prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: State Variable Access Within a Loop
### Description
State variable reads and writes are more expensive than local variable reads and writes. Therefore, it is recommended to replace state variable reads and writes within loops with a local variable. Gas savings should be multiplied by the average loop length.
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: [07] Precision loss in landlord Schnibble calculation
### Description
The current implementation of the schnibble calculation for landlords can result in significant precision loss, potentially leading to landlords receiving fewer schnibbles than they should. In extreme cases, particularly with small `schnibbl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Staking#_unstake removes votes from wrong person if msg.sender != owner
### Description
Staking#_unstake allows any msg.sender to unstake tokens for any owner that has approved them. The issue is that even when msg.sender != owner the votes are removed from msg.sender instead of owner. The result is that the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Sensitive data is archived in iCloud and iTunes backups
### Description
Magma does not explicitly exclude sensitive data from device backups, which will allow sensitive data to get exported to iTunes and iCloud backups. Apple and any attackers with access to a user’s iTunes or iCloud backup will have access... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: Optimization Of Signature Verification
### Description
## ECDSA Weakness and Recommendations
1. While `ECDSA.recover` itself does not inherently allow for full reliability, relying solely on it within `SearcherVault` and `OpportunityAdapter` for signature verification introduces a weakness. Including a unique... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Unused Constant `DELTASWAP_PROTOCOL_ID` in GammaLiquidityWarehouse Contract
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Resolved
**Location**: GammaSwapLiquidityWarehouse.sol
**Description**
The `GammaLiquidityWarehouse` contract defines a constant `DELTASWAP_PROTOCOL_ID` with a value of 3. However, this... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | true | false | ## Low: Function may run out of gas
### Description
Once the number of epochs grow to a large number, the array allocated will be large, and the number of iterations calling external functions on `ve` will also be large, leading to the function running out of gas
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
https://github.c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Anyone can steal all funds from the `market` due to incorrect health accounting for pending pnl from difference of intent price and market price when multiple intents are used.
### Description
When user opens position from signed intent, pending orders are created for 2 accounts (intent taker and maker) with ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | critical | rounding | true | true | ## Critical: Cancelling redeem requests permanently blocks the withdrawal queue
### Description
`AccountableWithdrawalQueue` can deadlock at the head if the current head entry (`_queue.nextRequestId`) is fully removed (e.g., by a cancel that zeroes `shares` and clears `controller`) without advancing `nextRequestId`.
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Missing `_disableInitializers()` call in constructor
### Description
_Resolved_
The constructor of `FunnelVaultUpgradeable` does not call [`_disableInitializers()`](https://docs.openzeppelin.com/upgrades-plugins/writing-upgradeable#initializing_the_implementation_contract), which could allow unintended initia... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unused rewards cannot be claimed back
### Description
Although highly unlikely, there is no provided mechanism to claim back unused rewards assigned to periods of time of inactivity in the pool. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Several external functions missing whenNotPaused mofifier
### Description
The following functions don’t have a `whenNotPaused` modifier while most other external functions do:
- `bumpTransfer` of `BridgeFacet`
- `forceReceiveLocal` of `BridgeFacet`
- `repayAavePortal` of `PortalFacet`
- `repayAavePortalFor` of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Unused errors can be removed
### Description
The `BunniHub__InvalidReferrer()` and `BunniToken__ReferrerAddressIsZero()` errors declared in `Errors.sol` are unused. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: The technical default of liquidity pool
### Description
In some cases, the liquidity providers can do a mass withdraw requests. It may happen on pending protocol changes and so on. However, liquidity can not be withdrawn while it is in use by a credit account. In such case, some liquidity providers may be unab... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Remove `decimals` from initial `RemoraToken` mint
### Description
`RemoraToken` overrides the `decimals` function to return 0 as its tokens are non-fractional:
```solidity
/**
* @notice Defines the number of decimal places for the token.
* RWA tokens are non-fractional and operate in whole units ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Potential Index Out of Bounds on Mint Orders
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `f6517e6f906e3c8ebda26b308c8bad8524a9748c`. The client provided the following explanation:
> check order type
**File(s) affected:**`EthenaMinting.sol`
**Description:**`EthenaMinting.mint()`... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Some dust rewards will be stuck in LiquidationRow
### Description
**Severity:** Low
**Path:** src/liquidation/LiquidationRow.sol#L360-L364
**Description:**
In `LiquidationRow::_performLiquidation` function, it swaps rewards in `fromToken` to `mainRewarder.rewardToken()`, then distributes them to all of dest... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: 9] Calling ZealousSwapFarms.setRewardToken() May Result in Inflated or Incorrect Staker Payouts
### Description
**Severity:** Low
**Path:** contracts/ZealousSwapFarms.sol#L442-L452
**Description:** The `setRewardToken() `function in `ZealousSwapFarms` allows the farm owner to update the reward token. Howeve... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: POSSIBILITY TO TRANSFER AN ARBITRARY AMOUNT OF TOKENS OUT OF SOME CONTRACTS
### Description
The **bonding-v1** and **mvp-treasury** contracts allow an admin (Brokkr team) to `transfer an arbitrary amount of tokens` out of them. Two possible attack scenarios will be described below.
\textbf{\underline{Attack ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Omnipool does not take into account pending balancer protocol fees
### Description
Omnipool does not take into account pending Balancer protocol fees, leading to an over-estimation of Balance Pool Token (BPT) valuation and under-minting of LP tokens to users interacting with Omnipool.
When depositing or wi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | true | false | ## Low: [08] Seller could deliberately refuse a purchase/forge
### Description
The `seller/forgeOwner` could deliberately refuse a purchase/forge in the `callback`/`receive` function by simply reverting. This can result in a denial of service (DoS) attack, where the `seller/forgeOwner` prevents successful transactions... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Wrong Math | true | false | ## High Risk Report
**Severity:** High Risk
**Context:** PublicVault.sol#L564
**Description:**
`VAULT_FEE` is set as an immutable argument in the construction of new vaults and is intended to be set in basis points. However, when the strategist interest rewards are calculated in `_handleStrategistInterestReward(... | Spearbit | 5 | Astaria |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: FundingFee is incorrectly accrued, leading it to always be 0.
### Description
**Severity**: Critical
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The `netFundingAmount`, which represents the funding fee amount for a trader based on the size and funding rates, is calculated and returned by the `getFundingFee()` fu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: [01] Lingering token approvals in `LandManager` may lead to unauthorized staking of Munchables
### Description
The `LandManager` contract lacks a mechanism to revoke or reset token approvals after they are granted. This could potentially allow the contract to stake Munchables without the current intent of the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Perpetual - withdraw should only be available in NORMAL state Pending
### Description
According to the [specification](https://github.com/mcdexio/documents/blob/0a44d7ec48e09e2d229a3c5b77501235d4de82b3/en/perpetual-interfaces.md) `withdraw` can only be called in `NORMAL` state. However, the implementation al... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Lack Of Check For Forbidden IDs
### Description
## Update Admin Policy Vulnerability
`update_admin_policy` in `permission.move` does not verify whether the permission ID provided is non-forbidden before allowing the setting of the admin policy. Therefore, it is possible to set the forbidden permission ID a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Some state-changing functions do not emit events
### Description
Contracts should emit events for state-changing operations to aid off-chain code (e.g., to identify whether important protocol parameters have been changed). We identified a number of state-changing functions that do not emit events:
- `upsertPl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Emit outside of for-loop to save gas (Not included in bot report)
### Description
In `slash()`, `Slash` events are emitted inside for-loops. Each event emitting has an overhead of 375 gas. Consider emitting the event outside of for-loops.
**Instance 1**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-gitcoin/blob/652... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing restriction on request data size during request lifecycle
### Description
The functions `requestServiceExecution`, `addInformationForServiceExecution`, `acceptServiceExecution`, `cancelServiceExecution`, and `disputeServiceExecution` allow users to input string data of arbitrary length.
The lack of a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | true | false | ## Medium: Slashing of re-delegated stake is computed incorrectly
### Description
When a validator is slashed due to double-signing, any stake delegated to that validator at the time of the misbehavior must also be slashed. The `orga` staking module allows delegators to transfer delegated coins from one validator to a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Use of unsafe ERC20 transfer functions and not checking return values
### Description
**Update**
The client provided the following explanation:
> SafeERC20 has been implemented.
**File(s) affected:**`EpochUpsidePoolV1.sol`
**Description:** The following lines are using the 'unsafe' ERC20 interface functions... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Price formula in `TpdaLiquidationPair._computePrice()` does not account for a jump in liquidatable balance
### Description
The linearly decreasing auction formula in `TpdaLiquidationPair._computePrice()` does not account for sudden increases in the vault's liquidatable balance, causing the price returned to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: “file” methods do not revert when “what” argument is unrecognized
### Description
Many of the DSS contracts feature one or more file methods for setting contract parameters. The contract parameter name when present (see TOB-MCD-012) is called *what*. None of the file methods revert when the *what* argument is u... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: Use `uint32` for more efficient storage packing when tracking minted and unclaimed tier box amounts
### Description
Firstly change `DropBox` storage like this for more efficient storage slot packing:
* move `vrfHandler` up to the start of the public variables
* change some non-constants to `uint32`
* group all... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | other | true | true | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-05-elfi-protocol-judging/issues/95
## Found by
blackhole, nikhil840096
## Summary
The implementation of `processExecutionFee()` didn't take `EIP-150` into consideration. Keepers can steal additional execution fee from users
## Vulnerability Detail
The issue arises on `... | Sherlock | 5 | Elfi |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: ForceWithdraw Can Be Blocked
### Description
Description
Force withdraw can be blocked since CashAsset::forceWithdraw() will withdraw the cash balance to the owner ad-
dress.
If a user controls an address which was blacklisted by USDC, then they can prevent being force withdrawn by trans-
ferring their sub acc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Chain Reorganization Attack | false | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-02-kairos-judging/issues/25
## Found by
0x52
## Summary
useLoan doesn't allow the liquidator to specify a max price they are will to pay for the collateral they are liquidating. On the surface this doesn't seem like an issue because the price is always decreasing due ... | Sherlock | 4 | Kairos Loan |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: More tokens can be retrieved from a safe via frontrunning
### Description
An attacker can retrieve more tokens from the Gnosis safe by frontrunning `executePayroll()` and increasing the `payoutAmounts[]` or adding entries with new `paymentTokens[]`, allowing them to retrieve other tokens. This situation can l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Events ✓ Fixed
### Description
Some state-changing functions do not emit an event at all or omit relevant information.
### Recommendation
Fixed in [3bbafab926df0ea39f444ef0fd5d2a6197f99a5d](https://github.com/TidalFinance/tidal-contracts-v2/tree/3bbafab926df0ea39f444ef0fd5d2a6197f99a5d) by implementin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: `emergency_shutdown` role is not enough for emergency shutdown.
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-08-cooler-judging/issues/1
## Found by
thekmj, ubermensch
There are two protocol roles, `emergency_shutdown` and `cooler_overseer`. The `emergency_shutdown` should have the abil... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Missing call type validation in _installFallbackHandler
### Description
When installing a fallback handler, there is no check that the call type is either `CALLTYPE_STATIC` or `CALLTYPE_SINGLE`. This will result in a successful installation including completion of the initialization steps. However, when the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | token | true | false | ## Gas: Optimize gas by using only named returns
### Description
The Solidity compiler can generate more efficient bytecode when using named returns. It's recommended to replace anonymous returns with named returns for potential gas savings.
Example:
40 issue instances in 6 files:
[320](https://github.com/code-42... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | flash-loan | true | false | ## Low: In `_withdrawAaveCollateral` fetch `aTokenAddress` from Aave instead of receiving as input in `refinance` as passing it to morpho and back again
### Description
**Description:** Aave's `aTokenAddress` is only required when withdrawing collateral in `_withdrawAaveCollateral`, but currently it is:
* passed in as... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: [G‑23] Use custom errors rather than `revert()`/`require()` strings to save gas
### Description
Custom errors are available from solidity version 0.8.4. Custom errors save [**\~50 gas**](https://gist.github.com/IllIllI000/ad1bd0d29a0101b25e57c293b4b0c746) each time they're hit by [avoiding having to allocate ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [09] Protocol might not be able to compromise basket when needed
### Description
Consider the following scenario:
* Protocol suffers from some loss and compromises the basket to a 1.1e9 ratio
* Months pass by and users mint new tokens and increase the TVL
* A small compromise is required (12%), this brings the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: NonfungiblePositionManager may cause losses if the tokensOwed0 overflow
### Description
The casting of `amount0` from `uint256` to `uint128` as well as the sum of `tokensOwed` can cause a loss to users of the `NonfungiblePositionManager` for tokens that have very high decimals (see NonfungiblePositionManager.s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Superfluous assignment can be removed
### Description
**Description:** The assignment of `newDuration` to `maxDuration` within `TimeWeightedIncentiveLogic::_earnedTimeWeigthed` when it exceeds this value can be removed as this case is handled in the subsequent conditional block and so is effectively a no-op.
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Bind UDP socket to localhost for liquidation process
### Description
The current implementation binds the UDP socket to "0.0.0.0:0", which is overly permissive. Binding to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) exposes the service unnecessarily, potentially allowing connections from any network interface.
### Recommendatio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | false | false | ## Low: Reentrancy on distributeOther()
### Description
## Handle
tensors
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
The distribute function can be re-entered by fake tokens or tokens with callbacks.
An attacker can use the callbacks on safeTransfer if a token has a callback to reenter an drain the entire balance of
that ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: Wrong precision when adding balance within the `restoreBridgeTransaction` function
### Description
Wrong precision when adding balance within the `restoreBridgeTransaction` function, leading to loss of assets.
### Impact
Loss of assets due to precision error, as shown in the above scenario.
### Recommendati... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: ESMS use of environment variable for chain info [Optimization] ✓ Fixed
### Description
Variables to create domain separator are hardcoded in the code, and it requires the modify code on different deployments (e.g. testnet, mainnet, etc).
### Recommendation
Fixed in [nopslip/gtc-request-signer#5](https://githu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Improper timing of WETH deposit operation
### Description
This issue has been identified within the [_placeOrder](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/70b15ec4d9e7578248141604503843716a67d875/src/HanjiLOB.sol#L998) function of the `HanjiLOB` contract.
The function processes WETH deposits bas... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | true | ## Low: Premature Hotfix Execute Possible
### Description
It is possible for the guardian account to successfully invoke `execute()` before the `RocketHotfixNodeFee` contract is “locked”, and the contract has not yet been accepted as a network contract. This is unlikely to occur and constitutes no risk to the network.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Wrong EIP-712 Transaction Type Check
### Description
In the `validateTypedTxStructure` function of the bootloader, the EIP-712 `txType` is [checked against 112](https://github.com/matter-labs/system-contracts/blob/4ad1f26ae205d5a973216d141833e0ac37d72ec8/bootloader/bootloader.yul#L1704), while it is [supposed ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: second pre-image best practice
### Description
When calculating custom [EIP-1967](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1967) storage slots, as in [Well.sol::RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT](https://github.com/BeanstalkFarms/Wells/blob/e5441fc78f0fd4b77a898812d0fd22cb43a0af55/src/Well.sol#L25), it is [best practice](https:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | false | false | ## Low: Order fill griefing via small partial fills
### Description
In `RecipeOrderbook.fillLPOrder()` and `RecipeOrderbook.fillIPOrder()`, there are checks (RecipeOrderbook.sol#L428, RecipeOrderbook.sol#L498) that require that the remaining order quantity be at least the specified fill amount. This is subject to griefin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Stale Funds Data in Leverage Validation Due to Missing Funding Rate Settlement
### Description
**Description:** In `perp_change_leverage`, the code calls `check_soc_loss` but omits `check_funding_rate` before validating leverage constraints. As a result, `check_client_leverage` uses stale funds data when comp... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Deterministic Seed in Bridge Application
### Description
The bridge application uses a time-based seeding method for its random number generator:
```
rand.Seed(uint64(time.Now().UnixNano()))
```
### Recommendation
Implement a cryptographically secure random number generator. Consider using `crypto/rand` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | liquidation | true | false | ## Gas: Only update auction.endTime if bid is within the time extension window
### Description
In the event the bid is early enough to be outside the time extension window, the auction's end time is needlessly updated to the same value. It would therefore be more gas efficient to convert the `else` case to an `else if... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: The result of external function calls should be cached rather than re-calling the function
### Description
The instances (outlined in the warden's [full report](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-alchemix-findings/issues/228)) point to the second+ call of the function within a single function | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: Project funds can be drained by reusing signatures, in some cases
### Description
_Submitted by 0xA5DF, also found by Bahurum, bin2chen, byndooa, cryptphi, hansfriese, horsefacts, kaden, Lambda, neumo, panprog, rokinot, scaraven, and sseefried_
[Project.sol#L386-L490](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-ri... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing Dependencies Exact Version Pinning
### Description
## Dependency Management
The app uses a significant amount of dependencies. Most of these dependencies are not pinned to an exact version; most are set like (^X.X.X), which will receive the most recent major version. This could enable dependency attac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: Remove unused imports
### Description
**Description:** Remove unused imports:
* `USDCBridgeV2.sol`
**Securitize:** Fixed in commit [a45cb7e](https://github.com/securitize-io/bc-securitize-bridge-sc/commit/a45cb7edcc9ec79c5e1cc30420c826e0566af827).
**Cyfrin:** Verified. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: The `QuantammCovarianceBasedRule::_calculateQuantAMMCovariance` returns a two dimensional array with a wrong dimension
### Description
The `QuantammCovarianceBasedRule::_calculateQuantAMMCovariance` function returns a two dimensional array of size `n*n by n` instead of a two dimensional array of size `n by n` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Incentives for different pools should differ by a large factor
### Description
I'm adding this as an issue because I didn't see it mentioned anywhere in the codebase, and I think its a fair point that relates to how the protocol gives out rewards to users. As I understand , the point of staking is to provid... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Underlying oracle decimals should be confirmed by `FloorPriceFeedAdaptor`
### Description
To calculate the value of the NFT in USD with 8 decimals of precision, the `FloorPriceFeedAdaptor` performs the following:
This takes the price of the NFT in ETH, multiplies it by the ETH price in USD, and divides by 1e1... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | false | false | ## Medium: LACK OF RESOURCES AND RATE LIMITING
### Description
API requests consume resources such as network, CPU, memory, and storage. This vulnerability occurs when too many requests arrive simultaneously and the API does not have enough compute resources to handle those requests. An attacker could exploit this vul... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: StakingToken.sol doesn't properly handle FOT, rebasing tokens or those with variable which will lead to accounting issues downstream
### Description
### Impact
The protocol aims to work with all sorts of ERC20 tokens including tokens that charge a fee on transfer including PAXG. Deposits and withdrawals of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Centralization Risk in Fee Distribution
### Description
In **BellumFactory** contract, the token launch function violates the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern and introduces centralization risks through fee distribution:
**1. CEI Pattern Violation:**
* External call (`sendValue`) is made before ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Cache external calls outside of loop to avoid re-calling function on each iteration
### Description
Performing STATICCALLs that do not depend on variables incremented in loops should always try to be avoided within the loop. In the following instances, we are able to cache the external calls outside of the loo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup
### Description
The `reservePrice_` parameter in the **BeraAuctionHouse** contract's `constructor`is used to set the minimum acceptable bid for auctions. However, the `constructor`does not validate this parameter to ensure it is non-zero or meets a p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | true | false | ## Medium: Incompatibility with Multi-Signature Wallets Due to .transfer Usage
### Description
The smart contract functions `slashIdleLocker`, `slashThiefLocker`, and `liquidateLocker` use Solidity's `.transfer` method to send Ether (or native tokens) to recipients. While `.transfer` is designed to prevent reentrancy ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: `BridgeToken.sendSimple()` does not call `msgInspector`
### Description
- https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/LayerZero-v2/blob/592625b9e5967643853476445ffe0e777360b906/packages/layerzero-v2/evm/oapp/contracts/oft/OFTCore.sol#L211
- https://github.com/defidotmoney/dfm-core/blob/0bde9fb784400d73f434d585aab7d9d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: TRST-M-2 Hedging won't work if token1.decimals() < token0.decimals()
### Description
**Description:**
`tickToToken0PriceInverted()` performs some arithmetic calculations. It's called by
`_getTicksAndMeanPriceFromWei()`, which is called by `hedgeDelta()`. This line can overflow:
Also, this line would rev... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: [19] Contracts should each be defined in separate files
### Description
Keeping each contract in a separate file makes it easier to work with multiple people, makes the code easier to maintain, and is a common practice on most projects. The following file contains more than one contract/library/interface.
[*U... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: No pause check in several LendingPool functions
### Description
Some methods in `LendingPool` lack checks to verify whether the contract is paused. In case of an emergency, calling these methods could pose a risk:
* [`borrow()`](https://github.com/Liquorice-HQ/contracts/blob/a5b4c6a56df589b8ea4f6c7b8cb028b1... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: NFTs Get Permanently Locked in Stability Pool After Liquidation
### Description
When a borrower is liquidated through the `finalizeLiquidation` function in the `LendingPool` contract, their NFT collateral is transferred to the `StabilityPool`. However, there is no functionality in the `StabilityPool` contract... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing reward token checks in Reward and VotingReward
### Description
Reward and VotingReward do not adequately enforce checks on whether a token is whitelisted before allowing it to be processed in the `getReward` and `notifyRewardAmount` functions. Specifically:
- **getReward function**: A valid tokenId ca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: _computeRate code implementation not matching with docs
### Description
In the IRMSynth documentation and EVK-78 specifications, it states that if the synth is trading at the target quote or below, the rate should be lowered by 10% (proportional to the previous rate). However, this does not match the code impl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Assigned Prover Signature Is Underspecified - Phase 1
### Description
The `AssignmentHook` contract is a canonical hook that can be used by proposers during block proposals. The proposer sends to the hook a signature that was given by a prover that contains [information](https://github.com/taikoxyz/taiko-mono/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration
### Description
The `constructor`of the **BeraAuctionHouse** contract directly assigns the `timeBuffer_`parameter to the `timeBuffer` state variable without validating that it adheres to the defined upper bound of **MAX\_TIME\_BUFFER**. This omission cou... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: Use Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern in `swEXIT::createWithdrawRequest`
### Description
The current implementation uses [`_safeMint`](https://github.com/SwellNetwork/v3-contracts-lst/blob/a95ea7942ba895ae84845ab7fec1163d667bee38/contracts/implementations/swEXIT.sol#L209) before modifying state variables:
* ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: `VaultPoolLib::reserve()` will store the `Pa` not attributed to user withdrawals incorrectly and leave in untracked once it expires again
### Description
[VaultPoolLib::reserve()](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-08-cork-protocol/blob/main/Depeg-swap/contracts/libraries/VaultPoolLib.sol#L12) stores the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: estimate is calculated incorrectly in Gateway
### Description
The gas estimate calculation through the `Gateway.estimate()` function is incorrect; the variables `proofCost` and `messageCost` are swapped. However, there's no current impact on the code because both values are set to be equal in the deployment sc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: | Dangerous Approve
### Description
**Description**
The `BaseToken` only exposes the dangerous `approve` function rather than an additional alternative `increaseAllowance` function.
**Recommendation**
Implement an `increaseAllowance` function so that users may increase their allowances without risk of fr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | false | false | ## Medium: Rounding-down of `flashFee` can result in calls to flash loan to revert
### Description
The [BalancerFlashLender::flashFee()](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-05-bakerfi/blob/main/contracts/core/flashloan/BalancerFlashLender.sol#L63) function returns a rounded-down fee. This `fee` is then [later used](htt... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | true | false | ## Medium: Front Running claimMessage on L1 and L2
### Description
The front-runner on L1 or L2 can front run the `claimMessage` transaction, as long as the `fee` is greater than the gas cost of the claiming the message and `feeRecipient` is not set, consequently the fee will be transferred to the `message.sender`(the... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Lack of access control on the `initialize()` function
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The `initialize()` functions of both `Hub` and `TokenManager` don’t have access control to prevent front running attacks.
And also the functions could be combined because the same var... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Business Logic | true | true | _Submitted by xiaoming90, also found by 0x52, cccz, codexploder, hyh, kenzo, Lambda, oyc_109, and zzzitron_
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/8f2697ae727c60c93ea47276f8fa128369abfe51/src/modules/Migration.sol#L334>
<https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-fractional/blob/8f2697ae727c60c93ea4727... | Code4rena | 5 | Fractional |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Liquidation process is flawed. missing incentive to call warn
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-10-aloe-judging/issues/145
## Found by
0xReiAyanami
Aloe´s Liquidation process s flawed in the way, that there is no incentive for Liquidators to call the warn function, which is ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Linear iteration over Rewards Plans in BeginBlock exposes permissionless chain halt
### Description
Rewards Plans are unboundedly iterated over in unmetered `BeginBlock` execution, allowing for an attacker to create an arbitrary number of plans and trigger a chain halt on the next block. While there is a fee ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Whitepaper Errors
### Description
## Algorithm 1 Corrections
There is a typo in Algorithm 1 in the procedure **UpdatePathToLeaf**.
## Original Procedure
The **PushFront** calls at the end of the procedure should in fact be **PushBack** calls.
## Incorrect Definition
The definition of rightmost leaf as:
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | true | false | ## Medium: Limiting the Price in the buy and onTokenTransfer Functions ✓ Fixed
### Description
When an investor tries to buy the tokens in the `Crowdinvesting` contract, the `buy` function does not allow to limit the amount of tokens that can be spent during this particular transaction:
**contracts/Crowdinvesting.so... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: TRST-M-2 Deviation from spec will result in dislocation of receiver delegate
### Description
**Description:**
The LSP0 `universalReceiver()` function looks up the receiver delegate by crafting a mapping key
type.
Mapping keys are constructed of a 10-byte prefix, 2 zero bytes and a 20-byte suffix. However,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Centralization of Critical Loan Management Functions and Parameter Configurations
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**:
Loan management functions, such as approving loans, marking loans as impaired, reversing impairment decisions, and declaring borrower defaults, ar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Usage/ Loop Concerns
### Description
**Update**
The team acknowledged the issue by stating that the input is being controlled by the UI and that no negative consequences occur in practice.
**File(s) affected:**`ElderGateway.sol`
**Description:** Gas usage is a concern for smart contract developers and users,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Lack of Event Emissions
### Description
Throughout the codebase, several instances were identified where events should be emitted.
* When `Whitelist` is deployed, the `owner` [is set](https://github.com/scroll-tech/scroll/blob/3bc8a3f5c6ac816ddffadca41024331dcf4d3064/contracts/src/L2/predeploys/Whitelist.sol... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Payout distributions to Remora token holders are diluted by initial token owner mint
### Description
**Description:** `RemoraToken::initialize` takes a parameter `_initialSupply` and mints this to `tokenOwner`:
`DividendManager::distributePayout` records the payout amount together with the current total s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: | Hold Farming Naming Not Free
### Description
**Description**
According to the docs, if an NFT is curated and is in the hold farming period, naming can be free. However, the `changeName` function still expects payment in the specified currency even if the NFT collection is curated and in the hold farming ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `x += y/x -= y` costs more gas than `x = x + y/x = x - y` for state variables
### Description
Total Instances: `2`
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L230-L231
*Gas Savings for `PrivatePool.buy`, obtained via protocol's tests: Avg 289 gas*
| | Med | Max | Avg |... | 0 |
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