prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | true | false | ## Medium: Attackers can abuse the quitLock function to get a very large amount of votes
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-fiatdao/blob/fece3bdb79ccacb501099c24b60312cd0b2e4bb2/contracts/VotingEscrow.sol#L632-L659
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
An attacker can use a flashlo... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | flash-loan | true | false | ## Medium: Transaction revert if the `baseToken` does not support 0 value transfer when charging `changeFee`
### Description
When call change via the PrivatePool.sol, the caller needs to the pay the change fee,
calling changeFeeQuote(inputWeightSum)
if the feeAmount is 0,
the code below would revert if the ERC20 ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Di�erent parsing formats for Jetton notification messages
### Description
The Jetton notification message for `transfer_notification`, with ID `0x7362d09c`, is defined differently for the settlement and the Stream Pool contracts. In particular, the `fund_id` and `subaccount` structure fields are read in reve... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: When a position is closed, the execution fees for the canceled stop orders are lost for the user
### Description
When a position is decreased fully or partially, all the stop orders for that particular position will be canceled. Normally, the cancel order flow returns the execution fee paid by the user. How... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | true | false | ## High: `dMute.sol`: Attacker can push lock items to victim's array such that redemptions are forever blocked
### Description
This report deals with how an attacker can abuse the fact that he can lock `MUTE` tokens for any other user and thereby push items to the array of `UserLockInfo` structs of the user.
There ar... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | false | false | ## High: [M-1]
### Description
Seller's funds may remain locked in the protocol, because of revert on 0 transfer tokens.
In the README.md file is stated that the protocol uses every token with ERC20 Metadata and decimals between 6-18, which includes some revert on 0 transfer tokens, so this should be considered as val... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | access-control | true | true | ## Medium: Redemption of slashed registrations could result in DoS due to incorrect state update
### Description
Due to the logic surrounding Pay As You Go (PAYG) registrations, potential refunds associated with failed validators, and post-expiry redemptions of stake, a minimum balance of `AVAX` is required to remain ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: Users can DOS the token deposits for any future bridges
### Description
Users can create a bridge on L1 that points to L2 chains, which allows them to transfer funds between the 2 chains. When creating a bridge an incremental ID is generated for that bridge, and saved. To deposit coins to an L2, users have ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: tbtc - Variable shadowing in TBTCDepositToken constructor ✓ Addressed
### Description
`TBTCDepositToken` inherits from `DepositFactoryAuthority`, which has a single state variable, `_depositFactory`. This variable is shadowed in the `TBTCDepositToken` constructor.
**tbtc/implementation/contracts/system/TBTCD... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: getMaxOrder overestimates output values
### Description
The `getMaxOrder` function adds `+ 1` to the output value, overestimating the output value. This can lead to failed swaps if this value is used.
```solidity
tempOutput = pool.virtualY - lowerY.mulWadDown(pool.liquidity) + 1;
```
It's also easy to see th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | dos | true | true |
* `clob/types/Book.sol` [# L275-L289](https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-07-gte-clob/blob/9f06332ebd4cfe2577d9eae81aeb58d3662ffccd/contracts/clob/types/Book.sol# L275-L289)
* `clob/types/Book.sol` [# L150-L154](https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-07-gte-clob/blob/9f06332ebd4cfe2577d9eae81aeb58d3662ffccd/contracts/clob... | Code4rena | 5 | GTE |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | reentrancy | false | false | ## Low: Change the state before transferring the funds
### Description
**Description**
In Zeefarm.sol file, in releaseRewards(), move the line-164 before the line-158, that is update
the state before transferring the funds or value.
**Recommendation**:
Place the statement
user.rewardClaimed[index] += totalPending;
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `getVotes` inside the `BlackGovernor` incorrectly provides `block.number` instead of `block.timestamp`, leading to complete DOS of proposal functionality
### Description
### Finding description and impact
Whenever user is making a proposal inside the `BlackGovernor`, the contract checks whether their votin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Optimization of Solidity Code for Gas Efficiency Using Combined Arithmetic Operations
### Description
[LeftRight.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-panoptic/blob/main/contracts/types/LeftRight.sol#L151)
In the provided Solidity code, an optimization opportunity arises in the arithmetic operations, sp... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Missing Parameters Checks in `LGEStaking` Constructor
### Description
This issue has been identified within the constructor of the `LGEStaking` contract.
The constructor [lacks some validation checks](https://github.com/LayerLabs-app/Ozean-Contracts/blob/dacd9ed9c895c9b6be422531eea15fecc3c2b1d8/src/L1/LGEStak... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Hash comparison can be optimized
### Description
`HubEvmSpokeDecoder::decode` does a keccak256 hash comparison to check if the blocks are finalized. One of the comparator is always constant, ie. keccak256(bytes("finalized")). Generating hashes is expensive and can be simplified by pre-calculating this value.
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use event indexing for faster off-chain parameter lookup
### Description
**Description:** Events in `IGlobalRegistryService` should use `indexed` keywords on the 3 most important parameters per event to enable faster lookup by those parameters off-chain.
**Securitize:** Fixed in commit [0c2321a](https://githu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Overlapping Fee Tiers Not Checked Acknowledged
### Description
The `addFeeTier` and `updateFeeTier` functions currently allow adding overlapping fee tiers without validation. This can lead to unintended fee calculations, as the logic to determine the applicable fee relies on non-overlapping tier ranges.
### ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: No return values for some functions
### Description
Saddle’s [`Swap` contract](https://github.com/saddle-finance/saddle-contract/blob/0b76f7fb519e34b878aa1d58cffc8d8dc0572c12/contracts/Swap.sol) interface is intended to closely match that of Curve’s [`SwapTemplateBase` contract](https://github.com/curvefi/curv... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | true | false | ## High: swapValidatorDetails incorrectly writes keys to memory, resulting in permanently locked beacon chain deposits
### Description
When loading BLS public keys from storage to memory, the keys are partly overwritten with zero bytes. This ultimately causes allocations of these malformed public keys to permanently l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | false | false | ## Low: Loan Requests with Unspecified Lender Can Behave Unexpectedly
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `21ad657dd4bfed780fdca288bc4ea3af444167dd`.
**File(s) affected:**`MultiSourceLoan.sol`, `BaseLoan.sol`
**Description:** A borrower can request a loan that any lender can tak... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | overflow | true | false | ## High: range fee growth underflow
### Description
_Submitted by broccoli_
#### Impact
The function `RangeFeeGrowth` ([ConcentratedLiquidityPool.sol#L601-L633](https://github.com/sushiswap/trident/blob/c405f3402a1ed336244053f8186742d2da5975e9/contracts/pool/concentrated/ConcentratedLiquidityPool.sol#L601-L633)) woul... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Unbounded Loops Found in DSCEngine.sol can lead to DoS of liquidations
### Description
The contract `DSCEngine.sol` contains unbounded loops over the `s_collateralTokens` array, which is used in critical parts of the system, such as when checking the health factor of a user, which is used on liquidations. In s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Users Will Get Wrong Rewards Due to Arbitrum’s `block.number` Incompatibility
### Description
**Update**
This issue is marked as Acknowledged. See [VMC-8](https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/venus-multichain-support/f163c791-6598-41b2-b626-b347ac0ee032/index.html#findings-qs8) for more details.
**Update*... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Blacklisted creditor can block all repayment besides emergency closure
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-10-real-wagmi-judging/issues/83
## Found by
0x52, ArmedGoose, Bauer, tsvetanovv
After liquidity is restored to the LP, accumulated fees are sent directly from the vault t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: depositor argument design consideration
### Description
This comment is about absence of possibility to check the correctness of the SHA2-256 hash being passed as a parameter `deposit_data_roots` to the `deposit` function in here: https://github.com/abyssfinance/abyss-eth2depositor/blob/a2d58dea4d79846dc682fe9... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | true | false | ## Medium: NativeMetaTransaction.sol :: executeMetaTransaction() failed txs are open to replay attacks.
### Description
Failed MetaTransactions can be replayed by an attacker because the nonce remains unchanged, potentially leading to unintended actions against the original MetaTransaction user.
### Impact
Actions co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | access-control | false | false | ## Gas: Unnecessary variable in `AllowList.sol`
### Description
**Function `_setPermissionToCall`:**
Variable `currentPermission` is used only once, which means it doesn't need to be declared at all. The code snippet below can be changed from:
[File: ethereum/contracts/common/AllowList.sol](https://github.com/code-4... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | false | false | ## Low: Yield Distribution Events Are Predictable
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> The official documentation has not been updated with the new mechanism yet. Previously, we manually performed rebases every 7-12 days to maintain random... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | true | false | ## High: Maverick oracle can be manipulated
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-tokemak-judging/issues/635
## Found by
Bauchibred, ctf\_sec, duc, lemonmon, rvierdiiev, saidam017, xiaoming90
The MavEthOracle.getPriceInEth() function uses the reserves of the Maverick pool to calculate th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | DOS | false | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2022-10-rage-trade-judging/issues/67
## Found by
ctf\_sec, 0x52
## Summary
DnGmxJuniorVaultManager#harvestFees grants fees to the senior vault by converting the WETH to USDC and staking it directly. The result is that the senior vault gains value indirectly by increasing t... | Sherlock | 4 | Rage Trade |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: (HAL-03) MAIL SERVER MISCONFIGURATION
### Description
`bitsCrunch` mail server contained multiple misconfigurations, allowing an attacker to impersonate emails as `bitsCrunch` and performing scams/fraud/phishing users, which may result in financial and customer loss.
### Recommendation
Configure the `SPF` an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Nonce Behavior Discrepancy Between zkSync Era and EIP-161
### Description
The discrepancy in deployment nonce behavior between zkSync Era and EVM can cause problems for contract factories and developers. zkSync Era starts the deployment nonce at zero, unlike the EVM, where it starts at one. This difference ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: The rewards will be lost between first notifyRewardAmount and first stake
### Description
When the `notifyRewardAmount` is called, we assume that the amount of reward starts to be distributed at the `block.timestamp`. This is not true if the `_totalSupply` is 0, meaning no stakes are present in the contract. For... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: When Senior's TargetGain is negative, the tx will revert because the senior loss is not accounted for on the Junior Tranche as profit, causing the navs summation to not match the current nav
### Description
**Description:** When `srtGainTarget < 0`, the code transfers senior loss to `jrtNavT0` *after* initi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | true | ## Low: Timelock library is missing expiration functionality
### Description
Timelocks protect a given function from being called with given arguments for a given time. However, because there is no expiration time enforced in the `_enforceTimelock` function (Figure 16.1), a timelocked function can be called once at an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: No default threshold configuration
### Description
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L128
The implementation of `_attachThreshold()` loops through each of the configured set of thresholds searching for the element that adjusts to the bridged amount.
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Inconsistent Best Response Selection Due to Missing Tiebreak Mechanism
### Description
The `getBestResponse` function in `LLMOracleCoordinator` lacks a tiebreak mechanism when multiple responses have the same highest validation score.
This can lead to inconsistent results and potential manipulation of which r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: Pending Owner cannot accept ownership because of wrong implementation of `transferOwnership` and `acceptOwnership` functions
### Description
When `admin`(`owner`) try to transfer ownership, `pending owner` is unable to accept ownership even after the required delay has elapsed because of wrong implementatio... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: An attacker can exploit the EVC account system to steal Euler vault tokens from users
### Description
The EVC introduces a new account system where all addresses with the same last byte are considered to belong to one entity. It might seem like a minor security reduction, and Euler stated it as such in the cod... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | true | false | ## High: DOS attack at future facilitator contract and stop SinkManager.convertVe
### Description
As noted in "DOS attack by delegating tokens at MAX_DELEGATES = 1024", the old votingEscrow has a gas concern, i.e., the gas cost of transfer/burn will increase when an address holds multiple NFT tokens. The concern becom... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: Hard-coded 165-byte vault account is too small for Raydium Token-2022 mints with extensions
### Description
`stake_clmm_position` creates the vault token account for the raydium position mint with a size 165 Bytes
```rust
// Create vault token account if it doesn't exist
let vault_account_inf... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | true | false | ## Low: Use of memory instead of calldata for an unmodified function argument
### Description
In the `pontis-bridge-nft.sol` contract in the `setBaseURI()` function, the memory keyword is used for a parameter which is not modified instead of the calldata keyword.
### Recommendation
Consider using the calldata keyword... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Liquidated Troves with ICR slightly above 100% will cause a loss of funds to the Stability Pool
### Description
When a Trove is liquidated with an ICR slightly above 100% but still below 100.5%, it will cause a loss of funds for the users in the StabilityPool due to the collateral gas compensation. A Trove ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [07] Implementing dynamic adjustments for enhanced transaction reliability when depositing/withdrawing
### Description
Incorporating dynamic adjustments within the PrizeVault contract's [`deposit`, `mint`, `withdraw`, and `redeem` functions](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-pooltogether/blob/main/pt-v5-va... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: `global_cumulative_sum` is not enforced to be zero when combine is complete
### Description
`global_cumulative_sum` is the sum of points for global sends and receives. It needs to be checked to be zero accross all shards, when shards are combined (i.e in the combine recursion circuit).
Unfortunately, althoug... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Inability To Close Position
### Description
## ClosePositionRequest
`ClosePositionRequest` allows the owner or a whitelisted keeper to close a perpetual position request. It transfers tokens and closes accounts associated with the position request, emitting an event to capture the relevant information.
## Im... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | true | ## High: Missing liquidity checks when initiating long-term swaps
### Description
When a long-term swap is submitted to a `UniV2TWAMMPair` instance, the code performs checks, such as those ensuring that the selling rate of a given token is nonzero, before the order is recorded. However, the code does not validate the ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: reclaimLiquidity() Malicious borrowers can force LPs to be unable to retrieve Liquidity by closing and reopening the Position before it expires
### Description
If `LP` wants to retrieve the `Liquidity` that has been lent out, it can set a `renewalCutoffTime` through `reclaimLiquidity()`.
If the `borrower` d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: Inconsistent use of checked arithmetic
### Description
In several locations, the Drift Protocol codebase uses unchecked arithmetic. For example, in `calculate_margin_requirement_and_total_collateral_and_liability_info` (figure 11.1), the variable `num_perp_liabilities` is used as an operand in both a checked a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: `2**<n> - 1` should be re-written as `type(uint<n>).max`
### Description
Earlier versions of solidity can use `uint(-1)` instead. Expressions not including the `- 1` can often be re-written to accomodate the change (e.g. by using a `>` rather than a `>=`, which will also save some gas)
*There are 2 instances ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Incorrect operator when validating subsidisation cap
### Description
When a new registration is created, `Ignite::_registerWithChecks` [validates](https://github.com/Benqi-fi/ignite-contracts/blob/bbca0ddb399225f378c1d774fb70a7486e655eea/src/Ignite.sol#L925-L928) that the subsidisation amount for the registrat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Implement some type of version counter that will be incremented automatically for contract upgrades
### Description
As part of the upgradeability of Proxies, the contract can be upgraded multiple times, where it is a systematic approach to record the version of each upgrade.
I suggest implementing some kind... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | rounding | true | false | ## Gas: Optimize `computeTotalReward()` and `computePurchaseRewards` into one function to save gas
### Description
Both the functions below do the same computation, which is not required if the functions are combined into one. This will also prevent the rounding issue mentioned [here](https://github.com/code-423n4/202... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Usage Of Single-Step Role Transfer
### Description
The `RemoteRegistry` contract implements setter functions that allow the modification of critical roles and components within the system. The transfer of these critical roles is done through a single-step process. The address to which ownership is transferred ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Miscalculation in addLiquidity of Router results in unauthorized spending of tokens
### Description
Users are expected to add liquidity through `addLiquidity()` of the Router. It receives base and quote amounts which are adjusted through `_adjustAddLiquidity()`:
function addLiquidity(
address lp,
add... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | other | true | true | ## Low: Protocol Fee Recipient Updates Are Not Enforced On Old EulerSwap Instances
### Description
The `protocolFeeRecipient` value is stored in the parameters of each `EulerSwap` instance at the time of its deployment. When the [`ProtocolFee::setProtocolFeeRecipient`](https://github.com/euler-xyz/euler-swap/blob/1022... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Rewards can be sabotaged by large deposit and withdraw
### Description
The rewards in the Staking contract are calculated based on the change in WETH and the amount of staked TKN at the exact time of withdrawal, regardless of how long the TKN has been staked. By sandwiching a claim() between a large deposit o... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | other | false | true | ## Medium: Users can use delegated treasury voting power to vote on proposals that give them more delegated treasury voting power
### Description
[`GovPoolCreate::_restrictInterestedUsersFromProposal()`](https://github.com/dexe-network/DeXe-Protocol/tree/f2fe12eeac0c4c63ac39670912640dc91d94bda5/contracts/libs/gov/gov-... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Unbounded growth of `withdrawalRequests` array in `ElytraUnstakingVaultV1`
### Description
_Resolved_
The `withdrawalRequests` array in the `ElytraUnstakingVaultV1` contract is never cleared or reduced in size after withdrawals are processed. As a result, the array can grow indefinitely over time. This unboun... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | true | false | ## Low: NatSpec Comments Improvements
### Description
The NatSpec documentation of the contracts and interfaces in scope contain inconsistencies and omissions that reduce clarity and could lead to misunderstandings for developers and auditors:
* **Inconsistent Caller Documentation**
The `unstake()` function in `... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: staleCheckLatestRoundData() does not check the status of the Arbitrum sequencer in Chainlink feeds.
### Description
Given that the contract will be deployed on any EVM chain, when utilizing Chainlink in L2 chains like Arbitrum, it's important to ensure that the prices provided are not falsely perceived as f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Don't update state | false | false | ## Handle
cmichel
## Vulnerability details
The `LendingPair.liquidateAccount` function does not accrue and update the `cumulativeInterestRate` first, it only calls `_accrueAccountInterest` which does not update and instead uses the old `cumulativeInterestRate`.
## Impact
The liquidatee (borrower)'s state will not ... | Code4rena | 5 | Wild Credit |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Vested, Unclaimed Tokens Become Frozen Once Admin Revokes the Grant
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. The revoked grant can still be claimed by the original user now. Addressed in: `69baa49024fd33c181f2f0cbcd8ddcd26de3cf38`.
**File(s) affected:**`TokenVesting.sol`
**Description:** ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Fei reweight and stabilization may not react to price swings
### Description
In the [`TribeReserveStabilizer`](https://github.com/fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core-internal/blob/f54d7bb07c55adb78e2e142e7044f60090bb7602/contracts/stabilizer/TribeReserveStabilizer.sol#L14) contract, the [`exchangeFei` function](ht... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: No sanity checks when adding a new coin
### Description
**Severity**: Low
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In contract PaymentProcessor.sol, in function approveCoin ( renamed to whitelistPaymentMethod in latest commit ), there are no sanity checks over the coin parameter, if the coin parameter will be s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Cheaper to not cache `calldata` array length
### Description
When an array is passed as `calldata` it is [cheaper not to cache the length](https://x.com/DevDacian/status/1791490921881903468):
```diff
// PermissionsManager::__Permissions_init
function __Permissions_init(RoleAddress[] calldata _roleAddresses) ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Insufficient validation for ETH as trading token
### Description
This issue has been identified within the [_placeOrder](https://github.com/longgammalabs/hanji-contracts/blob/70b15ec4d9e7578248141604503843716a67d875/src/HanjiLOB.sol#L942) function of the `HanjiLOB` contract.
The function includes a validation... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: Arrays are not properly cleared due to iteration during removal
### Description
In two different parts of the codebase, an array is iterated over while its elements are simultaneously removed. Because each removal will shift the indices of the remaining elements, both locations of this behavior will fail to r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Precision loss allows users to giveLoans to pools with less collateral then required
### Description
The `_calculateInterest` function is vulnerable to precision loss. Due to dividing twice the function will return zero for both interest and `protocolInterest`. This could lead to a lender giving their loan ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: `merkleProof` length not checked
### Description
`merkleProof` length is not checked:
https://github.com/Gearbox-protocol/gearbox-contracts/blob/0ac33ba87212ce056ac6b6357ad74161d417158a/contracts/core/AccountMining.sol#L64
### Recommendation
We recommend adding a check that `merkleProof.length > 0`. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: Renouncing Ownership May Leave Vault and Fee Calculator in an Unmanageable State
### Description
The current design allows ownership of `MultiDepositorVault` (and possibly `FeeVault`) to be renounced using the inherited `renounceOwnership()` function from `Auth2Step`. This was previously a valid pattern to ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: [ACKNOWLEDGED] Validation is redundant in `FathomProxyWalletOwner`, `FathomProxyWalletOwnerUpgradeable`
### Description
In the mentioned locations of the contract `FathomProxyWalletOwner` and the contract `FathomProxyWalletOwnerUpgradeable` the validation of variables for zero-value is redundant as the prior c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Redundant Parameter in the _computePublicInput ✓ Fixed
### Description
In the function `_computePublicInput` of the `LineaRollup` contract, the parameter `_endBlockNumber` is redundant as it’s included in the parameter `_finalizationData`, the function can load the parameter from `_finalizationData` directly.
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: setUnderlyingTokenPercent should check percentages
### Description
## Handle
gpersoon
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
The function setUnderlyingTokenPercent doesn't check that the sum of all the percentages is 100%.
This way the percentages could be accidentally set up the wrong way, with unpredictable ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | rounding | true | false | ## High: Method `takeUSDCRaised()` transfer wrong funds
### Description
**Severity**: High
**Status**: Resolved
In Contract TokenSale.sol, the method `takeUSDCRaised()` calculates earned USDC as follows:
Here, `state.totalPrivateSold` is in 1e24 and `state.totalSupplyInValue` is in 1e18 so most likely `earned` wil... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | true | false | ## High: Incorrect pricing for CurveV2 LP Token
### Description
Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-tokemak-judging/issues/621
## Found by
xiaoming90
The price of the CurveV2 LP Tokens is incorrect as the incorrect quote currency is being used when computing the value, resulting in a loss of assets d... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | front-running | false | false | ## Low: `Factory.deployRentalSafe()` can be front-run to revert safe creation
### Description
Consider the following scenario:
* A user sends out a tx to call `Factory.deployRentalSafe()`
* The attacker sees that and front runs it, calling `SafeProxyFactory.createProxyWithNonce()` directly with the same parameters
* T... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: `ISimpleStakingERC20.Withdraw` is emitted with incorrect `staker` field
### Description
Event `ISimpleStakingERC20.Withdraw` is emitted with `_receiver` as `staker` in `SimpleStakingERC20.withdraw()`:
https://github.com/SwellNetwork/swell-contracts/blob/5b421683380c3aa4077454ce6177f3d3ac24cb9b/src/SimpleStakin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Ethereum Test Suite is designed to be run on multiple versions and not a single one
### Description
The Ethereum Test Suite is designed to support multiple protocol versions (called Network), ran from the genesis (called Frontier) in increments until the last release. Some tests are enabled:
a) on specific... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Storage variable is only written to but never read from
### Description
The `GLPbacking` storage variable is only written to in `updateGLPbackingNeeded` but is never actually read from - this also means that the calls to `updateGLPbackingNeeded` are useless as they have no effect. If an external actor wants to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | flash-loan | true | true | ## High: Missing overflow check in flashLoan
### Description
## Handle
@cmichelio
## Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
`ERC20FlashMintUpgradeable.flashLoan` does not check for an overflow when adding the fees to the flashloan amount.
The functionality might have been copied from https://eips.ethereum... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Lack of upper bound for fees and system parameters
### Description
The PSM contract’s `setMintFee` and `setRedeemFee` functions, used by privileged actors to set optional minting and redeeming fees, do not have an upper bound on the fee amount that can be set; therefore, a privileged actor could set minting an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Marketplace Can Receive Native Tokens without Ability to Rescue
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `9430b3ea3b42384c5764f78a46e6773f2581a763`.
**File(s) affected:**`Marketplace.sol`
**Description:** The marketplace contract exposes an empty `receive()` function that is ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Margin Call State Detection After Liquidation in `perp_withdraw`
### Description
In perp_withdraw, the margin call state is incorrectly determined after executing liquidation checks. The function calls `check_long_margin_call()` and `check_short_margin_call()` first which may successfully liquidat... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Convert to shares and assets take into consideration the fees
### Description
When converting shares to assets and vice versa using `convertToShares` and `convertToAssets`, the corresponding preview functions call `accrueInterestView()`. Finally, the performance and management fee shares are used when deriving... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: ANYONE CAN DEPLOY COVER RIGHT TOKENS
### Description
Anyone can call `deployCRToken` under `CoverRightTokenFactory` which does deploy a new `CoverRight` Token. On the `PolicyCenter` contract, the `_getCRTokenAddress` function is used to retrieve this token address back using only the `_poolId`, `_expiry` an... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | reentrancy | false | false | ## Security Issue Report
## Severity
**High Risk**
## Context
`OrderBook.sol#L800-L810`
## Description
The `collectFees` function is not guarded by a re-entrancy guard. In the event that a transfer of at least one of the tokens in a trading pair invokes arbitrary code (e.g., token implementing callbacks/hooks), it i... | Spearbit | 5 | CLOBER |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: Lido does not check actual amount from LidoExecutionLayerRewardsVault rewards withdrawal
### Description
**Severity:** Medium
**Path:** Lido.sol:_collectRewardsAndProcessWithdrawals#L827-L860
**Description:**
Part of the Oracle report processing, is the withdrawal of rewards from the LidoExecutionLayerRe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | signature | true | false | ## High: Using the same block number as nonce for permit2 order
### Description
In BunniHook when code wants to create Flood.bid order it uses `block.number` as nonce for permit2 signature.
```solidity
IFloodPlain.Order memory order = IFloodPlain.Order({
offerer: address(this),
zone: address(env.floodZone),
r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Price can be manipulated via flashloans.
### Description
**Description**
PriceProvider.sol: update(), getToken Price(), getLpToken Price().
Since the contract calculates the price based on a single DEX (Uniswap or Balancer), it can be manipulated via flashloans. There are several parts of the protocol where... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: If the User's Pending Rewards Exceed `maxClaimPerWallet` the Remaining Reward Will be Reset to Zero
### Description
The `RewardsClaimer.sol` contract manages the distribution and claiming of rewards. There we have `maxClaimPerWallet`, which limits how many tokens users can claim. It is important to note that ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Exposed Dangerous Functions That Could Reset Contract State
### Description
The Atlas contract includes several potentially dangerous functions that could have severe consequences on the contract state if accidentally invoked by the current contract owner. These functions are located in the `src/atlas.rs` file... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Can’t update the status of a self destructed hook
### Description
The protocol doesn't allow updating the status of hooks with no code.
The issue is that if a hook is self destructed for any reason the admin can't update its status any more.
[code](https://github.com/re-nft/smart-contracts/blob/3ddd32455a849c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Vulnerabilities in Cosmos SDK v0.47.4 Affecting Elys Network
### Description
Elys Network, which utilizes the Cosmos SDK version 0.47.4, is exposed to multiple vulnerabilities identified within the specified version of the SDK. The issues encompass a range of security flaws that could potentially impact the st... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [05] Missing Contract-existence Checks Before Low-level Calls
### Description
Low-level calls return success if there is no code present at the specified address.
### Recommended Mitigation Steps
In addition to the zero-address checks, add a check to verify that `.code.length > 0` | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | true | false | ## High: TOKENS CAN BE STUCKED IF THE SAME CHAIN-ID USED IN THE BRIDGE
### Description
In the current implementation of the token bridge, the chain-id is used to identify the source and destination chains when transferring tokens. If the same chain-id is used on both sides of the bridge, the system is unable to determ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: Potential loss of access to funds if payment window is incorrectly set
### Description
The `_paymentWindow` variable within the `PaymentsERC20` contract stores the maximum amount of time allowed for an asset transfer to be completed once a payment starts. The default value is [30 days](https://github.com/fr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: Funding Rate Manipulation #2
### Description
Description
The funding rate is a time-weighted average difference between the oracle price and the market price. Users
are either rewarded or taxed based on whether the oracle price is above or below the market price and whether
they are long or short.
Users are a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Use shift Right/Left instead of division/multiplication if possible
### Description
*Instances (5)*:
[Link to code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tessera/blob/f37a11407da2af844bbfe868e1422e3665a5f8e4/src/lib/MinPriorityQueue.sol)
[Link to code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-tessera/blob/f37a... | 0 |
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