input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
The Control panel for the Epic motherships also sets the language to codepage'' 1251'': Codepage 1251 is commonly used to render Cyrillic characters. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There are other indications that the attackers are not native English language speakers: The sample e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f that was delivered to several Epic victims as an upgraded backdoor, has the compilation code page language set to'' LANGRUSSIAN''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The sample e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f",
"start": 89,
"end": 132
},
{
"text": "several Epic victims",
"start": 155,
"end": 175
},
{
"text": "an upgraded backdoor",
"start": 179... | [] |
The threat actor behind the'' Epic'' operation uses mainly hacked servers to host their proxies. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The hacked servers are controlled through the use of a PHP webshell. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This shell is password protected; the password is checked against an MD5 hash: The MD5'' af3e8be26c63c4dd066935629cf9bac8'' has been solved by Kaspersky Lab as the password'' kenpachi''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In February 2014 we observed the Miniduke threat actor using the same backdoor on their hacked servers, although using a much stronger password. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Miniduke threat actor",
"start": 29,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "the same backdoor",
"start": 61,
"end": 78
},
{
"text": "their hacked servers",
"start": 82,
"end": 102
... | [] |
Once again, it is also interesting to point out the usage of Codepage 1251 in the webshell, which is used to render Cyrillic characters. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There appears to be several links between Turla and Miniduke, but we will leave that for a future blogpost. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
On some of the C & C servers used in the Epic attacks, we were able to identify detailed victim statistics, which were saved for debugging purposes by the attackers. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "detailed victim statistics",
"start": 80,
"end": 106
},
{
"text": "debugging purposes",
"start": 129,
"end": 147
},
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 151,
"end": 164
... | [] |
This is the country distribution for the top 20 affected countries by victim's IP: According to the public information available for the victims' IPs, targets of'' Epic'' belong to the following categories: When G-Data published their Turla paper, there were few details publicly available on how victims get infected wi... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Our analysis indicates this is a sophisticated multi-stage infection; which begins with Epic Turla. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is used to gain a foothold and validate the high profile victim. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "the high profile victim",
"start": 45,
"end": 68
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "validate",
"start": 36,
"end": 44
}
... | [] |
If the victim is interesting, they get upgraded to the Turla Carbon system. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "they",
"start": 30,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "the Turla Carbon system",
"start": 51,
"end": 74
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "upgraded",
"start": 39,
"end": 47
}
... | [] |
Most recently, we observed this attack against a Kaspersky Lab user on August 5, 2014, indicating the operation remains fresh and ongoing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services customers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Contact: intelreports @kaspersky.com We would like to add the following at the end of the blogpost, right before the detection names: If you'd like to read more about Turla/Uroburos, here's a few recommendations: | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In this day and age of interconnected cloud services and distributed content delivery networks (CDNs), it is important for both CDN service providers and security professionals alike to recognize and understand the risks that these systems can introduce within an modern enterprise. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For organizations within both public and private sectors that leverage CDN platforms to dynamically deliver web content, it is important that the content is also routinely monitored. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Otherwise, malicious third-party content can be loaded into a target organization's website without their knowledge, delivering untold risks to unwitting visitors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) recently observed a targeted cross-site scripting (XSS)'' drive-by'' attack that leveraged a single content delivery network resource to distribute a malicious Java applet via nearly all of the major official Government of Afghanistan websites. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a targeted cross-site scripting (XSS)'' drive-by'' attack",
"start": 71,
"end": 128
},
{
"text": "a single content delivery network resource",
"start": 144,
"end": 186
},
{
"text": "distrib... | [] |
The compromised CDN resource in question is a JavaScript file hosted at [http:] //cdn.afghanistan [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] af/scripts/gop-script.js The domain cdn.afghanistan [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] af is a legitimate CDN site used by the Afghan Ministry of Communications and IT (MCIT) to host web content that is displayed and used on many official gov.af websites. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The javascript URL ([http:] //cdn.afghanistan [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] af/scripts/gop-script.js) is called from numerous official Afghan Government websites, including the following: It is likely that this javascript URL itself is normally legitimate, but the attackers obtained access to the file and prepended the following malicious JavaScript functions to the beginning of the script: ... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Judging by the last modified timestamp on the HTTP response of gop-script.js, which is Tue, 16 Dec 2014 08:07:06 GMT, this malicious CDN compromise was very recent in nature. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In fact, it occurred on the very same day that China's Prime Minister Li Keqiang would meet with Abdullah Abdullah, the Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan in Astana Kazakhstan, they would discuss infrastructure development and bilateral cooperation issues. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Looking at the EXIF metadata of the image of Keqiang meeting with Abdullah that is hosted on the Chinese embassy website we note a Tue, 16 December 2014 07:43:31 modify time as well as the www.news [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] cn watermark in the bottom righthand corner. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This indicates that the image of Keqiang and Abdullah was likely taken and edited sometime prior to 07:43:31. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While it is ambiguous as to which timezone the edits actually took place in (Kazakhstan or China) we assume the date timestamp references GMT because the press release states'' In the afternoon of December 15 local time…'' If we assume the photograph and afternoon meeting took place sometime prior to 13:43 Alma-Ata sta... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The modification of the gop-script.js by the attackers at 08:07:06 GMT likely tracks extremely close to a window of a few hours in which Keqiang met with Abdullah. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is worth mentioning that a similar scenario occurred on June 20th when security researcher PhysicalDrive0 observed a malicious Java file hosted on the Embassy of Greece in Beijing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At the time, a Chinese delegation led by Keqiang was visiting Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras in Athens. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Security researcher R136a1 aka'' thegoldenmessenger'' released a followup blog with detailed analysis of the Greek embassy compromise. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While these two separate events are not directly related, additional research into the status of ministerial and official government websites on or around the dates of notable Chinese delegations and or bilateral meetings may yield additional patterns of interest. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Upon closer inspection of the prepended malicious JavaScript code, one will notice the similarity in the update.javaplug-in [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com naming convention and URL structure to the C2 domain java-se [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com found in the Palo Alto Networks blog post Attacks on East Asia using Google Code for Command and Control and associated with Operation Poisoned Hurricane. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, the malicious document.write driveby URLs listed above both result in 403 Forbidden errors as of December 18, 2014. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While the 403 Forbidden errors may seem like an analytic dead end, the TCIRT also identified a malicious Java applet submission to VirusTotal that confirms the nature of this malicious activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This Java applet, SHA1: 388E6F41462774268491D1F121F333618C6A2C9A, has no antivirus detections as of December 21st. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The applet contains its malicious class file at the path'' jre7u61windows/x86/Update.class''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This class file downloads and decodes an XOR 0xC8 encoded Windows PE executable payload from [http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png, hosted on the official Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs site, which was also affected by the gop-script XSS. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This class file",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "an XOR 0xC8 encoded Windows PE executable payload",
"start": 38,
"end": 87
},
{
"text": "[http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35... | [] |
Using historic context archived within ThreatConnect, the TCIRT concluded that this Java applet is from the same source code as the applet SHA1: ADC162DD909283097E72FC50B7AB0E04AB8A2BCC, which was previously observed by the TCIRT at the Operation Poisoned Hurricane related URL [http:] //jre7.java-se [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com/java.jar on August 15, 2014. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This applet has the same class path, and downloads an XOR 0xFF encoded payload executable from the URL [https:] //amco- triton.co [.] jp/js/dl/in.jpg. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This applet",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "an XOR 0xFF encoded payload executable",
"start": 51,
"end": 89
},
{
"text": "the URL [https:] //amco- triton.co [.] jp/js/dl/in.jpg",
... | [] |
Additional indicators and context associated with this particular Java driveby activity can be found in the ThreatConnect Common Community Incident 20140815A: The XOR 0xC8 encoded payload downloaded from [http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png decodes into the Windows PE executable SHA1: This executable is a... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The XOR 0xC8 encoded payload",
"start": 159,
"end": 187
},
{
"text": "[http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png",
"start": 204,
"end": 254
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "downl... | [] |
This same certificate was also used to sign the Java applet that downloaded this malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This executable drops the following files: Malicious DLL that loads into the above dllhost.exe, using a similar DLL sideloading technique to that most commonly associated with the PlugX backdoor. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This executable",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "the following files",
"start": 22,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "Malicious DLL",
"start": 43,
"end": 56
},
{
... | [] |
This backdoor connects to the faux Oracle Java themed command and control (C2) domain oracle0876634.javaplug-in [.] com. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This backdoor",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "the faux Oracle Java themed command and control (C2) domain oracle0876634.javaplug-in [.] com",
"start": 26,
"end": 119
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
Note that javaplug-in [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com is the same root domain found in the compromised version of [http:] //cdn.afghanistan [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] af/scripts/gop-script.js as [http:] //update.javaplug- in [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] com/o/j.js, confirming that this Java malware is in fact directly associated with the Afghan MCIT CDN XSS compromise. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Full indicators of this activity and a YARA rule to detect the malware certificate can be found in the ThreatConnect Common Community under Incident 20141217A: Afghan Government Java Driveby and signature APTOnAndOncert.yara. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As the US and NATO reduce their troop levels in Afghanistan, China is posturing to fill the gap of influence that the west is leaving behind. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
With plans to facilitate multilateral peace talks with the Taliban and establish major transportation projects which aim to bolster the Afghan economy, Beijing has been eyeing Afghanistan as part of its broader South Asian strategy. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
By exploiting and co-opting Afghan network infrastructure that is used by multiple ministerial level websites, Chinese intelligence services would be able to widely distribute malicious payloads to a variety of global targets using Afghanistan's government websites as a topical and trusted distribution platform, exploi... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Chinese intelligence services",
"start": 111,
"end": 140
},
{
"text": "malicious payloads",
"start": 176,
"end": 194
},
{
"text": "a variety of global targets",
"start": 198,
... | [] |
This being a variant of a typical'' watering-hole'' attack, the attackers will most likely infect victims outside the Afghan government who happened to be browsing any one of the CDN client systems, specifically, partner states involved in the planned troop reduction. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "a variant of a typical'' watering-hole'' attack",
"start": 11,
"end": 58
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "being",
"start": 5,
"e... | [] |
It is important to consider that corporate enterprises are not immune to this tactic, and this is not just a technique that is used by APT threat actors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If an enterprise's website leverages a CDN to speed up content delivery, unintended consequences must be anticipated. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Fortunately, modern browsers now implement a security concept called'' Content Security Policy''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As long as the server's response headers are configured properly, third party content may be restricted to originating from a narrow whitelist. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Just as attackers distribute malicious content to users en masse or CDN services distribute web content to users, security professionals must be able to quickly distribute actionable Threat Intelligence in formats readable by both humans and machines. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
ThreatConnect is the industry's first comprehensive Threat Intelligence Platform that enables enterprises to orchestrate the aggregation of Threat Intelligence from multiple sources, use integrated analytics and a robust API that gives enterprises the control to action their own Threat Intelligence, in the cloud and on... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Register for a free account now to view the Common Community shares and more. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Two years ago, we published our research into RedOctober, a complex cyber-espionage operation targeting diplomatic embassies worldwide. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We named it RedOctober because we started this investigation in October 2012, an unusually hot month. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
After our announcement in January 2013, the RedOctober operation was promptly shut down and the network of C & Cs was dismantled. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As usually happens with these big operations, considering the huge investment and number of resources behind it, they don't just'' go away'' forever. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Normally, the group goes underground for a few months, redesigns the tools and the malware and resume operations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
See: Since January 2013, we've been on the lookout for a possible RedOctober comeback. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One possible hit was triggered when we observed Mevade, an unusual piece of malware that appeared late in 2013. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Mevade C & C name styles as well as some other technical similarities indicated a connection to RedOctober, but the link was weak. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It wasn't until August 2014 that we observed something which made us wonder if RedOctober is back for good. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In August 2014, some of our users observed targeted attacks with a variation of CVE-2012-0158 and an unusual set of malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We did a quick analysis of the malware and it immediately stood out because of certain unusual things that are not very common in the APT world. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Some of the filenames used in the attacks included: At least one of them immediately reminded us of RedOctober, which used a very similarly named spearphish:'' Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "RedOctober",
"start": 100,
"end": 110
},
{
"text": "a very similarly named spearphish:'' Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc''",
"start": 123,
"end": 189
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used",
... | [] |
As we started digging into the operation, more details emerged which supported this theory. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Perhaps the most unusual fact was that the Microsoft Office exploit didn't directly write a Windows PE backdoor on disk. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Instead, it writes an encrypted Visual Basic Script and runs it. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 9,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "an encrypted Visual Basic Script",
"start": 19,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 61,
"end": 63
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
This VBScript drops a pair of files on disk-a loader and an encrypted payload. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This VBScript",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "a pair of files",
"start": 20,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 39,
"end": 43
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
The loader appears to be different every time and internal strings indicate it is'' polymorphically'' generated. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The payload is always encrypted with a unique key, making it impossible to decrypt unless the DLL is available. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The payload",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "a unique key",
"start": 37,
"end": 49
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is always encrypted",
"start": 12,
"end": 31
... | [] |
We observed several different spear-phishing documents that drop uniquely named payloads. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "several different spear-phishing documents",
"start": 12,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "uniquely named payloads",
"start": 65,
"end": 88
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "drop",
"start"... | [] |
For instance, the'' qPd0aKJu.vbs'' file MD5: E211C2BAD9A83A6A4247EC3959E2A730 drops the following files: The VBS also adds a registry key: HKEYCURRENTUSER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ setting the key'' bookstore'' to the value'' regsvr32% path% \ctfmonrn.dll /s'', which ensures the malware runs every ... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "E211C2BAD9A83A6A4247EC3959E2A730",
"start": 45,
"end": 77
},
{
"text": "the following files",
"start": 84,
"end": 103
},
{
"text": "The VBS",
"start": 105,
"end": 112
... | [] |
Some of the DLL names we observed include: Some of the payload names include: The payload includes an encrypted configuration block which contains information about the C & C sever: The information from the config includes a WebDAV URL which is used for connections, a username and password, two folders on the WebDAV se... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "an encrypted configuration block",
"start": 99,
"end": 131
},
{
"text": "information about the C & C sever",
"start": 147,
"end": 180
},
{
"text": "a WebDAV URL",
"start": 223,
... | [] |
The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C & C mechanism. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The Cloud Atlas implants",
"start": 0,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "a rather unusual C & C mechanism",
"start": 33,
"end": 65
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "utilize",
"start": 25,
... | [] |
All the malware samples we've seen communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server'' cloudme.com'', a cloud services provider. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "All the malware samples we've seen",
"start": 0,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "HTTPS and WebDav",
"start": 51,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "the same server'' cloudme.com'', a cloud services provider",... | [] |
According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in Linköping, Sweden. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(Important note: we do not believe that CloudMe is in any way related to the Cloud Atlas group-the attackers simply create free accounts on this provider and abuse them for command-and-control). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Each malware set we have observed so far communicates with a different CloudMe account though. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Each malware set we have observed so far",
"start": 0,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "a different CloudMe account",
"start": 59,
"end": 86
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "communicates",
... | [] |
The attackers upload data to the account, which is downloaded by the implant, decrypted and interpreted. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "data",
"start": 21,
"end": 25
},
{
"text": "the implant",
"start": 65,
"end": 76
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is downloaded",
"start": 48,
"end": 61
}
]
}... | [] |
In turn, the malware uploads the replies back to the server via the same mechanism. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 9,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "the replies",
"start": 29,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "the server",
"start": 49,
"end": 59
},
{
"text": "th... | [] |
Of course, it should be possible to reconfigure the malware to use any Cloud-based storage service that supports WebDAV. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Here's a look at one such account from CloudMe: The data from the account: The files stored in the randomly named folder were uploaded by the malware and contain various things, such as system information, running processes and current username. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The files stored in the randomly named folder",
"start": 75,
"end": 120
},
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 138,
"end": 149
},
{
"text": "various things, such as system information, runnin... | [] |
The data is compressed with LZMA and encrypted with AES, however, the keys are stored in the malware body which makes it possible to decrypt the information from the C & C. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The data",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "LZMA",
"start": 28,
"end": 32
},
{
"text": "AES",
"start": 52,
"end": 55
}
],
"action": [
{
"text":... | [] |
We previously observed only one other group using a similar method–ItaDuke–that connected to accounts on the cloud provider mydrive.ch. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "only one other group",
"start": 23,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "accounts on the cloud provider mydrive.ch",
"start": 93,
"end": 134
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "connected",
"star... | [] |
Just like with RedOctober, the top target of Cloud Atlas is Russia, followed closely by Kazakhstan, according to data from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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