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Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Speical Operations Command didn't think the intelligence was good enough |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Speical Operations Command didn't think the intelligence was good enough |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Speical Operations Command didn't think the intelligence was good enough |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence was not good enough to justify it |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence was not good enough to justify it |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence was not good enough to justify it |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enoughto justify it |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enoughto justify it |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enoughto justify it |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed.Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed.Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed.Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enough |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enough |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were the AC 130's never deployed The intelligence wasn't good enough |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Zinni |
Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Zinni |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who lobbied for the decision paper written by the Joint Staff Zinni |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans.He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret |
He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans.He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans.He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about That Bin Laden would locate himself in cities in the future and that Pakistani authorities would not get proper warning |
He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about That Bin Laden would locate himself in cities in the future and that Pakistani authorities would not get proper warning |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about That Bin Laden would locate himself in cities in the future and that Pakistani authorities would not get proper warning |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden would locate himself in cities and that Pakastani authories would not get proper warning |
He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden would locate himself in cities and that Pakastani authories would not get proper warning |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden would locate himself in cities and that Pakastani authories would not get proper warning |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden locating himself in US cities in the future |
He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden locating himself in US cities in the future |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. | What were the two things that Zinni worried about Bin Laden locating himself in US cities in the future |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Deployment of the AC-gunships |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| We had to live there." | What option did Zinni deny blocking Deployment of the AC-gunships |
Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Deployment of the AC-gunships |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using the AC-130 in an attack on Bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| We had to live there." | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using the AC-130 in an attack on Bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan |
Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using the AC-130 in an attack on Bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using AC-130s to attack al Qaeda |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| We had to live there." | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using AC-130s to attack al Qaeda |
Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What option did Zinni deny blocking Using AC-130s to attack al Qaeda |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the option was feasible |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| We had to live there." | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the option was feasible |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the option was feasible |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought it was feasible but that serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| We had to live there." | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought it was feasible but that serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought it was feasible but that serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia |
After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. ||||| Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the AC-130 option feasible |
Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. ||||| We had to live there." | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the AC-130 option feasible |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | What did the head of special operation command think of the optio He thought the AC-130 option feasible |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. | Did Schoomaker claim the AC-130 to be expensive or feasible Feasible |
Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. ||||| We had to live there." | Did Schoomaker claim the AC-130 to be expensive or feasible Feasible |
Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | Did Schoomaker claim the AC-130 to be expensive or feasible Feasible |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Bases in the middle east would be required for re-fueling |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Bases in the middle east would be required for re-fueling |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Bases in the middle east would be required for re-fueling |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Zinni opposed their use but he doesn't remember it |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Zinni opposed their use but he doesn't remember it |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Zinni opposed their use but he doesn't remember it |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because their deployment would serious preparation for any such operations |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because their deployment would serious preparation for any such operations |
The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. ||||| Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. | Why were AC-130s never deployed Because their deployment would serious preparation for any such operations |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton in the Pentagon |
Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton in the Pentagon |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton in the Pentagon |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Officers in the Pentagon |
Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Officers in the Pentagon |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Officers in the Pentagon |
After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. ||||| Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton |
Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton |
Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. ||||| After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. | Who with the help of officers decided to use a plane called "spooky" against Kandahar Shelton |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles |
Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia |
Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option Both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia |
The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. ||||| The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The AC-130's limited range would require building bases in the Middle East or South Asia |
The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. ||||| Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The AC-130's limited range would require building bases in the Middle East or South Asia |
Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. ||||| But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. | What is the most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections about the AC-130 Option The AC-130's limited range would require building bases in the Middle East or South Asia |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, Cheney and Bush |
On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, Cheney and Bush |
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. ||||| At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, Cheney and Bush |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, President, Fleischer |
On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, President, Fleischer |
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. ||||| At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. | Who was a part of this conversation Bolten, President, Fleischer |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. | Who was a part of this conversation "President's press secretary" |
On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who was a part of this conversation "President's press secretary" |
Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. ||||| At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. | Who was a part of this conversation "President's press secretary" |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed Joshua Bolten - The engage order |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed Joshua Bolten - The engage order |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed Joshua Bolten - The engage order |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted to confirm the President |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted to confirm the President |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted to confirm the President |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted the engage order confirmed |
At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. ||||| Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted the engage order confirmed |
Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. ||||| Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. | Who at the White House asked the Vice President to get in Touch with the President and what was top be confirmed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten wanted the engage order confirmed |
The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." ||||| Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. ||||| Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. | Had there been previous intel regarding the low flying aircraft and what did it turn out to be With no intel about the aircraft, the take out order was issued, but it turned out to be a medivac chopper |
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