text stringlengths 1 81 | start float64 0 10.1k | duration float64 0 24.9 |
|---|---|---|
Why is that? | 2,398.7 | 0.88 |
Well, as you might know,
in your phone is typically | 2,399.58 | 3.29 |
a SIM card, either a physical
card, a little chip, or nowadays | 2,402.87 | 3.627 |
it might actually be built
into the phone as well. | 2,406.497 | 2.083 |
But that SIM card has
a unique identifier. | 2,408.58 | 2.61 |
And when you sign up for phone
service, typically, with a company, | 2,411.19 | 3.05 |
they need to know what the unique
identifier is of your SIM card, | 2,414.24 | 4.14 |
be it something physical or something
wired, hardwired into your device. | 2,418.38 | 3.82 |
Why? | 2,422.2 | 0.5 |
Because that's how they associate your
phone number with that specific device. | 2,422.7 | 3.9 |
The catch is that it's all too possible,
and in some cases, all too easy, | 2,426.6 | 5.4 |
to trick, even the phone companies, into
swapping your SIM not necessarily doing | 2,432 | 4.95 |
it physically per se, but
convincing the mobile phone | 2,436.95 | 2.97 |
carriers to update
their system to say, oh, | 2,439.92 | 3.06 |
David now has this SIM card
and not that original one. | 2,442.98 | 4.05 |
That is to say, if I'm
an adversary and I just | 2,447.03 | 2.07 |
have any old phone
with any old SIM card, | 2,449.1 | 2.04 |
and I figure out what the unique
ID is, and maybe I call up | 2,451.14 | 3.03 |
David's mobile phone provider,
and I somehow convince them | 2,454.17 | 4.35 |
that I am David by tricking them into
believing it's me, as by telling them | 2,458.52 | 6.27 |
all of that personal
information about myself, | 2,464.79 | 2.17 |
I might be able to convince
them to swap my SIM card, | 2,466.96 | 3.68 |
the adversary's, with
what is already on file. | 2,470.64 | 3.03 |
The implication of that is that when
David subsequently gets text messages, | 2,473.67 | 5.01 |
they don't actually go
to me, the real David. | 2,478.68 | 2.55 |
They go to the adversary's phone as well
because they're tied to that SIM card. | 2,481.23 | 5.08 |
So in general nowadays,
if you have a choice, | 2,486.31 | 2.63 |
using some website or app to
use SMS or text-based messaging | 2,488.94 | 4.98 |
versus a native application
that you install | 2,493.92 | 3.24 |
onto your phone or other
device, you should generally | 2,497.16 | 3.24 |
prefer the latter, some
first-class piece of software | 2,500.4 | 3.36 |
that actually uses push
notifications or your data plan | 2,503.76 | 2.67 |
and does not rely on SMS text messaging
because of this potential threat. | 2,506.43 | 5.83 |
So what are still other threats
when it comes to these systems? | 2,512.26 | 5.16 |
Well, it turns out that it's
very possible, unfortunately, | 2,517.42 | 3.68 |
for adversaries to somehow get
software, malicious software, | 2,521.1 | 3.69 |
otherwise known as malware,
onto your Mac, onto your PC, | 2,524.79 | 3.15 |
perhaps even onto your phone . | 2,527.94 | 1.83 |
This might be because you
installed a piece of software | 2,529.77 | 2.4 |
that you shouldn't have trusted. | 2,532.17 | 1.47 |
This might be because
your phone or your device | 2,533.64 | 2.31 |
is infected with something
like a virus or a worm. | 2,535.95 | 2.58 |
But in general, you might
be vulnerable to malware, | 2,538.53 | 3.33 |
including software that
logs all of your keystrokes. | 2,541.86 | 3.33 |
Key logging refers to exactly
that, some piece of software | 2,545.19 | 3.24 |
that most likely maliciously is
literally recording everything you type | 2,548.43 | 4.32 |
or everything you tap into that device. | 2,552.75 | 2.34 |
And what is this software
do with those keystrokes? | 2,555.09 | 2.31 |
Very often it will upload them. | 2,557.4 | 1.71 |
If there's an internet
connection, maybe to a server | 2,559.11 | 2.37 |
that the adversary controls. | 2,561.48 | 1.65 |
Now, what's the implication
of this key logging threat? | 2,563.13 | 2.88 |
Well, if you're typing in your
username, that's not such a big | 2,566.01 | 3.212 |
because those are generally public. | 2,569.222 | 1.458 |
But if you're typing in
your password, and that's | 2,570.68 | 2.33 |
being automatically uploaded
to the adversary's server, | 2,573.01 | 2.46 |
now they know your
username and your password. | 2,575.47 | 2.28 |
Worse, if the adversary
also sees you typing | 2,577.75 | 3.18 |
in that six-digit code,
your one-time password | 2,580.93 | 3.51 |
that you might have received even
from your phone or some other device, | 2,584.44 | 3.03 |
if they are fast enough and
smart enough and figure out | 2,587.47 | 3.57 |
how to log what you're typing, send it
to the server, perhaps even before you | 2,591.04 | 4.68 |
yourself hit Enter, maybe they
can use not only your username | 2,595.72 | 4.08 |
and your password, but
even that one-time password | 2,599.8 | 3.36 |
by pretending to be on their own
phone or their own laptop or desktop, | 2,603.16 | 5.01 |
typing in or more
realistically, automatically | 2,608.17 | 3.18 |
through software typing
in those same values | 2,611.35 | 2.82 |
and accessing your account even before
you had a chance to do so as well. | 2,614.17 | 5.59 |
Now what are the defenses
against that particular threat? | 2,619.76 | 2.93 |
Really just to be generally paranoid
about what computers you yourself use. | 2,622.69 | 4.71 |
For instance, nowadays
I will rarely, if ever, | 2,627.4 | 3.13 |
actually use an internet cafe's
computer or even a lab computer | 2,630.53 | 4.95 |
here on Harvard's campus, or
frankly, even a friend's computer | 2,635.48 | 3.3 |
because I don't know just how safe they
are when it comes to best practices | 2,638.78 | 4.32 |
using their device on the internet. | 2,643.1 | 2.05 |
I will in general only
log into websites and apps | 2,645.15 | 3.11 |
on my own personal devices, which
isn't to say that I, too, am perfect, | 2,648.26 | 4.11 |
but rather at least I'm
reducing the probability | 2,652.37 | 3.15 |
that I lose control over my data by
using some other device that I myself | 2,655.52 | 4.77 |
don't oversee by that
person, that owner, | 2,660.29 | 3.72 |
not themselves adhering
to best practices. | 2,664.01 | 2.91 |
Now, even then, I will
admit, that using key logging | 2,666.92 | 3.78 |
and getting it up to
an adversary's server | 2,670.7 | 2.31 |
and inputting it faster than you might
is a pretty sophisticated and difficult | 2,673.01 | 5.31 |
threat. | 2,678.32 | 0.54 |
But it's worth keeping in mind and
realizing that these are certainly | 2,678.86 | 5.04 |
theoretical attacks. | 2,683.9 | 2.1 |
And if you yourself are
targeted for some reason, | 2,686 | 2.79 |
these are absolutely things
you should be mindful of. | 2,688.79 | 2.89 |
So in general, if you have the
luxury of only using your own device | 2,691.68 | 3.77 |
and not some shared device that, too,
tends to be best practice, I would say. | 2,695.45 | 6.27 |
Any questions on these here attacks? | 2,701.72 | 4.14 |
AUDIENCE: Regarding
using long passwords, | 2,705.86 | 2.25 |
do you recommend using Google passwords
or Apple passwords for the system | 2,708.11 | 5.49 |
to remember the passwords for us? | 2,713.6 | 1.8 |
DAVID MALAN: A really good question. | 2,715.4 | 1.5 |
Short answer, yes,
but we'll come to that | 2,716.9 | 1.708 |
in more detail in just a few minutes. | 2,718.608 | 1.782 |
So what are other attacks
that we should be mindful of? | 2,720.39 | 3.208 |
So this one has kind of a funny
name, but there's this attack | 2,723.598 | 2.542 |
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