Type stringclasses 20
values | Text stringlengths 1 236 | Score float64 0.22 0.96 | Original Sentence ID int64 0 6.64k | Original Sentence stringlengths 6 383 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 16.8k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
LOC | Iranian | 0.881464 | 207 | We expect B- I- will continue to cover a broad scope of targeted entities, and may spread into other regions and sectors as Iranian interests dictate . | 634 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia, | 0.907297 | 208 | The B-Hack B-Hack I-Hack (aka B-Hack) has remained highly active over the past three years, attacking at least 50 organizations in Saudi Arabia, the United States, and a range of other countries . | 635 |
LOC | United States, | 0.857427 | 208 | The B-Hack B-Hack I-Hack (aka B-Hack) has remained highly active over the past three years, attacking at least 50 organizations in Saudi Arabia, the United States, and a range of other countries . | 636 |
TIME | May 16, 2019 | 0.929985 | 209 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 637 |
SECTEAM | FireEye's Advanced Practices | 0.908192 | 209 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 638 |
APT | B-Hack, | 0.744065 | 209 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 639 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.913467 | 209 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 640 |
LOC | Saudi Arabia, | 0.91169 | 210 | The B-Hack I-Hack (aka B-Hack) has remained highly active over the past three years, attacking at least 50 organizations in Saudi Arabia, the United States, and a range of other countries . | 641 |
LOC | United States, | 0.867537 | 210 | The B-Hack I-Hack (aka B-Hack) has remained highly active over the past three years, attacking at least 50 organizations in Saudi Arabia, the United States, and a range of other countries . | 642 |
TIME | May 16, 2019 | 0.929514 | 211 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 643 |
SECTEAM | FireEye's Advanced Practices | 0.911782 | 211 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 644 |
APT | B-Hack, | 0.494092 | 211 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 645 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.920199 | 211 | On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining " suspected B- I- " to B-Hack, operating at the behest of the Iranian government . | 646 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.897657 | 212 | B-Hack has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea . | 647 |
TIME | 2012 | 0.922129 | 212 | B-Hack has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea . | 648 |
LOC | South Korea | 0.91275 | 212 | B-Hack has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea . | 649 |
TIME | 2017, | 0.897591 | 213 | In 2017, B-Hack expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including B-, B-, B-, B-, B- and B- I- . | 650 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.858436 | 213 | In 2017, B-Hack expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including B-, B-, B-, B-, B- and B- I- . | 651 |
LOC | Korean peninsula | 0.918367 | 213 | In 2017, B-Hack expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including B-, B-, B-, B-, B- and B- I- . | 652 |
LOC | Japan, Vietnam | 0.904565 | 213 | In 2017, B-Hack expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including B-, B-, B-, B-, B- and B- I- . | 653 |
LOC | Middle East, | 0.910462 | 213 | In 2017, B-Hack expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including B-, B-, B-, B-, B- and B- I- . | 654 |
TIME | 2017, | 0.895884 | 214 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a company in Middle East that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country . | 655 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.660444 | 214 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a company in Middle East that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country . | 656 |
LOC | Middle East | 0.878911 | 214 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a company in Middle East that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country . | 657 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.900427 | 214 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a company in Middle East that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country . | 658 |
LOC | Iranian | 0.915491 | 215 | While not conclusive by itself, the use of publicly available Iranian hacking tools and popular Iranian B- I- may be a result of B-Hack's familiarity with them and lends support to the assessment that B-Hack may be based in Iran . | 659 |
MAL | B- I- | 0.876724 | 215 | While not conclusive by itself, the use of publicly available Iranian hacking tools and popular Iranian B- I- may be a result of B-Hack's familiarity with them and lends support to the assessment that B-Hack may be based in Iran . | 660 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.867295 | 215 | While not conclusive by itself, the use of publicly available Iranian hacking tools and popular Iranian B- I- may be a result of B-Hack's familiarity with them and lends support to the assessment that B-Hack may be based in Iran . | 661 |
LOC | Iran | 0.914769 | 215 | While not conclusive by itself, the use of publicly available Iranian hacking tools and popular Iranian B- I- may be a result of B-Hack's familiarity with them and lends support to the assessment that B-Hack may be based in Iran . | 662 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.90349 | 216 | North Korean defector and human rights-related targeting provides further evidence that B-Hack conducts operations aligned with the interests of North Korea . | 663 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.912203 | 216 | North Korean defector and human rights-related targeting provides further evidence that B-Hack conducts operations aligned with the interests of North Korea . | 664 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.909262 | 216 | North Korean defector and human rights-related targeting provides further evidence that B-Hack conducts operations aligned with the interests of North Korea . | 665 |
TIME | 2017, | 0.875814 | 217 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a Middle Eastern B- that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country (read on for a case study). | 666 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.594187 | 217 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a Middle Eastern B- that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country (read on for a case study). | 667 |
LOC | Middle Eastern | 0.865473 | 217 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a Middle Eastern B- that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country (read on for a case study). | 668 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.894907 | 217 | In 2017, B-Hack targeted a Middle Eastern B- that entered into a joint venture with the North Korean government to provide B- I- to the country (read on for a case study). | 669 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.517212 | 218 | B-Hack targeted a B- I-, B- I-, and B- associated with different North Korean human rights issues and B- I- . | 670 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.90126 | 218 | B-Hack targeted a B- I-, B- I-, and B- associated with different North Korean human rights issues and B- I- . | 671 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.90204 | 219 | B-Hack distributed SLOWDRIFT malware using a lure referencing the Korea Global Forum against B- and B- I- located in South Korea . | 672 |
MAL | SLOWDRIFT malware | 0.916588 | 219 | B-Hack distributed SLOWDRIFT malware using a lure referencing the Korea Global Forum against B- and B- I- located in South Korea . | 673 |
LOC | South Korea | 0.911506 | 219 | B-Hack distributed SLOWDRIFT malware using a lure referencing the Korea Global Forum against B- and B- I- located in South Korea . | 674 |
LOC | Middle East | 0.836036 | 220 | We believe a organization located in Middle East was targeted by B-Hack because it had been involved with a North Korean B- and a business deal went bad . | 675 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.910748 | 220 | We believe a organization located in Middle East was targeted by B-Hack because it had been involved with a North Korean B- and a business deal went bad . | 676 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.920355 | 220 | We believe a organization located in Middle East was targeted by B-Hack because it had been involved with a North Korean B- and a business deal went bad . | 677 |
IDTY | B- | 0.636482 | 220 | We believe a organization located in Middle East was targeted by B-Hack because it had been involved with a North Korean B- and a business deal went bad . | 678 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.402699 | 221 | In one instance, B-Hack weaponized a video downloader application with KARAE malware that was indiscriminately distributed to South Korean victims through torrent websites . | 679 |
MAL | KARAE malware | 0.916083 | 221 | In one instance, B-Hack weaponized a video downloader application with KARAE malware that was indiscriminately distributed to South Korean victims through torrent websites . | 680 |
LOC | South Korean | 0.904246 | 221 | In one instance, B-Hack weaponized a video downloader application with KARAE malware that was indiscriminately distributed to South Korean victims through torrent websites . | 681 |
SECTEAM | FireEye | 0.924229 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 682 |
TIME | November 2017, | 0.914682 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 683 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.917847 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 684 |
VULNAME | zero-day | 0.92569 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 685 |
TOOL | Adobe Flash | 0.898862 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 686 |
VULID | CVE-2018-4878, | 0.915284 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 687 |
MAL | DOGCALL malware | 0.913732 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 688 |
LOC | South Korean | 0.906645 | 222 | FireEye confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 689 |
SECTEAM | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence | 0.895574 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 690 |
TIME | November 2017, | 0.911319 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 691 |
APT | B-Hack | 0.920786 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 692 |
VULNAME | zero-day | 0.929838 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 693 |
TOOL | Adobe Flash | 0.898551 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 694 |
VULID | CVE-2018-4878, | 0.920359 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 695 |
MAL | DOGCALL malware | 0.909618 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 696 |
LOC | South Korean | 0.9026 | 223 | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence confirmed that since at least November 2017, B-Hack exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to South Korean victims . | 697 |
TIME | April 2017, | 0.916844 | 224 | In April 2017, B-Hack targeted South Korean B- and B- I- with the DOGCALL backdoor and RUHAPPY wiper malware . | 698 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.638894 | 224 | In April 2017, B-Hack targeted South Korean B- and B- I- with the DOGCALL backdoor and RUHAPPY wiper malware . | 699 |
LOC | South Korean | 0.9026 | 224 | In April 2017, B-Hack targeted South Korean B- and B- I- with the DOGCALL backdoor and RUHAPPY wiper malware . | 700 |
MAL | DOGCALL backdoor | 0.871253 | 224 | In April 2017, B-Hack targeted South Korean B- and B- I- with the DOGCALL backdoor and RUHAPPY wiper malware . | 701 |
MAL | RUHAPPY wiper malware | 0.82968 | 224 | In April 2017, B-Hack targeted South Korean B- and B- I- with the DOGCALL backdoor and RUHAPPY wiper malware . | 702 |
APT | B-Hack's | 0.852319 | 225 | It is possible that B-Hack's distribution of KARAE malware via torrent websites could assist in creating and maintaining botnets for future distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) B-, or for other B- such as financially motivated B- or disruptive operations . | 703 |
MAL | KARAE malware | 0.920852 | 225 | It is possible that B-Hack's distribution of KARAE malware via torrent websites could assist in creating and maintaining botnets for future distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) B-, or for other B- such as financially motivated B- or disruptive operations . | 704 |
ACT | distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) | 0.701058 | 225 | It is possible that B-Hack's distribution of KARAE malware via torrent websites could assist in creating and maintaining botnets for future distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) B-, or for other B- such as financially motivated B- or disruptive operations . | 705 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.909391 | 226 | We assess with high confidence that B-Hack acts in support of the North Korean government and is primarily based in North Korea . | 706 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.913323 | 226 | We assess with high confidence that B-Hack acts in support of the North Korean government and is primarily based in North Korea . | 707 |
MAL | APT37 malware | 0.922984 | 227 | The compilation times of APT37 malware is consistent with a developer operating in the North Korea time zone (UTC +8:30) and follows what is believed to be a typical North Korean workday . | 708 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.88779 | 227 | The compilation times of APT37 malware is consistent with a developer operating in the North Korea time zone (UTC +8:30) and follows what is believed to be a typical North Korean workday . | 709 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.890887 | 227 | The compilation times of APT37 malware is consistent with a developer operating in the North Korea time zone (UTC +8:30) and follows what is believed to be a typical North Korean workday . | 710 |
FILE | B- I- | 0.773961 | 228 | The majority of B- I- continues to target South Korea, North Korean B-, and organizations and individuals involved in Korean Peninsula reunification efforts . | 711 |
LOC | South Korea, North Korean | 0.913159 | 228 | The majority of B- I- continues to target South Korea, North Korean B-, and organizations and individuals involved in Korean Peninsula reunification efforts . | 712 |
LOC | Korean Peninsula | 0.916649 | 228 | The majority of B- I- continues to target South Korea, North Korean B-, and organizations and individuals involved in Korean Peninsula reunification efforts . | 713 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.457635 | 229 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a company located in Middle East in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 714 |
LOC | Middle East | 0.876282 | 229 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a company located in Middle East in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 715 |
TIME | 2017 | 0.907923 | 229 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a company located in Middle East in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 716 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.905103 | 229 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a company located in Middle East in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 717 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.905311 | 229 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a company located in Middle East in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 718 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.852346 | 230 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a Middle Eastern B- in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 719 |
LOC | Middle Eastern | 0.770771 | 230 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a Middle Eastern B- in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 720 |
TIME | 2017 | 0.909561 | 230 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a Middle Eastern B- in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 721 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.895923 | 230 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a Middle Eastern B- in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 722 |
LOC | North Korea | 0.899239 | 230 | Similarly, B-Hack targeting of a Middle Eastern B- in 2017 is also consistent with North Korean objectives given the entity's extensive relationships inside North Korea . | 723 |
TIME | May 2017, | 0.91546 | 231 | In May 2017, B-Hack used a bank liquidation letter as a spear phishing lure against a B- I- of a Middle Eastern B- I- . | 724 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.56204 | 231 | In May 2017, B-Hack used a bank liquidation letter as a spear phishing lure against a B- I- of a Middle Eastern B- I- . | 725 |
ACT | spear phishing lure | 0.914545 | 231 | In May 2017, B-Hack used a bank liquidation letter as a spear phishing lure against a B- I- of a Middle Eastern B- I- . | 726 |
LOC | Middle Eastern | 0.821272 | 231 | In May 2017, B-Hack used a bank liquidation letter as a spear phishing lure against a B- I- of a Middle Eastern B- I- . | 727 |
LOC | North Korean | 0.881203 | 232 | Though they have primarily tapped other tracked suspected North Korean teams to carry out the most aggressive actions, B-Hack is an additional tool available to the regime, perhaps even desirable for its relative obscurity . | 728 |
MAL | B-Hack | 0.434072 | 232 | Though they have primarily tapped other tracked suspected North Korean teams to carry out the most aggressive actions, B-Hack is an additional tool available to the regime, perhaps even desirable for its relative obscurity . | 729 |
ACT | B-Hack | 0.332102 | 233 | B-Hack is a relatively new B-Hack I-Hack, victims have been observed in Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania . | 730 |
LOC | Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait | 0.922502 | 233 | B-Hack is a relatively new B-Hack I-Hack, victims have been observed in Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania . | 731 |
LOC | Romania | 0.922499 | 233 | B-Hack is a relatively new B-Hack I-Hack, victims have been observed in Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania . | 732 |
MAL | B- I- | 0.893797 | 236 | B- I- appears to have been launched by unknown B-Hack to infect high profile targets through spear-phishing e-mails . | 733 |
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