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Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed The Secret Service was relying on projections from the FAA and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania |
The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. ||||| The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. ||||| Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed They were getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. They were basing their information on projections |
The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. ||||| The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed They were getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. They were basing their information on projections |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed They were getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. They were basing their information on projections |
The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. ||||| The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. ||||| Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed Based on projected path |
The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. ||||| The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed Based on projected path |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed Based on projected path |
The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. ||||| The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. ||||| Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed Not based on radar return |
The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. ||||| The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed Not based on radar return |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. | Why was the Secret Service's information about United 93 flawed Not based on radar return |
Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." |
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." |
Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." |
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." |
Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Hearing the Vice President inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Hearing the Vice President inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." |
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Hearing the Vice President inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." |
Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Caps are up |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Caps are up |
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation Caps are up |
Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. ||||| Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation The Vice President inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up |
Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation The Vice President inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up |
We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. ||||| Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. ||||| The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. | What did Rice recall hearing of the President and Vice President's conversation The Vice President inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up |
The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. ||||| He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. | Who said the president signed off on the rules of engagement for the CAP The Vice President |
The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. ||||| He said the President signed off on that concept. | Who said the president signed off on the rules of engagement for the CAP The Vice President |
She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. ||||| That aircraft was United 93. | Who said the president signed off on the rules of engagement for the CAP The Vice President |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using "Spooky" missiles |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using "Spooky" missiles |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using "Spooky" missiles |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using AC-130 against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using AC-130 against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using AC-130 against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using AC-130 missiles |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using AC-130 missiles |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Using AC-130 missiles |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Developing plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Developing plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option does Zinni not recall blockin Developing plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Where did Zinni say the Pakistani would think the missiles came from India |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Where did Zinni say the Pakistani would think the missiles came from India |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Where did Zinni say the Pakistani would think the missiles came from India |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Use AC-130 gunships |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Use AC-130 gunships |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Use AC-130 gunships |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missles |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missles |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missles |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missiles |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missiles |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Not using cruise missiles |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Plans were developed to use AC-130s rather than cruise missle strikes |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Plans were developed to use AC-130s rather than cruise missle strikes |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998 Plans were developed to use AC-130s rather than cruise missle strikes |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan The Joint Staff |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan The Joint Staff |
But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan The Joint Staff |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Berger and Clarke |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Berger and Clarke |
But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Berger and Clarke |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton and officers in the Pentagon, Berger and Clarke, and John Maher- the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton and officers in the Pentagon, Berger and Clarke, and John Maher- the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations |
But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton and officers in the Pentagon, Berger and Clarke, and John Maher- the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton |
But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Who approved of plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan Shelton |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An attack on Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An attack on Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. ||||| We had to live there." | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An attack on Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. ||||| We had to live there." | What did the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship entail An AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook A little over 2000 miles |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What is the range of a spook A little over 2000 miles |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| We had to live there." | What is the range of a spook A little over 2000 miles |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | What is the range of a spook A little over 2,000 miles |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What is the range of a spook A little over 2,000 miles |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| We had to live there." | What is the range of a spook A little over 2,000 miles |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Osama Bin Laden |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Osama Bin Laden |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Osama Bin Laden |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Bin Laden |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Bin Laden |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. | Funding to kill who was denied due to fear of dictators misusing a military Bin Laden |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Uzbekistan |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government A neighbor like Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government A neighbor like Uzbekistan |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government A neighbor like Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Afghanistan's neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Afghanistan's neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Which countries were thought to have dictatorial government Afghanistan's neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Special Operations Command couldn't justify using them |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Special Operations Command couldn't justify using them |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Special Operations Command couldn't justify using them |
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