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He launched some tests with the CT RAT we exposed earlier: Here we can see a user'' Toot'' from a machine named'' toot-2a601225a8'' logging in the CT RAT and executing some commands.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a user'' Toot''", "start": 75, "end": 90 }, { "text": "some commands", "start": 168, "end": 181 } ], "action": [ { "text": "executing", "start": 158, "end": 167 ...
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The c & c IP address, 198.100.113.27, can be seen there.
{ "entities": {} }
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Other log files showed that'' Toot'' is using virtual machines for his tests.
{ "entities": {} }
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We can also see the system: Microsoft Windows XP SP3.
{ "entities": {} }
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The'' P'' field is the language ID.
{ "entities": {} }
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1028 means'' Chinese traditional''.
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We have also seen tests run by'' toot'' with a language ID of 2052, which is'' Chinese simplified''.
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The'' M'' field is probably used for versioning.
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It is a hardcoded string in the binary.
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After these tests, we could see some real connections to a victim using this RAT.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "some real connections to a victim", "start": 32, "end": 65 }, { "text": "this RAT", "start": 72, "end": 80 } ], "action": [ { "text": "using", "start": 66, "end": 71...
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Here is a follow-up of the commands launched by the bot controller, in a standard command-line shell: The attacker goes on like this, using his tools, and then ends the communication with this RAT on that computer.
{ "entities": {} }
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Please note that at this point, the attacker has at least the privileges of a local administrator, since he is allowed to write content in the system32 folder of a Windows XP system.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacker", "start": 32, "end": 44 }, { "text": "the privileges of a local administrator", "start": 58, "end": 97 }, { "text": "he", "start": 105, "end": 107 }, ...
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He could also gain the credentials to a sensitive e-mail account.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "He", "start": 0, "end": 2 }, { "text": "the credentials to a sensitive e-mail account", "start": 19, "end": 64 } ], "action": [ { "text": "gain", "start": 14, "end":...
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In addition to all information already shown, we saw Toot connect to an account on a cloud service named'' Baidu Drive''.
{ "entities": {} }
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The e-mail address linked to this account is dyanmips @qq.com (QQ-ID: 2589315828).
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We could find traces of two other e-mail accounts associated to Toot, ciscodyanmips @qq.com (QQ ID: 204156335) and ciscodynamips @qq.com (QQ ID: 1878836793).
{ "entities": {} }
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We did not find more information about user'' Toot'', yet we miss Chinese language capabilities.
{ "entities": {} }
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The controller part of CT RAT/PittyTiger RAT revealed the following'' about'' information, once translated from Chinese to English language: CT console (compatible pittytiger) v1.3 2013.12 by Trees and snow We believe this translation of the author's name might not be accurate due to the use of automated translation to...
{ "entities": {} }
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Moreover, we have strong suspicions that there is not a single individual nicknamed'' Trees and snow'' but rather two programmers nicknamed'' Trees'' and'' Snow''.
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'' Trees'' could also be'' Cold''.
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We noticed that the symbol for this word is translated differently according to the context it is used in.
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Once again, we lack Chinese language skills.
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We identify the two nicknames on the current campaign as Automn Snow (秋雪) and Cold Air Kiss (风吻寒).
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While we are confident that these people are indeed the developers of both PittyTiger and CT RAT malware, we are not sure they belong to the PittyTiger group.
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These developers might just have been hired to develop these RATs.
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They might also just be selling it to the PittyTiger group.
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There is no trace of usage from other attacking groups, we believe the PittyTiger RAT is exclusively used by this group of attackers.
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According to indicators we gathered and threat activities profiling we have some hypothesis on the way the group is conducting its operations.
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We have strong evidence of a bot operator position.
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We identify one nickname for this position, the user known as TooT.
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As we did not see other nickname, we think that TooT is one person and not a group of persons.
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We also identified a malware development position.
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We identified two nicknames for this position on the current campaign, Automn Snow (秋雪) and Cold Air Kiss (风吻寒).
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Yet we are unsure that they belong to the group, they might just be a third party providing or selling their malware.
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We have a strong suspicion of a coordinator position, which coordinates the bot operator, provides him with some logistics support (weaponized document, tools…) and reviews the programmers work.
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This position could imply a communication channel with another manager.
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We named this position'Chen', in relation with several references of this common Chinese name in c & c WHOIS and other investigation materials.
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We have some suspicion of a customer relationship manager position that may act as an interface between a customer and Chen.
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We named this position'Lilly'.
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The c & c servers used by the attackers revealed a lot of interesting files stored in various folders: This is quite the usual arsenal for a group of APT attackers: What is rare to find is the controller part of those tools.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The c & c servers", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 26, "end": 39 } ], "action": [ { "text": "used", "start": 18, "end": 22 } ...
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We have been lucky enough to get the controller part of Pitty Tiger and CT RAT, and even to get a kind of hybrid controller made for CT RAT but also supporting Pitty Tiger.
{ "entities": {} }
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We suppose that the CT RAT is the new evolution of Pitty Tiger and that it will replace Pitty Tiger in the following months.
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The presence of a Chinese version of'' calc.exe'', the official calculator provided in Microsoft Windows, is interesting.
{ "entities": {} }
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Not only is it one more indicator of a probable Chinese origin, but also an indicator that this server was probably used as a test base, in addition to being operational and controlling infected machines from different targets.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "this server", "start": 91, "end": 102 }, { "text": "infected machines from different targets", "start": 186, "end": 226 } ], "action": [ { "text": "controlling", "start": 17...
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In addition to those tools, we found some interesting scripts.
{ "entities": {} }
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A script named ipc.bat uses a file named user.txt to try to brute-force a shared folder access: The user.txt file contains thousands of lines, each one being a couple of one particular username and one password attempt: This user.txt file has been anonymized, yet we wanted to give you the feel for it.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a file named user.txt", "start": 28, "end": 49 }, { "text": "a shared folder access", "start": 72, "end": 94 } ], "action": [ { "text": "brute-force", "start": 60, "...
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This file is 67320 lines long, and uses 5610 different passwords for each of 12 users contained in this file.
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The user names are clearly the result from a user enumeration and are dedicated to a particular French victim.
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The passwords listed in this file are either build from several campaigns or from the current campaign.
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A lot of passwords are related to the targeted company and might be previous passwords from users.
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We have also discovered a pack of files which can be used to trigger an Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2014-0322).
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The date of these files, namely Tope.swf and index.html, was 2014/02/18, a few days after the revelation of existing exploits in the wild used in APT attacks.
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We do not know if the Pitty Tiger group used this exploit or not, but found no trace indicating they did.
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A lot of different attackers seem to have used that vulnerability since.
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Determining who is exactly behind an APT campaign is difficult.
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We tried to extract different technical indicators, together with contextual elements.
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Information relating to the tools used by the attackers has been leveraged for attribution: The IP addresses used for the hosting of the c & c domains are mainly located in Taipei (Taïwan) and Hong Kong City (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PRC): Most RDP connections to the c & c infrastructure come from Chine...
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The IP addresses", "start": 92, "end": 108 }, { "text": "the hosting of the c & c domains", "start": 118, "end": 150 }, { "text": "Most RDP connections to the c & c infrastructure", ...
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Yet some IP addresses in the USA and in Hong Kong have also been found; All the items listed in this chapter are strong indicators that the attackers might be Chinese.
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Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011.
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Pitty Tiger is effective and mature in the use of targeted malware, the use of known exploits to infect computers with their malware and the creation of an infrastructure to efficiently conduct APT attacks.
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Pitty Tiger", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "computers", "start": 104, "end": 113 }, { "text": "their malware", "start": 119, "end": 132 } ], "action": [ ...
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They are quite unprofessional in their way of using their infrastructure: they do launch vulnerability scanners directly from a c & c server and also use their connection for personal activities (downloading pornographic material for example, as we have seen a whole folder on a c & c server full of xxx torrent links).
{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "they", "start": 74, "end": 78 }, { "text": "vulnerability scanners", "start": 89, "end": 111 }, { "text": "a c & c server", "start": 126, "end": 140 } ], "acti...
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Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers.
{ "entities": {} }
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The attackers lack the experience and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers.
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We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector.
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One governmental network has been targeted by the group, yet we do not have any evidence of the purpose of this attack.
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We suppose this particular attack has been executed to provide a usable bounce for the group.
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The campaign we studied has been largely focused on one particular target.
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We suspect the Pitty Tiger group to work according to an opportunistic business model: this group might offer its services to third parties from the private sector.
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This group seems to be very small compared to other APT groups.
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We have leveraged several profiles and could identify some attackers to a certain extent.
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We believe this group might keep working as it is now, with limited budgets, or grow to extend its attacking campaign capabilities.
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This list of indicators is provided in order to help people detect Pitty Tiger APT campaign.
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Domains used by the Pitty Tiger group: (please note several subdomains are used, as seen in the report)
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