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Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. ||||| At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be With no intel about the aircraft, the take out order was issued, but it turned out to be a medivac chopper |
On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be With no intel about the aircraft, the take out order was issued, but it turned out to be a medivac chopper |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be Yes - a medevac helicopter |
Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. ||||| At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be Yes - a medevac helicopter |
On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be Yes - a medevac helicopter |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane "three seconds" |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane "three seconds" |
He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane "three seconds" |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 12 minutes |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 12 minutes |
He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 12 minutes |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 10 minutes |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 10 minutes |
He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Approximately how much time passed between when The Vice President was logged calling the President, and when the shelter first received reports of another hijacked plane 10 minutes |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about The hijacked plane |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | What did Bolten talk about The hijacked plane |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | What did Bolten talk about The hijacked plane |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about VP talking to the President, |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | What did Bolten talk about VP talking to the President, |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | What did Bolten talk about VP talking to the President, |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | What did Bolten talk about "Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order" |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | What did Bolten talk about "Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order" |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | What did Bolten talk about "Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order" |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft "Until the Aricraft drops below the radar screen" |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft "Until the Aricraft drops below the radar screen" |
Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft "Until the Aricraft drops below the radar screen" |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft 15 minutes |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft 15 minutes |
Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft 15 minutes |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft From 10:03 to 10:30 |
Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft From 10:03 to 10:30 |
Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | How long was the government monitoring the aircraft From 10:03 to 10:30 |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Did the President order the aircraft to stop Yes |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. | Did the President order the aircraft to stop Yes |
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Did the President order the aircraft to stop Yes |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order "Bolten watched the exchange" |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order "Bolten watched the exchange" |
At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. ||||| Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order "Bolten watched the exchange" |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order At the conference room table |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order At the conference room table |
At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. ||||| Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order At the conference room table |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order Conference Room |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order Conference Room |
At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. ||||| Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. | Where was Joshua Bolten when he suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order Conference Room |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him "White House" |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him "White House" |
At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him "White House" |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him Air Force One |
The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him Air Force One |
At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. | Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him Air Force One |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern Since there had been no prior discussion with the President, He wanted the President to know that the Vice President had executed the order |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern Since there had been no prior discussion with the President, He wanted the President to know that the Vice President had executed the order |
The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. ||||| Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern Since there had been no prior discussion with the President, He wanted the President to know that the Vice President had executed the order |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern No prior discussion - he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern No prior discussion - he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order |
The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. ||||| Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. | HAd there been prior discussion and what was Bolten's concern No prior discussion - he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about "No direct conversation between them" |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about "No direct conversation between them" |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about "No direct conversation between them" |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about What to do with the low-flying plane |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about What to do with the low-flying plane |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about What to do with the low-flying plane |
Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about An Order to Shoot Down the Plane |
Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. ||||| The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about An Order to Shoot Down the Plane |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. | What was the conversation between the Vice President and President about An Order to Shoot Down the Plane |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price Around 20 |
At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price Around 20 |
"There is finally some sort of sense in the market," she says. ||||| Other works also have been exceeding price estimates. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price Around 20 |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 |
At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 |
"There is finally some sort of sense in the market," she says. ||||| Other works also have been exceeding price estimates. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 prints |
At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 prints |
"There is finally some sort of sense in the market," she says. ||||| Other works also have been exceeding price estimates. | How many of Alfred Stieglitz's prints sold at a record price 21 prints |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Photo portfolio |
Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Photo portfolio |
At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. ||||| This information used to be poorly documented and largely anecdotal, says Beth Gates-Warren of Sotheby's. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Photo portfolio |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Christie's |
Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Christie's |
At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. ||||| This information used to be poorly documented and largely anecdotal, says Beth Gates-Warren of Sotheby's. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Christie's |
Price records are being set at auctions this week. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Photographs |
Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. ||||| At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Photographs |
At Christie's, a folio of 21 prints from Alfred Stieglitz's "Equivalents" series sold for $396,000, a single-lot record. ||||| This information used to be poorly documented and largely anecdotal, says Beth Gates-Warren of Sotheby's. | Which entities are setting auction price records this week Photographs |
Most in demand: classic photographs by masters such as Stieglitz and Man Ray. ||||| Price records are being set at auctions this week. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Alfred Stieglitz |
Most in demand: classic photographs by masters such as Stieglitz and Man Ray. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Alfred Stieglitz |
But much contemporary work is also fetching "a great deal of money," says Miles Barth of the International Center of Photography. ||||| PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTING gains new stature as prices rise. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Alfred Stieglitz |
Most in demand: classic photographs by masters such as Stieglitz and Man Ray. ||||| Price records are being set at auctions this week. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Man Ray |
Most in demand: classic photographs by masters such as Stieglitz and Man Ray. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Man Ray |
But much contemporary work is also fetching "a great deal of money," says Miles Barth of the International Center of Photography. ||||| PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTING gains new stature as prices rise. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Man Ray |
Most in demand: classic photographs by masters such as Stieglitz and Man Ray. ||||| Price records are being set at auctions this week. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Man Ray and Alfred Stieglitz |
Most in demand: classic photographs by masters such as Stieglitz and Man Ray. ||||| Corporations and museums are among the serious buyers, giving greater market stability, says Robert Persky of the Photograph Collector. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Man Ray and Alfred Stieglitz |
But much contemporary work is also fetching "a great deal of money," says Miles Barth of the International Center of Photography. ||||| PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTING gains new stature as prices rise. | Which photographers are setting auction price records this week Man Ray and Alfred Stieglitz |
More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. ||||| Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. ||||| In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 The FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information |
In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. ||||| The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. ||||| In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 The FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information |
This statement was incorrect. ||||| NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. ||||| As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 The FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information |
More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. ||||| Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. ||||| In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 Transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction |
In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. ||||| The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. ||||| In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 Transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction |
This statement was incorrect. ||||| NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. ||||| As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 Transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction |
More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. ||||| Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. ||||| In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 The FAA's ability to notify the military in a timely and useful manner was overstated |
In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. ||||| The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. ||||| In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. | What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/1 The FAA's ability to notify the military in a timely and useful manner was overstated |
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