text on standard protocols, as I'm trying to figure out if I've been rooted.
ps. Should have mentioned, the computer in question is a MacBook Air Retina Pro, running OS X 10.9.3.
|
I've been tasked with writing a module for my company to interface with an external API. This API has a syntax similar to SSH where I have to incorporate the user details as well as the host address of the server I'm trying to connect to.
However, I run into the security issue that in order to pass the user details, I need to have them in plaintext. Even worse is the fact that these user details are actually the user details for the machine that the server is running on. Is there a smart way to do accomplish this task without going overboard and using an external login server? I know there have been similar discussions where the conclusion "Don't do it" was reached, but in this case I really have no control over the way the API works.
|
I've been trying to determine if there is malware on my OS X 10.9.3 Mac, that is could be doing keylogging or other forms of non-destructive intrusion.
Given the (not technically based) suspicion I have that my machine was compromised and that the compromise may have survived a complete HD wipe and OS reinstall, I'm wondering what steps I could take to determine if the machine is still compromised. I am not asking for help determining if I am being spied on personally, just trying to determine whether my laptop is secure. Please no comments explaining why it is unlikely that something is happening. I'm asking about technical steps I can take to increase confidence that no one is currently monitoring my laptop.
Steps I've taken so far:
Manually inspected several areas of my disk using basic shell tools. Some files had been overwritten including binaries within specific application directories, and a rogue process that was identified as spyware which I was able to remove, prior to eventually wiping the hard drive and reinstalling OS X (over Air from another machine, since this is a MacBook).
Installed Sophos AntiVirus (many months after OS reinstall). Full HD scan found no threats. Background process scan has yet to alert me of anything.
Wireshark has found several suspicious (to me) network streams sending varying amounts of encrypted packets at regular intervals to several servers, including ones with no DNS entry, a few from *.nl or *.ch TLDs, and some that have turned out to be explained. (A process named SophosWeb is sending encrypted payloads every few seconds, rotating ports in the 5K range, back and forth from a server registered to Google. So, sounds legit...) Wireshark produces a lot of data.
On the last in particular, where the ultimate concern is spying on my activities or data, I don't know how to wade through the noise of frequent traffic between my laptop, the Verizon router, my phone... Some of this looks completely kosher, but then there are things like UPnP exchanges between my Apple laptop and the Verizon router, which are questionably secure at best, and hard to know how to turn off. If I close Chrome I can get traffic down to enough of a trickle to manually investigate each unknown server, but I don't know what to look for.
|
Is it true that when I connect to a site over HTTPS , my mobile service provider or the ISP gets to snoop in the communication? Can they play MITM?
|
I got free certificate from Comodo and installed on my Windows. Now I'm trying to sign PDF document using this certificate, but get message: "signature validity is unknown":
Why is this? How I can validate my signature?
PS. Adove Reader XI Version 11.0.07
|
On the etterfilter(8) man page, there is a section about the inject() function, which takes the contents of a file and injects it in a packet, or as its own packet when coupled with drop():
inject(what)
this function injects the content of the file 'what' after the
packet being processed. It always injects in DATA.data. You can use it
to replace the entire packet with a fake one using the drop() function
right before the inject() command. In that case the filtering engine
will drop the current packet and inject the fake one.
example: inject("./fake_packet")
However, there is no documentation anywhere I have looked to speak to what type of file is expected by this function. (Another user on a BackTrack Linux forum had the same question.)
What type of file does etterfilter's inject() function take? PCAP? Plain text? Another file format?
|
I have a fixed line broadband connection at home. This morning when I tried accessing Google or Facebook through my browser (Google Chrome) I got a webpage asking me to update my flash player. I found this to be a little suspicious since I had accessed Facebook just a little while earlier from the same machine on a different network. My suspicions were confirmed when the similar thing happened when I tried to connect through a different system and my mobile.
When I tried to ping Facebook or Google, the packets are sent to an IP based in Seattle (108.62.62.234). When I tried to trace the route of the packets, I found a shocking thing that the packets were being sent first to my ISP and then were being sent to that IP.
Is someone tampering my connection? What is happening? What needs to be done in future?
|
Following worked on Ubuntu 12.04 using chromium and firefox browsers.
I ran following command on terminal for both firefox and chromium browser
HOME=/tmp/tmpdir firefox
Both browsers promptly created new directories in the given location where tracking cookies and cache files were installed. Even flash cookies were created in new directory.
I can create the script to create a new directory every time.
I am wondering if this technique can sufficient to defeat all or most of the tracking activities. Will browsers and plugins be able to sense the actual home directory and store data in actual directory? Are there any other problems for changing the HOME directory for browser session.
Can this technique also work on mac machines also? I understand because of registry settings this will not work on Windows as registry can not easily changed.
If its this simple then all I have do is create a shell script which can be double clicked to create a new browser session. Am I missing something else?
|
As I understand it, DANE (RFC 6698) is a promising candidate for addressing issues with current TLS Trust Anchors (i.e. Trust Anchors).
My attempt at explaining the issue:
Currently, CAs are universal trust anchors and, as a result, are permitted to issue certificates for any site, regardless of TLD or prior existence of a valid cert. DANE would move these trust anchors to the DNS infrastructure where there would be a strict public key hierarchy (e.g. "*" —> "*.com" —> "*.example.com" etc.).
Tying trust to the DNS entry requires that these be secure (from, say, cache poisoning). The proposed standard attempting to solve this is DNSSEC ([RFC 5155][2]). It also surprises me that the move towards DNSSEC has not been more rapid given that the current issues with DNS appear to be numerous, well-documented, and potentially quite serious.
The conspiracy theorist in me wants to blame the CA business, which has a vested interest in DANE’s failure, but I’m sure there are more rational explanations.
Basically: What, if anything, is hindering progress/adoption of these RFCs?
|
Is it possible to identify the algorithm used for the stream cipher based upon analysis of an encrypted stream?
|
I've heard of tools that could be used to graph entropy of a file. Is there a graphical Linux program that I could use for this job that would let me conveniently explore which blocks of a file have certain entropy patterns that could suggest compressed or encrypted data?
|
If I travel abroad and am concerned that when I land in the foreign country they may try to install a digital keylogger, does this work as a potential solution: If I sign my entire computer's hard disk using for example Keybase's code signing mechanism for directories (I know there are lots of issues here, just bear with me for a second) would this a reasonable method to know that no digital keyloggers or other malicious software are installed? Of course it would not resolve the issue that if (for example) I leave my computer in my hotel room someone may install a physical keylogger or other malicious device in the hardware itself, but I would know for example that none of the data on my computer was tampered with or altered.
Some other issues with this approach are that it would take a long time to compute the signature of literally every file on your computer, and also that in the general scheme of things actually using your computer, the size and contents of files (esp. system files) can change at any time behind the scenes.
|
I'm developing a RESTful API using MongoDB as the backend. The easiest thing to do programmatically would be to simply use MongoDB's _id field in the URI, such as:
https://api.example.com/collection/507c7f79bcf86cd7994f6c0e
I know that the ObjectID is based in part on the creation timestamp. Is there anything else an attacker could gain from knowledge of the ObjectID?
|
Regarding this: http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2014/07/21/exploit-dealer-snowdens-favourite-os-tails-has-zero-day-vulnerabilities-lurking-inside/
Apparently, even the version of Tails released yesterday contains critical 0day vulnerabilities potentially compromising anyone's anonymity, which are sold by Exodus Intelligence.
I am no security expert, only just now starting to take my online privacy seriously, so my main question is: Is using Tails any less secure than carefully building my own privacy-focused stack to boot from USB or use in a VirtualBox, or is a combo of software I choose myself just as likely to contain such vulnerabilities?
Furthermore - is my stack any more secure if I throw in a VPN?
Thanks!
|
Let's say that I sign someone's key and then later decide that was a bad idea - either it was a bad idea at all, or I should have signed it with a different level of trust. Is it possible, both in a theoretical and also in a practical way, to "un-sign" someone else's key?
|
I have a website and it has an audio player to play music files. The music files are hosted in a public directory. Since they are there anyome can point there and use the files on their website.
Is there a way to only allow my webpages to use the audio tracks?
|
I have a small website on which users can upload several types of files: images, zip files ... (except .exe files). Suppose a user uploads via the front end interface of my website a picture which is infected: will this picture be hosted without a problem on mywebsite or are they antiviruses/scanners hosted on the server on which i host mywebsite that check this ?
|
I would like to block websites like Facebook, YouTube and other social sites as part of my job and would need your advice on how to manage that. There are about 120 PCs in the building. Is something like that possible?
Can it be done with the host file, or is there other way?
|
i am trying to login to my yahoo mail, but no avail. i recently discovered after monitoring some traffic that the dumb yahoo server doesn't send a close_notify response but just acts ignorantly and closes the ssl session. i know if i do this i may be vulnerable to truncation attacks, but i will disable it as soon as i import everything i have from yahoo and then delete my yahoo account. i want to bypass the close_notify verification in firefox (or iceweasel as you want to call it). thanks.
i'll also quote a comment that has been made in the pidgin support board. it's down here:
Both GnuTLS and CDSA (Adium's SSL plugin) check whether a TLS
connection has been closed properly by checking if the server sent a
close_notify alert first.
[https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=508698 NSS doesn't]. If
that alert wasn't sent, GnuTLS and CDSA consider it a fatal error,
which for the HTTPS handler means the response is completely
discarded. That's what's happening here with Yahoo: their HTTPS server
closes the connection without sending close_notify first.
The danger of not checking for that alert is that any MitM may cause
a response to be truncated, yet we'd be unable to tell that it is.
Is it really an error condition libpurple should consider fatal? I'm
not entirely sure.
|
I have an android app that connects to a server through HTTP (notice the abscence of S, also android means Java, so nothing I'll hardcode in my app will be unreachable).
I want to store the password securely on my DB, so I wanted to use bcrypt (with password and salt)
My issue is the following : since I'm on HTTP, I don't want to send the plain password to my server.
Since I'm on mobile and 3G is very slow, I don't quite want to send the salt to the phone first so he can send the already hashed password to the server. (two queries instead of one)
Is there a way to make it work other than using the login + a fixed string as a salt ?
Thanks !
|
Recently I got a CAcert Assurance and discovered that I can get my PGP key signed by CAcert key. After I got their signature, CAcert website suggested that I sign their key, too.
Question: CAcert status aside, what are the pros and cons of blindly signing an arbitrary key?
|
is Pentesting now just about running tools like Nessus and creating a report based on it ?
and not actually exploiting anything on your own based on the Agreement ?
|
I am trying to find out why this process appeared during 2 boot occasions. Autoruns does not show it anywhere. It appeared when I uninstalled google chrome and malwarebytes.
The prefetch file for makecab.exe (makecab is an official microsoft process) showed it was created yesterday, and modified today (it ran once today and yesterday very briefly - no more than 10 seconds at boot.
I've uninstalled the 2 programs before at the same time in the past multiple times, and have never seen this pb.exerocess.
However, usually I delete EVERY file associated with those programs including registry when I did uninstall them.
Is there any reason why makecab.exe would run? I've used process explorer, but the process starts and ends too quickly for me to see what starts it. However, its only twice I've seen it appear, and thats after uninstalling chrome and mbam, both times I did not have process explorer ready.
Should I be worried about this? Or has it a legit reason for running?
I've noticed it begins around the same time as the windows module installer (comparing prefetch file to event viewer).
I haven't added any programs; I only saw this after uninstalling these programs, but as I said I usually delete the files manually. I've uploaded the versions of makecab onto virustotal and they're all clean.
I couldn't find anything in the registry other than a value which listed various system processes, however exporting it as a text file shows it hasn't been edited for years.
How can I find out what is starting it? I've rebooted various times with process explorer and nothing happened, I installed malwarebytes to scan, I did a full scan and found nothing, and installed chrome again. After the scan, I uninstalled the 2, and then while NOT using process explorer, but the normal task manager, I saw it again after I rebooted.
Is there a way I can make process explorer extend the time it shows killed processes?
|
I would like to get the browsing history of a computer in my network (without running that web browser), is it possible?
|
In any major server-side web framework, there is usually a mechanism to read HTML form input, e.g. in ASP, for an HTML element, <input type="text" name="the_field" />, it is Request.Form("the_field"), where Request.Form is a dictionary-type object where the values are parsed from the POST data into key/value pairs.
There are also various recommendations for only keeping passwords in memory for minimal time, up to and including using a mutable character array instead of an immutable string, pinning it so it cannot be paged or copied, and zeroing each array element when done (or using something like .NET's SecureString, which does the same).
Given these, what mechanisms might exist for telling the web server that it needs to treat the posted form data as secure, and to do the pinning/clearing for, say, an HTML <input type="password" /> field?
One might reasonably expect the browser to go the extra mile for password fields (although I expect they don't), because they can infer from the markup that such protections are necessary.
The transport layer is covered by HTTPS, and is not in question.
But nothing I have seen provides the web server with the semantics of post data, so it can choose to apply in-memory protections.
I've had a couple of ideas how such a thing might be handled in a web server if designed by scratch (note that I am not designing a web server from scratch!):
Apply in-memory protections to all requests: This seems like it might be the most straight-forward, but may negatively impact performance for pages that are not strictly sensitive but are served under SSL (e.g. all-SSL sites or 'My Account' pages that don't have 'New Password' fields). Might be configurable at an 'all requests' / 'HTTPS only'
Standardise an HTTP header that defines the fields to be protected: Mitigates the all-SSL issue, but would provide an obvious starting point for inspection (although I'm sure txtUser=foo&txtPassword=bar is already a good-enough indicator). Would take x years for the W3C to agree on a standard, and another y years for browsers to implement it.
Register secure post fields in server config (or through language integration): The server's request stream parser would be responsible for reading each post key, checking against the internal list and apply in-memory protections to the subsequent post value. Maybe even excluding it from the normal Request.Form in lieu of a Request.Passwords object with a fit-for-purpose data structure, or substituing the Request.Form value with an object reference to the SecureString.
So are there any web servers that already do this (or something like it), or allow you low-enough level access to implement these protections manually? I thought maybe IIS7's integrated pipeline, but I can't see an event that runs early enough.
Are such protections even necessary, or is this just a solution looking for a problem? If so, what makes this unnecessary where a desktop app's in-memory password handling is not?
|
I use pass to manage my passwords and sync this manually to a private git repo in the cloud.
I believe this is safe because the repo is not public and, more importantly, the data is GPG encrypted.
Am I at risk doing this?
|
Lets assume I want to give my hypothetic 10mio users userbase a good feedback on their password strength. Besides the classical entropy tests and top500 list of bad passwords, I might want it to be based on "there are already more than N users with the same password" (for N maybe 100).
So aside of the state-of-the-art multiround salted hashed password stuff I naively store a big table with password:counter pairs (and maintain it through password changes) and tell the user his password is bad when that counter reaches N. Now of course this defeats my good password hash management: whoever gets that table has all the possible passwords and can just try them trivially. I could hash them, which would just add some time factor far too small to be secure.
So how can I (if at all) maintain any statistics that will allow me to have these counters (or something similar enough with not too many false positives) without the statistics data being more of a security risk when exposed than the table of password hashes?
|
Starting around 3 weeks ago, my site started getting a lot of strange and recurring http requests from my users.
I'm familiar with malicious scans which happen on a daily basis, but these requests seems to be different, and I believe its some browser, extension or javascript malfunction somewhere, rather than anything malicious.
Heres a small sample of the request from one user (although it affects various user agents and users)
[22/Jul/2014:20:57:49 +0100] "GET /groups/%60%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:20:58:11 +0100] "GET /members/%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5176 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:20:58:45 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5345 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:20:59:18 +0100] "GET /groups/%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:20:59:41 +0100] "GET /groups/%EF%BF%BDi%19%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:00:06 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BDg%19%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5008 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:00:30 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BDc%19%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 4991 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:01:35 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5167 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:03:08 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5129 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:04:35 +0100] "GET /groups/%EF%BF%BDj%19%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:05:21 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BDf%19%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5271 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:07:01 +0100] "GET /groups/%EF%BF%BDc%19%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:12:44 +0100] "GET /P%EF%BF%BD%16%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5161 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:13:04 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BDO%0F%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5328 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:13:52 +0100] "GET /groups/0%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:14:14 +0100] "GET /groups/%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:14:34 +0100] "GET /@%EF%BF%BD%16%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5347 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:15:04 +0100] "GET /@%EF%BF%BD%16%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 4942 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:15:11 +0100] "GET /groups/%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 723 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[22/Jul/2014:21:16:05 +0100] "GET /p%EF%BF%BD%18%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 5020 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
[23/Jul/2014:01:11:58 +0100] "GET /%EF%BF%BD%07%1B%01?o=3&g=&s=&z=\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-\x//\x,/\x,-X? HTTP/1.1" 404 4877 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko" "-"
Ive studied it in detail but drawing a blank.
Heres what Ive concluded so far...
Most of these requests are coming from long term users who are logged into my site, and they all started sending them around the same time
I started logging the request method, and they are all standard http rather a malfunctioning XMLHttp call
I isolated a few users who seem to send them frequently, and started logging captured the HTML of the page I was sending them prior.
I'm fairly confident there is nothing at all in my HTML which could be prompting their browser to generate these requests. My site and database are fully utf-8.
Im also confident my site has not been compromised and I do not serve scripts or ads from third parties, other than Google Analytics.
They always contain %EF%BF%BD which is the encoded version of the hex representation (EF BF BD) of the bytes of the UTF-8 replacement character
The requests always contain GET params o, g, s, z
It doesnt happen for all users, and I cannot reproduce on a variety of Windows, Mac or Mobile browsers.
For certain users, as the user is browsing around my site, around 40% of the time it is followed up by one or more of these requests (which accesses the same directory as their previous valid request)
I'd love some help on this, maybe someone will look at the params and recognise what could be causing it
The possible explanations i can think of are:
Some jquery regression (yet they aren't ajax requests)
Some regression with google maps (cannot reproduce)
Maybe a popular browser extension which has suddenly started going haywire
|
I am from Australia and I use a iPhone 4.
Today, a young guy asked to borrow my phone, since he was out of credit and since I was trying to be a good samaritan, let him borrow my phone (also we were at a well surveillance area). He told me that he was meeting his friend and he just arrived. Did not think much of it at the time, and I was with another girlfriend so we just kept talking whilst he borrowed my phone.
He was only using it for about a minute or two but after we walked away, I decided to check my call log, and saw that he dialled two numbers. Getting abit suspicious, because It didn't seem like was looking at his phone to find the contacts but more like he remembered the numbers in his head.
So I come home, accidentally (honestly) pocket dialled one of the two numbers for about two rings until I pressed the end call button. 20 minutes later, my phone rings saying "NO CALLER ID" and i pick up because I was pretty sure it was one of the two numbers. He asked me who it was, and I asked if it was the guy that borrowed my phone and he said yes it was, In which i replied , with an apology and that i accidentally pocket dialled him. then I think he thanked me for borrowing my phone and then asked me to coffee in which I replied with a no and we hung up.
I am suspicious because when he borrowed my phone, he said he was calling a friend, but it was him on the line when he called me back. Also I then checked my call logs more closely both the numbers dialled says "canceled" next to them, which means the calls didn't go through, because if it went through it would have said how long the duration of the call went on for.
So should I be paranoid? or is it just some guy thats a bit weird and wanted my number without having to ask for it? Also what I should do if my phone is being tapped/tracked/monitored/spied on. thanks.
|
Looking for any open and dynamic list(blacklist) of
adult,dangerous,+18,sucide,drugs etc web resources
to filter it in intranet for children security in internet
|
In Chrome, every tab is its own process. Yet, logging in to a site, say, Facebook, persists across tabs. For that matter, in many cases, it persists across OS reboots. This seems inherently very very insecure, but I'm just wondering, how is Chrome implementing this? The reboot thing in particular means it is storing something like a session token even after the process is terminated, which allows seamlessly reconnecting, already authenticated, with secure sites.
|
I first tried to log in this morning and our password was changed on our ubuntu server.
I contacted our server support and they told me that I had just been fat fingering the password.
I thought it was fishy, I am not the type of person to mistype a password and blame the IT guy.
I looked at the history file and sure enough the password was changed but not by me.
I called our server support out and they said that they were just verifying the password. makes no sense.
Now there are 10 lines in the history file that has been deleted.
I smell something fishy, I now can't sftp in, but I still have an active session through SSH.
Is there a log file that can tell me who edited a file and when.
Is there any other log files that can help me catch this person and find out for sure what is going on.
This is our production server and it makes me nervous having someone running a without us asking. As of right now I can't prove anything strange is going on, but I know there is.
Thank you in advance.
|
A paper on web tracking mechanisms identifies the web-tracking company AddThis as a major user of canvas fingerprinting.
Are IE:s Tracking Protection, provided Tracking Protection Lists including AddThis entries, able to prevent user identification by AddThis using canvas fingerprinting?
|
Is there any difference between the technique or algorithm used from Nmap to guess the OS between the option -A and -O? If not, why -O option requires root privileges but -A that it is doing at least the same (and even more) does not require special privileges?
|
I'm wondering how large companies with tens / hundred of applications are handling access-rights for their users. From what I've seen, it's a nightmare that never ends, and it requires full-time resources for a poor result.
I'm not looking for specific examples of IAM solutions, but more generally, what are the different options for doing that, from defining the roles and accesses to implementing, modifying and reviewing the privileges on the systems.
Also, are home-made solutions with connectors to all the applications used in the real world, or would that just be another pain in the neck to develop and maintain ?
|
I have a lot of experience with software as a developer, and am trying to move from newbie to more informed about present-day security. Everything I uncover makes me feel that personal computers have become horribly horribly insecure, while most consumers (like me) have grown complacent because the old days of constant system crashes, pop-ups, destructive malware, etc. have seemingly gone away. My system never crashes, ever. I never see pop-ups. I block annoying spam and ads. I have never seen a virus scanner find anything (Mac past 3 years; Linux for several years before that; Windows at work managed by IT team).
I am not implying these things represent rock-solid security, just saying, they have made most people believe their systems are more secure when in fact, they seem less secure than they've ever been, with more dangerous threats. Am I wrong in this assessment?
|
I have used LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon) earlier .
Today i was reading on wikipedia that there are many types of dos attacks , namely SYN attacks , HTTP flooding ,UDP flooding ,etc and two questions striked my mind .
1)I want to know which type of attack can LOIC do ?
2)Can anyone list the examples of dos attacks in different osi layers ?
|
I'm working on an app that is planned to be licensed to OEMs, who would in turn offer it as a service to their users. We would host the app server and the OEM would optionally host the app's web client. Because of this we want the option for OEMs to allow users to authenticate through the OEM, using their existing credentials, without requiring that they make an account specifically for the app.
I have one idea for how to accomplish this, but I feel like there should be a better way. In brief, the client sends an authorization token to the app server on behalf of the user, identifying them and the OEM they've authenticated with. In slightly more detail:
Upon obtaining a license for the app, our server and the OEM server negotiate a shared secret string. (I'm not sure yet if the shared secret should be dictated by us, or chosen by the OEM with a minimum length requirement.) When a user who has already authenticated with the OEM first loads the app, the client sends an AJAX request to the OEM server asking for an authentication ticket, and then passes it on to the app server with a POST request. This ticket has the parameters
userID, oemID, timestamp, token, digest
where oemID is a string representing the OEM in question, token is a random value generated by the OEM server, and digest is the base64 string encoding of
HMAC( sharedSecret, userID"|"oemID"|"timestamp"|"token )
The app server checks the timestamp to see that the ticket is still valid, then gets the corresponding shared secret for the given oemID and uses it to hash its own digest. It then hashes both digests again and compares them to each other. If they both match, the app server concedes that the request came from an authenticated user in the OEM's client, and sends a session cookie to the user's browser and stores userID and oemID in the session store. to uniquely identify future requests from that user. (We can assume userID to be unique from a given OEM, but not universally, hence using both.) This entire interaction (and all activity in the app) takes place over HTTPS.
Mostly I'm concerned that this system feels kind of hackish, but that might just be because most of my prior experience with authentication systems has involved plain old login pages, or made use of libraries that abstracted away essentially all of the work. Is this scheme essentially viable, or are there any clear problems or areas for improvement? Is checking the ticket digest enough to trust the initialization message? Does it actually make sense to implicitly trust the OEM server, or is there some motive and means for them to undermine the authentication process in a way that would affect more than their own users? Mostly, does it leave out anything glaring?
|
SSL certificates, generally speaking, use a "chain of trust" model - a trusted certificate authority (CA) gets proof that a company such as Amazon owns amazon.com and issues an SSL certificate.
However, certs can be expensive - and it doesn't make sense to spend that kind of money for example on a personal website. But more and more people have been arguing that web traffic should always be encrypted because computers can handle it and it protects you over public wifi networks e.g. starbucks. So you can use SSL with a "self signed" certificate but users will get a nasty message saying that the certificate is not trusted since it is "self signed" and not by a "trusted" authority. The problem is that there have been numerous cases of the "trusted" authorities making mistakes and giving SSL certs to "bad guys" so to speak. But in reality, a self-signed cert is not significantly less secure than a cert signed by a CA - in the sense that your traffic is encrypted and sent to the web server and decrypted there. It just means that no one "trusted" checked the identity of the webserver in question.
Is there a way to do a "web of trust" model with SSL certificates similar to PGP keys? I.e. if I know someone personally and know that they are the administrator of website www.example.com, and they have a self-signed certificate, I can "sign" the certificate to say that I trust them. Then when users go to a self-signed website it will say that the person can be trusted based on their place in the 'web of trust'.
|
In addition to the fact that encryption systems like PGP are notoriously difficult to use, and that encryption doesn't always jive with cloud-based services like webmail, the fact is that most people don't believe that they have secrets that they want to keep from others, or from the government, which would make encryption necessary. How would you explain to a person who is not into security & encryption "for its own sake" (and who isn't totally paranoid) why they would want to have encryption & digital signing in their toolkit of things they can do with their computer?
|
In Europe most cards use a chip+pin system to secure the card information. You put the card in te machine and enter a PIN number to decrypt the card information which is stored on the chip. Theoretically this is more secure as the credit card number alone is not enough to make transactions: you still need the PIN.
How does this work swirly when you want to set up a recurring transaction eg. your phone bill? I presume that you do not give your pin to the phone company.
|
I have recently gotten a prompt from my anti virus stating that there was an intrusion with an OS attack as describe in the link below:
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=20443
It seems that it isn't the first time occurring and it happens sometimes when I use my mobile 3G stick to connect myself to the Internet.
I am quite worried if there were to be any compromise and I do not really understand what the page in the link was saying.
Could someone help me out and let me know what should I do?
Note: I am running windows 7 32bit.
|
I have a file that's nearly 200Mb. It was reportedly packed/encrypted with Kruptos 2. But it has a .~enc extension. The header of the file is pure gibberish. Running file says it's data running mimetype says it's an application/octet-stream. The only thing that looks like a way to identify the file is at the end of the file. It looks like it may be a checksum. Here's what I gathered from the hex editor at the end of the file.
786D4532D08A6A06F14D78EA11C648AC6615C025727D1294AA08F43862CBE529©9AA799BC68761F45F3360FEE03D88665©none©F75C7BCC8FB7E449636AE9E3CB81BC8018FCBF307DE1A881765C0A1CBCB65339©193971605©11©3©0©2©32©0© 202©<tkk>
My other hex editor shows the copyright symbols as dots
786D4532D08A6A06F14D78EA11C648AC6615C025727D1294AA08F43862CBE529.9AA799BC68761F45F3360FEE03D88665.none.F75C7BCC8FB7E449636AE9E3CB81BC8018FCBF307DE1A881765C0A1CBCB65339.193971605.11.3.0.2.32.0. 202.<tkk>
Is there a way I can run a decrypt command with trying all the available encryption types using the password I have? Or at least identify how this file was made and what it is?
One odd thing, I ran df -T myfile.~enc and it says ext4 type filesystem. I tried to mount it but that didn't work. So maybe that's just a fluke.
Oh, maybe the file name would be a hint. It's 021405631868CFACCB0C965D0AF04738ABDCB012CEEAC9C583B2A49CDFEE75BE296b.~enc
|
I'm considering the possibility of running an Open Server, as I would call it, that is, a server where as much of its contents are publicly visible as possible. I would like to give read access to everyone for as much content as possible. I'm wondering what content on a linux server, such as an Ubuntu one, with the typical Apache, Mysql, PHP setup, would need to be hidden. I can move the database password to another server and transmit it through an encrypted exchange. I can use an NIS system for the system passwords. Then, I'm not sure what else needs to be hidden. It seems I can allow read access for the entire server that way. Is there anything else that would have to remain hidden?
|
Why don't the commands
gpg2 --armor --sign file.txt
and
gpg2 --clearsign file.txt
have the same output?
Also when I use just --sign I get a bunch of binary gibberish surrounding the message in plaintext, however using the options --armor --sign spits out ASCII text with no plaintext message.
What's going in the background here?
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.