prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unnecessary division
### Description
**Description**
RUSD.sol:91, removeRestrictions()
Division by 1 second can be removed since it is division by 1 and timestamp is already in
seconds.
**Recommendation**:
Remove division | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Users can borrow assets that they are actively using as collateral
### Description
When a user calls the `BorrowAsset` function to take out a loan, the function does not check whether the user is borrowing the same type of asset as the collateral they supplied. In other words, a user can borrow tokens from the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | oracle | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-notional-judging/issues/18
## Found by
xiaoming90
## Summary
The oracle slippage rate (`oraclePriceDeviationLimitPercent`) is used for checking the ratio of the primary and secondary tokens to be deposited into the pool.
As a result, changing the `oraclePriceDevi... | Sherlock | 5 | Notional Update #2 |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Access to raw private key and signing without additional authentication
### Description
The private key can be displayed (Figure 4.1) and used to sign arbitrary data (Figure 4.2) without additional authentication. Anyone with access to an unlocked wallet (once unlocked, it stays unlocked until the application... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Assumptions about sequential execution of order actions may be incorrect
### Description
The order documentation states that the order actions are executed sequentially: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | true | false | ## High: Signers can bypass checks to add new modules to a safe by abusing reentrancy
### Description
The `checkAfterExecution()` function has checks to ensure that new modules cannot be added by signers. This is a crucial check, because adding a new module could give them unlimited power to make any changes (with no ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | other | false | true |
`RewardDistributor` will stop accumulating fees for staker rewards once `rewardToken` supply has reached the maximum supply (1 billion).
### Vulnerability Details
[RewardDistributor.sol#L98-L138](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-golom/blob/e5efa8f9d6dda92a90b8b2c4902320acf0c26816/contracts/rewards/RewardDistrib... | Code4rena | 5 | Golom |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Potential use of malicious Lockup contract when creating an airstream from the factory
### Description
`createMerkleLL()` and `createMerkleLT()` take an address for the LockupLinear and LockupTranched contracts to be used when the streams are claimed. In the constructor of both `SablierV2MerkleLL` and `Sabl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Merge unchecked blocks
### Description
Some `unchecked` blocks can be merged:
- https://github.com/EnsoFinance/enso-weiroll/tree/9289118113f753d460a97d7c6ee72577e5c3f5eb/contracts/CommandBuilder.sol#L49
- https://github.com/EnsoFinance/enso-weiroll/tree/9289118113f753d460a97d7c6ee72577e5c3f5eb/contracts/Comman... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Changes Should Use Two-step Procedure
### Description
The critical procedures should be two step process.
See similar findings in previous Code4rena audits for reference:
https://code4rena.com/reports/2022-06-illuminate/#2-critical-changes-should-use-two-step-procedure
### Proof Of Concept
https://github.c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Fillers Can Incur a Loss Without a Chance to Revert
### Description
When fillers execute an order, they have a chance to revert at the end of their [callback](https://github.com/Uniswap/UniswapX/blob/7c5e359fc476f3e55497a8cd6f405f67af2c1dcf/src/reactors/BaseReactor.sol#L54) if the trade was not profitable f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [05] Using the Deprecated `x/params` Module
### Description
According to the documentation, the Cosmos SDK should no longer use the x/params module as it has been deprecated.
[Cosmos SDK Upgrading Guide](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/main/UPGRADING.md# xparams)
However, there are still multiple i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Does not check if `to_chain` and `to_handler` is whitelisted in `cross_chain_erc20_settlement`
### Description
### Impact
The handler does not prevent tokens from being sent to incorrect chains and handlers. If a message is sent to an incorrect handler, the failure cannot be handled through `receive_cross_... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Overwritten Assignment to state_success ✓ Fixed
### Description
In the function `verify_quotient_poly_eval_at_zeta(aproof)` we have the following two lines at the end:
```
mstore(add(state, state\_success), mload(computed\_quotient))
mstore(add(state, state\_success),eq(mload(computed\_quotient), mload(s2)))... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | true | false | ## High: Use EIP-712-style Signed Hashing to Prevent Cross-Chain Signature Replaying ✓ Fixed
### Description
The current implementation uses a raw `ecrecover` function to verify whether a user signed a data structure by hashing the data directly. This approach is susceptible to cross\-network replay attacks. To enhanc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | false | false | ## Gas: Cache required storage slots in top-level functions then pass cached values to child functions
### Description
**Description:** A common pattern of inefficiency is when parent functions read certain storage slots, then call child functions (which can themselves call other child functions), and the child functi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | oracle-manipulation | true | false | ## Low: Refactor `RepricingOracle::handleReprice`, `_assertRepricingSnapshotValidity` and `_repricingPeriodDeltas`
### Description
In `RepricingOracle::_assertRepricingSnapshotValidity` and `_repricingPeriodDeltas` there is a lot of logic around whether to use the old snapshot or not, based around if `upgradeableRepri... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect rounding directions
### Description
The issue from the first review still applies: **First review - Finding 2**
### Recommendation
Rounding direction needs to be corrected based on the signs of the numerator and denominator. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Solidity version update
### Description
**Description**
Issue is classified as Medium, because it is included to the list of standard smart contracts’
vulnerabilities. Currently used version (0.8.0) is not the last in the line, so it contradicts
standard checklist.
**Recommendation**:
You need to update ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Proposal max_voting_time Future Incompatibility
### Description
## Spl-Governance Program: Max Voting Time Attribute
The `spl-governance` program has a `max_voting_time` attribute per proposal that exists, but is not implemented yet. It is intended to allow additional optionality to set a `max_voting_time` gr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Prefer `calldata` to `memory` for external function parameters
### Description
**Description:** Prefer `calldata` to `memory` for external function parameters:
File: `src/DropBox.sol`:
**Mode:**
Fixed in commit [9776bc3](https://github.com/Earnft/dropbox-smart-contracts/commit/9776bc3f3be227afb45e22356c9887... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Optimization: Use `calldata` Instead of `memory`
### Description
**Update**
Addressed in: `c9c77fa42b93b6737d564b64a037c5e5c8ffd217`.
**File(s) affected:**`Orderbook.sol`
**Description:** Solidity's `calldata` is a read-only byte-addressable space where function arguments reside. It is more cost-effective to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: First Submission Can Be Triggered Multiple Times
### Description
The first submission multiplier can be applied multiple times if `TokenHopper.pressButton()` is called repeatedly before reaching the `firstSubmissionTriggerCutoff`. This occurs because the `generateHopperActions()` is view-only and does not mai... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | rounding | true | true | **Description:** The `OracleUniGeoDistribution` intends to compute a geometric or uniform distribution with two limits; one is arbitrarily set by the owner, and the other is derived from an external price oracle. The price of the bond is returned in terms of USD in 18 decimals before it is converted to a `sqrtPriceX96`... | Cyfrin | 5 | Bunni |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Timelock and events for governor functions
### Description
_Submitted by pauliax_
#### Impact
There are contracts that contain functions that change important parameters of the system, e.g. `OverlayV1Mothership` has `setOVL`, `initializeMarket`, `disableMarket`, `enableMarket`, `initializeCollateral`, `en... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | false | false | ## Medium: _resolveContract return value can cause failure
### Description
The [`_resolveContract` function](https://github.com/graphprotocol/contracts/blob/cab50f4975580d71cb43b5731a62b86d07d951bc/contracts/governance/Managed.sol#L132) of the `Managed` contract attempts to retrieve the address of a contract given the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Interest is not accrued before parameters are updated in `SavingsVest`
### Description
Stablecoin holders can receive wrongly calculated yield in the `SavingsVest` contract. Also, wrong vesting profit can be slashed when the protocol is under-collateralized.
### Proof of Concept
The [SavingsVest](https://... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | true | ## High: Incorrect Debt Tracking in `_updateRepaymentState`
### Description
In `CrossChainRouter.sol`, the [_updateRepaymentState](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-05-lend-audit-contest/blob/713372a1ccd8090ead836ca6b1acf92e97de4679/Lend-V2/src/LayerZero/CrossChainRouter.sol#L505) function incorrectly checks `use... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Unsafe ERC20 operations
### Description
Unsafe ERC20 operations that don't use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library have been detected. These operations may fail silently with non-compliant tokens that return false instead of reverting on failure, or tokens like `USDT` that require resetting allowances to zero bef... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `tokenWhitelistingBallotWithTheMostVotes()` returns the ballot id `0` when no proposal reaches quorum
### Description
[If no proposal votes reaches quorum](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/dao/Proposals.sol#L429), then the function will [returns its ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect Block Time Assumptions Across Chains
### Description
**File(s) affected:**`PowerloomDataMarket.sol`
**Description:** The `PowerloomDataMarket` contract assumes a fixed block time when calculating epochs per day:
The calculation assumes block times are fixed by using constant `SOURCE_CHAIN_BLOCK_TI... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Test_process_escrow failed
### Description
**Description**
When I call the tests execution I get:
thread 'test_process_escrow' panicked at 'assertion failed: `(left == right)`
left: `12040255`,
right: `12040230`', tests/lib.rs:1250:5
**Recommendation**:
Fix tests. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Users with escrowed stables are charged a penalty if TCR < MCR during the grace period
### Description
When the redemption cooldown requirement is set, users need to escrow their stables for a certain period before being able to redeem collateral. After the cooldown period, the grace period starts, and user... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent End States for Streams and Vests
### Description
Both contracts **FuroStream** and **FuroVesting** have two end states: the stream/vest can be terminated by its creator, or it can come to the end of its time period (after which it can also be terminated). When a creator terminates, the contracts d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: TRST-H-1 _calculateClaim() does not distribute boost emissions correctly
### Description
**Description:**
The function `_calculateClaim()` is responsible for the calculations of the amount of emissions a
specific veSatin is entitled to claim. The idea is to distribute emissions only to veSatin tokens
locked... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Save 1 storage read in `TokenBridge::removeReserved` by caching `sourceChainId`
### Description
`sourceChainId` is read from storage twice in `TokenBridge::removeReserved` so caching it can save 1 storage read, eg:
```solidity
function removeReserved(address _token) external nonZeroAddress(_token) onlyOwner ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Events are missing indexed attribute
### Description
Indexed event fields make them quickly accessible to off-chain tools. While this is applied across most events, few events are missing this indexed attribute for address parameters.
### Recommendation
Consider evaluating the application of the `indexed` key... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: [3] contracts/mixins/shared/ContractFactory.sol
### Description
On line [31](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-foundation/blob/792e00df42/contracts/mixins/shared/ContractFactory.sol#L31), there is a check for `_contractFactory` to see if it already has a code. I guess this is an extra check that can be rem... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | true | false | ## Medium: Blacklisted STADIUM_ADDRESS address cause fund stuck in the contract forever
### Description
The vulnerability relates to the immutability of `STADIUM_ADDRESS`. If this address is blacklisted by the token used for rewards, the system becomes unable to make transfers, leading to funds being stuck in the cont... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect Repay Rounding
### Description
## Required USDA Repayment Calculation
The required USDA repayment is calculated in `required_repay_amount_internal`. This function should round up instead of down to properly round against the user. Otherwise, for small repayment amounts, it might be possible to furth... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing rate mode assertion in `getCurrentDebt`
### Description
The `AaveV3TreasuryConnector` contract's `getCurrentDebt` method returns the variable debt for any `_rateMode != 1`, although the variable debt should only be returned when `_rateMode == 2`. This can be misleading for integrators relying on this m... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: Incompatibility with fee-on-transfer/inflationary/deflationary/rebasing tokens, on both base tokens and quote tokens, with varying impacts
### Description
The following report describes two issues with how the `SizeSealed` contract incorrectly handles several so-called "weird ERC20" tokens, in which the tok... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | false | ## Low: New EVault deployment and configuration mechanism can be tricked to gain advantages
### Description
When a new EVault is deployed, all its configuration parameters do not get set in the deployment transaction. The governor needs to set them after the deployment using dedicated setter functions (like `setCaps`).... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | flash-loan | true | false | ## Low: Error messages hardcode `USDC` but other debt tokens may be used
### Description
Error messages hardcode `USDC` but other token may be used, eg:
```solidity
function _closeLoanPositionAndReturnCollateralBalance(
// @audit debt token can be other tokens apart from USDC but error
// message hardcodes USD... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Staker can perform rewards withdrawal every overdueBlocks less 1 and have zero frozenCoinAge
### Description
Time difference accounted for in _getEffectiveAmounts() that is used for rewards computation is based on the lesser amount of time passed since last reward withdrawal and borrower's last repay. In orde... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent use of uint alias instead of uint256
### Description
Throughout the code in scope, it has been noted that there is inconsistent use of `uint` and `uint256` variable declarations, where some variables are declared as `uint` and others as `uint256`. While this does not affect the functionality of th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | false | false | ## Medium: Looping Fees Can Be Bypassed
### Description
The `RizLeverager` contract implements functionality allowing users to [loop](https://github.com/radiant-capital/riz/blob/65ca7bb55550d30388e2b2277fefe5686ab7e4e8/src/leverager/RizLeverager.sol#L193) over their positions. To do this, users must specify several pa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: [03] Owner-approved addresses are not allowed to contribute to existing `PartyGovernanceNFT` tokens during crowdfunding
### Description
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-party/blob/b23c65d62a20921c709582b0b76b387f2bb9ebb5/contracts/crowdfund/InitialETHCrowdfund.sol#L305
With the current implementation of ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Keeper fills market order using incorrect old `marketId` but newly updated position size when trader updates open order immediately before keeper processes original order
### Description
**Description:** Consider the following scenario:
1) A trader creates an order for the BTC market with position size POS_... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | false | ## Low: Missing contract-existence checks before low-level calls
### Description
Low-level calls return success if there is no code present at the specified address. In addition to the zero-address checks, add a check to verify that `.code.length > 0`
1. File: src/AxelarGateway.sol (lines [398-415](https://github.co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | true | false | ## Low: Reflected XSS in validator node endpoints leads to node shutdown via validator-gui
### Description
Report type: Websites and Applications
Target: https://github.com/shardeum/validator-gui/tree/dev
Impacts:
* Taking down the application/website
* Injection of malicious HTML or XSS through metadata
## Descr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Approving MAX_UINT amount of ERC20 tokens
### Description
Approving the maximum value of uint256 is a known practice to save gas. However, this pattern was proven to increase the impact of an attack many times in the past, in case the approved contract gets hacked.
### Recommendation
Consider approving the ex... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Setting new NSRbreaks reliability of extrapolating view functions
### Description
Context: SNst.sol#L202-L204
Description: Setting a new savings rate via SNst.file("nsr", *) does not update the interest accumula-
tor to the current time with the old savings rate. Therefore, view functions that extrapolate the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Vault 's flow caps should be constrained by the vault 's state and configuration
### Description
The current implementation of `PublicAllocator.setFlowCaps` allows the caller to update the `reallocateTo` flow caps of a vault for specific markets. The only check currently performed is that the `maxIn` and `maxOut... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | liquidation | true | false | ## Gas: # `_burnDsc` function on `DSCEngine` can be simplified
### Description
`_burnDsc` function on `DSCEngine` can be simplified to avoid extra calls.
### Impact
Gas impact **Overall gas change: -336291 (-2.229%)**
```
testRevertsIfTokenLengthDoesntMatchPriceFeeds() (gas: -40 (-0.022%))
testRevertsIfMintFails() ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Insufficient Vector Space Allocation
### Description
## Vulnerability in Ido Structure Space Calculation
There is a potential vulnerability in the space calculation for the Ido structure due to an incorrect allocation of bytes for the `vesting_schedule` vector. The current space calculation for `vesting_sc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: AttestHeader::Verify() accepts invalid confirmation level
### Description
Here `h.GetConfLevel()` is truncated to a byte. This function could accept an attestation with an invalid confirmation level. For example, `513 & 0xFF == 1`. It is unclear to us how this could be abused.
### Recommendation
Out of caution... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Unreachable code inside `sUSDeStrategy::reduceReserve`
### Description
**Description:** The last line inside `sUSDeStrategy::reduceReserve`: `revert UnsupportedToken(token);` is unreachable.
`sUSDeStrategy::reduceReserve` can be called only via `StrataCDO::reduceReserve`, which before calling `strategy.reduce... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Protocol assets can be stolen through sandwich attacks
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:**
High, as protocol assets will be lost
**Likelihood:**
High, as sandwich attacks are very common and easy to execute
**Description**
The `Capsule` contract is currently vulnerable to sandwich attack in many plac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Incorrect UPGRADER_ROLE allows unauthorized proxy upgrades leading to protocol hijacking
### Description
The `UPGRADER_ROLE` is used to enforce role-based access control, allowing the UUPS proxy to upgrade its implementation via `_authorizeUpgrade()`. However, the value of `UPGRADER_ROLE` in `AttestationInd... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: `block.timestamp` May Not Be Futureproof
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Mitigated" by the client. Addressed in: `a6db65ed39f52c04067bdcd514d2aa631905290b`. The client provided the following explanation:
> The date of timestamp overflow has been documented in the codebase for future reference (date is i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Not restricted round start
### Description
**Description**
LGEWhitelisted.sol, line 145, _applyLGEWhiteList function
For now anyone can start the purchases rounds (send tokens to _lgePairAddress, thus
triggering _applyLGEWhiteList ).
**Recommendation**:
Confirm the functionality or consider restricting for ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: `BaseConicPool._setWeightToZero()` does not update `Controller.lastWeightUpdate` leading to excessive minting of rewards
### Description
Rewards for pool rebalancing when calling `BaseConicPool.depositFor()` grow proportionally to `Controller.lastWeightUpdate`:
```
function computeRebalancingRewards
...
ui... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Repay paused but Liquidation enabled
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
The protocol can enter a state where repay is paused for borrowers but liquidation is open.
Given the volatility of the market, this state will prevent borrowers from repaying their loans lead... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Updating FeeCollector payoutToken or payoutAmount can result in loss to fee collector or protocol
### Description
Severity: Medium Risk
Context: FeeCollector.sol#L73-L84
Description: In FeeCollector.claimFees , there is a keeper mechanism wherein when the value of fee tokens
exceeds the payoutAmount + assoc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [05] Upgradability issue
### Description
### Issue Description
The `IntentHandler` contract lacks proper upgradeability practices, which could lead to issues during future upgrades.
While the contract is designed to be upgradeable, it does not follow best practices such as defining storage gaps and ensuring ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Interest rate model update impacts the old time period
### Description
After an admin changes the interest rate model parameters by using this function
https://github.com/ibdotxyz/compound-protocol/blob/8cd45803b48552e344e22be280c9e1c03ec8644a/contracts/TripleSlopeRateModel.sol#L100
indexes will be recalcul... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: When recoverToken in DaiGoldAction contract is called, it does not update the status
### Description
**Description:** recoverToken function moves specific amount of TGLD from the auction contract to another and delete last epoch so that it can be reset and restart.
The tokens get moved but the status nextAu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: Users are unable close or add to their Lyra vault positions when price is stale or circuit breaker is tripped
### Description
Users are unable close or add to their Lyra vault positions when price is stale or circuit breaker is tripped. This is problematic for a few reasons. First is that the circuit breaker ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: Incorrect condition
### Description
The condition is incorrect here that can lead to an infinite loop: https://github.com/mixbytes/lido-dot-ksm/blob/76a10efa5f223c4c613f26794802b8fb9bb188e1/contracts/Lido.sol#L748
### Recommendation
We recommend changing `||` into `&&`. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Lack of market maker address check
### Description
A flaw has been detected within the [`placeOrder`](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/09b6188e028650b9c1758010846080c5f8c80f8e/src/OnchainLOB.sol#L313) function of the `LOB` contract.
If the market maker is not a smart contract that impl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Outbound zEVM cross-chain messages ignore the user-specified gas limit and may fail with an out-of-gas error
### Description
Cross-chain Zeta messages originating from the zEVM have the user-specified destination gas limit ignored (hardcoded to `90000`), potentially causing the transaction to fail with an o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | reentrancy | false | false | ## Medium: Unnecessary usage of `nonReentrant` modifier on `ReferralManager::completeFirstPurchase`
### Description
`ReferralManager::completeFirstPurchase` has in place the `nonReentrant` modifier from the `ReentrancyGuardTransientUpgradeable` library, but this function is not susceptible to reentrancy.
- The caller ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: `TimeLock` cannot schedule the same calls multiple times
### Description
_Submitted by cmichel_
The `TimeLock.schedule` function reverts if the same `targets` and `data` fields are used as the `txHash` will be the same.
This means one cannot schedule the same transactions multiple times.
Imagine the delay... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | token | true | true | ## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/main/contracts/Trading.sol#L689-L750
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/main/contracts/Trading.sol#L762-L810
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tigris/blob/main/contracts/GovNFT.sol#L287-L294
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
Call... | Code4rena | 4 | Tigris Trade |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | initialization | false | false | ## Gas: Avoid redundant ownership checks in MintForwarder.initialize
### Description
The `MintForwarder.initialize` function has the `onlyOwner` modifier which validates the ownership of `msg.sender`. It then performs `transferOwnership` which again validates the ownership of `msg.sender`.
### Recommendation
Consider... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Weak role management and lack of robust access control in UniswapV2Factory.sol
### Description
The `UniswapV2Factory.sol` contract defines key role-based setters (`feeToSetter` and `routerSetter`) responsible for managing critical contract configurations, such as fees and router settings. However, the current ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: XMozToken should sanitize whitelist changes better
### Description
The `updateTransferWhitelist()` allows adding an account that is already in the whitelist, or
removing one that isn't in it. Consider checking the return value of `add()`/`remove()` operations. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: OPTIMIZE UNSIGNED INTEGER COMPARISON
### Description
The check != 0 costs less gas compared to > 0 for unsigned integers in require statements with the optimizer enabled. While it may seem that > 0 is cheaper than !=0, this is only true without the optimizer enabled and outside a require statement. If the opti... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: `CompoundHandler#topUp()` Using the wrong function selector makes native token `topUp()` always revert
### Description
_Submitted by WatchPug_
[compound-finance/CEther.sol#L44-L47](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/blob/v2.8.1/contracts/CEther.sol#L44-L47)
`mint()` for native cToken (... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: The price calculation in StrategyDutchAuction can be more accurate
### Description
The `StrategyDutchAuction` calculates the auction price as follows:
```solidity
uint256 duration = makerAsk.endTime - makerAsk.startTime;
uint256 decayPerSecond = (startPrice - makerAsk.minPrice) / duration;
uint256 elapsedTime... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Replace Hard-Coded Values With Constants
### Description
## SyncSpace Code Improvement
In SyncSpace, the `operationType` variable passed to the `requireAdminSignature` modifier is currently hard-coded as zero for deposits and one for withdrawals. Utilizing constant variables instead of hard-coding zero and on... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: `PreDepositVault::initialize` should not be exposed as public
### Description
**Description:** `PreDepositVault::initialize` is currently exposed as public. Based on the `pUSDeVault` and `yUSDeVault` implementations that invoke this super function, it is not intended. While this does not appear to be exploitab... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | false | false | ## Low: Reorg attack in SmartVaultManagerV5
### Description
The mint function deploys a vault contract using create1. However, some of the chains (Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum) to which the SmartVaultManagerV5 may be deployed are suspicious of the reorg attack.
### Impact
Vault's are created from the SmartVaultManager... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | true | ## Low: The try-catch block at NounsAuctionHouseFork will only catch errors that contain strings
### Description
This issue has been previously identified and documented in the Nouns Builder Code4rena Audit. The catch `Error(string memory)` within the `try/catch` block in the `_createAuction` function only catches rev... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Tier information upgrading flow likely not designed
### Description
We outline that updating Tiers in `tiers` with dedicated functions do not change tier information stored at Collections in `collections`.
In addition, collection parameters related to tiers can be easily changed and thus deviate from predefin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: verifyingSigner is immutable and fully trusted
### Description
By making this variable immutable, any change to the `verifyingSigner` address will require deploying a new Paymaster. This will require several steps including withdrawing and transferring the ETH that is in the current Paymaster. If the `verifyin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: MintOnDeposit event logs amount of underlying asset
### Description
The [`MintOnDeposit` event](https://gitlab.com/aave-tech/dlp/contracts/blob/1f8e5e65a99a887a5a13ad9af6486ebf93f57d02/contracts/tokenization/AToken.sol#L94) logs the amount of underlying asset sent instead of the number of aTokens minted. This ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | true | false | ## High: Risk of reuse of signatures across forks due to lack of chainID validation
### Description
At construction, the LooksRareExchange contract computes the domain separator using the network’s `chainID`, which is fixed at the time of deployment. In the event of a post-deployment chain fork, the `chainID` cannot b... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: ShortLongSpell#openPosition uses the wrong balanceOf when determining how much collateral to put
### Description
The _doPutCollateral subcall in ShortLongSpell#openPosition uses the balance of the uToken rather than the vault resulting in the vault tokens being left in the contract which will be stolen.
### ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Redundant Check in ERC4626Router
### Description
In the `_liquidate()` function of `ERC4626Router`, the function `_validateNodeAcceptsRouter()` is invoked to check that the router is compatible with the node being operated on. However, the node itself performs the same check during the call to `execute()` due ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: | Dangerous Edition Update
### Description
**Description**
The `owner` can update the `ethereum` field for an edition that has already been minted. This can lead to a state where users are shifted to a different redemption method but there are not enough funds for all users to redeem their ethernote, causi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | access-control | true | false | ## Gas: `isRestricted` checks can be skipped if `msg.sender` is the minter address
### Description
In `IndexToken.sol`, there are checks when tokens are minted, burned or transferred that nobody involved in the transaction is restricted. This functionality is used to blacklist bad actors.
These checks extend to chec... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Erroneous Gas Computation in CALL Breaks Sending Ether to a Contract
### Description
During a call to another contract, an amount of gas should be provided to the callee. The gas computation of CALL in RSKJ does not follow the yellow paper specification. In particular, it does not transfer the minimum require... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Don't update state | false | false | ## Severity: High Risk
**Context:** ExitPositionsManager.sol#L239
## Description
Morpho has a single position on Aave that encompasses all of Morpho's individual user positions that are on the pool. When this Aave Morpho position is liquidated, the user position state tracked in Morpho desyncs from the actual Aave po... | Spearbit | 5 | Morpho |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Attackers can control the vote result and amplify target gauge's share
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/zerolend/governance
Impacts:
- Manipulation of governance voting result deviating from voted outcome and resulting in a direct change from intended effect of origina... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Storage assigning may be in if statement
### Description
This assigning can be placed in if statement above
https://github.com/lidofinance/lido-dao/blob/5b449b740cddfbef5c107505677e6a576e2c2b69/contracts/0.4.24/nos/NodeOperatorsRegistry.sol#L154.
### Recommendation
It is recommended to place in if statement ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Shadowed variables in `DIAWhitelistedStaking` constructor
### Description
In the `DIAWhitelistedStaking` contract, the constructor parameters `rewardsWallet` and `rewardRatePerDay` shadow the state variables of the same name. This shadowing can lead to confusion and reduce code readability. While the current i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | false | false | ## Medium: Relying solely on oracle base slippage parameters can cause significant loss due to sandwich attacks
### Description
AaveLeverageStrategyExtension relies solely on oracle price data when determining the slippage parameter during a rebalance. This is problematic as chainlink oracles, especially mainnet, have... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: tbtc - Signer collusion may bypass increaseRedemptionFee flow ✓ Addressed
### Description
DepositRedemption.increaseRedemptionFee is used by signers to approve a signable bitcoin transaction with a higher fee, in case the network is congested and miners are not approving the lower-fee transaction.
Fee increa... | 0 |
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