instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
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***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
I know that elements of a non-prime order cyclic group **G** can be moved to its subgroup **H** by a process called "cofactor clearing". You just have to simply multiply a cofactor by an element of main group that ends u... |
I recently started reading about Yao's Millionaires' problem. If the Yao's Millionaires' problem is capable of finding if one party has less money / more or equal money than the other party, then is it possible for one party to find the exact amount of money that the other party have?
Let's move this problem to a pr... |
Could Yao's Millionaires' problem be used as a problem of binary search? |
I am looking for a safe and easy way for my inheritors to get a password after my death. That can be the password of a digital vault, a password manager, or anything else.
I could write the password in a testament but since a leak is still possible, I do not want this to be in clear. I was thinking to encrypt the p... |
We will continue our [previous topic](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/108051/can-i-move-elements-from-cyclic-subgroup-to-its-cyclic-parent-group?noredirect=1#comment231108_108051) here⬇️ for clarity...
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pl... |
PAGE 2: Can I move elements from cyclic subgroup to its cyclic parent group? |
We will continue our [previous topic](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/108051/can-i-move-elements-from-cyclic-subgroup-to-its-cyclic-parent-group?noredirect=1#comment231108_108051) here⬇️ for clarity...
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pl... |
OK, the way it is normally stated, the two users A and B interact with a trusted server, behave according to the protocol and at the end learn which one has more money, let's say weather $w(A)\geq w(B),$ where $w$ is the wealth.
So your setup of the problem needs to be changed to $B$ being *another* trusted server w... |
We will continue our [previous topic](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/108051/can-i-move-elements-from-cyclic-subgroup-to-its-cyclic-parent-group?noredirect=1#comment231108_108051) here⬇️ for clarity...
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pl... |
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
I know that elements of a non-prime order cyclic group **G** can be moved to its subgroup **H** by a process called "cofactor clearing". You just have to simply multiply a cofactor by an element of main group that ends u... |
We will continue our [previous topic](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/108051/can-i-move-elements-from-cyclic-subgroup-to-its-cyclic-parent-group?noredirect=1#comment231108_108051) here⬇️ for clarity...
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pl... |
I recently started reading about Yao's Millionaires' problem. If the Yao's Millionaires' problem is capable of finding if one party has less money / more or equal money than the other party, then is it possible for one party to find the exact amount of money that the other party have?
I specifically read the article... |
As a preamble,I acknowledge that it is fundamentally impossible to authenticate
that a networked client is who they claim to be. The question is, given that
it's impossible, what should I do anyway?
Suppose I have a http server and only want to provide services to browser X rather
than all the other brands of... |
Client authentication: only talk to trusted clients? |
OK, the way it is normally stated, the two users A and B interact with a trusted server, behave according to the protocol and at the end learn which one has more money, let's say weather $w(A)\geq w(B),$ where $w$ is the wealth.
So your setup of the problem needs to be changed to $B$ being *another* trusted server w... |
I'm working on finding an attack on textbook RSA using non-prime, low public exponents $e_1,e_2$ for each encryption.
Given $$c_1 = m^{e_1}\space mod \space n \\ c_2 = m^{e_2} \space mod \space n$$
I found there's `Common Modulus Attack` which works when $gcd(e_1,e_2)=1$. But is there a different way to solve the ... |
I'm working on finding an attack on textbook RSA using non-prime, low public exponents $e_1,e_2$ for each encryption.
Given $$c_1 = m^{e_1}\space mod \space n \\ c_2 = m^{e_2} \space mod \space n$$
I found there's the *Common Modulus Attack* which works when $gcd(e_1,e_2)=1$.
But is there a different way to s... |
I have a question in regards to a task I've been given at uni. I need to encode the string `'Cyber'` 2 characters at a time with RSA with padding being space.
What do the chunks look like than need to be encrypted? Should I just concatenate the ascii codes `'Cy'`,then `'be'`,then `'r '` , ex `'Cy'=67121`, or should ... |
In my idea, $n$ clients will have the connection to a server, and clients will not be able to connect with other clients. Are there any previous design has been published to let $n$ clients agree on a same shared secret, while the server does not know what the secret is? |
I need to design some protocol where actors will leverage Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) to prove that they know the pre-image of some specific SHA256 hash without revealing the pre-image itself.
Ideally, they should also be able to batch proofs of multiple hashes into a single ZKP.
SHA-256 hashing is not a ZK frien... |
> Practically, when RSA is used to encrypt strings, what is the $x$ in $x^e\bmod n$?
That depends on the variant of RSA. Among the most common:
1. Toy-sized textbook RSA, where the public modulus $n$ is small: it is customary to encrypt letter by letter (or pair of letters, as in the [original RSA article's _smal... |
The answer to both questions is yes, and they both follow immediately by the link in the comments (even though the fact that the second follows from the link was not mentioned).
The trick is that lattice duality interchanges sums and intersections, e.g.
$$(L_0+L_1)^* = L_0^*\cap L_1^*$$
There are some conditio... |
Given two lattices $L_1$ and $L_2$ represented by bases $B_1$ and $B_2$, is there an efficient algorithm to compute $L_1\cap L_2$?
I can show, I think, that if $\gcd(\det(B_1)\det(B_2)=1$, then $B_1adj(B_1)B_2$ generates $L_1\cap L_2$, but I'm interested in lattices whose volumes have greater GCDs.
A follow-up q... |
Given two lattices $L_1$ and $L_2$ represented by bases $B_1$ and $B_2$, is there an efficient algorithm to compute $L_1\cap L_2$?
I can show, I think, that if $\gcd(\det(B_1),\det(B_2))=1$, then $B_1adj(B_1)B_2$ generates $L_1\cap L_2$, but I'm interested in lattices whose volumes have greater GCDs.
A follow-up... |
Assume I am using the SIMD encryption of homomorphic encryption. Performing plaintext-ciphertext multiplication between two vectors $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{x}$ means
$Dec(\mathbf{a} \times Enc(\mathbf{x})) = \mathbf{a} \times \mathbf{x}$. I am wondering if all elements of $\mathbf{a}$ is the same. Is there any chea... |
Is there any cheaper way for multiplying a plaintext scalar to a vector? |
Assume I am using the SIMD encryption of homomorphic encryption. Performing plaintext-ciphertext multiplication between two vectors $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{x}$ means
$Dec(\mathbf{a} \times Enc(\mathbf{x})) = \mathbf{a} \times \mathbf{x}$, where $\times$ means point-wise (or say element-wise) multiplication. I am wo... |
Firstly, let me mention some improprieties in your example:
>Given
$n=p∗q$
$e_1=2$
$e_2=6$
$n$ can't be factorized since $p$,$q$ are both 1024-bit numbers. $m^e>n$ so it wont be attack by $m=c^{1/e}$
**1)** $e_1=2$ and $e_2=6$ are not valid public exponents for Textbook RSA-2048 since the public ex... |
**The situation:**
I have a group with 20 members, each member broadcasting 1 message per second. Communicating one on one is possible, but 1 message per member per second is the absolute limit and every member needs every message.
The only means of communication for this group allows me to send 258 bits per mess... |
We will continue our [previous topic](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/108051/can-i-move-elements-from-cyclic-subgroup-to-its-cyclic-parent-group?noredirect=1#comment231108_108051) here⬇️ for clarity...
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pl... |
**The situation:**
I have a group with 20 members, each member broadcasting 1 message per second. Communicating one on one is possible, but 1 message per member per second is the absolute limit and every member needs every message.
The only means of communication for this group allows me to send 258 bits per mess... |
**The situation:**
I have a group with 20 members, each member broadcasting 1 message per second. Communicating one on one is possible, but 1 message per member per second is the absolute limit and every member needs every message.
The only means of communication for this group allows me to send 258 bits per mess... |
**The situation:**
I have a group with 20 members, each member broadcasting 1 message per second. Communicating one on one is possible, but 1 message per member per second is the absolute limit and every member needs every message.
The only means of communication for this group allows me to send 258 bits per mess... |
We will continue our [previous topic](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/108051/can-i-move-elements-from-cyclic-subgroup-to-its-cyclic-parent-group?noredirect=1#comment231108_108051) here⬇️ for clarity...
***The following context is based on elliptic curves in short-weierstrass form y^2 = x^3 + b.***
**pl... |
Firstly, let me mention some improprieties in your example:
>Given
$n=p∗q$
$e_1=2$
$e_2=6$
$n$ can't be factorized since $p$,$q$ are both 1024-bit numbers. $m^e>n$ so it wont be attack by $m=c^{1/e}$
**1)** $e_1=2$ and $e_2=6$ are not valid public exponents for Textbook RSA-2048 since the public ex... |
> 1. If I use the 48-bit random nonce and change the key every day, would this solution be secure?
Well, every day, you will be (in aggregate) sending $20 \times 86,400 = 1,728,000$ encrypted messages each day. So, the probability that two transmissions randomly pick the same 48 bit nonce is $\binom{1728000}{2} \ti... |
> 1. If I use the 48-bit random nonce and change the key every day, would this solution be secure?
Well, every day, you will be (in aggregate) sending $20 \times 86,400 = 1,728,000$ encrypted messages each day. So, the probability that two transmissions randomly pick the same 48 bit nonce is $\binom{1728000}{2} \ti... |
> 1. If I use the 48-bit random nonce and change the key every day, would this solution be secure?
Well, every day, you will be (in aggregate) sending $20 \times 86,400 = 1,728,000$ encrypted messages each day. So, the expected number of pairs of transmissions that randomly pick the same 48 bit nonce is $\binom{172... |
I am not an expert but here is my understanding. It is best to first understand [[MP12]]. A lot of this is to give background and not exactly on-point, also for my reference.
**Question:** Why does `SampleG` return a spherical distribution?
**Answer:** `SampleG` returns a spherical distribution because the author... |
> Is there any **cheaper** way to do this multiplication?
This word has two natural interpretations
1. Cheaper **computation**, and
2. Cheaper **noise growth**.
For 1, the answer is "no".
Additionally, your square-and-multiply algorithm is not necessary.
To efficiently (from the perspective of computation) ... |
I need to store a public key in a variable of **maximum 32 bytes**.
I recover the compressed key and remove its prefix, but then I have to do the opposite: I have to rebuild the compressed address from it without the prefix.
I know that the prefix depends on the last two characters of the uncompressed key.
Pre... |
> I know that the prefix depends on the last two characters of the uncompressed key.
**Not the last; is it prefixed**,i.e. added to the beginning
In secp256k1, for compression we have the following rule;
- prefix `04` means no compression
- prefix `02` means compression with $y$ coordinate is even
- prefix `... |
> I know that the prefix depends on the last two characters of the uncompressed key.
**Not the last; is it prefixed**,i.e. added to the beginning.
In secp256k1, for compression we have the following rule;
- prefix `04` means no compression
- prefix `02` means compression with $y$ coordinate is even
- prefix ... |
**The situation:**
I have a group with 20 members, each member broadcasting 1 message per second. Communicating one on one is possible, but 1 message per member per second is the absolute limit and every member needs every message.
The only means of communication for this group allows me to send 258 bits per mess... |
I used to think that adding random padding to an rsa plaintext was to prevent attack when you can ask/have access to different ciphered output, and decipher it without access to the private key (under certain conditions).
I've came across a signature verification scheme that seems to use random padding (at start and... |
I need to store a public key in a variable of **maximum 32 bytes**.
I recover the compressed key and remove its prefix, but then I have to do the opposite: I have to rebuild the compressed address from it without the prefix.
I know that the prefix depends on the last two characters of the uncompressed key.
Pre... |
I'm studying a case where when i sign a same message with the same private key and a different nonce, i sometimes get signatures (r,s) where r values share some similarities (same numbers at the same indexes).
```
import ecdsa
import random
import sys
import math
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long
... |
I am not an expert but here is my understanding. It is best to first understand [[MP12]]. A lot of this is to give background and not exactly on-point, also for my reference.
**Question:** Why does `SampleG` return a spherical distribution?
**Answer:** `SampleG` returns a spherical distribution because the author... |
I am not an expert but here is my understanding. It is best to first understand [[MP12]]. A lot of this is to give background and not exactly on-point, also for my reference.
**Question:** Why does `SampleG` return a spherical distribution?
**Answer:** `SampleG` returns a spherical distribution because the author... |
I have seen that Filecoin performed a public set-up ceremony for their zkSNARK system. Because Filecoin uses the Groth16 prover (which has a circuit-specific set-up), the output of this ceremony was public parameters that anyone can use to prove statements involving one of six Filecoin-defined circuits.
It would be ... |
Are there reputable public proving parameters for universal zkSNARK systems? |
I just tried to implement ISAAC from scratch, using the Jean-Philippe Aumasson paper from 2007 as a reference.
This paper gives a definition of the original ISAAC algorithm as well as the improved ISAAC+ algorithm.
JPA states in this paper that there are several flaws in ISAAC, and that ISAAC+ would fix those.
... |
Is ISAAC+ actually an improvement over ISAAC? |
The BSI (Federal Office for Information Security in Germany) has published a paper detailing the requirements of cryptographic modules for certain applications in the energy sector: [Key Lifecycle Requirements](https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekAusweise/CVCA/KeyLifecycleSecurityRequirements.pdf?__... |
I just noticed that the FSE 1996 conference paper which defines ISAAC mentions a counter variable "cc".
This variable is said to be the reason why ISAAC has a guaranteed minimum cycle length of 2**40.
However, no-one seems to have noticed (until I did just now) that the algorithm does not use the "cc" variable fo... |
Does ISAAC really guarantee a cycle length of at least 2**40? |
I just noticed that [the FSE 1996 conference paper which defines ISAAC][1] mentions a counter variable "cc".
This variable is said to be the reason why ISAAC has a guaranteed minimum cycle length of 2**40.
However, no-one seems to have noticed (until I did just now) that the algorithm does not use the "cc" variab... |
I just tried to implement ISAAC from scratch, using the Jean-Philippe Aumasson [paper from 2007][1] as a reference.
This paper gives a definition of the original ISAAC algorithm as well as the improved ISAAC+ algorithm.
JPA states in this paper that there are several flaws in ISAAC, and that ISAAC+ would fix thos... |
I just noticed that [the FSE 1996 conference paper which defines ISAAC][1] mentions a counter variable `cc`.
This variable is said to be the reason why ISAAC has a guaranteed minimum cycle length of $2^{40}$.
However, no-one seems to have noticed (until I did just now) that the algorithm does not use the `cc` var... |
Assume RSA with a public modulus $N$ of $n$ bits, a small odd public exponent $e$, plaintext $M$ a random non-negative integer less than $2^m$ for some integer parameter $m$, with $M\mapsto C=M^e\bmod N$ (textbook RSA) used for encryption. Inasmuch as it matters, assume there are $2^r$ ciphertexts available to the atta... |
Using TR-31 key exchange, how is it possible to use restrictive modes of use, such as V (Verify only)? If Alice were to generate such a key, and send it to Bob, Bob would not be able to generate a MAC for Alice to verify. Can this be solved without leaving the safe bounds of Key Blocks? |
So I'm reading this article where they talk shortly about pseudo random generators where I'm not quite familiar with some of the notation. They call $\lambda$ the security parameter.
Pseudorandom function (PRF). Let $\mathcal{F}=\left\{F_{\text {sk }}:\{0,1\}^{\ell_1(\lambda)} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\ell_2(\lambda)} \m... |
So I'm reading this article where they talk shortly about pseudo random generators where I'm not quite familiar with some of the notation. They call $\lambda$ the security parameter.
"Pseudorandom function (PRF). Let $\mathcal{F}=\left\{F_{\text {sk }}:\{0,1\}^{\ell_1(\lambda)} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\ell_2(\lambda)} \... |
So I'm reading this article where they talk shortly about pseudo random generators where I'm not quite familiar with some of the notation. They call $\lambda$ the security parameter.
"Pseudorandom function (PRF). Let $\mathcal{F}=\left\{F_{\text {sk }}:\{0,1\}^{\ell_1(\lambda)} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\ell_2(\lambda)} \... |
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find the correct reference.
The quoted requirement in [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] makes reference to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, without doub... |
So I'm reading this article where they talk shortly about pseudo random generators where I'm not quite familiar with some of the notation. They call $\lambda$ the security parameter.
"Pseudorandom function (PRF). Let $\mathcal{F}=\left\{F_{\text {sk }}:\{0,1\}^{\ell_1(\lambda)} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\ell_2(\lambda)} \... |
I am trying to implement [Pei10](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/088.pdf) and [BB13](https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/297.pdf), but I am confused about what concrete parameters to use.
In Pei10, **Algorithm 1** takes a rounding parameter $r = \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ as parameter, but it does not specify how to choose it con... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
I implemented AES128-CBC algorithm and what I need is to be able to compare encrypted text without decrypting. <br>Is the only way to use static or no iv to achieve this?<br> . Any ideas?
Use in code -Something like :
select x from ins left join Users ui on ui.UserIDNumber=id
or `Select * from users wher... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
Suppose, we have a secure PRF $F$. Then can there be a MAC Scheme $I=(Sign, Verify)$ using F such that $I$ is insecure under, but I is secure under the restriction that all the queries for MAC challenges are different? |
Suppose, we have a secure PRF $F$. Then can there be a MAC Scheme $I=(Sign, Verify)$ using F such that $I$ is insecure, but I is secure under the restriction that all the queries for MAC challenges are different? |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
what is mean by software and hardware implementation? How to do it? |
I am using a Shamir Secret Sharing implementation in Java and I have the use case,
that I may have to generate more Subkeys of the Secret after I already generated some.
Generating them works, but if I combine the new keys with the old keys I can't recreate the secret.
I am using GF(256) as finite field.
For ex... |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
1. Any hyperelliptic curve having base field characteristic dividing group order?
2. A subgroup of order equal to the basefield characteristic, a large prime?
3. Having hard DLP in that subgroup?
4. Having pairing?
5. New elliptic-hyperelliptic cycle anyone?
SNARKs were introduced with QAP "intermediate... |
Recursive snarks with a genus-2 no-cycle hyperelliptic curve? |
#### Reference
Since the question is about conformance, it's critical to find to what.
The quoted requirement in \[KLSR\] [Key Lifecycle Security Requirements Version 1.0.3][1] refers to
> \[AIS 20/31\] BSI: A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0
which, wit... |
How RSA keys are tested for primality if they are random generated? I imagine this could be time consuming task. |
> what is mean by software and hardware implementation?
> I want to know how its been done.
**Software implementation** is coding the cryptographic schemes/algorithms with a programming language so that it can run under the target operation system. The programming language can be really wide;
- C is preferred m... |
> what is mean by software and hardware implementation?
> I want to know how its been done.
**Software implementation** is coding the cryptographic schemes/algorithms with a programming language so that it can run under the target operation system. The programming language can be really wide;
- C is preferred m... |
> what is mean by software and hardware implementation?
> I want to know how its been done.
**Software implementation** is coding the cryptographic schemes/algorithms with a programming language so that it can run under the target operation system. The programming language can be really wide;
- C is preferred m... |
> what is mean by software and hardware implementation?
> I want to know how its been done.
**Software implementation** is coding the cryptographic schemes/algorithms with a programming language so that it can run under the target operation system. The programming language can be really wide;
- C is preferred m... |
> what is mean by software and hardware implementation?
> I want to know how its been done.
**Software implementation** is coding the cryptographic schemes/algorithms with a programming language so that it can run under the target operation system. The programming language can be really wide;
- C is preferred m... |
> what is mean by software and hardware implementation?
> I want to know how its been done.
**Software implementation** is coding the cryptographic schemes/algorithms with a programming language so that it can run under the target operation system. The programming language can be really wide;
- C is preferred m... |
What is meant by software and hardware implementations? How to do it? |
I'm looking for an authoritative reference about the history of salts in the context of hash functions. Why is the personalization string in a hash function called a "salt"? Who should be credited with introducing this technique?
So far I have found:
* Plenty of speculative folk etymology on the [Wikipedia discussi... |
Who invented salt, and why is it called salt? |
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