prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Cache external calls outside of loop to avoid re-calling function on each iteration
### Description
Performing STATICCALLs that do not depend on variables incremented in loops should always try to be avoided within the loop. In the instance, we are able to cache the external calls outside of the loop to save a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Multiple calls to `BaseGauge::notifyRewardAmount()` override existing reward rate, causing loss of rewards for stakers
### Description
The `BaseGauge::notifyRewardAmount()` function can be called multiple times through `GaugeController.distributeRewards()`, which overrides the existing reward rate. This reset... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Use `SafeERC20` approval and transfer functions instead of standard IERC20 functions
### Description
**Description:** Use [SafeERC20::forceApprove](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#L105-L110) and `safeTransfer` functions instead of sta... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Check return value when calling `Allowlist::exchangeAllowed` and `RemoraToken::_exchangeAllowed` to prevent unauthorized transfers
### Description
`Allowlist::exchangeAllowed` will revert if the users are not allowed but when the users are both allowed, it will return a boolean determined by whether the `do... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Division by two should use bit shifting
### Description
` / 2` is the same as ` >> 1`. While the compiler uses the `SHR` opcode to accomplish both, the version that uses division incurs an overhead of [**20 gas**](https://gist.github.com/IllIllI000/ec0e4e6c4f52a6bca158f137a3afd4ff) due to `JUMP`s to and from a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unused 'Finished' auction state.
### Description
**Description**
Unused auction state. In the enum 'AuctionState', the 'Finished' field isn't used anywhere further.
programs/auction_house/src/auction.rs
Line. 78.
**Recommendation**
The 'Finished' auction state should be used further or removed.
**Re-audit ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Attacker can overwrite legitimate refundsInfo by triggering `GatewayTransferNative::onRevert`
### Description
The `GatewayTransferNative::onRevert` function allows an attacker to overwrite legitimate, pending refunds. This is because `GatewayTransferNative` used RevertMessage to do accounting of refunds. Ho... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: The function `updateMember()` change the state of the contract, but there is no emitted event, so an event should be emitted
### Description
The function `updateMember` in the restriction manager contract should emit the event `updatedMember()` with the right parameters.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: `LibFertilizer.beginBarnRaiseMigration()` incorrectly checks that Oracle supports such token
### Description
Here you can see it calls LibUsdOracle to ensure it supports token. However `LibUsdOracle.getTokenPrice()` returns 0 on failure instead of revert.
```solidity
function beginBarnRaiseMigration(address ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | false | false | ## Medium: Several issues related to policy issuance
### Description
## Denial of Service
**Type:** Denial of Service
**Target:** nucypher/keystore/keystore.py
## Difficulty: Low
- The `m` parameter is never signed.
- Alice’s signature is optional, and not included when creating a policy with `from_alice`.
- The ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: No check that seller is already registered
### Description
The `registerAsSeller` function in the `PaymentsERC20` contract [emits a `NewSeller` event](https://github.com/freeverseio/PaymentsERC20Public/blob/a95f0f6499be396c0a245f0183009b98cc72f123/contracts/Payments/PaymentsERC20.sol#L85) when a user calls it.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Contract doesn't emit any event
### Description
`LendingLedger` doesn't emit any event which can help tracking activity for offline services. For example when market is whitelisted/blacklisted, when rewards per block is set for new epochs, when user claimed rewards or when governance has changed.
### Recommen... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Back-running can neutralize curator's `unwindVault()` action
### Description
_Acknowledged_
The `TokiHook` contract provides a permissioned `unwindVault()` function, allowing a curator to withdraw funds from an external rehypothecation vault in an emergency or for rebalancing purposes. However, the contract a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: LiquidityGauge is not compliant with EIP-4626 due to MIN_SHARES constraint
### Description
According to the README, `LiquidityGauge` is supposed to comply with EIP-4626. However, it does not, because the `maxWithdraw` and `maxRedeem` functions violate the standard by not accounting for `MIN_SHARES`.
### Im... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Staking contract is not able to support native USDB/WETH
### Description
Loss of yield if USDB/WETH is used as reward token.
### Proof of Concept
From what I understood from the protocol team, they want to support any ERC20 tokens that are considered safe/well known. I believe USDB/WETH falls into this ca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Gator - Missing Runtime Verification for API Responses ✓ Fixed
### Description
The `AccountApiClient.getTokenBalanceAndMetadata()` method uses a compile time type assertion `(await response.json()) as TokenBalanceResponse` without validating the actual structure or content of every field in the response at ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Message Fee Can Be Increased by Any Account
### Description
The `TeleporterMessenger` contract allows users to [add additional fees](https://github.com/ava-labs/teleporter/blob/253b833518aa7a6448650388cc288bd76d8470a7/contracts/src/Teleporter/TeleporterMessenger.sol#L190) to a submitted message on the origin c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Lack of access modifiers on Vault.initialize leaves it susceptible to front-running
### Description
July 9, 2021 Update: The severity of this issue was initially set to high. However, we agreed to lower the severity rating after CompliFi provided the following additional context:
1. “Anyone is free to call ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: MochiTreasuryV0.withdrawLock() Is Callable When Locking Has Been Toggled
### Description
## Handle
leastwood
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
`withdrawLock()` does not prevent users from calling this function when locking has been toggled. As a result, withdraws may be made unexpectedly.
## Proof of... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: `StrategyPassiveManagerUniswap` gives ERC20 token allowances to `unirouter` but doesn't remove allowances when `unirouter` is updated
### Description
**Description:** `StrategyPassiveManagerUniswap` gives ERC20 token [allowances](https://github.com/beefyfinance/experiments/blob/14a313b76888581b05d42b6f7b609... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: All balance wasn't sent, some dust would be remained in `_sendToDistributor`
### Description
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-malt/blob/700f9b468f9cf8c9c5cffaa1eba1b8dea40503f9/contracts/RewardSystem/RewardThrottle.sol#L124-L128
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-malt/blob/700f9b468f9cf8c9c5cffaa1e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Mission Credit Price Is Inconsistent with Documentation
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `d44be2d`. The credit price is now `100 REACH` tokens.
**File(s) affected:**`ReachAffiliateDistribution.sol`
**Description:** In the documentation, it mentioned that each mission ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | true | false | ## Medium: Use of `payable.transfer()` may lock user funds
### Description
_Submitted by IllIllI, also found by 0x1f8b, 0x29A, Amithuddar, Avci, bardamu, BowTiedWardens, c3phas, cccz, codexploder, cryptphi, hake, horsefacts, hyh, Kthere, Limbooo, MEP, oyc_109, pashov, peritoflores, Ruhum, scaraven, simon135, slywa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent Sorting and Subset Validation
### Description
The `executeDstOrder` function relies on `getMatchDstAmount` from the `OrderBookConfig` contract to compute destination amounts. This function assumes that:
1. All `srcChainIds` are sorted.
2. `allSrcChainIds` is a subset of `srcChainIds`.
If these c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `sellRewards()` threshold values
### Description
At lines
https://github.com/tonkers-kuma/strategy-ssb/blob/e49d07a64ea0eb4f5a199c2bf9ea4c8aee2b313f/contracts/Strategy.sol#L295
https://github.com/tonkers-kuma/strategy-ssb/blob/e49d07a64ea0eb4f5a199c2bf9ea4c8aee2b313f/contracts/Strategy.sol#L277
The threshold... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: WALLET CONFIGURATION OVERWRITE VIA DIRECT ACCESS TO THE REGISTER PAGE
### Description
When a user directly accesses the registration page, he can overwrite the existing configuration, compromising the integrity of the wallet's setup and security.
### Recommendation
Implement proper access control checks to pr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Insecure Liquidity Valuation with Oracle Updates
### Description
This issue has been identified within the `addLiquidity` and `removeLiquidity` functions of the `LPManager` contract.
Because Pyth oracles can be updated atomically by users in the same transaction, it is possible to supply liquidity at a low ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Contract Can Be Bricked at Deployment by Donation
### Description
During initialization, there is a check to ensure `lstCollateralAmount` is zero. An attacker can send 1 wei of an LST to the vault contract before or after deployment, causing initialization to fail. If initialization fails, no other actions can... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | false | false | ## Medium: Orders with `tokenAmt` of `type(uint256).max` cannot be cancelled by `GolomTrader.sol#cancelOrder`
### Description
[GolomTrader.sol#L312-L317](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-golom/blob/e5efa8f9d6dda92a90b8b2c4902320acf0c26816/contracts/core/GolomTrader.sol#L312-L317)
Order unable to be cancelled by ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unnecessary Clone
### Description
**Description:**
The functions return Vec so we need to copy the slice on the memory to construct a new Vec.
while 'static [u8]is a reference, there is no copy needed.
Thus, we can return 'static [u8]directly.
**Recommendations:**
Change return type from Vec to 'static ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | reentrancy | true | false | ## Low: Unnecessary `BoostedIncentiveLogic` functions can be removed
### Description
* `BoostedIncentiveLogic::_updateRewardState` overrides the `BaseIncentiveLogic` implementation; however, both functions have exactly the same implementation, so there is no need to override it.
* `BoostedIncentiveLogic::updateUserBo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | liquidation | true | true |
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-07-cap-judging/issues/542
## Found by
0xsh, Drynooo, Tigerfrake, dobrevaleri, farismaulana, silver\_eth, valuevalk
### Summary
Liquidators cannot specify a minimum amount of collateral to receive during liquidation, exposing them to potential losses when slashable co... | Sherlock | 5 | Cap |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Lack of Check for Same token\_eth and recipient in the NEAR Contract
### Description
**Description:**
In the provided code snippet, a JSON object is created, containing the details for a transfer, including the token\_eth and recipient fields. However, there is no check to ensure that the token\_eth and recip... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Get rewards on withdraw
### Description
User has to make the second call of `getReward` before or after `withdraw(tokenId)`:
https://github.com/keep3r-network/StakingRewardsV3/blob/13ecc6966ae1a413f62224382bfd4d64b1a22351/contracts/StakingRewardsV3-1.sol#L257
### Recommendation
We recommend to add `getReward(... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect Version of Solidity
### Description
**Update**
The client acknowledged the issue and provided the following explanation:
> Given that dynamic tuples are not involved in the encoding process of the core protocol, so no pressing need to update the version. Moreover, updating the version would introduc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Device-to-device backups are not disabled
### Description
The Uniswap mobile wallet does not disable local device-to-device transfers. Encrypted shared preferences may be shared with other devices. While the wallet disables backups to Google Drive with the `allowBackup` flag, the newer Android version (Android... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Sanity check around transferPeriodEnds ✓ Fixed
### Description
`BaseRegistrarImplementation.acceptRegistrarTransfer` has a hardcoded limit such that only domains registered 183 days ago can be transferred in.
This imposes an implicit constraint on the `transferPeriodEnds` state variable. If the transfer peri... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `_receiverGas` check excludes minimum acceptable value
### Description
In the LayerZero bridge contracts [`BridgeLR::send`](https://github.com/YieldFiLabs/contracts/blob/40caad6c60625d750cc5c3a5a7df92b96a93a2fb/contracts/bridge/BridgeLR.sol#L76) and [`BridgeMB::send`](https://github.com/YieldFiLabs/contracts/b... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Oracles Can Claim Token Payments Without Processing the Request Callback
### Description
An Oracle can “fulfil” a request without updating state or performing useful calls to the requester. This is due to the lack of gas stipend in the external call made on line [118]. This means an Oracle, when submitting ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Missing length checks
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
In contract Voter.sol, the method `claimBribes(address[] memory _bribes, address[][] memory _tokens,uint _tokenId) ` and in contract Minter.sol, the method initializeToken(address[] memory targets, uint[] memory... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: NFT ORDER TYPE MISMATCH
### Description
The program creates two types of NFT sell orders: `SellOrder` and `LimitedEditionSale`. NFTs may be either single- or multiple edition. Edition ID is stored in NFT metadata as `edition_nonce`. Editions are identified with `u8` integer, but for single edition NFTs this pr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect yield tracking in case of amount > tracked allocation
### Description
_Resolved_
In `deallocateFromStrategy` function, yield amount is tracked as `withdrawn - amount`, however, it's incorrect because tracked strategy allocation is the actual amount forwarded to the strategy, and if the amount variab... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Casting between types without overflow checks
### Description
Throughout the codebase, there are instances of larger `uint` types being cast to smaller `uint` types without overflow checks. For example:
* In both the [`RibbonThetaVault`](https://github.com/ribbon-finance/ribbon-v2/blob/3fa3bec15ad1e2b18ad87f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Non Critical Issues：Discrepancy between code and comments
### Description
- The code implementation does not match the description provided in the corresponding comments. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Target raises can be highly damaging for dutch auctions with multiple components
### Description
Multi-component dutch auctions are fundamentally incompatible with target raises and will lead to inefficient pricing causing loss to set token.
### Impact
Pricing after target raises will likely be heavily ske... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Update State After Admin Action | false | false | ## Severity: Medium Risk
## Context
- `ERC721SeaDrop.sol#L180`
- `ERC721SeaDrop.sol#L256`
## Description
When an owner of an `ERC721SeaDrop` token creates either a public or a token gated drop by calling `updatePublicDrop` or `updateTokenGatedDrop`, the `PublicDrop.feeBps` / `TokenGatedDropStage.feeBps` is initially ... | Spearbit | 5 | SeaDrop |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing revert messages and return paths in `setUtilizationScaled` and `setMaxLeverage` functions of UniMexFactory.sol
### Description
**Description**
In contract UniMexFactory.sol in function setUtilizationScaled at lines 45 and 46 there are no revert messages in the require checks. Also, the function has a ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | initialization | true | false | ## Gas: No need to explicitly initialize variables with default values
### Description
If a variable is not set/initialized, it is assumed to have the default value (`0` for `uint`, `false` for `bool`, `address(0)` for address...). Explicitly initializing it with its default value is an anti-pattern and wastes gas.
A... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | token | false | false | ## Gas: Caching storage variables in local variables to save gas
### Description
Anytime you are reading from storage more than once, it is cheaper in gas cost to cache the variable: a SLOAD cost 100gas, while MLOAD and MSTORE cost 3 gas.
In particular, in `for` loops, when using the length of a storage array as the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Stealing Wrapped Manifest in WETH.sol
### Description
_Submitted by Soosh, also found by 0x52, 0xDjango, cccz, saian, TerrierLover, WatchPug, and zzzitron_
Allows anyone to steal all wrapped manifest from the WETH.sol contract. Attacker can also withdraw
to convert Wrapped Manifest to Manifest.
Issue in ap... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use a more recent version of Solidity
### Description
**Context:**
All contracts
**Description:**
For security, it is best practice to use the latest Solidity version.
For the security fix list in the versions;
https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/blob/develop/Changelog.md
**Recommendation:**
Old version of ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Multiple accesses of a mapping/array should use a storage pointer
### Description
Caching a mapping's value in a storage pointer when the value is accessed multiple times saves ~40 gas per access due to not having to perform the same offset calculation every time. Help the Optimizer by saving a storage variabl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | true | ## High: Trusted forwarder can take over the WalletFactory contract
### Description
The WalletFactory contract implements ERC-2771, which enables the use of a trusted forwarder to create wallets on behalf of other accounts. With the introduction of PR #110, the contract is also upgradeable. Therefore, the trusted forw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Reward Manipulation
### Description
## Vulnerability Description
An attacker may steal funds from the diamond by increasing rewards after updating an enclave before using it for validation. The reward is taken in `updateEnclave`, which posts the enclave’s cid.
## Code Snippet
The reward provided in `updat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Pausable contract management should be handled by AccessControl plugin instead of the owner.
### Description
**Description:**
In the current implementation, only the owner of the Pausable contract has the ability to pause or unpause it. This creates a potential security vulnerability, as the contract cann... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Implementing Soft Limits to Ensure Pricing Updates
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation: We are considering avoiding a fix here, since this might be counterproductive if its case 1, where an error in the oracle provides strange updates... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: A malicious early depositor can manipulate the `LP-Token` price per share to take an unfair share of future user deposits
### Description
A malicious early depositor can profit from future depositors' deposits. While the late depositors will lose part of their funds to the attacker.
### Vulnerability Deta... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Fee-on-transfer/deflationary tokens will not be supported
### Description
When creating a new order, `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` assumes that the amount of deposited tokens is equal to the
function parameter plus the balance before the deposit. For tokens which take a fee on every transfer, this assumption ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: 3S-LENFT-N16 protocol/VotingEscrow.sol: unecessary modifiers
### Description
On the VotingEscrow contract, functions:
- increaseAmount()
- increaseUnlockTime()
- withdraw()
- claimRebates()
implement the modifiers `lockExists(tokenId)` and `lockOwner(tokenId)`, which check that the token exists (owner is not ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Events that mark critical parameter changes should contain both the old and the new value
### Description
This should especially be done if the new value is not required to be different from the old value.
*There are 3 instances of this issue.* | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Use assembly to hash instead of Solidity
### Description
### Gas Report
### Lines
For full list of line references, see warden's [original submission](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-ens-findings/issues/176). | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Dangerous Use Of Confidence Interval
### Description
The vulnerability concerns the utilization of Pyth oracle prices and their associated confidence intervals within the `getPrice` function. In Pyth, prices are reported with an associated confidence interval, which reflects the degree of uncertainty. A wider ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: TRST-H-8 It’s possible to drain all the funds from ExternalBribe
### Description
**Description:**
The function `earned()` is used to calculate the amount rewards owed to a **tokenId**, to do so it
performs a series operations over a loop and then it always executes:
which adds to **reward** the amount of r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Validation of Network URL Format
### Description
## Validate URL Format of Networks
Utilize the new `URL()` constructor call to ensure that any URLs provided for network configuration are valid and correctly structured.
## Remediation
Implement the above-mentioned suggestion.
### Recommendation
Implement t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Fees may be incorrectly handled
### Description
The `setDisabled` function in the `UniversalBuyAndBurn` contract allows toggling whether an input token is considered active for the buy and burn mechanism. However, this function does not trigger fee collection in the FarmKeeper contract before changing the disa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: No way to set CURVE_POOL approval after setting new curve pool address
### Description
_Submitted by 0xDjango, also found by BowTiedWardens, cccz, hansfriese, Metatron, shung, ych18, and zzzitron_
`Staking.setCurvePool()` allows the owner to set a new `CURVE_POOL` address, however, there is no way to set t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Missing consistency checks for the ETH movements recorded
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
HordETHStakingManager.sol, setValidatorStats()
After the upgrade, the contract utilizes new funds tracking mechanism:
- totalETHOnContractRecorded to track the balance after... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | timing | false | false | ## Medium: `block.timestamp` used as swap deadline offers no protection
### Description
`UniV3Utils::swap` performs a [swap](https://github.com/beefyfinance/experiments/blob/14a313b76888581b05d42b6f7b6097c79f3e65c6/contracts/interfaces/exchanges/UniV3Utils.sol#L20) with `deadline: block.timestamp`. This function is ca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Delayed Nature of Exchange Rate Updates Can Lead to Protocol Debt
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Mitigated" by the client. Addressed in: `8ca0e4b6347838787f144db00a46870c154b76ee`, `0b4adaca134e5eea4877d70ab03f523a9835f3f4`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Refer to the following docum... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: AragonFundraisingController - an untapped address in toReset can block attempts of opening Trading after presale ✓ Fixed
### Description
AragonFundraisingController can be initialized with a list of token addresses `_toReset` that are to be reset when trading opens after the presale. These addresses are suppo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Lack of Documentation
### Description
Docstrings improve readability and ease maintenance. They should explicitly explain the purpose or intention of the functions, the scenarios under which they can fail, the roles allowed to call them, the values returned, and the events emitted. In the case of structs, docs... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | rounding | true | true |
The [\_getStakingFactor()](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/RankedBattle.sol#L530-L532) function rounds-up the `stakingFactor_` to one if its zero. Additionally, the [\_addResultPoints()](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/RankedBattle.sol#L439) function rounds-dow... | Code4rena | 5 | AI Arena |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | token | true | false | ## Gas: `require()`/`revert()` strings longer than 32 bytes cost extra gas
### Description
1. File: core-contracts/contracts/ERC721Payable.sol (lines [21-24](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-joyn/blob/c9297ccd925ebb2c44dbc6eaa3effd8db5d2368a/core-contracts/contracts/ERC721Payable.sol#L21-L24))
2. File: core-c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Redundant Calculations.
### Description
**Severity**: Informational
**Status**: Resolved
**description**
bpnmMain.sol: _buyLimitPack(), lines 639, 641.
There are lines within the function where calculations are repeated unnecessarily, which can
lead to inefficiencies in contract execution.
**Recommendation... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Enforce minimum TWAP duration
### Description
When creating a Uniswap V3 TWAP, there is no enforcement of a minimum TWAP duration. Setting the TWAP duration too low undermines its purpose and can lead to price manipulation.
### Recommendation
Consider implementing a reasonable minimum duration. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: `PrePOMarket.setFinalLongPayout()` shouldn't be called twice.
### Description
If `finalLongPayout` is changed twice by admin fault, the market would be insolvent as it should pay more collateral than it has.
### Proof of Concept
If `finalLongPayout` is less than `MAX_PAYOUT`, it means the market is ended ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Owner can set unlimited amount
### Description
Owner can set merkle root in which, for his account, allowed amount can be very big:
https://github.com/1inch/cumulative-merkle-drop/tree/96fb63d0cbfea73603e7500961c71e8ab1fb8c10/contracts/CumulativeMerkleDrop128.sol#L24-L27
https://github.com/1inch/cumulative-... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Lack of event emission
### Description
Several functions in the code base do not emit relevant events to log their execution. In particular:
* In the `GnosisSafeRegistry` contract, external functions [`register`](https://github.com/AugurProject/augur/blob/67c0fec95e65fca8d27751f28a6c06e5247978c6/packages/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent usage of `whenNotPaused` modifier for bridging fulfillment in `SecuritizeBridge` and `USDCBridgeV2`
### Description
**Description:** `USDCBridgeV2` inherits pause functionality from `BaseRBACContract`. Currently `USDCBridgeV2::receiveWormholeMessages` does not apply the `whenNotPaused` modifier al... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Not effective depositETH() and withdrawETH()
### Description
`depositETH()` and `withdrawETH()` are inherited and make calls to WETH.
It is used to swap between native ETH and WETH. But the implementation makes Executor call itself (external call), send ETH itself.
This step is useless and can be dropped.
`... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: `get_virtual_price()` can be manipulated
### Description
`get_virtual_price()` can be manipulated by directly transferring tokens to the pools. The thing is that directly transferred tokens can be skimmed via the `exchange_received()` function:
https://github.com/curvefi/stableswap-ng/blob/8c78731ed43c22e6bcd... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: A `pauser` can brick the contracts
### Description
_Submitted by WatchPug, also found by JMukesh, peritoflores, and whilom_
[Pausable.sol#L65-L68](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-biconomy/blob/db8a1fdddd02e8cc209a4c73ffbb3de210e4a81a/contracts/security/Pausable.sol#L65-L68)
A malicious or compromis... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Cannot claim rewards
### Description
**Severity**: Critical
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
Because `feeReceiver` is initially unset, the `claim` function reverts with the message "ERC20: transfer to the zero address"
**Recommendations**:
add zero-address verification for the `feeReceiver` address ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | true | ## High: Unsound assumption about structure of calldata arrays
### Description
When accessing calldata arrays in inline assembly (e.g. `myArray`), it's essentially a struct with two fields: `myArray.offset` and `myArray.length`. The `.offset` property gives you the direct calldata offset of the first value in the arra... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Solidity compiler optimizations can be problematic
### Description
The `complifi-protocol-internal` and `complifi-amm-internal` repositories have enabled optional compiler optimizations in Solidity. There have been several optimization bugs with security implications. Moreover, optimizations are actively being... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: ETH and FEI can get locked in EthUniswapPCVDeposit
### Description
The [`deposit` function](https://github.com/fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core/blob/29aeefddd97f31c7f2a598fb3dca3ef24dc0beb4/contracts/pcv/EthUniswapPCVDeposit.sol#L26) in `EthUniswapPCVDeposit` takes an ETH amount, mints an amount of `FEI`, and... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Accounts blocked by the token cannot claim their fees
### Description
In `SolidlyV2`, liquidity providers accrue fees from trades made in the pool. These fees are bound to the account holding the liquidity position at the time of trading as the fees are synced on transfers.
When the liquidity provider wants t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | dos | true | true | Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/Bribe.sol
Impacts:
- Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value
## Description
## Brief/Intro
The bribe contract has an access-controlled function `addRewardToken()` that allows only the cor... | Immunefi | 5 | Alchemix |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `++i` costs less gas than `i++`, especially when it's used in `for`-loops (`--i`/`i--` too) | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Potential of Locked Funds in `Maximillion`
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `731ca28d3f8a4ce428b89dc9ee279cd58cf2d5c7`. The client provided the following explanation:
> Added a check to ensure that the `call()` succeeds to avoid loss of funds.
**File(s) affected:**`Ma... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Tokens can be locked on account
### Description
Some tokens can be locked on account (for example USDT):
https://github.com/Gearbox-protocol/gearbox-contracts/blob/0ac33ba87212ce056ac6b6357ad74161d417158a/contracts/credit/CreditAccount.sol
### Recommendation
We recommend adding a function for transferring loc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Changing hat toggle address can lead to unexpected changes in status
### Description
Changing the toggle address should not change the current status unless intended to. However, in the event that a contract's toggle status hasn't been synced to local state, this change can accidentally toggle the hat back ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: Proposal requiring native coin transfers cannot be executed
### Description
### Lines of code
Proposals that require sending native coins in at least one of their calls cannot be executed.
### Proof of Concept
The [InterchainProposalExecutor.\_execute](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-axelar/blob/2f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Users are susceptible to back-running when depositing ETH to `TridenRouter`
### Description
_Submitted by broccoli_
#### Impact
The `_depositToBentoBox` and `_depositFromUserToBentoBox` allow users to provide ETH to the router, which is later deposited to the `bento` contract for swapping other assets or p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | false | false | ## High: Wrong fee calculation after `totalSupply` was 0
### Description
_Submitted by kenzo_
`handleFees` does not update `lastFee` if `startSupply == 0`.
This means that wrongly, extra fee tokens would be minted once the basket is resupplied and `handleFees` is called again.
### Impact
Loss of user funds.
The ext... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Bridging tokens to address(0) will cause funds to be locked in the adapter contracts
### Description
In the current implementation of USDC, transfers to `address(0)` are reverted. However, the `L1OpUSDCBridgeAdapter` and `L2OpUSDCBridgeAdapter` do not revert a cross-chain transfer to `address(0)` on the origin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Deposits after the grace period should not be allowed
### Description
_Submitted by pauliax_
[Shelter.sol#L34](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-02-concur/blob/main/contracts/Shelter.sol#L34)
[Shelter.sol#L54](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-02-concur/blob/main/contracts/Shelter.sol#L54)
Function dona... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | true | false | ## Medium: Basket.sol#mint() Malfunction due to extra nonReentrant modifier
### Description
## Handle
WatchPug
## Vulnerability details
https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-10-defiprotocol/blob/7ca848f2779e2e64ed0b4756c02f0137ecd73e50/contracts/contracts/Basket.sol#L83-L88
The `mint()` method is malfunction becaus... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Lack of Origin Check on RPC Requests ✓ Fixed
### Description
The Snap does not validate the origin of RPC requests, allowing any arbitrary dApp to connect to the Snap and initiate arbitrary RPC requests. Specifically, any dApp can access the privileged getToken and deleteToken RPC endpoints. Consequently, a m... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Current collectionIdToAllowList likely has practical limits
### Description
`allowList` is checked when `mint()` happens at `FantiumMinterV1`. It always sets false for an address (buyer). But if it is true, it allows only one mint for an address when a collection is paused. This behavior is strange and likely ... | 0 |
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