Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
APT | B-Hack | 0.913937 | 172 | Since at least 2014, FireEye has observed B-Hack targeting B- I- with a vested interest in Vietnam's B-, B- I-, and B- I- . | 518 |
LOC | Vietnam's | 0.776365 | 172 | Since at least 2014, FireEye has observed B-Hack targeting B- I- with a vested interest in Vietnam's B-, B- I-, and B- I- . | 519 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.469131 | 173 | B-Hack operations are characterized through deployment of signature malware payloads including WINDSHIELD, KOMPROGO, SOUNDBITE, and PHOREAL . | 520 |
MAL | WINDSHIELD, KOMPROGO, SOUNDBITE, | 0.90456 | 173 | B-Hack operations are characterized through deployment of signature malware payloads including WINDSHIELD, KOMPROGO, SOUNDBITE, and PHOREAL . | 521 |
MAL | PHOREAL | 0.902248 | 173 | B-Hack operations are characterized through deployment of signature malware payloads including WINDSHIELD, KOMPROGO, SOUNDBITE, and PHOREAL . | 522 |
TIME | 2017, | 0.881568 | 174 | In 2017, B- I- content in lures used by the B-Hack provided evidence that they were likely used to target members of the Vietnam B- in Australia as well as B- I- in the Philippines . | 523 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.554968 | 174 | In 2017, B- I- content in lures used by the B-Hack provided evidence that they were likely used to target members of the Vietnam B- in Australia as well as B- I- in the Philippines . | 524 |
LOC | Vietnam | 0.881429 | 174 | In 2017, B- I- content in lures used by the B-Hack provided evidence that they were likely used to target members of the Vietnam B- in Australia as well as B- I- in the Philippines . | 525 |
LOC | Australia | 0.885476 | 174 | In 2017, B- I- content in lures used by the B-Hack provided evidence that they were likely used to target members of the Vietnam B- in Australia as well as B- I- in the Philippines . | 526 |
LOC | Philippines | 0.883682 | 174 | In 2017, B- I- content in lures used by the B-Hack provided evidence that they were likely used to target members of the Vietnam B- in Australia as well as B- I- in the Philippines . | 527 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.616228 | 175 | B-Hack often deploys these backdoors along with the commercially-available Cobalt Strike BEACON backdoor . | 528 |
MAL | Cobalt Strike BEACON backdoor | 0.858721 | 175 | B-Hack often deploys these backdoors along with the commercially-available Cobalt Strike BEACON backdoor . | 529 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.558489 | 176 | B-Hack often deploys these backdoors along with the commercially-available Cobalt Strike backdoor . | 530 |
MAL | Cobalt Strike backdoor | 0.875335 | 176 | B-Hack often deploys these backdoors along with the commercially-available Cobalt Strike backdoor . | 531 |
SECTEAM | FireEye | 0.916256 | 177 | Based on incident response investigations, product detections, and intelligence observations along with additional publications on the same B-Hack, FireEye assesses that B-Hack is a B-Hack I-Hack I-Hack aligned with Vietnamese government interests . | 532 |
LOC | Vietnamese | 0.606354 | 177 | Based on incident response investigations, product detections, and intelligence observations along with additional publications on the same B-Hack, FireEye assesses that B-Hack is a B-Hack I-Hack I-Hack aligned with Vietnamese government interests . | 533 |
LOC | Vietnam-based | 0.545818 | 178 | B-Hack, also known as B-Hack, is believed to be a Vietnam-based B-Hack I-Hack that has become increasingly sophisticated in its attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). | 534 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.403806 | 178 | B-Hack, also known as B-Hack, is believed to be a Vietnam-based B-Hack I-Hack that has become increasingly sophisticated in its attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). | 535 |
SECTEAM | Volexity | 0.91753 | 179 | While Volexity does not typically engage in attempting attribution of any B-Hack I-Hack, Volexity does agree with previously reported assessments that B-Hack is likely operating out of Vietnam . | 536 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.906727 | 179 | While Volexity does not typically engage in attempting attribution of any B-Hack I-Hack, Volexity does agree with previously reported assessments that B-Hack is likely operating out of Vietnam . | 538 |
LOC | Vietnam | 0.916313 | 179 | While Volexity does not typically engage in attempting attribution of any B-Hack I-Hack, Volexity does agree with previously reported assessments that B-Hack is likely operating out of Vietnam . | 539 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.465165 | 180 | During that phase, the B-Hack operated a fileless PowerShell-based infrastructure, using customized PowerShell payloads taken from known offensive frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit and Nishang . | 540 |
MAL | customized PowerShell | 0.842077 | 180 | During that phase, the B-Hack operated a fileless PowerShell-based infrastructure, using customized PowerShell payloads taken from known offensive frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit and Nishang . | 541 |
MAL | Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit | 0.877834 | 180 | During that phase, the B-Hack operated a fileless PowerShell-based infrastructure, using customized PowerShell payloads taken from known offensive frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit and Nishang . | 542 |
MAL | Nishang | 0.917681 | 180 | During that phase, the B-Hack operated a fileless PowerShell-based infrastructure, using customized PowerShell payloads taken from known offensive frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit and Nishang . | 543 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.881689 | 181 | However, over the past few years, we have been tracking a separate, less widely known suspected Iranian B-Hack with potential destructive capabilities, whom we call B-Hack . | 544 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.906384 | 181 | However, over the past few years, we have been tracking a separate, less widely known suspected Iranian B-Hack with potential destructive capabilities, whom we call B-Hack . | 546 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.795196 | 182 | Our analysis reveals that B-Hack is a capable B-Hack that has carried out B- I- I- since at least 2013 . | 548 |
TIME | 2013 | 0.925516 | 182 | Our analysis reveals that B-Hack is a capable B-Hack that has carried out B- I- I- since at least 2013 . | 549 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.489557 | 183 | We assess B-Hack works at the behest of the Iranian government . | 550 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.768777 | 183 | We assess B-Hack works at the behest of the Iranian government . | 551 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.66791 | 184 | B-Hack has targeted organizations – B- I- I- – headquartered in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea . | 552 |
LOC | United States, Saudi Arabia | 0.834446 | 184 | B-Hack has targeted organizations – B- I- I- – headquartered in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea . | 553 |
LOC | South Korea | 0.888193 | 184 | B-Hack has targeted organizations – B- I- I- – headquartered in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea . | 554 |
SECTEAM | Cybereason | 0.927773 | 185 | Cybereason also attributes the recently reported Backdoor.Win32.Denis to the B-Hack I-Hack, which at the time of this report's writing, had not been officially linked to this B-Hack I-Hack . | 555 |
MAL | Backdoor.Win32.Denis | 0.916592 | 185 | Cybereason also attributes the recently reported Backdoor.Win32.Denis to the B-Hack I-Hack, which at the time of this report's writing, had not been officially linked to this B-Hack I-Hack . | 556 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.880571 | 186 | B-Hack has shown particular interest in organizations in the B- I-, as well as organizations in the B- I- with ties to B- production . | 557 |
TIME | mid-2016 | 0.926782 | 187 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised a U.S. | 558 |
TIME | early 2017, | 0.810432 | 187 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised a U.S. | 559 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.665927 | 187 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised a U.S. | 560 |
LOC | U.S. | 0.900097 | 187 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised a U.S. | 561 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.89485 | 188 | B- in the B- I- and targeted a B- I- located in Saudi Arabia with aviation holdings . | 562 |
TIME | mid-2016 | 0.928938 | 189 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised organizations located in Saudi Arabia and U.S. | 563 |
TIME | early 2017, | 0.865003 | 189 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised organizations located in Saudi Arabia and U.S. | 564 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.909641 | 189 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised organizations located in Saudi Arabia and U.S. | 565 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.91621 | 189 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised organizations located in Saudi Arabia and U.S. | 566 |
LOC | U.S. | 0.921411 | 189 | From mid-2016 through early 2017, B-Hack compromised organizations located in Saudi Arabia and U.S. | 567 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.582908 | 191 | During the same time period, B-Hack also targeted companies in South Korea involved in B- I- and B- . | 568 |
LOC | South Korea | 0.918684 | 191 | During the same time period, B-Hack also targeted companies in South Korea involved in B- I- and B- . | 569 |
TIME | May 2017, | 0.920434 | 192 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target a Saudi B- and a South Korean B- I- using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian B- I- . | 570 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.912003 | 192 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target a Saudi B- and a South Korean B- I- using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian B- I- . | 571 |
LOC | Saudi | 0.921658 | 192 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target a Saudi B- and a South Korean B- I- using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian B- I- . | 572 |
LOC | South Korean | 0.911393 | 192 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target a Saudi B- and a South Korean B- I- using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian B- I- . | 573 |
FILE | malicious file | 0.891998 | 192 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target a Saudi B- and a South Korean B- I- using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian B- I- . | 574 |
LOC | Saudi Arabian | 0.915659 | 192 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target a Saudi B- and a South Korean B- I- using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian B- I- . | 575 |
TIME | May 2017, | 0.922981 | 193 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target organizations in Saudi and South Korea using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies . | 576 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.912699 | 193 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target organizations in Saudi and South Korea using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies . | 577 |
LOC | Saudi | 0.906353 | 193 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target organizations in Saudi and South Korea using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies . | 578 |
LOC | South Korea | 0.90266 | 193 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target organizations in Saudi and South Korea using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies . | 579 |
FILE | malicious file | 0.908737 | 193 | More recently, in May 2017, B-Hack appeared to target organizations in Saudi and South Korea using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies . | 580 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.913697 | 194 | We assess the targeting of multiple companies with aviation-related partnerships to Saudi Arabia indicates that B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vi... | 582 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia's | 0.900098 | 194 | We assess the targeting of multiple companies with aviation-related partnerships to Saudi Arabia indicates that B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vi... | 583 |
LOC | Iran's | 0.917731 | 194 | We assess the targeting of multiple companies with aviation-related partnerships to Saudi Arabia indicates that B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vi... | 585 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.894982 | 194 | We assess the targeting of multiple companies with aviation-related partnerships to Saudi Arabia indicates that B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vi... | 586 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.898146 | 195 | B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vis Saudi Arabia . | 587 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia's | 0.901103 | 195 | B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vis Saudi Arabia . | 588 |
LOC | Iran's | 0.918726 | 195 | B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vis Saudi Arabia . | 589 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia | 0.897852 | 195 | B-Hack may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia's military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making vis a vis Saudi Arabia . | 591 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.575966 | 196 | The generalized targeting of organizations involved in B- and B- mirrors previously observed targeting by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack, indicating a common interest in the sectors across Iranian B-Hack . | 592 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.689159 | 196 | The generalized targeting of organizations involved in B- and B- mirrors previously observed targeting by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack, indicating a common interest in the sectors across Iranian B-Hack . | 593 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.894013 | 197 | B-Hack sent spear phishing emails to B- whose jobs related to the B- I- . | 595 |
ACT | spear phishing | 0.925232 | 197 | B-Hack sent spear phishing emails to B- whose jobs related to the B- I- . | 596 |
TOOL | emails | 0.919038 | 197 | B-Hack sent spear phishing emails to B- whose jobs related to the B- I- . | 597 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.770162 | 198 | B-Hack registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian B- I- and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi's military and commercial fleet . | 598 |
LOC | Saudi Arabian | 0.901185 | 198 | B-Hack registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian B- I- and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi's military and commercial fleet . | 599 |
LOC | Western | 0.883053 | 198 | B-Hack registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian B- I- and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi's military and commercial fleet . | 600 |
LOC | Saudi's | 0.77373 | 198 | B-Hack registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian B- I- and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi's military and commercial fleet . | 601 |
IDTY | military | 0.730982 | 198 | B-Hack registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian B- I- and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi's military and commercial fleet . | 602 |
IDTY | commercial | 0.558274 | 198 | B-Hack registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian B- I- and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi's military and commercial fleet . | 603 |
MAL | APT33 malware | 0.929082 | 199 | We identified APT33 malware tied to an Iranian persona who may have been employed by the Iranian government to conduct B- I- I- against its adversaries . | 604 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.89834 | 199 | We identified APT33 malware tied to an Iranian persona who may have been employed by the Iranian government to conduct B- I- I- against its adversaries . | 605 |
APT | B-Hack's | 0.893855 | 200 | B-Hack's targeting of organizations involved in B- and B- most closely aligns with nation-state interests, implying that the B-Hack I-Hack is most likely government sponsored . | 607 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.686903 | 201 | B-Hack leverages popular Iranian hacker tools and DNS servers used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 608 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.818282 | 201 | B-Hack leverages popular Iranian hacker tools and DNS servers used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 609 |
PROT | DNS | 0.609933 | 201 | B-Hack leverages popular Iranian hacker tools and DNS servers used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 610 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.910614 | 202 | This coupled with the timing of operations – which coincides with Iranian working hours – and the use of multiple Iranian hacker tools and name servers bolsters our assessment that B-Hack may have operated on behalf of the Iranian government . | 613 |
MAL | name servers | 0.871161 | 202 | This coupled with the timing of operations – which coincides with Iranian working hours – and the use of multiple Iranian hacker tools and name servers bolsters our assessment that B-Hack may have operated on behalf of the Iranian government . | 615 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.920175 | 202 | This coupled with the timing of operations – which coincides with Iranian working hours – and the use of multiple Iranian hacker tools and name servers bolsters our assessment that B-Hack may have operated on behalf of the Iranian government . | 616 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.774802 | 203 | The publicly available backdoors and tools utilized by B-Hack – including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell – are all available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian B-Hack, and used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 618 |
MAL | NANOCORE, NETWIRE, | 0.905208 | 203 | The publicly available backdoors and tools utilized by B-Hack – including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell – are all available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian B-Hack, and used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 619 |
MAL | ALFA Shell | 0.860891 | 203 | The publicly available backdoors and tools utilized by B-Hack – including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell – are all available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian B-Hack, and used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 620 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.891173 | 203 | The publicly available backdoors and tools utilized by B-Hack – including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell – are all available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian B-Hack, and used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 621 |
ACT | B-Hack, | 0.354828 | 203 | The publicly available backdoors and tools utilized by B-Hack – including NANOCORE, NETWIRE, and ALFA Shell – are all available on Iranian hacking websites, associated with Iranian B-Hack, and used by other suspected Iranian B-Hack I-Hack . | 623 |
APT | B-Hack's | 0.88624 | 204 | B-Hack's focus on B- may indicate the group's desire to gain insight into regional B- capabilities to enhance Iran's aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making . | 626 |
LOC | Iran's | 0.92039 | 204 | B-Hack's focus on B- may indicate the group's desire to gain insight into regional B- capabilities to enhance Iran's aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making . | 627 |
LOC | Iran's B- | 0.817194 | 204 | B-Hack's focus on B- may indicate the group's desire to gain insight into regional B- capabilities to enhance Iran's aviation capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making . | 628 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.685067 | 205 | Specifically, the targeting of organizations in the B- and B- I- indicates that the B-Hack is likely in search of strategic intelligence capable of benefitting a B- or B- sponsor . | 629 |
APT | B-Hack's | 0.885699 | 206 | B-Hack's focus on B- may indicate the group's desire to gain insight into regional military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's B- capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making . | 630 |
LOC | Iran's | 0.923072 | 206 | B-Hack's focus on B- may indicate the group's desire to gain insight into regional military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran's B- capabilities or to support Iran's B- and strategic decision making . | 632 |
FILE | B- I- | 0.792464 | 207 | We expect B- I- will continue to cover a broad scope of targeted entities, and may spread into other regions and sectors as Iranian interests dictate . | 633 |
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