prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Return result directly rather than assigning to a stack variable | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Admin will not be able to upgrade the smart contracts, breaking core functionality and rendering the upgradeable contracts useless
### Description
The [AssetFactory](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-08-cork-protocol/blob/main/Depeg-swap/contracts/core/assets/AssetFactory.sol#L14) and [FlashSwapRouter]... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: ECDSA library has a vulnerability for signature malleability of EIP-2098 compact signatures
### Description
#### Resolution
Remediated as per the 1inch team in [1inch/[email protected]`166353b`](https://github.com/1inch/solidity-utils/commit/166353b6d225b0ae830f9d9d76be17444c8c2178) by adding a warning note... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Cache storage values in memory to minimize SLOADs
### Description
The code can be optimized by minimizing the number of SLOADs.
### NounsDAOLogicV2.sol.propose(): `nouns` should be cached(saves 110 gas on average)
https://github.com/nounsDAO/nouns-monorepo/blob/718211e063d511eeda1084710f6a682955e80dcb/packag... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | true | ## Medium: Incorrect Data Cost Calculation
### Description
There are components to the data cost calculation that are incorrect or do not account for gas and asset price volatility, which can lead to a fee that is lower than intended.
The `FeeOracleV1.feeFor()` function uses the size of the transaction input data (al... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Validation | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-11-bullvbear-judging/issues/127
## Found by
GimelSec, bin2chen, Ruhum, kirk-baird, \_\_141345\_\_, 0x52, carrot, hansfriese
## Summary
`reclaimContract()` would transfer payment tokens to `bulls[contractId]`. An attacker can make `reclaimContract()` transfer assets to... | Sherlock | 4 | Bull v Bear |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | logic-error | true | false | ## Low: `PerpMarket::getOrderFeeUsd` incorrectly charges `makerFee` when skew is zero and trade is buy order
### Description
In `PerpMarket::getOrderFeeUsd` there is this comment to which I've added (*) at the end:
```solidity
/// @dev When the skew is zero, taker fee will be charged. (*)
```
But doing a truth table ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Not checking asset balance in strategy before removal
### Description
The [`removePToken` function](https://github.com/OriginProtocol/origin-dollar/blob/bf4ff28d5944ecc277e66294fd2c702fee5cd58b/contracts/contracts/utils/InitializableAbstractStrategy.sol#L148) from the `InitializableAbstractStrategy` lets th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Assets Might Get Stuck in Contracts
### Description
Across the codebase, there are several circumstances in which assets can get locked in the contracts due to external call failures. Two examples are:
* When bridging ETH from L2 to L1, the `finalizeWithdrawalTransaction` [function](https://github.com/mantle... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Missing selectors from `SimplexFacet` for diamond cuts
### Description
Several functions from `SimplexFacet` are missing from the diamond cuts:
- `withdrawFees`
- `setName`
- `getName`
Since these functions are not included in the selector list, they cannot be called through the diamond contract, **effect... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Pending Status Reset
### Description
## State Management Best Practices
To ensure proper state management, set `isPending` back to `false` in the `_lzReceive` function. While there are no direct security implications, it is considered best practice to reset `isPending`, especially since it is a public variabl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | flash-loan | true | true | ## High: DoSing vault rehypothecation through flashloans
### Description
During a flash loan, the AToken contract transfers the underlying amount to the user through the `transferUnderlyingTo` function, which withdraws tokens from the vault when using it:
```solidity
function transferUnderlyingTo(address target, uint... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: [9] Add `unchecked {}` for subtractions where the operands cannot underflow because of a previous `require()`
### Description
`require(a `require(a <= b); unchecked { x = b - a }`
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-backd/blob/2a5664d35cde5b036074edef3c1369b984d10010/p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing Fixing Window Data Accumulation After Daily Reset in `drv_update`
### Description
**Description:** When `drv_update` resets fixing data for a new day, the current `last_asset_tokens` and `last_crncy_tokens` are discarded instead of being accumulated into the new day's fixing data, leading to incomplete... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: `require()`/`revert()` strings longer than 32 bytes cost extra gas
### Description
Each extra memory word of bytes past the original 32 [incurs an MSTORE](https://gist.github.com/hrkrshnn/ee8fabd532058307229d65dcd5836ddc#consider-having-short-revert-strings) which costs **3 gas**.
*There are 39 instances of t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: Validation for BPS Values in Fee Tiers ✓ Fixed
### Description
The `addFeeTier` and `updateFeeTier` functions allow setting `mintFee` and `burnFee` without enforcing upper bounds. Since these fees are expressed in basis points (BPS), omitting such validation may lead to accidental or malicious misconfigurat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Neither `sellCreditMarket()` nor `compensate()` checks whether the credit position to be sold is allowed for sale
### Description
### Impact
A credit buyer could be forced to buy a `not for sale` credit position with no way to sell it passively, potentially suffering a loss due to missing an arbitrage oppo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | false | false | ## High: User can abuse tight stop losses and high leverage to make risk free trades
### Description
User can abuse how stop losses are priced to open high leverage trades with huge upside and very little downside.
### Proof of Concept
function limitClose(
uint _id,
bool _tp,
PriceData calldata _priceData,
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | oracle | true | false | ## Severity: High Risk
## Context
- `SMAOracle.sol#L82-L96`
- `ChainlinkOracleWrapper.sol#L36-L60`
## Description
The `update()` function of the `SMAOracle` contract doesn’t scale the `latestPrice` although a scaler is set in the constructor. On the other hand, the `_latestRoundData()` function of the `ChainlinkOracl... | Spearbit | 5 | Tracer |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Traders can't limit slippage and expiration time when creating market orders
### Description
**Description:** Traders can't limit slippage and expiration time when creating market orders.
**Impact:** Traders' orders may be filled later and at a less favorable price than they were expecting.
**Recommended Mit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Restricted addresses are still able to use Zetachain due to faulty update
### Description
Zetachain has a restricted address list that stops inbounds from going through, [link](https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-04-zetachain-cross-chain/blob/main/node/zetaclient/chains/sui/observer/inbound.go#L190-L202)... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Oracle data feed can be outdated yet used anyways which will impact payment logic
### Description
_Submitted by 0xNineDec, also found by 0x1f8b, 0x29A, 0x52, 0xdanial, 0xDjango, 0xf15ers, bardamu, cccz, Cheeezzyyyy, Chom, codexploder, defsec, Franfran, Alex the Entreprenerd, Green, hake, hansfriese, horsefact... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Possible to bypass saleConfig.limitPerAccount
### Description
_Submitted by itsmeSTYJ, also found by 0x1f8b, 0x52, 0xDjango, auditor0517, byndooa, cccz, Ch_301, Chom, csanuragjain, KIntern_NA, ladboy233, nine9, PwnedNoMore, shenwilly, thank_you, Treasure-Seeker, wagmi, yixxas, and zkhorse_
It i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | true | ## Low: `TradingAccount::deductAccountMargin` can incorrectly add the same values multiple times to output parameter `marginDeductedUsdX18`
### Description
In `TradingAccount::deductAccountMargin`, `ctx.settlementFeeDeductedUsdX18`, `ctx.orderFeeDeductedUsdX18`, and `ctx.pnlDeductedUsdX18` are added to `marginDeducted... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `Voter.replaceFactory()` and `Voter.addFactory()` functions are broken.
### Description
The `Voter.replaceFactory()` and `Voter.addFactory()` functions are broken due to invalid validation.
### Impact
Broken code. DoS when calling `Voter.createGauge()`.
### Recommendation
1. Add the `require(!isFactory[_p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: compromised `owner` can drain funds from`VeTokenMinter.sol`
### Description
_Submitted by SmartSek, also found by ch13fd357r0y3r_
Compromised `owner` can `withdraw()` entire balance of `VeTokenMinter.sol` to any other account.
### Proof of Concept
The `owner` can choose any `_destination` and `_amount` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `BaseJumpRateModelV2` Contract Incorrectly Assumes that Blocks Are Produced Every Three Seconds on the Target Network, Instead of Two
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `12cbe0a9f0efaa2dfe8a2577e33102a40802f584`. The client provided the following explanation:
> When depl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: For modern and more readable code; update import usages
### Description
Solidity code is also cleaner in another way that might not be noticeable: the struct Point. We were importing it previously with global import but not using it. The Point struct `polluted the source code` with an unnecessary object we wer... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `TrustedGuardiansPlugin._setGuardiansConfig` should have a below bound check for `guardiansChallengeTimeout`
### Description
In the `TrustedGuardiansPlugin` contract, the `guardiansChallengeTimeout` parameter lacks a lower bound check and only enforces an [upper bound](https://github.com/CryptoCust/cryptolegac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: getAddedAmount can return wrong results
### Description
## Handle
@cmichelio
## Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The `getAddedAmount` function only works correctly when called with `(VADER/USDV, pool)` or `(pool, pool)`.
However, when called with (`token, pool)` where `token` is neither `VA... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | critical | access-control | true | true | ## Critical: Attacker can steal user deposited collateral tokens by updating account nft token to a custom attack contract address
### Description
`GlobalConfigurationBranch.setTradingAccountToken` has [no access control](https://github.com/zaros-labs/zaros-core-audit/blob/de09d030c780942b70f1bebcb2d245214144acd2/src/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Unnecessary invoke_signed with no signer seeds
### Description
## Code Review Summary
In `src/processor/utils.rs`, the `transfer_with_system_program` function is using `invoke_signed` without the signer seeds.
Since the program is invoked without signer seeds, there is no need to use `invoke_signed`.
## Re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Consider allowing the subprotocol owner to be transferred
### Description
Once a subprotocol has been registered in the `SubprotocolRegistry` there is no way to update any of the values. The `SubprotocolData.owner` is the fee recipient leveraged as the fee recipient in [`CidNFT.add`](https://github.com/code-42... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Griefer can extend period of higher withdrawal fees
### Description
_Submitted by 0xDjango_
[LiquidityPool.sol#L790-L792](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-04-backd/blob/c856714a50437cb33240a5964b63687c9876275b/backd/contracts/pool/LiquidityPool.sol#L790-L792)
The `_updateUserFeesOnDeposit()` function in... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: `liquidatePositionsPartyA` limits partyB loss to partyB allocated balance, which can lead to inflated partyB balance and loss of funds for protocol users
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-08-symmetrical-judging/issues/6
## Found by
bitsurfer, panprog
If partyB has positions bo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | false | false | ## Low: Overflow and Division by Zero Errors Can Happen in Unlikely Edge Cases
### Description
**Update**
The team has acknowledged and decided to keep the minor issue as it is.
**File(s) affected:**`locker.fc`
**Description:** During our audit, we detected several instances where there was a risk of overflow. While... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | front-running | false | false | ## Medium: Wrong reward distribution between early and late depositors because of the late `syncRewards()` call in the cycle, `syncReward()` logic should be executed in each withdraw or deposits (without reverting)
### Description
Function `syncRewards()` distributes rewards to TokenggAVAX holders, it linearly distrib... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [18] Use of Block.Timestamp
### Description
Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the Entropy Illusion for further details), locking funds for periods of time, and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: `Strategy::checkPoolActivity()` does not look as far back as it should
### Description
`Strategy::checkPoolActivity()` is supposed to check tick delta until the tick more in the past than `lookAgo`. From the security doc:
> `checkPoolActivity` does intentionally check 1 extra observation before `lookAgo`
"... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: `buy()` in `LPDA.sol` Can be Manipulated by Buyers
### Description
A buyer could plan on buying early at higher prices to make sure he would secure a portion (say 50%) of NFTs he desired. When the number of NFTs still available got smaller and that `sale.endTime` were yet to hit, he would then watch the mem... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing validation of _owner argument could lead to incorrect event emission
### Description
Because the `setOwner` lacks input validation, the owner can be updated to the existing owner. Although such an update wouldn’t change the contract state, it would emit an event falsely indicating the owner had been ch... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | token | true | true |
[AddressRegistry.sol#L47](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-canto-identity/blob/dff8e74c54471f5f3b84c217848234d474477d82/src/AddressRegistry.sol#L47)
Users can register their on-chain identity (ie their CID NFT) by calling `AddressRegistry.register()`
```solidity
File: src/AddressRegistry.sol
42: function re... | Code4rena | 5 | Canto Identity Protocol |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [54] Wrong error message in `BaseZkSyncUpgradeGenesis::_setNewProtocolVersion`
### Description
### Proof of Concept
Take a look at https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-zksync/blob/4f0ba34f34a864c354c7e8c47643ed8f4a250e13/code/contracts/ethereum/contracts/upgrades/BaseZkSyncUpgradeGenesis.sol#L20-L41
This f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Consider using named mappings
### Description
The Solidity version of the different contracts in scope is not fixed, some contracts use a Solidity version from 6.12.0 up to 7.0.0, others use a Solidity version greater than 0.8.1. Consider using a Solidity version grater than 0.8.18, which supports named mappin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: RocketTokenRPL - inaccurate inflation rate and potential for manipulation lowering the real APY ✓ Addressed
### Description
RocketTokenRPL allows users to swap their fixed-rate tokens to the inflationary RocketTokenRPL ERC20 token via a `swapToken` function. The DAO defines the inflation rate of this token an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | true | false | ## Medium: `CollectionBatchBuyOperator.sol`: `tokenIds` array is not shortened properly which makes execute function revert when not all NFTs are purchased successfully
### Description
The [`CollectionBatchBuyOperator`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-party/blob/440aafacb0f15d037594cebc85fd471729bcb6d9/contracts... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | logic | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Reward Distribution Calculation in `ProtocolRewardsPool`
### Description
This report highlights a vulnerability in the `ProtocolRewardsPool` contract. The `getReward()` function, designed to distribute rewards to users, uses an incorrect calculation method that can result in incorrect reward distr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Redundant memory allocation for asset index type
### Description
`getMostPremium()` function (in here: [strategy-curve-scrv-v4_1.sol#L81](https://github.com/pickle-finance/protocol/blob/master/src/strategies/curve/strategy-curve-scrv-v4_1.sol#L81)
returns tuple `(address, uint256)`, which
contains unnecessaril... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Pool is put in NON_STANDARD state only after executeTimelock() is called
### Description
In the event of a protocol error, the RCLGovernance contract has the ability to start a non-standard payment procedure or a rescue operation. This will instead use the NonStandardPaymentModule to handle the repayment proce... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Reentrancy | false | true | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-10-mover-judging/issues/120
## Found by
WATCHPUG
## Summary
Comparing the before and after balance of the swap call for the swapped amount can be exploited to escape the `exchangeFee` by wrapping the actual swap inside a fake swap.
## Vulnerability Detail
The attack... | Sherlock | 5 | Mover |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: File does not contain an SPDX Identifier
### Description
1. File: external/MedianOracle.sol (line [0](https://github.com/ampleforth/market-oracle/blob/5e7fd1506784f074748ab6bd5df740ca2227b14f/contracts/MedianOracle.sol#L0)) | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Redundant `_updateAccount()` Function Used in Multiple Functions
### Description
In `stake()`, `unstake()`, `forceUnstakeAll()`, `buyPortalEnergy()`, `sellPortalEnergy()` functions `_updateAccount()` is being called. It updates the whole data of the user but for most of the functions it is only needed some of ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Ocean may accept unexpected airdrops
### Description
Unexpected transfers of tokens to the Ocean contract may break its internal accounting, essentially leading to the loss of the transferred asset. To mitigate this risk, Ocean attempts to reject airdrops.
Per the ERC721 and ERC1155 standards, contracts must ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Permanent staking reward dilution
### Description
Staking rewards can be diluted by people who transfer staking tokens to the staking contract by any means other than by calling the `deposit` function.
### Impact
Reward pool is diluted permanently | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Liquidation might fail
### Description
The `liquidate()` function checks if a position can be liquidated and, through the `liquidatable()` function, uses `maintenanceMarginFraction` as a factor to determine if enough value is left. However, in the rest of the `liquidate()` function, `liquidationFeeRate` is us... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: Attacker can block LayerZero channel
### Description
_Submitted by Ruhum_
According to the LayerZero docs, the default behavior is that when a transaction on the destination application fails, the channel between the src and dst app is blocked. Before any new transactions can be executed, the failed transact... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: AddressWhitelist owner can be added to the whitelist
### Description
The **AddressWhitelist** contract implements a payee whitelist used to bypass the daily limits imposed by the **Wallet** contract. **AddressWhitelist** contains a modifier, `hasNoOwnerOrZeroAddress`, intended to prevent the contract owner ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: PUBLICLY EXPOSED FUNCTIONS
### Description
Several functions are being involved in the management of the `WeightedFarmingPool` contract, which are publicly exposed and without any sort of access control:
* `addPool`: It can add an arbitrary pool into the system.
* `addToken`: It can add any token, even not w... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Front-running in referral link assignment leading to DoS of the functionality
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
The NarwhalReferrals.signUp function allows a user to register on the platform with a referral. It takes in two parameters, _user which is the sender’s a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: In the unlockProtectedListing() function, the interest that was supposed to be distributed to LP holders was instead burned.
### Description
In the unlockProtectedListing() function, the interest that was supposed to be distributed to LP holders was instead burned.
### Impact
LP holders suffer losses, and ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: adjustMaker ignores recipient parameter when removing liquidity
### Description
The adjustMaker function takes a recipient parameter. The NatSpec says this should define who gets the tokens when removing liquidity.
But in the code, the function always sends tokens to msg.sender, even when removing liquidit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Undervalued funding fee when accFundingRate is negative
### Description
The funding fee accounting differs between when Longs pay to Shorts and when Shorts pay to Longs, and Shorts always pay less funding fee than they should when oiDelta is negative.
This issue arises from the fact that, regardless of which... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect use of `investorExists` modifier in `PublicStockOnRamp::swap`
### Description
**Description:** `PublicStockOnRamp::swap` functions incorrectly validates investor registration. These functions use the `investorExists` modifier which checks if `msg.sender` is a registered wallet, but they also have ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Config param sanity check for `_srcAddress` in LzApp forceResumeReceive.
### Description
**Description**
In contract LzApp.sol, in the function force Resume Receive, there's no sanity check for the _srcAddress parameter. This can generate a wrong assignment, even if the route can only be accessed by the owner... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Incorrect condition always bound to fail
### Description
_Submitted by codexploder_
The state function check GovernorBravoDelegate.sol#L115 will always fail since proposalId cannot lie in between initialProposalId and proposalCount due to an initialization in `_initiate` function
### Proof of Concept
1.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | false | false | ## Gas: Checking before external library call can save 2600 gas
### Description
_Submitted by 0xRajeev, also found by pauliax_
EIP-2929 in Berlin fork increased the gas costs of CALL* family opcodes to 2600. Making a `delegatecall` to a library function therefore costs 2600. `LibUtils.revertIfCallFailed()` reverts an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | false | false | ## Medium: Rounding errors will occur for tokens without decimals
### Description
Some rare tokens have 0 decimals: https://etherscan.io/token/0xcc8fa225d80b9c7d42f96e9570156c65d6caaa25
For these tokens, small losses of precision will be amplified by the lack of decimals.
Consider a constant product pool with 1000 o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | storage | false | false | ## Low: Immutable variables are not checked
### Description
In the `VerifyOPCM.s.sol` script, the `_verifyOpcmContractRef()` function does not check the value of immutable variables to ensure they are correct. As such, the OPCM's `superchainConfig`, `protocolVersions`, `superchainProxyAdmin`, and `upgradeController` a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `dripInfo` function does not calculate `fee0` and `fee1` in the `else` block
### Description
In the `else` block, the [`MuteAmplifier.dripInfo`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-mute/blob/4d8b13add2907b17ac14627cfa04e0c3cc9a2bed/contracts/amplifier/MuteAmplifier.sol#L417-L460) function does not calculate ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Improper timing of WETH deposit operation
### Description
This issue has been identified within the [_placeOrder](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/70b15ec4d9e7578248141604503843716a67d875/src/HanjiLOB.sol#L998) function of the `HanjiLOB` contract.
The function processes WETH deposits bas... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Modifier `mintRequestExist` can be safely removed from `RequestsManager::cancelMint, cancelBurn` saving 1 identical storage read
### Description
`RequestsManager::cancelMint` validates that `request.provider == msg.sender`:
```solidity
L152: _assertAddress(request.provider, msg.sender);
```
Hence the modif... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Incorrect burn address in Vader.sol
### Description
The `internal _transfer()` function is called from external facing `transfer()`, `transferFrom()`, and `transferTo()` functions all of which have different sender addresses. It is `msg.sender` for `transfer()`, sender parameter for `transferFrom()` and `tx.o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | true | true | ## Low: Any user can borrow the underlying asset from EVault and repay it within the same trans- action without paying any fee
### Description
The `EVault` provides a flash loan function that allows any user to borrow the underlying asset as long as they repay it within the same transaction. The flash loan function ca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: Avoid hardcoded magic numbers to improve code readability
### Description
The codebase uses hardcoded magic numbers, reducing the code readability and quality.
1. In the following function, `nextNonce()` returns zero to enforce non-orderly message delivery. However, there is no inline documentation or clear d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Later challengers can bid on the previous challenge to extend the expiration time of the previous challenge, so that their own challenge can succeed before the previous challenge and get challenge rewards
### Description
When bidders bid, if the expiration time of the challenge is less than 30 minutes, the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Compromised resolver can bypass trust assumptions on indexer
### Description
Indexer updates two mappings `attestationsByAttester` and `attestationsByRecipient`:
1. **attestationsByAttester**:
- This is an attestation index by attester, recipient, and schema.
- It is "Intended for attestations using sche... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: UI Spoofing While Connecting Apps
### Description
## Connecting with App Using near_connect RPC Method
While connecting with an app using the `near_connect` RPC method, the dApp can specify which methods must be allowed via `request.params.methods`. If there are no specified methods, all methods will be allow... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: crvRewardsContract `getReward` can be called directly, breaking vaults `claimRewards` functionallity
### Description
crvRewardsContract of convex can be called by anyone on behalf of Vault, this will allow malicious users to call `getReward` and break the Vault `claimRewards` functionality.
### Proof of Conc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Incomplete Cancel Order Implementation
### Description
## cancelOrder Function Overview
The `cancelOrder` function only cleans up relevant storage variables without returning collateral and execution fees paid by the order’s creator.
## Source Code Location
`contracts/manager/facets/order/ExecuteOrderFacet... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Forcing Starknet handlers to be whitelisted on the same chain allows exploit of `BurnUnlock` mode to drain handler funds
### Description
### Impact
In Cairo contracts, when handling cross-chain messages or callbacks, the contract ensures that the handler on the same chain (Starknet) is whitelisted:
In this... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | liquidation | true | false | ## Gas: Remove redundant `unary` call from `TradingAccount::getAccountMarginRequirementUsdAndUnrealizedPnlUsd`
### Description
**Description:** `TradingAccount::getAccountMarginRequirementUsdAndUnrealizedPnlUsd` [L239](https://github.com/zaros-labs/zaros-core-audit/blob/de09d030c780942b70f1bebcb2d245214144acd2/src/per... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Stuck Funds if no `exitAdministrator` Assigned
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `3ddf2e26297b00493437c51e99f0a129850522f3; pr-61`.
The team explained that the absence of an `exitAdministrator` indicates that the Sonic chain is operating independently of Ethereum. If... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Test code present in the code base ✓ Fixed
### Description
Test code are present in the code base. This is mainly a reminder to fix those before production.
### Recommendation
Fixed in [lukso-network/[email protected]`edb880c`](https://github.com/lukso-network/rICO-smart-contracts/commit/edb880c56e5c84fe02... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Principal USD not utilized
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
In Contract YollloStaking.sol, the method setTier(...) sets a tier with principal USD but principalUSD value is not used anywhere when purchasing/accruing/releasing the package.
**Recommendation**:
Updat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Privileged Roles and Ownership
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Mitigated" by the client. Addressed in: `df4791d0ab33c3c47ead2565e4b2f04a26ed0a0f`. The client provided the following explanation:
> We are mitigating this by:
>
>
> 1. Renouncing ownership of some of the contracts
> 2. Transferring o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Testing suite limitations may affect codebase robustness
### Description
The testing suite can be further enhanced to provide higher levels of assurance on codebase robustness. Specific concerns include:
- **Consolidation of Test Cases**: There are instances where multiple test cases exist within a single `te... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Using `ecrecover` directly vulnerable to signature malleability
### Description
`DebtToken::permit` and `BabelToken::permit` call `ecrecover` directly but due to the symmetrical nature of the elliptic curve for every `[v,r,s]` there exists another `[v,r,s]` that returns the same valid result.
### Impact
Usage... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: LBP Fee Drainage
### Description
## ExitLBP Functionality Overview
The `exitLBP` function does not reset the `_swapFeeAmounts` arrays stored within `BazaarLBP` after a successful exit. This array keeps track of the total swap fees accrued for each token within the LBP. If an LBP owner exits the pool via `e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | true | false | ## Medium: variableBorrowIndex is only updated in _updateIndexes of the mini pool if currentLiquidityRate
### Description
## Non-Zero Condition Review
**Severity:** Medium Risk
**Context:** MiniPoolReserveLogic.sol#L320-L340
**Description:**
The second `if` block is nested in this context, although it is not n... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | token | true | true | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-11-buffer-judging/issues/73
## Found by
ak1, bin2chen, 0x4non, jonatascm, sach1r0, pashov, HonorLt, peanuts, m\_Rassska, adriro, Deivitto, \_\_141345\_\_, eierina, 0xcc, rvierdiiev, cccz, minhtrng, ctf\_sec, aphak5010, Bnke0x0, eyexploit, hansfriese, 0x007
## Summary
... | Sherlock | 3 | Buffer Finance |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Cheaper input valdiations should come before expensive operations
### Description
*There are 2 instances of this issue:*
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-cally/blob/1849f9ee12434038aa80753266ce6a2f2b082c59/contracts/src/Cally.sol#L211
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-cally/blob/1849f9ee12434038aa8... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Possible loss of assets by mistake
### Description
If a liquidator calls this function by mistake with the next parameters: `to = address(0), force = true`, then he loses all assets:
https://github.com/Gearbox-protocol/gearbox-contracts/blob/0ac33ba87212ce056ac6b6357ad74161d417158a/contracts/credit/CreditMana... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | false | false | ## Low: Cross-Seaport re-entrancy with the stateful validateOrder call
### Description
The re-entrancy check in Seaport 1.2 will prevent the Zone from interacting with Seaport 1.2 again. However, an interesting scenario arises when the conduit has open channels to both Seaport 1.1 and Seaport 1.2 (or different deploym... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | false | false | ## High: Proposal which started buyout which fails is able to settle migration as if its buyout succeeded.
### Description
_Submitted by panprog, also found by 0xsanson, bin2chen, hansfriese, kenzo, PwnedNoMore, smiling_heretic, Treasure-Seeker, and TrungOre_
If one proposal starts a buyout which fails, and then ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: `WildcatMarketWithdrawals.executeWithdrawal()` function can be optimized
### Description
By moving condition checks up in the execution flow, we save on computational steps and improve the gas efficiency of the `executeWithdrawal()` function.
Overall gas change: `-413 (-0.070%)` | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Unchecked Tenor Period
### Description
## TenorInDays Implementation Overview
`tenorInDays` is used when calculating the final payoff.
## Code References
**File:** `contracts/Calculations.sol` (SOLIDITY)
`tradeDate` is used when calculating the final payoff in `calculateCurrentYield()`. Therefore, `tenorI... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | true | false | ## High: Adversary can steal user's NFT's if they have set Magnetar as `isApprovedForAll == true`
### Description
Since Magnetar is supposed to be used as a router for multiple operations, it can be expected that user will have it pre-approved for their NFTs (such as `tOLP` as `oTAP` ones, as they'll be the ones prima... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | false | false | ## Medium: Stack-based call stack may overflow the stack
### Description
## Medium Risk Notice
**Severity:** Medium Risk
**Context:** handler.rs#L1134
**Description:**
EVM execution requires a call stack to store all information of sub-calls as they happen. Etherlink uses a custom implementation of its call/cr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: `RuniverseLandMinter._mintTokensUsingTokenId` does not verify that the `tokenId` matches the corresponding `plotSize`
### Description
The first eight digits of the RuniverseLand TokenID indicate the corresponding plotSize of the NFT.
Owner can call `RuniverseLandMinter.ownerMintUsingTokenId` directly to min... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: | Loop Optimization
### Description
**Description**
The length of `bStr` can be cached. Furthermore, because a name’s length is restricted in NFTR, the index can be incremented in a `unchecked` block.
**Recommendation**
Consider the above gas optimizations. | 0 |
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