text stringlengths 1 81 | start float64 0 10.1k | duration float64 0 24.9 |
|---|---|---|
violate as a recommendation still. | 1,791.3 | 2.4 |
If you're in a corporate
workplace, in particular, | 1,793.7 | 2.43 |
and you're being required
by the system administrators | 1,796.13 | 2.91 |
to change your password every
month, maybe every three months, | 1,799.04 | 3.7 |
six months, every year perhaps, that's
not generally recommended anymore, | 1,802.74 | 5.06 |
even though not too long ago, it did
feel like, sound like a best practice. | 1,807.8 | 5.44 |
But why is this not recommended
anymore, to have you forcibly | 1,813.24 | 5.72 |
change your password periodically,
like every few months? | 1,818.96 | 4.71 |
AUDIENCE: Because the password
will be easily forgotten | 1,823.67 | 2.38 |
and be more vulnerable
to brute force attacks. | 1,826.05 | 3.11 |
DAVID MALAN: Why would
it be more vulnerable? | 1,829.16 | 2.19 |
AUDIENCE: Because the hackers
can get access to all passwords | 1,831.35 | 4.14 |
and get hints about the new password. | 1,835.49 | 2.063 |
DAVID MALAN: OK. | 1,837.553 | 0.667 |
So yes, one danger of forcing you and
me to change our password too frequently | 1,838.22 | 4.47 |
is that you and I do not tend
to exert much effort when | 1,842.69 | 2.88 |
we're required to do so. | 1,845.57 | 1.38 |
For instance, if my password today
is, for instance, password 1, well, | 1,846.95 | 4.505 |
you know what my password
might be in three months? | 1,851.455 | 2.125 |
Password 2 or in another
three months, password 3. | 1,853.58 | 3.54 |
You and I might exert the
minimal amount of energy | 1,857.12 | 2.34 |
to change the password so that we
meet the company's requirements | 1,859.46 | 2.79 |
but so that it's not too hard
for you and me to remember | 1,862.25 | 2.34 |
what the new password is. | 1,864.59 | 1.08 |
And so indeed, if information
about my past passwords leaks out | 1,865.67 | 3.84 |
and some adversary sees,
oh, well, wait a minute, | 1,869.51 | 2.16 |
your password was
password 2 last month, I'm | 1,871.67 | 2.52 |
just going to guess heuristically
that this month it's password 3. | 1,874.19 | 3.33 |
We might indeed be leaking information. | 1,877.52 | 2.16 |
What's another reason
that you might not want | 1,879.68 | 2.22 |
to require humans to change
their passwords arbitrarily | 1,881.9 | 4.32 |
on some schedule like this? | 1,886.22 | 2.138 |
AUDIENCE: We keep
forgetting our passwords, | 1,888.358 | 1.792 |
too, if we change it too frequently. | 1,890.15 | 2.8 |
So that is not a good
practice for a website. | 1,892.95 | 2.03 |
DAVID MALAN: Exactly. | 1,894.98 | 0.875 |
If you make me change my
password too frequently, | 1,895.855 | 2.485 |
honestly, I'm probably going to
forget what my next password is | 1,898.34 | 2.82 |
because I'm going to get
confused with last month's | 1,901.16 | 1.8 |
or the previous months or the like. | 1,902.96 | 1.458 |
And so there's these sociological
effects on us humans, | 1,904.418 | 2.712 |
just being human, not being very good at
remembering not only the first password | 1,907.13 | 4.17 |
you made me choose that's very complex,
but the second and the third as well. | 1,911.3 | 3.76 |
And so generally, you should not come
up with such a scheme anymore because | 1,915.06 | 3.23 |
of these adverse side effects. | 1,918.29 | 1.56 |
And how about one more
recommendation here? | 1,919.85 | 2.22 |
"Verifiers shall implement
a rate-limiting mechanism | 1,922.07 | 3.6 |
that effectively limits the number of
failed authentication attempts that can | 1,925.67 | 3.81 |
be made on the subscriber's account." | 1,929.48 | 2.25 |
Now, what do we mean by this? | 1,931.73 | 1.432 |
Well, odds are this is
something you yourselves | 1,933.162 | 1.958 |
might have experienced if, for
instance, you forgot your password | 1,935.12 | 3.66 |
or you kept typing it slightly wrong. | 1,938.78 | 1.77 |
Maybe your phone screen
was wet so it wasn't | 1,940.55 | 2.01 |
registering your fingertips properly. | 1,942.56 | 2.1 |
It turns out you can lock
yourself out of your own phone. | 1,944.66 | 2.76 |
And you might have, in fact, seen
something like this on iPhone. | 1,947.42 | 2.85 |
Android has a similar
screen, if, for instance, you | 1,950.27 | 2.64 |
type in the wrong passcode
10 times in a row. | 1,952.91 | 3.51 |
The presumption, by Apple and Google
and others, is that if after 10 times | 1,956.42 | 5.28 |
you still haven't inputted
your password correctly, | 1,961.7 | 2.64 |
it's probably a higher probability
that you are not David, | 1,964.34 | 4.02 |
that you are not you, but rather it's
someone else who has taken your phone, | 1,968.36 | 3.95 |
stolen your phone, and
is trying to get into it. | 1,972.31 | 2.79 |
Now that's not always the case. | 1,975.1 | 1.93 |
You can imagine situations where
you just were being absent minded. | 1,977.03 | 3.08 |
You were half asleep. | 1,980.11 | 1.14 |
Maybe you weren't really focusing
on it, and you locked yourself out. | 1,981.25 | 3.43 |
And so there, too is, again, a trade
off between usability and security. | 1,984.68 | 4.22 |
But the higher probability
event after 10 wrong attempts | 1,988.9 | 3.39 |
probably tends to be that it's an
adversary trying to get in and not you. | 1,992.29 | 3.72 |
But what's the point of this? | 1,996.01 | 1.95 |
Beyond annoying the adversary
and maybe more significantly, | 1,997.96 | 3.69 |
really annoying you when it happens by
accident, what this effectively does | 2,001.65 | 4.32 |
is it slows the adversary down. | 2,005.97 | 2.32 |
In other words, it increases the
cost of this attack to the adversary. | 2,008.29 | 3.77 |
Why? | 2,012.06 | 0.54 |
Well, we saw a moment ago
that a smart adversary | 2,012.6 | 2.88 |
who knows a little bit of Python
code and steals your phone | 2,015.48 | 2.76 |
can try 10,000 possible passwords
in just less than a second. | 2,018.24 | 5.02 |
However, if you now slow them
down by having this feature | 2,023.26 | 3.14 |
on your iPhone or Android device
that pumps the brakes, so to speak, | 2,026.4 | 4.42 |
that lets the adversary try
no more than 10 at a time, | 2,030.82 | 3.87 |
that's significantly slows them down. | 2,034.69 | 2.7 |
Now they might have to spend at least
10 seconds, 20 seconds, an hour, a day, | 2,037.39 | 4.95 |
or longer, especially since
what Android and iPhone also | 2,042.34 | 3.75 |
do is they tend to
increase this time limit. | 2,046.09 | 3.03 |
The first time you
mess up, it's 1 minute. | 2,049.12 | 1.89 |
If you mess up another 10 times,
it's now 2 minutes, maybe 5 minutes, | 2,051.01 | 4.229 |
maybe 10 minutes. | 2,055.239 | 1.021 |
Maybe the phone even deletes
itself, wipes itself, | 2,056.26 | 3.33 |
if that, too, is a feature that
you or your company has enabled. | 2,059.59 | 3.27 |
So again, the right way to think about
this, beyond the usability trade off, | 2,062.86 | 3.99 |
is that we're just trying to
raise the bar to the adversary. | 2,066.85 | 2.76 |
We're trying to make it
more expensive, more costly, | 2,069.61 | 2.609 |
maybe more risky to the
adversary by slowing them down. | 2,072.219 | 3.571 |
And by more risky I mean if
this is like a Hollywood moment, | 2,075.79 | 2.73 |
and someone's just stolen the phone
from your table at Starbucks or a coffee | 2,078.52 | 3.627 |
shop, they've plugged
it into their laptop-- | 2,082.147 | 1.833 |
they're trying desperately to crack into
it before you come back to the table-- | 2,083.98 | 3.929 |
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