input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
It's likely that Stage 0 is responsible for setting up various extended attributes and/or registry keys and values that hold encoded versions of stages 2, 3, and potentially stages 4 and onwards. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 0",
"start": 17,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "various extended attributes and/or registry keys and values that hold encoded versions of stages 2, 3, and potentially stages 4 and onwards",
"start": 55,
"end": ... | [] |
The dropper could be transient rather than acting as an executable file and may possibly be part of the infection vector exploit code. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Stage 1 is the initial load point for the threat. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 1",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "the initial load point for the threat",
"start": 11,
"end": 48
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 8,
"end": 10
... | [] |
There are two known Stage 1 file names: These are kernel drivers that load and execute Stage 2. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "kernel drivers",
"start": 50,
"end": 64
},
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 87,
"end": 94
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "load and execute",
"start": 70,
"end": 86
}
... | [] |
These kernel drivers may be registered as a system service or may have an associated registry key to load the driver while the computer is starting up. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "kernel drivers",
"start": 6,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "the driver",
"start": 106,
"end": 116
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "load",
"start": 101,
"end": 105
}
]
... | [] |
Stage 1 simply reads and executes Stage 2 from a set of NTFS extended attributes. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 1",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 34,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "a set of NTFS extended attributes",
"start": 47,
"end": 80
}
],
"ac... | [] |
If no extended attributes are found, Stage 2 is executed from a set of registry keys. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 37,
"end": 44
},
{
"text": "a set of registry keys",
"start": 62,
"end": 84
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is executed",
"start": 45,
"end": 56
... | [] |
Stage 2 is a kernel driver that simply extracts, installs and runs Stage 3. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "kernel driver",
"start": 13,
"end": 26
},
{
"text": "Stage 3",
"start": 67,
"end": 74
}
],
"action": [
{
... | [] |
Stage 2 is not stored in the traditional file system, but is encrypted within an extended attribute or a registry key blob. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "an extended attribute or a registry key blob",
"start": 78,
"end": 122
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is encrypted",
"start": 58,
... | [] |
Stage 2 can be found encrypted in: This stage can also hide running instances of Stage 1. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "This stage",
"start": 35,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "running instances of Stage 1",
"start": 60,
"end": 88
}
],
"acti... | [] |
Once this happens, there are no remaining plainly visible code artifacts. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Similar to previous stages, Stage 2 finds and loads an encrypted version of Stage 3 from either NTFS extended attributes or a registry key blob. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 28,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "an encrypted version of Stage 3",
"start": 52,
"end": 83
},
{
"text": "either NTFS extended attributes or a registry key blob",
"start... | [] |
Stage 2 can also monitor the state of the threat. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 2",
"start": 0,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "the state of the threat",
"start": 25,
"end": 48
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "monitor",
"start": 17,
"end": 24
}
... | [] |
This stage drops the file msrdc64.dat, which appears to always be 512 bytes in size. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This stage",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "the file msrdc64.dat",
"start": 17,
"end": 37
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "drops",
"start": 11,
"end": 16
}
... | [] |
The first two bytes are used and the remaining bytes are set to zero. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The second byte indicates the exclusive maximum number of instances allowed to run, which is set to two. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This means no more than one instance should run at any time. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The first byte indicates how many instances were run or attempted to run. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Therefore, the potential combinations for the first two bytes are: Stage 3 is a kernel mode DLL and is not stored in the traditional file system. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Instead, this file is encrypted within an extended attribute or registry key blob. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this file",
"start": 9,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "an extended attribute or registry key blob",
"start": 39,
"end": 81
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is encrypted",
"start": 19,
... | [] |
Stage 3 can be found in the following locations: The file is six to seven times the size of the driver in Stage 2. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition to loading and executing Stage 4, Stage 3 offers a framework for the higher level stages. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "loading and executing",
"start": 15,
"end": 36
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 4",
"start": 37,
"end": 44
},
{
"text": "Stage 3",
"start": 46,
"end": 53
}
... | [] |
Stages 3 and above are based on a modular framework of code modules. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These modules offer functions through a private, custom interface. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Each file in stages 3 and above can'' export'' functionality to other parts of Regin. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the case of Stage 3, the following primitives are offered: These primitives are provided through a custom export methodology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Stage 3 DLL exports a wide range of functionality through a custom export methodology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The interface used to export functionality does not make use of the traditional Windows DLL export mechanism by name or ordinal. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Exported Regin methods are referenced by a tuple consisting of a major and minor number. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Stage 3 exports hundreds of methods, organized into 12 different major groups. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The numbers used vary across versions. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We acquired artifacts using two different numbering schemes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Table 2 is an example listing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
With Regin's modular nature, Stage 4 kernel modules and Stage 5 user modules (payloads) can provide functionality and export routines using the same major and minor numbering scheme. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The files for Stage 4, which are loaded by Stage 3, consist of a user-mode orchestrator and multiple kernel payload modules. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The files for Stage 4",
"start": 0,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "Stage 3",
"start": 43,
"end": 50
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are loaded",
"start": 29,
"end": 39
}
... | [] |
They are stored in two EVFS containers as files: •% System% \config\SystemAudit.Evt: Contains Stage 4 kernel drivers, which constitute the kernel mode part of Regin's payload. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
•% System% \config\SecurityAudit.Evt: Contains a user mode version of Stage 3. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The files are injected into services.exe. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When the attackers who operated Regin cleaned up compromised computers once they were finished with them, they often failed to remove Stage 4 and 5 artifacts from the system. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attackers who operated Regin",
"start": 5,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "compromised computers",
"start": 49,
"end": 70
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "cleaned up",
"start": 38,
... | [] |
Stage 4 also uses the same export methodology described in Stage 3. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Stage 5 consists of the main Regin payload functionality. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The files for Stage 5 are injected into services.exe by Stage 4. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The files for Stage 5",
"start": 0,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "services.exe",
"start": 40,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "Stage 4",
"start": 56,
"end": 63
}
],
"action":... | [] |
Stage 5 files are EVFS containers containing other files: Regin's payload involves the DLLs contained in the SystemLog.evt EVFS container. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The payload functionality differs depending on the targeted computer. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Custom payload files will likely be delivered for each specific environment. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Example payload functionality seen to date includes: Regin stores data files and payloads on disk in encrypted virtual file system files. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Regin",
"start": 53,
"end": 58
},
{
"text": "data files and payloads",
"start": 66,
"end": 89
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 93,
"end": 97
},
{
"text": "e... | [] |
Such files are accessed by the major routines 3Dh. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Files stored inside EVFS containers are encrypted with a variant of RC5, using 64-bit blocks and 20 rounds. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Files stored inside EVFS containers",
"start": 0,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "a variant of RC5",
"start": 55,
"end": 71
},
{
"text": "64-bit blocks and 20 rounds",
"start": 79,
... | [] |
The encryption mode is reverse cipher feedback (CFB). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The encryption mode",
"start": 0,
"end": 19
},
{
"text": "reverse cipher feedback (CFB)",
"start": 23,
"end": 52
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 20,
"end":... | [] |
Known extensions for EVFS containers are *.evt and *.imd. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The structure of a container is similar to the FAT file system. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One major difference is that files do not have a name; instead, they're identified using a binary tag. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The tag itself is the concatenation of a major number and a minor number. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The major number typically indicates the major function group that will handle the file. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A container starts with the header in Table 3 (little-endian ordering). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The header is followed by the file entry table (Table 4). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Each file entry is 13h+taglen bytes long. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The sectors follow (Table 5). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A sector of sectsize bytes starts with a DWORD pointing to the next sector (if the file does not fit within single sector), followed by sectsize-4 bytes of payload data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As explained above, the files are encrypted. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the files",
"start": 20,
"end": 29
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are encrypted",
"start": 30,
"end": 43
}
]
}
} | [] |
Other layers of encryption and compression may also be in place, although those would be handled by higher level components. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Regin's C & C operations are extensive. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Regin's C & C operations",
"start": 0,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "extensive",
"start": 29,
"end": 38
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are",
"start": 25,
"end": 28
}
... | [] |
These backchannel operations are bidirectional, which means either the attackers can initiate communications with compromised computers on the border network or the compromised computers can initiate communications with the attacker. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "backchannel operations",
"start": 6,
"end": 28
},
{
"text": "bidirectional",
"start": 33,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 67,
"end": 80
},
{
... | [] |
Furthermore, compromised computers can serve as a proxy for other infections and command and control can also happen in a peer-to-peer fashion. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "compromised computers",
"start": 13,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "a proxy for other infections",
"start": 48,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "command and control",
"start": 81,
"end": 10... | [] |
All communications are strongly encrypted and can happen in a two-stage fashion where the attacker may contact a compromised computer using one channel to instruct it to begin communications on a different channel. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "All communications",
"start": 0,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "a two-stage fashion",
"start": 60,
"end": 79
},
{
"text": "the attacker",
"start": 86,
"end": 98
},
{
... | [] |
Four transport protocols are available for C & C: • ICMP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded in lieu of legitimate ICMP/ping data. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Payload information",
"start": 58,
"end": 77
},
{
"text": "legitimate ICMP/ping data",
"start": 117,
"end": 142
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be encoded and embedded",
"start"... | [] |
The string'shit' is scattered in the packet for data validation. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition, CRC checks use the seed'31337'. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
• HTTP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded within cookie data under the names SESSID, SMSWAP, TW, WINKER, TIMESET, LASTVISIT, AST.NETSessionId, PHPSESSID, or phpAdsd. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Payload information",
"start": 8,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "cookie data",
"start": 63,
"end": 74
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be encoded and embedded",
"start": 32,
"en... | [] |
This information can be combined with another cookie for validation under the names USERIDTK, UID, GRID, UID=PREF=ID, TM, utma, LM, TMARK, VERSION, or CURRENT. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The C & C operations are undertaken by various modules, including major groups C373h, 19h, 9, as well as Stage 5 payloads, such as C375h and 1Bh. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The C & C operations",
"start": 0,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "various modules",
"start": 39,
"end": 54
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are undertaken",
"start": 21,
"end": ... | [] |
Regin logs data to the ApplicationLog.dat file. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Regin",
"start": 0,
"end": 5
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 11,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "the ApplicationLog.dat file",
"start": 19,
"end": 46
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
This file is not an encrypted container, but it is encrypted and compressed. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 45,
"end": 47
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is encrypted and compressed",
"start": 48,
"end": 75
}
]
}
} | [] |
Regin can be distributed with various payload modules or receive payload modules after infection. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Regin",
"start": 0,
"end": 5
},
{
"text": "various payload modules",
"start": 30,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "payload modules",
"start": 65,
"end": 80
},
{
"... | [] |
The extensible nature of Regin and its custom payloads indicate that many additional payloads are likely to exist in order to enhance Regin's capabilities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Furthermore, we have found data files accompanying payload modules that have not been recovered. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The following table describes the Stage 4 kernel payload modules and Stage 5 user mode payload modules, which we have seen several variants of Regin use. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The IIS web server log stealing module, 27E9h, is an example of a payload module that was installed after the initial infection and was specifically deployed for a particular target. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The IIS web server log",
"start": 0,
"end": 22
},
{
"text": "module",
"start": 32,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "27E9h",
"start": 40,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "a... | [] |
Only a small amount of the 64-bit Regin files have been recovered. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These samples may represent version 2.0 or their differences may possibly be solely specific to 64-bit versions of Regin. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also recovered files from infected computers that may or may not be associated with 64-bit Regin, including several variants of svcsstat.exe, a file that aims to retrieve binary data over pipes or sockets and execute the data. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "svcsstat.exe",
"start": 131,
"end": 143
},
{
"text": "a file",
"start": 145,
"end": 151
},
{
"text": "binary data",
"start": 174,
"end": 185
},
{
"text":... | [] |
The recovered files do not appear to fundamentally vary from their 32-bit counterparts, apart from a few noteworthy differences. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Regin use different file names. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These differences are shown in the first section of this paper as well as in the appendix. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Most importantly, in the 64-bit version of Regin, the names of containers are changed: The 64-bit version of Regin's Stage 1 (wshnetc.dll) is no longer a kernel mode driver, as drivers under 64-bit Windows must be signed. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Instead, Stage 1 is a user mode DLL loaded as a Winsock helper when the computer is starting up. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 1",
"start": 9,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "a Winsock helper",
"start": 46,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "the computer is starting up",
"start": 68,
"end": 95
}
],
... | [] |
Rather than loading Stage 2 from an NTFS extended attribute, Stage 1 looks for the last partition (in terms of physical location) on disk and searches for the payload in the raw sectors in this area of the disk. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Stage 1",
"start": 61,
"end": 68
},
{
"text": "the last partition (in terms of physical location) on disk",
"start": 79,
"end": 137
},
{
"text": "the payload",
"start": 155,
... | [] |
The 64-bit Regin's Stage 3 has not been recovered. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We believe that it may not exist, as the 32-bit version is a driver. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Stage 4 is an orchestrator just like its 32-bit counterpart and it uses the same major and minor values to export functionality. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
No Stage 5 payload modules have been recovered. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Regin is a highly-complex threat which has been used for large-scale data collection or intelligence gathering campaigns. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Regin",
"start": 0,
"end": 5
},
{
"text": "large-scale data collection or intelligence gathering campaigns",
"start": 57,
"end": 120
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "been used",
... | [] |
The development and operation of this threat would have required a significant investment of time and resources. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Threats of this nature are rare and are only comparable to the Stuxnet/Duqu family of malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The discovery of Regin serves to highlight how significant investments continue to be made into the development of tools for use in intelligence gathering. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Many components of Regin have still gone undiscovered and additional functionality and versions may exist. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.Regin. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Regin's data files are classified as Stage 5 components and are contained in an EVFS container. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As the data files are stored in a container, they do not have names. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Just like Stage 5 modules, they are referenced by their filetag, which is the aggregation of the major and minor identifiers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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