instruction stringlengths 15 30k |
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We utilize a differential privacy mechanism (Laplace noise, with scale $b$) to provide the privacy of records stored within a dataset. Each individual is associated with two, and at most $k$, records. These records are represented as $(Username, O_i)$, where $O_i$ denotes the $i$th noisy value (generated by the mechani... |
If I have $n$ secure encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
|
Is concatenation of secure encryptions secure? |
I'm wondering if anyone is aware of the best input difference to input into the system Heys outlines in his paper (http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/crypto2017/heys.pdf) to achieve a high probability differential characteristic w/ S-Box 4_1 and S_Box 4_3 active at the point of attack (4_2 and 4_4 inactive). I've built a f... |
This question may seem related to [this one][1], but it is not the same.
Let's suppose I take 1GiB of data, encrypt the data with a (secure) block cipher and apply the Vigenère key, being the key much smaller than the ciphertext data (let's say, 512KiB), repeating the key hundreds/thousands of times over the plainte... |
In Vigenère, if I encrypt a plaintext with a block cipher before applying the key, will it be possible to recover the key if it repeats? |
EdDSA generates the private nonce deterministically by hashing the private key and the message, and this means that the public nonce $r$ and the signature s will be same if the same message signed more than once.
Does this mean that EdDSA is vulnerable to replay attacks? I know it is not, but I don't know what the m... |
> Does this mean that EdDSA is vulnerable to Reply attack ? I now it is not, but I don't what are the mechanisms that EdDSA uses to avoid this type of attacks.
Well, for any signature system, if an attacker gets a (message, signature) pair, they could try to use it multiple times, and the signature would validate ea... |
If I have $n$ secure encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
On the one hand my intuition is that the cancatenation is secure, but on the other hand I can't solve it by reduction which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advan... |
If I have $n$ secure encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
On the one hand my intuition is that the cancatenation is secure, but on the other hand I can't solve it by reduction which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advan... |
I know that in groups from large prime order the disccrete log problem is considered hard. For example, it is hard to compute $x$ from $g^x$ and $g$.
Is the same holds for the root problem? For example, is it hard in such groups to compute $g$ from $g^x$ and $x$? |
Is the discrete root considered a hard problem? |
Among other sources, [this Wikipedia entry][1] states that triple-DES using three separate keys (k1, k2, k3) is vulnerable to meet-in-the-middle-attacks, while triple-DES using only two keys (k1, k2, k1) is not.
Why is this attack possible if all the keys are different, but not if the first and the third are the sam... |
Among other sources, [this Wikipedia entry][1] states that triple-DES using three separate keys $(k_1, k_2, k_3)$ is vulnerable to meet-in-the-middle-attacks, while triple-DES using only two keys $(k_1, k_2, k_1)$ is not.
Why is this attack possible if all the keys are different, but not if the first and the third a... |
Im new to cryptoanalysis and started reading [A Tutorial on
Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis](https://stackoverflow.com). The author is trying to explain it as simple as he can. But I still got some questions, can anybody help me please? He uses this example of simple spn.
[![enter image description here][1]][1]... |
I want to use TweetNaCl.js for encrypting user data that is stored in `LocalStorage`. Therefore, I want to prompt the user to provide a PIN/password that shall be used to derive a key that is then used as a secret key for TweetNaCl's secretbox.
Looking for a modern scrypt implementation in JavaScript, I couldn't fin... |
I know that DES has 56 independent key bits, and that 3DES has 168 independent key bits by using 3 separate 56-bit DES keys. 3DES also has a block size of 64 bits.
If I use 3DES as the underlying block cipher to construct a Davies-Meyer compression function, what would be the input/output size of this compression fu... |
If I have $n$ secure encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
On the one hand my intuition is that the cancatenation is secure, but on the other hand I can't solve it by reduction which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advan... |
I'm currently studying the different adversarial settings for digital signatures.
In Goldwasser, Micali and Rivests [paper](https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.findit.cvt.dk/science/article/pii/B9780123868701500228?via%3Dihub) they propose three different chosen message attack settings, which are vastly different.
... |
I'm currently studying the different adversarial settings for digital signatures.
In Goldwasser, Micali and Rivests [paper](https://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs276/fa20/notes/Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest.pdf#page=4) they propose three different chosen message attack settings, which are vastly different.
More specifically... |
I'm tired of going online looking for a simple explanation of how the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange works. Many guides I've found attempt to explain it using anything from "paint" to massive holes in the explanation such as "g is usually 2" which infuriates me. If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well... |
I'm tired of going online looking for a simple explanation of how the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange works. Many guides I've found attempt to explain it using anything from "paint" to massive holes in the explanation such as "g is usually 2" which infuriates me. If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well... |
Is there any way to derive the RSA private key from another RSA private key?
Let's say I am using the P prime (prime1) and Q prime (prime2) from the base private RSA key, use some salt and an algorithm that creates a new primes.
Is there any security issue with my approach?
Does anyone have a better solution f... |
I have AES-GCM output with GMAC tag. The plaintext consists of some bitfields I know the structure. When I generate input which should only affect timestamps and counters I see coresponding ciphertext changes only in those bytes for 2 subsequent calls to the encryption function.
Ignoring the GMAC part for now, what w... |
Can I proof AES-GMAC nonce reuse just from the bytes? |
I have AES-GCM output with GMAC tag. The plaintext consists of some bitfields I know the structure. When I generate input which should only affect timestamps and counters in very specific bytes I see coresponding ciphertext changes only in those bytes for 2 subsequent calls to the encryption function.
Ignoring the GM... |
my question is as in the title.
For example, there are 2^256 different values that a SHA256 code can take.
But is it possible to shorten this number somehow? |
One uses a Schnorr group both for [Schnorr signature][1] (or [DSA][2]), and for [Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange][3]. They target 128-bit security, and choose prime $q$ that's 256-bit, prime $p=q\,r+1$ that's 3072-bit, and $g$ of order $q$ (e.g. $g=2^r\bmod p$). In DHKE, a participant chooses an ephemeral secret $x\in[1,q)... |
Can I proof AES-GCM nonce reuse just from the bytes? |
The company Qrypt [states](https://docs.qrypt.com/concepts/key-generation-architecture/) that "Key distribution based on asymmetric algorithms is a weak link for cryptography" and claims to "enable encryption without distributing encryption keys" using its BLAST architecture. It gives non-technical explanations [here](... |
Does Qrypt's BLAST protocol based on "Doubly-Affine Extractors" use public-key or symmetric-key cryptography? |
If I have $n$ secure encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
My intuition is that the concatenation is secure, but I can't solve it by reduction, which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advantage of the combination of the en... |
Is there any way to derive the RSA private key from another RSA private key?
Let's say I have a base RSA key $(P, Q)$ (both prime), and then use some salt and an algorithm that creates a new primes, e.g. $(P', Q') = f(P, Q, \mathsf{salt})$.
Is there any security issue with my approach?
Does anyone have a better ... |
[Computer scientist here who is not totally familiar with the factoring literature -- please forgive my ignorance.]
It's well known that hard-to-factor integers, $n$, are typically semi-primes, such that their factors are roughly $O(\sqrt{n})$ in size. However, it's not clear to me that all such semi-primes are nece... |
How often do hard-to-factor numbers occur? |
I have a question about the implementation of the functions
$$Compress_q(x,d) = \left\lfloor (2^d/q)\cdot x\right\rceil mod^{+}2^d$$
and
$$Decompress_q(x,d) = \left\lfloor (q/2^d)\cdot x\right\rceil$$
I have copied two lines from the [GitRepo][1], which contain the compression:
t[k] = ((((uint32_t)... |
[Computer scientist here who is not totally familiar with the factoring literature -- please forgive my ignorance.]
It's well known that hard-to-factor integers, $n$, are typically semi-primes, such that their factors are roughly $O(\sqrt{n})$ in size. However, it's not clear to me that all such semi-primes are nece... |
There seems to be a common trend among forums involving the topic of cryptography to shutdown any conversation very quickly, least in my experience.
From the stand point of a newcomer to the field making bold claims and selling snake oil I can understand the trepidation and warnings. But as someone who has been read... |
How do I gain enough knowledge to experiment with cryptography? |
I have a question about the implementation of the functions
$$Compress_q(x,d) = \left\lfloor (2^d/q)\cdot x\right\rceil mod^{+}2^d$$
and
$$Decompress_q(x,d) = \left\lfloor (q/2^d)\cdot x\right\rceil$$
from Kyber.
I have copied two lines from the [GitRepo][1], which contain the compression:
t[k] ... |
Im reviewing my crypto and I would like to prove the following: RSA experiment where the adversary is given N, e, and y. The adversary knows p, q.
I know the RSA scheme is built on the idea that it is hard to find 2 large primes that are factors of N, and we already have this so it's easy to solve for d now. In orde... |
> Is there any security issue with my approach?
Well, no, there doesn't have to be.
One approach would be to seed a cryptorng with $P, Q, salt$, and then use the output bits of your cryptorng as the seed for a standard RSA private key generation algorithm.
Of course, this doesn't try to take advantage of the f... |
After the discussion in the comments, and with the help of @kelalaka I will answer myself.
I will assume that $p:=|G|$ is prime.
$p$ is prime, so we can efficiently compute the multiplicative inverse of $x$ modulu $p$, that is $a\in\mathbb{{Z}}_{p}$ such that $x\cdot a=1\;mod\;p$, using the extended Euclid's algo... |
One uses a Schnorr group both for [Schnorr signature][1] (or [DSA][2]), and for [Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange][3]. They target 128-bit security, and choose prime $q$ that's 256-bit, prime $p=q\,r+1$ that's 3072-bit, and $g$ of order $q$ (e.g. $g=2^r\bmod p$). In DHKE, a participant chooses an ephemeral secret $x\in[1,q)... |
I have a question about the implementation of the functions
$$Compress_q(x,d) = \left\lfloor (2^d/q)\cdot x\right\rceil mod^{+}2^d$$
and
$$Decompress_q(x,d) = \left\lfloor (q/2^d)\cdot x\right\rceil$$
from Kyber.
I have copied two lines from the [GitRepo][1], which contain the compression:
t[k] ... |
I checked a [related question](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/51629/is-triple-des-still-considered-safe-to-use), but I still did not find the answer I was looking for.
Specifically, do we have any statistics on the usage of DES/2DES/3DES?
It seems [from here](https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/... |
After the discussion in the comments, and with the help of @kelalaka I will answer myself.
I will assume that $p:=|G|$ is prime, and that $0 \neq x \in\mathbb{{Z}}_{p}$.
$p$ is prime, so we can efficiently compute the multiplicative inverse of $x$ modulu $p$, that is $a\in\mathbb{{Z}}_{p}$ such that $x\cdot a=1\;... |
Simple question, Given c=$b$<sup>$e$</sup> mod $m$, we all know finding $e$ is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm.
But what about finding $b$ from c ; $e$ and the semi‑prime $m$ ? Is it something harder than factoring $m$ too ? |
I am a new dev dabbling in ECC. I am currently building an Android app in Java/Kotlin and can't get a piece of content that was signed with a private key to be verified using the corresponding public key. I have been stuck for a few days so I thought I'd come here!
Here's my code for keypair generation:
fun g... |
I am a new dev dabbling in ECC. I am currently building an Android app in Java/Kotlin and can't get a piece of content that was signed with a private key to be verified using the corresponding public key. I have been stuck for a few days so I thought I'd come here!
Here's my code for keypair generation:
fun g... |
I am a new dev dabbling in ECC. I am currently building an Android app in Java/Kotlin and can't get a piece of content that was signed with a private key to be verified using the corresponding public key. I have been stuck for a few days so I thought I'd come here!
Here's my code for keypair generation:
fun g... |
Is there a direct non-iterative formula for point multiplication by 3 in the secp256k1 elliptic curve just like point multiplication by 2 (point doubling)? If such a formula exists, could you explain how to achieve this? If not, could you clarify why it's not possible? |
Simple question, Given c=$b$<sup>$e$</sup> mod $m$, we all know finding $e$ is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm.
But what about finding $b$ from c ; $e$ and the semi‑prime $m$ ? Is it something harder than factoring $m$ too ?
If yes, how to compute $b$ when $e$ is more than 128‑bits long ? |
Simple question, Given c=$b$<sup>$e$</sup> mod $m$, we all know finding $e$ is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm.
But what about finding $b$ from c ; $e$ and the semi‑prime $m$ ? Is it something harder than factoring $m$ too ?
If yes as this is different from the ʀꜱᴀ problem, how to compute $b$ when ... |
I have been reading *Flaws in Applying Proof Methodologies to Signature Schemes* and ran into a bit that I do not understand.
In *section 4.2* the authors describe a scheme where a malicious signer crafts a public key and signature that verifies two different messages. They postulate that upon revealing the second ... |
I have been reading *Flaws in Applying Proof Methodologies to Signature Schemes* and ran into a bit I do not understand.
In *section 4.2* the authors describe a scheme where a malicious signer crafts a public key and signature that verifies two different messages. They postulate that upon revealing the second messa... |
Setting aside the issue of nuanced time *dependency* \(if a message can be decrypted at time $t$, how will you forbid anyone from using all the information that was available at time $t$ to decrypt it at time $t+1$?\), I'll just mention the idea of a time-*lock*, which keeps the message secret for a certain amount of t... |
Simple question, Given c=$b$<sup>$e$</sup> mod $m$, we all know finding $e$ is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm.
But what about finding $b$ from c ; $e$ and the semi‑prime $m$ ? Is it something harder than factoring $m$ too ?
If yes as this is different from the ʀꜱᴀ problem, how to compute $b$ when ... |
I have AES-GCM output with GMAC tag. The plaintext consists of some bitfields I know the structure of. When I generate input which should only affect timestamps and counters in very specific bytes, I see corresponding ciphertext changes only in those bytes for 2 subsequent calls to the encryption function.
Ignoring ... |
Can I prove AES-GCM nonce reuse just from the bytes? |
[Computer scientist here who is not totally familiar with the factoring literature -- please forgive my ignorance.]
It's well known that hard-to-factor integers, $n$, are typically semi-primes, such that their factors are roughly $O(\sqrt{n})$ in size. However, it's not clear to me that all such semi-primes are nece... |
If I have $n$ secure assymetric encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
My intuition is that the concatenation is secure, but I can't solve it by reduction, which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advantage of the combinatio... |
In a certificateless aggregate signature scheme, can a signature aggregator be a type 1 adversary (external attacker who can have access to secret value of a user)? I thought signature aggregator is always assumed to be trustworthy in a certificateless aggregate signature scheme. |
Can an aggregator be a type 1 adversary? |
If I have $n$ secure assymetric encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
My intuition is that the concatenation is secure, but I can't solve it by reduction, which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advantage of the combinatio... |
If I have $n$ secure assymetric encryption schemes, is their concatenation $Enc_{k_1,...,k_n}(m)=Enc_{k_1}(m)||...||Enc_{k_n}(m)$ secure?
My intuition is that the concatenation is secure, but I can't solve it by reduction, which gives me the feeling that maybe an attacker can somehow take advantage of the combinatio... |
I'd like to know if there's any cryptographic scheme that implements something similar to what I'm summarizing here below.
Thanks a lot for reading and for any hint or question.
Intro-Scenery:
--------------
There's a public encrypted ledger of accounts such that each contains a balance of funds.
Wh... |
I'd like to know if there's any cryptographic scheme that implements something similar to what I'm summarizing here below.
Thanks a lot for reading and for any hint or question.
Intro-Scenery:
--------------
There's a public encrypted ledger of accounts such that each contains a balance of funds.
Wh... |
I understand that AES-CBC uses the following scheme for encrypting data (diagram [from Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Initialization_vector_.28IV.29)):
[![AES-CBC Diagram][1]][1]
And, I understand that we don't want initialization vectors to be [predictable or constant](ht... |
I understand that AES-CBC uses the following scheme for encrypting data (diagram [from Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Initialization_vector_.28IV.29)):
[![AES-CBC Diagram][1]][1]
And, I understand that we don't want initialization vectors to be [predictable or constant](ht... |
I understand that AES-CBC uses the following scheme for encrypting data (diagram [from Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Initialization_vector_.28IV.29)):
[![AES-CBC Diagram][1]][1]
And, I understand that we don't want initialization vectors to be [predictable or constant](ht... |
Given the ring $R_2=\mathbb{Z}_{2}[x]/x^8+1$, initiate a public key encryption based on RLWE $(A,b=As+e)$ where all the parameters are selected as polynomials over the given ring. Under the assumption of brute force attack only and if the vector $s$ is 248-byte long, I have the following questions:
- is this secur... |
Is using the polynomials ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2}[x]/x^8+1$ in RLWE secure agianst brute force attack? |
In systems where computations are performed in remote or potentially untrusted environments(e.g. Ethereum NaaS providers such as Infura), how can we gain confidence in the accuracy of the results? Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) provide an intriguing solution for verifying specific aspects of computation.
My focus:
... |
Can Cryptographic Proofs Directly Attest to Function Call Results? |
Passwords are vulnerable to hash collision attacks? |
> But, what if the Initialization vector is computed with some number of random bits and then some counter. For example, 12 bytes of random data plus 4 bytes of a counter?
That's still relatively secure. Block ciphers are random permutations, so as long as the plaintext block XOR'ed with the IV is doesn't collide wi... |
> But, what if the Initialization vector is computed with some number of random bits and then some counter. For example, 12 bytes of random data plus 4 bytes of a counter?
That's still relatively secure. Block ciphers are random permutations, so as long as the plaintext block XOR'ed with the IV is doesn't collide wi... |
I was reading LAC (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1009.pdf). They mention about high-hamming weight attacks on the CBD. To counter this, they propose CBD with fixed hamming weight.
> To prevent high hamming weigh attacks, we switch to n-ary centered
> binomial distribution with fixed Hamming weight. This makes LAC co... |
I was reading LAC (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1009.pdf). They mention about high-hamming weight attacks on the CBD. To counter this, they propose CBD with fixed hamming weight.
> To prevent high hamming weigh attacks, we switch to n-ary centered
> binomial distribution with fixed Hamming weight. This makes LAC co... |
I am working on generating pseudo random numbers from a chaotic oscillator's signal. In literature I have read about the Nist 800-22 test used for checking randomness. I friend gave me a software "random number analyzer to use for this test. Has any one ever used this software before? Is it reliable?
If not, what rec... |
I was reading LAC (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1009.pdf). They mention about high-hamming weight attacks on the CBD. To counter this, they propose CBD with fixed hamming weight.
> To prevent high hamming weigh attacks, we switch to n-ary centered
> binomial distribution with fixed Hamming weight. This makes LAC ... |
Given the ring $R_2=\mathbb{Z}_{2}[x]/(x^8+1)$, initiate a public key encryption based on RLWE $(A,b=As+e)$ where all the parameters are selected as polynomials over the given ring. Under the assumption of brute force attack only and if the vector $s$ is 248-byte long, I have the following questions:
- is this sec... |
Is using the polynomials ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2}[x]/(x^8+1)$ in RLWE secure against brute force attack? |
I know that the normal construction for Ajtai hash functions is as follows:
Pick $n, m, q \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $n \log q < m < \frac{q}{2n^4}$ and $q = O(n^c)$ for some $c>0$, and some random matrix $A \in {\mathbb{Z}_q}^{n \times m}$. Then the Ajtai hash function $f_A: \{ 0,1 \}^m \to {\mathbb{Z}_q}^n$ is de... |
I know that the normal construction for Ajtai hash functions is as follows:
Pick $n, m, q \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $n \log q < m < \frac{q}{2n^4}$ and $q = O(n^c)$ for some $c>0$, and some random matrix $A \in {\mathbb{Z}_q}^{n \times m}$. Then the Ajtai hash function $f_A: \{ 0,1 \}^m \to {\mathbb{Z}_q}^n$ is de... |
I'm trying to decrypt a message that has been encrypted using a one-time pad with a repeated key. The encryption technique involves using the same key ($k_0$) twice: $k = k_0 \ ||\ k_0$. The length of the subkey $k_0$ is half the length of the complete key.
The formula used for encryption is
$$
(M_1 \oplus k)(M... |
I'm trying to decrypt a message that has been encrypted using a one-time pad with a repeated key. The encryption technique involves using the same key ($k_0$) twice: $k = k_0 \ ||\ k_0$. The length of the subkey $k_0$ is half the length of the complete key.
I tried to use the fact that
$$
(M_1 \oplus k) \oplus (... |
I'm trying to decrypt a message that has been encrypted using a one-time pad with a repeated key. The encryption technique involves using the same key ($k_0$) twice: $k = k_0 \ ||\ k_0$. The length of the subkey $k_0$ is half the length of the complete key.
I tried to use the fact that
$$
(M_1 \oplus k) \oplus (... |
I know that the normal construction for Ajtai hash functions is as follows:
Pick $n, m, q \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $n \log q < m < \frac{q}{2n^4}$ and $q = O(n^c)$ for some $c>0$, and some random matrix $A \in {\mathbb{Z}_q}^{n \times m}$. Then the Ajtai hash function $f_A: \{ 0,1 \}^m \to \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is defi... |
I was reading LAC (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1009.pdf). They mention about high-hamming weight attacks on the Centered Binomial Distribution (CBD). To counter this, they propose CBD with fixed hamming weight.
> To prevent high hamming weigh attacks, we switch to n-ary centered
> binomial distribution with fixe... |
I'm trying to decrypt a message that has been encrypted using a one-time pad with a repeated key. The encryption technique involves using the same key twice. We know the message was encrypted with ($k_0$): $k = k_0 \ ||\ k_0$ and that the length of the subkey $k_0$ is half the length of the complete key. We also know t... |
I'm trying to decrypt a message that has been encrypted using a one-time pad with a repeated key. The encryption technique involves using the same key twice. We know the message was encrypted with $k = k_0 \ ||\ k_0$ and that the length of the subkey $k_0$ is half the length of the complete key. We also know that the e... |
I'm trying to decrypt a message that has been encrypted using a one-time pad with a repeated key. The encryption technique involves using the same key twice. We know the message was encrypted with $k = k_0 \ ||\ k_0$ and that the length of the subkey $k_0$ is half the length of the complete key. We also know that the e... |
The French cybersecurity organization, [ANSSI](https://cyber.gouv.fr/), has seemed to address this comparison of purely symmetric-cryptography-based solution compared to QKD solutions. [Should quantum key distribution be used for secure communications?](https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/publication/should-quantum-key-distribu... |
in the Montgomery Curve using Affine coordinates, we have points that lie on either the (0,0) coordinate or have a y-coordinate of 0. The question here is: Can we use these points as the Generator Point (Base Point)? Because if we did, then the denominator of the slope in the point doubling process would be zero, and w... |
I'm trying to hash (as secure as resonably possible) a password inside my db.
Per user I have their email, username and password and a uuid4 to identify them.
And for the password I though of using python's hashlib library with the pbkdf2_hmac function.
It takes:
- a hash function I went with sha512
- the pa... |
I'm trying to hash (as secure as resonably possible) a password inside my db.
Per user I have their email, username and password and a uuid4 to identify them.
And for the password I though of using python's hashlib library with the pbkdf2_hmac function.
It takes:
- a hash function I went with sha512
- the pa... |
I just saw [this article][1] and many like them before where they use a video of some random movement and a hashing function to make a cryptographic random number generator
but I'm always curious why this is as "unpredictable" as they claim. These random generators, they're supposed to help with random number genera... |
We utilize a differential privacy mechanism (Laplace noise, with scale $b$) to provide the privacy of records stored within a dataset. Each individual is associated with two, and at most $k$, records. These records are represented as $(\textsf{Username}, O_i)$, where $O_i$ denotes the $i$th noisy value (generated by th... |
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