instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
|---|
> Are the results of these two scenarios the same
For $\mathrm{SHAKE256}$, both cases result in exactly the same final internal state.
---
> are there any quirks I should know about?
The [canonical][1] meaning of the inputs to hash and XOF functions should be reflected in a change to their internal states ... |
1. I have $C_1 \oplus C_2$ where $C_1$ = $AES128_k(P_1)$ and $C_2$ = $AES128_k(P_2)$.
2. I know the *`k`*, it is 0 (i.e. 16 bytes of zeros).
3. I know the piece of $P_1$ (7 bytes).
How to restore the plaintexts ($P_1$, $P_2$), knowing all this?
|
Use a block cipher in CBC mode with a public or all-0 key. Twice.
Wrapping the last block into (xor) the first on the second round.
Every block will depend on all previous and all successive blocks. Any corruption in any block will corrupt all the rest.
Will this be a solution to an all-or-nothing transform (A... |
Does using a block cipher in CBC mode *twice* result in an all-or-nothing transform (AONT)? |
Use a block cipher in CBC mode with a public or all-0 key. Twice.
Wrapping the last block into (xor) the first on the second round.
Every block will depend on all previous and all successive blocks. Any corruption in any block will corrupt all the rest.
Will this result in an all-or-nothing transform (AONT)? |
The below is the first pass with the encryption of CBC where key $k$ is public or $0$ and $nb$ is the number of blocks. We keep the IV as random number
\begin{align}
C_1 &= Enc_k(P_1 \oplus IV)\\
C_i &= Enc_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}),\;\; 1 < i \leq nb,
\end{align}
Second encryption pass;
\begin{align}
D_1 &= E... |
I've been sometimes getting this error while interacting with zksync "invalid value.blockHash" and have been unable to find information about it elsewhere. What's curious to me is that it only happens sometimes, not all the time and it also happens with different smart contracts interactin in zksync that belong to diff... |
The below is the first pass with the encryption of CBC where key $k$ is public or $0$ and $nb$ is the number of blocks. We keep the IV as random number
\begin{align}
C_1 &= Enc_k(P_1 \oplus IV)\\
C_i &= Enc_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}),\;\; 1 < i \leq nb,
\end{align}
Second encryption pass;
\begin{align}
D_1 &= E... |
Use a block cipher in CBC mode with a public or all-0 key. Twice.
Wrapping the last block into (xor) the first on the second round.
Every block will depend on all previous and all successive blocks. Any corruption in any block will corrupt all the rest.
Will this result in an All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT)? |
Is the SNI extension signed in TLS 1.3? |
In PHOTON-Beetle Authenticated Encryption algorithm, the state consists of 64 4-bit
elements, which is represented as a (8 × 8) matrix. The Initial Value which consists of Key and Nonce from the specification is $IV \gets N||K$. Can anyone guide me how this 256-bit $IV$ sits on the state matrix?\
For example Key is $... |
How IV value shapes the State Matrix of PHOTON AEAD? |
The below is the first pass with the encryption of CBC where key $k$ is public or $0$ and $nb$ is the number of blocks. We keep the IV as random number
\begin{align}
C_1 &= Enc_k(P_1 \oplus IV)\\
C_i &= Enc_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}),\;\; 1 < i \leq nb,
\end{align}
Second encryption pass;
\begin{align}
D_1 &= E... |
The below is the first pass with the encryption of CBC where key $k$ is public or $0$ and $nb$ is the number of blocks. We keep the IV as random number
\begin{align}
C_1 &= Enc_k(P_1 \oplus IV)\\
C_i &= Enc_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}),\;\; 1 < i \leq nb,
\end{align}
Second encryption pass;
\begin{align}
D_1 &= E... |
The below is the first pass with the encryption of CBC where key $k$ is public or $0$ and $nb$ is the number of blocks. We keep the IV as random number
\begin{align}
C_1 &= Enc_k(P_1 \oplus IV)\\
C_i &= Enc_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}),\;\; 1 < i \leq nb,
\end{align}
Second encryption pass;
\begin{align}
D_1 &= E... |
The below is the first pass with the encryption of CBC where key $k$ is public or $0$ and $nb$ is the number of blocks. We keep the IV as random number
\begin{align}
C_1 &= Enc_k(P_1 \oplus IV)\\
C_i &= Enc_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}),\;\; 1 < i \leq nb,
\end{align}
Second encryption pass;
\begin{align}
D_1 &= E... |
This answer was for the original question:
> What is the simplest conjunctive normal form (CNF) representation of the SHA-256 algorithm?
----
There is none. Conjunctive normal form is for Boolean formulas, which have a single truth value. SHA-256 is not a Boolean formula (SHA-256(x) is not "true" or "false.")... |
I implemented AES algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this? I really want to leave at with random IV. I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and d... |
I implemented AES algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this? I really want to leave at with random IV. I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and d... |
I implemented AES algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this? I really want to leave at with random IV. I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and d... |
I implemented AES algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this? I really want to leave at with random IV. I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and d... |
**Short version:**
Given a hash of a plaintext, a public key, and a ciphertext (but not knowing the original plaintext), is there any way to verify that the ciphertext is the plaintext after being encrypted with the public key?
**Long version:**
I'd like to develop a broker that can pass to a recipient a mes... |
**Short version:**
Given a hash of a plaintext, a public key, and a ciphertext (but not knowing the original plaintext), is there any way to verify that the ciphertext is the plaintext after being encrypted with the public key?
**Long version:**
I'd like to develop a broker that can pass to a recipient a mes... |
Can we use array as the input of a transition/function? Just like:\
```
transition testarr(arr: [u32; 3]) {
}
```
I saw some tutorials that have examples of this but now the Aleo seems not to support this grammar. |
Suppose I have a masked AES encryption $AES(\oplus_i K_i, \oplus_i P_i)=\oplus_i C_i$, and consider the following situations.
- A static key is already expanded and split into shares. How often should I refresh the masks on the round keys (assuming incoming data blocks are freshly masked)?
- Suppose the masked cip... |
> Are the results of these two scenarios the same
For $\mathrm{SHAKE256}$, both cases result in exactly the same final internal state.
---
> are there any quirks I should know about?
The [canonical][1] meaning of the inputs to hash and XOF functions should be reflected in a change to their internal states ... |
I'm new to cryptography, and I'm working on exercises that involve "breaking" PRF schemes which involves writing a poly-time program that distinguishes between two particular programs, the ideal random world and the fake random world. Basically, I need to write a poly-time program that "wins" a distinguishing game by d... |
How to "break" this PRF scheme? |
I'm new to cryptography, and I'm working on exercises that involve "breaking" PRF schemes which involves writing a poly-time program that distinguishes between two particular programs, the ideal random world and the fake random world. Basically, I need to write a poly-time program that "wins" a distinguishing game by d... |
I implemented AES algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this? I really want to leave at with random IV. I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and d... |
I implemented AES128-CBC algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. <br>Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this?<br> I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and display value but in my offi... |
The seed used in the pre-hash of the SHA1 function for P256 parameter generation seems to never have been verified. If a large chunk of randomly generated curves are "weak", this could be a disaster. The seed was not some simple constant like 0 or 1.
https://credelius.com/credelius/?p=97
There are some additional ... |
> I implemented AES128-CBC algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting.
Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this?
I believe that the core problem is "how do I encrypt data in such a way that I can find matching plaintexts with minimal processing?"
Well, the ... |
Suppose I have a masked AES encryption $AES(\oplus_i K_i, \oplus_i P_i)=\oplus_i C_i$, i.e. the key, plaintext, and resulting ciphertext are tuples $K_i$, $P_i$, and $C_i$ that sum to $K$, $P$, and $C$ respectively, and the encryption acts independently on the randomized input shares to the extent possible to produce t... |
Background: there is a conspiracy theory going around that P256 has been backdoored by the NSA. The theory goes is that the NSA found a weakness that applies to a nontrivial fraction of elliptic curves (perhaps one in a thousand, perhaps one in a trillion). So, what the NSA supposedly did is use a published procedure... |
Background: there is a conspiracy theory going around that P256 has been backdoored by the NSA. The theory goes is that the NSA found a weakness that applies to a nontrivial fraction of elliptic curves (perhaps one in a thousand, perhaps one in a trillion). So, what the NSA supposedly did is use a published procedure... |
Background: there is a theory going around that claims that P256 was backdoored by the NSA. The theory goes is that the NSA found a weakness that applies to a nontrivial fraction of elliptic curves (perhaps one in a thousand, perhaps one in a trillion). So, what the NSA supposedly did is use a published procedure to ... |
> I implemented AES128-CBC algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting.
Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this?
I believe that the core problem is "how do I encrypt data in such a way that I can find matching plaintexts with minimal processing?"
Well, the ... |
I've been thinking about ways to improve the security of my data stored and backed up using the "3-2-1" method.
Moreover by using several layers of encryption to encrypt and decrypt a filesystem structure steps by steps.
Consider the following :
```
/root
|____folder1
|____folder2
|____subfolder1
|... |
Would encrypting several layers of a filesystem be a waste? |
Gaussian distribution on lattices generally seems esoteric (at least for me, for now). My question is:
Does Gaussian distribution on a lattice mean to add a Gaussian noise on a single point of a lattice (or its span) or adding Gaussian noise on all points of a lattice?
When we are reading a paper,
- in some ... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $g$ reveals ... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same/similar asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $... |
Bob has constructed a non-linear function $f: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of moderate complexity (i.e., evaluation takes on the order of seconds on a modern computer). Is it possible to share a function $g: \mathbb{R}^n\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ of the same asymptotic complexity with Alice, such that:
(1) $... |
I'm new to cryptography, and I'm working on exercises that involve "breaking" PRF schemes which involves writing a poly-time program that distinguishes between two particular programs, the ideal random world and the fake random world. Basically, I need to write a poly-time program that "wins" a distinguishing game by d... |
I'm new to cryptography, and I'm working on exercises that involve "breaking" PRF schemes which involves writing a poly-time program that distinguishes between two particular programs, the ideal random world and the fake random world. Basically, I need to write a poly-time program that "wins" a distinguishing game by d... |
I want to sign and transmit a short message which happens to contains a few simple hashes. I don't care if an attacker can insert a fake message, as long as this attacker cannot craft the contents of a fake message.
The standard way to do it is of course to hash the message I want want to sign, encrypt it with the p... |
I want to sign and transmit a short message which happens to contains a few simple hashes. I don't care if an attacker can insert a fake message, as long as this attacker cannot craft the contents of a fake message.
The standard way to do it is of course to hash the message I want to sign, encrypt the hash with the ... |
I want to sign and transmit a short message, which contains a few simple hashes. My objective is not to prevent an attacker from inserting a fake message, but to ensure that the attacker cannot define or craft the specific contents of such a fake message.
The conventional method involves creating a signature by firs... |
The seed used in the pre-hash of the SHA1 function for P256 parameter generation (c49d3608 86e70493 6a6678e1 139d26b7 819f7e90) seems to never have been verified. If a large chunk of randomly generated curves are "weak", they could have just iterated random numbers to find this value. The seed was not some simple, smal... |
I'm implementing encryption in my browser extension that will allow users to encrypt their data and then share them with others. And since shared links can be leaked, I want to protect the data as much as possible against brute force attacks.
I'm using PBKDF2 to derive 256 bits:
```javascript
self.crypto.subtle.de... |
Is it better to use PBKDF2 with SHA-512 and 1e6 iterations or SHA-256 and 6e6 iterations? |
In TLS 1.2, when client authentication is carried out, digital signatures are utilized. However, at what point is the specific signature algorithm communicated to the server? It seems to me that the server cannot perform verification without receiving a unique algorithm from the client.
From what I understand, what ... |
The seed used in the pre-hash of the SHA1 function for P256 parameter generation (c49d3608 86e70493 6a6678e1 139d26b7 819f7e90) seems to never have been verified. If a large chunk of randomly generated curves are "weak", they could have just iterated random numbers to find this value. The seed was not some simple, smal... |
> I want to sign and transmit a short message, which contains a few simple hashes. My objective is not to prevent an attacker from inserting a fake message, but to ensure that the attacker cannot define or craft the specific contents of such a fake message.
I will assume that you don't care about the privacy of the ... |
In the Wikipedia page on differential privacy, [the section on $\varepsilon$-differential privacy for the Laplace mechanism][1] says that the Laplace mechanism is specified for some output as $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{A}}(x)=f(x)+ Y$, where $Y = (Y_1, \ldots, Y_n)$ and the $Y_i \sim \mathrm{Lap}(\lambda)$. Here's my quest... |
> I implemented AES128-CBC algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting.
Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this?
I believe that the core problem is "how do I encrypt data in such a way that I can find matching plaintexts with minimal processing?"
Well, the ... |
I implemented AES128-CBC algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. <br>Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this?<br> I wanted to create only field with hashed value for comparing and the other with AES for when needing to encrypt and display value but in my offi... |
The Japanese made efforts and could have broken Navajo code later in the War since [Joe Kieyoomia][1] didn't know teaching Navajo would damage the confidence of the code greatly. Even without his help, one don't have to know a language before breaking code written in it, as long as you know its [Orthography][2]. Even i... |
The Japanese made efforts and could have broken Navajo code later in the War since [Joe Kieyoomia][1] didn't know teaching Navajo would damage the confidence of the code greatly. Even without his help, one don't have to know a language before breaking code written in it, as long as you know its [Orthography][2]. Even i... |
I've implemented a CTR_DRBG random number generator according to NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 and I am now testing it with test vectors provided in NIST CAVS 14.3 (drbgvectors_no_reseed\CTR_DRBG.txt).
Starting from the very first example of [AES-128 no df]:
```
[AES-128 no df]
[PredictionResistance = False]
[Entropy... |
I want to implement authentication for an API and thought about using Shamir Secret Sharing to do so.
My plan is to generate 1 Master Key which is stored in the Database, we then generate about 1000 Subkeys or more with the key threshold of 2.
1 of the subkeys is then also stored in the DB and will be used as the A... |
I understood your setup as follows: You have a secret master key $K$, and generate $1000$ shares $(k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_{1000})$ using a $2$-out-of-$1000$ secret sharing scheme. Each user $P_i$, as well as the API, gets one share $k_i$.
But then, any two users can combine their shares $k_i$ and $k_j$, reconstructing ... |
I understood your setup as follows: You have a secret master key $K$, and generate $1000$ shares $(k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_{1000})$ using a $2$-out-of-$1000$ secret sharing scheme. Each user $P_i$, as well as the API, gets one share $k_i$.
But then, any two users can combine their shares $k_i$ and $k_j$, reconstructing ... |
The Japanese made efforts and could have broken Navajo code later in the War since [Joe Kieyoomia][1] didn't know teaching Navajo would damage the confidence of the code greatly. Even without his help, one don't have to know a language before breaking code written in it, as long as you know its [Orthography][2]. Even i... |
The Japanese made efforts and could have broken Navajo code later in the War since [Joe Kieyoomia][1] didn't know teaching Navajo would damage the confidence of the code greatly. Even without his help, one doesn't have to know a language before breaking code written in it, as long as one knows its [Orthography][2]. Eve... |
The Japanese made efforts and could have broken Navajo code later in the War since [Joe Kieyoomia][1] didn't know teaching Navajo would damage the confidence of the code greatly. Even without his help, one doesn't have to know a language before breaking code written in it, as long as one knows its [Orthography][2]. Eve... |
I am trying to implement an encryption function that uses the AES T-Tables implementation.
I am quite sure that my roundKeys are correct.
I also know that the initial round key addition in the following code is correct.
So there must be an error in the main rounds, but i am not sure what went wrong. I have narr... |
If you can get creative with the protocol, you can simplify things as follows:
There is a plaintext which has been encrypted with a secret key $x$. The key $x$ is a uniformly random scalar. In the context of ECC, a scalar value is an integer less than the size of the group generated by the base point $G$ chosen for ... |
If you can get creative with the protocol, you can simplify things as follows:
There is a plaintext which has been encrypted with a secret key $x$. The key $x$ is a uniformly random scalar, and is known by Alice. In the context of ECC, a scalar value is an integer less than the size of the group generated by the bas... |
If you can get creative with the protocol, you can simplify things as follows:
There is a plaintext which has been encrypted with a secret key $x$. The key $x$ is a uniformly random scalar, and is known by Alice. In the context of ECC, a scalar value is an integer less than the size of the group generated by the bas... |
If you can get creative with the protocol, you can simplify things as follows:
There is a plaintext which has been encrypted with a secret key $x$. The key $x$ is a uniformly random scalar, and is known by Alice. In the context of ECC, a scalar value is an integer less than the size of the group generated by the bas... |
Can we have an asymmetric key in AES? Clarification about PBKDF2 and AES-GTM in WebCrypto
According to [wikipedia AES page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard), AES is a *symmetric-key algorithm*.
> The algorithm described by AES is a symmetric-key algorithm, meaning the same key is used... |
Can we have an asymmetric key in AES? Clarification about PBKDF2 and AES-GTM in WebCrypto |
Can we have an asymmetric key in AES? Clarification about PBKDF2 and AES-GCM in WebCrypto
According to [wikipedia AES page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard), AES is a *symmetric-key algorithm*.
> The algorithm described by AES is a symmetric-key algorithm, meaning the same key is used... |
Can we have an asymmetric key in AES? Clarification about PBKDF2 and AES-GCM in WebCrypto |
A Mersenne Twister is a [Linear-Feedback Shift Register][1] with other characteristics, including period a Mersenne prime¹. In essence, the question asks why that is desirable.
A LFSR with $n$-bit state generates a [Maximum-length sequence][2] (M-sequence) that repeats for the first time after $2^n-1$ steps (startin... |
I was reading [this post](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/107226/zero-knowledge-card-shuffle) and the accepted answer wrote about a way to “prove that some list of points $[A,B,C,...]$ when multiplied by $x$ produces $[A′,B′,C′,...]$”. However, in their explanation their definition of $e$ seems t... |
Zero Knowledge Argument for Elliptic Curve Multiplication/Inverse Multiplication Correctness? |
> * How it comes that is this possible? Aren't encKey and decKey two different keys thus making this example a case for asymmetric key?
AES is a block-ciper that are synonym to Pseudo Random Permutation (PRF). As we understand from the word permutation, they have the inverse ( decryption) and **you will get true res... |
> * How it comes that is this possible? Aren't encKey and decKey two different keys thus making this example a case for asymmetric key?
AES is a block-ciper that are synonym to Pseudo Random Permutation (PRF). As we understand from the word permutation, they have the inverse ( decryption) and **you will get true res... |
Are there any encryption protocols or services that are time based. I.e I can encrypt something now and it can only be decrypted on or after 01/01/2100. Like a digital time capsule.
The only way I can think that this could be implemented is by a third party that publishes a list public keys - one for each future day... |
Decryption only on a specified future date? |
Can I move elements from cyclic subgroup to its cyclic parent group? |
> how could Alice convince him that the multiplication done to compute $B′$ was the inverse of the multiplication done to compute $A′$ without revealing $x$, or ideally any information about $x$?
If you've solved the previous problem (given $A, B, A', B'$, such that there exists an $x$ with $xA = A'$ and $xB = B'$),... |
Given two lattices $L_1$ and $L_2$ represented by bases $B_1$ and $B_2$, is there an efficient algorithm to compute $L_1\cap L_2$?
I can show, I think, that if gcd$(\det(B_1)\det(B_2)=1$, then $B_1adj(B_1)B_2$ generates $L_1\cap L_2$, but I'm interested in lattices whose volumes have greater GCDs.
A follow-up qu... |
I need to design some protocol where actors will leverage Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) to prove that they know the pre-image of some specific SHA256 hash without revealing the pre-image itself.
Ideally, they should also be able to batch proofs of multiple hashes into a single ZKP.
SHA256 hashing is not a ZK friend... |
The answer to both questions is yes, and they both follow immediately by the link in the comments (even though the fact that the second follows from the link was not mentioned).
The trick is that lattice duality interchanges sums and intersections, e.g.
$$(L_0+L_1)^* = L_0^*\cap L_1^*$$
There are some conditio... |
What are the theoretical usage limits of Kyber and Dilithium? Are there any sources to back this up? Maximum number of encryptions/signatures allowed per key, etc.? |
Kyber and Dilithium usage limits? |
Suppose we have $GF(2^{128})=F_2[x]/(x^{128}+x^7+x^2+x+1)$ and $a,b,c \in GF(2^{128})$ with $a*b=c$, where `*` is multiplication in $GF(2^{128})$. Could we convert them to $a',b',c'$ of length 128 bit vectors, such that $a'\&b'=c'$, where `&` is bitwise AND?
I think FFT might work, but I am confused how to do a FFT ... |
Convert multiplication in $GF(2^{128})$ to bitwise AND? |
> Could we convert them to $a',b',c'$ of length 128 bit vectors, such that $a'\&b'=c'$, where `&` is bitwise AND?
No. There are $2^{128}$ elements of $GF(2^{128})$, and there are $2^{128}$ length 128 bit vectors, and so there must be a 1:1 correspondence.
Now, consider the $GF(2^{128})$ element that converts to ... |
I have a question in regards to a task I've been given at uni. I need to encode the word 'Cyber' 2 characters at a time with RSA with padding being space.
What do the chunks look like than need to be encrypted? Should I just concatenate the ascii codes 'Cy',then 'be',then 'c ' , ex 'Cy'=67121, or should I separate th... |
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
I know that elements of a non-prime order cyclic group **G** can be moved to its subgroup **H** by a process called "cofactor clearing". You just have to simply multiply a cofactor by an element of main group that ends u... |
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