instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HandleContextMenu(const ContextMenuParams& params) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct operand *op,
unsigned size, bool sign_extension)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
op->type = OP_IMM;
op->bytes = size;
op->addr.mem.ea = ctxt->_eip;
/* NB. Immediates are sign-extended as necessary. */
switch (op->bytes) {
case 1:
op->val = insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
break;
case 2:
op->val = insn_fetch(s16, ctxt);
break;
case 4:
op->val = insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
break;
case 8:
op->val = insn_fetch(s64, ctxt);
break;
}
if (!sign_extension) {
switch (op->bytes) {
case 1:
op->val &= 0xff;
break;
case 2:
op->val &= 0xffff;
break;
case 4:
op->val &= 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
done:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_height;
UWORD16 u2_width;
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u2_width = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
u2_height = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
if ((u2_width != ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size)
|| (u2_height != ps_dec->u2_vertical_size))
{
if (0 == ps_dec->u2_header_done)
{
/* This is the first time we are reading the resolution */
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size = u2_width;
ps_dec->u2_vertical_size = u2_height;
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = (UWORD32) (u2_width);
}
}
else
{
if((u2_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (u2_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = u2_height;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = u2_width;
return e_error;
}
else
{
/* The resolution has changed */
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
return SET_IVD_FATAL_ERROR(e_error);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* aspect_ratio_info (4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_aspect_ratio_info = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Frame rate code(4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code > MPEG2_MAX_FRAME_RATE_CODE)
{
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* bit_rate_value (18 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,18);
GET_MARKER_BIT(ps_dec,ps_stream);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* vbv_buffer_size_value(10 bits), constrained_parameter_flag (1 bit) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,11);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the intra blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_intra_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the inter blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_inter_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init_dimensions(H264Context *h)
{
int width = h->width - (h->sps.crop_right + h->sps.crop_left);
int height = h->height - (h->sps.crop_top + h->sps.crop_bottom);
av_assert0(h->sps.crop_right + h->sps.crop_left < (unsigned)h->width);
av_assert0(h->sps.crop_top + h->sps.crop_bottom < (unsigned)h->height);
/* handle container cropping */
if (!h->sps.crop &&
FFALIGN(h->avctx->width, 16) == h->width &&
FFALIGN(h->avctx->height, 16) == h->height) {
width = h->avctx->width;
height = h->avctx->height;
}
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid cropped dimensions: %dx%d.\n",
width, height);
if (h->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring cropping information.\n");
h->sps.crop_bottom = h->sps.crop_top = h->sps.crop_right = h->sps.crop_left = 0;
h->sps.crop = 0;
width = h->width;
height = h->height;
}
h->avctx->coded_width = h->width;
h->avctx->coded_height = h->height;
h->avctx->width = width;
h->avctx->height = height;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long jas_iccpadtomult(long x, long y)
{
return ((x + y - 1) / y) * y;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usbtest_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usbtest_dev *dev = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "disconnect\n");
kfree(dev);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 59,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void show_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *stack)
{
unsigned long sp, ip, lr, newsp;
int count = 0;
int firstframe = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
int curr_frame = current->curr_ret_stack;
extern void return_to_handler(void);
unsigned long rth = (unsigned long)return_to_handler;
#endif
sp = (unsigned long) stack;
if (tsk == NULL)
tsk = current;
if (sp == 0) {
if (tsk == current)
sp = current_stack_pointer();
else
sp = tsk->thread.ksp;
}
lr = 0;
printk("Call Trace:\n");
do {
if (!validate_sp(sp, tsk, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD))
return;
stack = (unsigned long *) sp;
newsp = stack[0];
ip = stack[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE];
if (!firstframe || ip != lr) {
printk("["REG"] ["REG"] %pS", sp, ip, (void *)ip);
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
if ((ip == rth) && curr_frame >= 0) {
printk(" (%pS)",
(void *)current->ret_stack[curr_frame].ret);
curr_frame--;
}
#endif
if (firstframe)
printk(" (unreliable)");
printk("\n");
}
firstframe = 0;
/*
* See if this is an exception frame.
* We look for the "regshere" marker in the current frame.
*/
if (validate_sp(sp, tsk, STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE)
&& stack[STACK_FRAME_MARKER] == STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER) {
struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)
(sp + STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD);
lr = regs->link;
printk("--- interrupt: %lx at %pS\n LR = %pS\n",
regs->trap, (void *)regs->nip, (void *)lr);
firstframe = 1;
}
sp = newsp;
} while (count++ < kstack_depth_to_print);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 56,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int index_entry_create(
git_index_entry **out,
git_repository *repo,
const char *path,
bool from_workdir)
{
size_t pathlen = strlen(path), alloclen;
struct entry_internal *entry;
unsigned int path_valid_flags = GIT_PATH_REJECT_INDEX_DEFAULTS;
/* always reject placing `.git` in the index and directory traversal.
* when requested, disallow platform-specific filenames and upgrade to
* the platform-specific `.git` tests (eg, `git~1`, etc).
*/
if (from_workdir)
path_valid_flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_WORKDIR_DEFAULTS;
if (!git_path_isvalid(repo, path, path_valid_flags)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INDEX, "invalid path: '%s'", path);
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, sizeof(struct entry_internal), pathlen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, alloclen, 1);
entry = git__calloc(1, alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(entry);
entry->pathlen = pathlen;
memcpy(entry->path, path, pathlen);
entry->entry.path = entry->path;
*out = (git_index_entry *)entry;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_proc_write_setup(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr,
struct rpc_message *msg)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(hdr->inode);
if (!nfs4_write_need_cache_consistency_data(hdr)) {
hdr->args.bitmask = NULL;
hdr->res.fattr = NULL;
} else
hdr->args.bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask;
if (!hdr->pgio_done_cb)
hdr->pgio_done_cb = nfs4_write_done_cb;
hdr->res.server = server;
hdr->timestamp = jiffies;
msg->rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_WRITE];
nfs4_init_sequence(&hdr->args.seq_args, &hdr->res.seq_res, 1);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_get_regs(struct net_device *dev,
struct ethtool_regs *regs, void *_p)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
regs->version = 0;
memset(_p, 0, TG3_REG_BLK_SIZE);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_LOW_POWER)
return;
tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
tg3_dump_legacy_regs(tp, (u32 *)_p);
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_db_args(krb5_context context, char **db_args, xargs_t *xargs,
OPERATION optype)
{
int i=0;
krb5_error_code st=0;
char *arg=NULL, *arg_val=NULL;
char **dptr=NULL;
unsigned int arg_val_len=0;
if (db_args) {
for (i=0; db_args[i]; ++i) {
arg = strtok_r(db_args[i], "=", &arg_val);
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
dptr = &xargs->tktpolicydn;
} else {
if (strcmp(arg, USERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL ||
xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, st,
_("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->dn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, CONTAINERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, st,
_("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->containerdn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, LINKDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, st,
_("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->linkdn;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, st,
_("unknown option: %s"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
xargs->dn_from_kbd = TRUE;
if (arg_val == NULL || strlen(arg_val) == 0) {
st = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, st,
_("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (arg_val == NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, st,
_("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
arg_val_len = strlen(arg_val) + 1;
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context,
arg_val,
dptr)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
*dptr = k5memdup(arg_val, arg_val_len, &st);
if (*dptr == NULL)
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
cleanup:
return st;
}
Commit Message: Fix LDAP key data segmentation [CVE-2014-4345]
For principal entries having keys with multiple kvnos (due to use of
-keepold), the LDAP KDB module makes an attempt to store all the keys
having the same kvno into a single krbPrincipalKey attribute value.
There is a fencepost error in the loop, causing currkvno to be set to
the just-processed value instead of the next kvno. As a result, the
second and all following groups of multiple keys by kvno are each
stored in two krbPrincipalKey attribute values. Fix the loop to use
the correct kvno value.
CVE-2014-4345:
In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC
database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause it to perform an
out-of-bounds write (buffer overrun) by performing multiple cpw
-keepold operations. An off-by-one error while copying key
information to the new database entry results in keys sharing a common
kvno being written to different array buckets, in an array whose size
is determined by the number of kvnos present. After sufficient
iterations, the extra writes extend past the end of the
(NULL-terminated) array. The NULL terminator is always written after
the end of the loop, so no out-of-bounds data is read, it is only
written.
Historically, it has been possible to convert an out-of-bounds write
into remote code execution in some cases, though the necessary
exploits must be tailored to the individual application and are
usually quite complicated. Depending on the allocated length of the
array, an out-of-bounds write may also cause a segmentation fault
and/or application crash.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: clarified commit message]
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 81c332e29f10887c6b9deb065f81ba259f4c7e03)
ticket: 7980
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 36,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HeadlessPrintManager::OnDidPrintDocument(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPrintDocument_Params& params) {
if (!base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(params.metafile_data_handle)) {
ReleaseJob(INVALID_MEMORY_HANDLE);
return;
}
auto shared_buf =
std::make_unique<base::SharedMemory>(params.metafile_data_handle, true);
if (!shared_buf->Map(params.data_size)) {
ReleaseJob(METAFILE_MAP_ERROR);
return;
}
data_ = std::string(static_cast<const char*>(shared_buf->memory()),
params.data_size);
ReleaseJob(PRINT_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 149,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* OmniboxViewWin::parent_view() const {
return parent_view_;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _zip_read_eocd(zip_buffer_t *buffer, zip_uint64_t buf_offset, unsigned int flags, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_cdir_t *cd;
zip_uint64_t i, nentry, size, offset, eocd_offset;
if (_zip_buffer_left(buffer) < EOCDLEN) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
eocd_offset = _zip_buffer_offset(buffer);
_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4); /* magic already verified */
if (_zip_buffer_get_32(buffer) != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK, 0);
return NULL;
}
/* number of cdir-entries on this disk */
i = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
/* number of cdir-entries */
nentry = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
if (nentry != i) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_NOZIP, 0);
return NULL;
}
size = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
offset = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
if (offset+size < offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return NULL;
}
if (offset+size > buf_offset + eocd_offset) {
/* cdir spans past EOCD record */
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((flags & ZIP_CHECKCONS) && offset+size != buf_offset + eocd_offset) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return NULL;
}
if ((cd=_zip_cdir_new(nentry, error)) == NULL)
return NULL;
cd->is_zip64 = false;
cd->size = size;
cd->offset = offset;
return cd;
}
Commit Message: Make eocd checks more consistent between zip and zip64 cases.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 61,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_get_output_colorspace(struct iw_context *ctx, struct iw_csdescr *csdescr)
{
*csdescr = ctx->img2cs; // struct copy
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 64,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void br_multicast_port_group_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg = (void *)data;
struct net_bridge *br = pg->port->br;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || timer_pending(&pg->timer) ||
hlist_unhashed(&pg->mglist) || pg->state & MDB_PERMANENT)
goto out;
br_multicast_del_pg(br, pg);
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 30,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowContentSettingsWindow(ContentSettingsType content_type) {
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableTabbedOptions)) {
ShowOptionsTab(
chrome::kContentSettingsExceptionsSubPage + std::string(kHashMark) +
ContentSettingsHandler::ContentSettingsTypeToGroupName(content_type));
} else {
window()->ShowContentSettingsWindow(content_type,
profile_->GetOriginalProfile());
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart)
{
u32 __user *uaddr = restart->futex.uaddr;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
if (restart->futex.flags & FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT) {
t = restart->futex.time;
tp = &t;
}
restart->fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
return (long)futex_wait(uaddr, restart->futex.flags,
restart->futex.val, tp, restart->futex.bitset);
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 84,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int keyboard_load_and_wait(const char *vc, const char *map, const char *map_toggle, bool utf8) {
const char *args[8];
unsigned i = 0;
pid_t pid;
int r;
/* An empty map means kernel map */
if (isempty(map))
return 0;
args[i++] = KBD_LOADKEYS;
args[i++] = "-q";
args[i++] = "-C";
args[i++] = vc;
if (utf8)
args[i++] = "-u";
args[i++] = map;
if (map_toggle)
args[i++] = map_toggle;
args[i++] = NULL;
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
_cleanup_free_ char *cmd;
cmd = strv_join((char**) args, " ");
log_debug("Executing \"%s\"...", strnull(cmd));
}
r = safe_fork("(loadkeys)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_CLOSE_ALL_FDS|FORK_RLIMIT_NOFILE_SAFE|FORK_LOG, &pid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
execv(args[0], (char **) args);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
return wait_for_terminate_and_check(KBD_LOADKEYS, pid, WAIT_LOG);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 0
| 92,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long wakeup_gran(struct sched_entity *se)
{
unsigned long gran = sysctl_sched_wakeup_granularity;
/*
* Since its curr running now, convert the gran from real-time
* to virtual-time in his units.
*
* By using 'se' instead of 'curr' we penalize light tasks, so
* they get preempted easier. That is, if 'se' < 'curr' then
* the resulting gran will be larger, therefore penalizing the
* lighter, if otoh 'se' > 'curr' then the resulting gran will
* be smaller, again penalizing the lighter task.
*
* This is especially important for buddies when the leftmost
* task is higher priority than the buddy.
*/
return calc_delta_fair(gran, se);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct f_hidg *func_to_hidg(struct usb_function *f)
{
return container_of(f, struct f_hidg, func);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 96,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: short CCITTFaxStream::lookBits(int n) {
int c;
while (inputBits < n) {
if ((c = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
if (inputBits == 0) {
return EOF;
}
return (inputBuf << (n - inputBits)) & (0xffffffff >> (32 - n));
}
inputBuf = (inputBuf << 8) + c;
inputBits += 8;
}
return (inputBuf >> (inputBits - n)) & (0xffffffff >> (32 - n));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TEE_Result op_attr_value_from_obj(void *attr, void *src_attr)
{
uint32_t *v = attr;
uint32_t *src_v = src_attr;
*v = *src_v;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MessageImpl(const std::string& message, int host_id)
: msg(message),
host_id(host_id) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nested_svm_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
int vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
switch (exit_code) {
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled_msr(svm);
break;
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
vmexit = nested_svm_intercept_ioio(svm);
break;
case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0 ... SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8: {
u32 bit = 1U << (exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0);
if (svm->nested.intercept_cr & bit)
vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
break;
}
case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0 ... SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7: {
u32 bit = 1U << (exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0);
if (svm->nested.intercept_dr & bit)
vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
break;
}
case SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE ... SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + 0x1f: {
u32 excp_bits = 1 << (exit_code - SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE);
if (svm->nested.intercept_exceptions & excp_bits)
vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
/* async page fault always cause vmexit */
else if ((exit_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR) &&
svm->apf_reason != 0)
vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
break;
}
case SVM_EXIT_ERR: {
vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
break;
}
default: {
u64 exit_bits = 1ULL << (exit_code - SVM_EXIT_INTR);
if (svm->nested.intercept & exit_bits)
vmexit = NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
}
}
return vmexit;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_file_ioctl(
struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long p)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
void __user *arg = (void __user *)p;
int ioflags = 0;
int error;
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME)
ioflags |= IO_INVIS;
trace_xfs_file_ioctl(ip);
switch (cmd) {
case FITRIM:
return xfs_ioc_trim(mp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_ALLOCSP:
case XFS_IOC_FREESP:
case XFS_IOC_RESVSP:
case XFS_IOC_UNRESVSP:
case XFS_IOC_ALLOCSP64:
case XFS_IOC_FREESP64:
case XFS_IOC_RESVSP64:
case XFS_IOC_UNRESVSP64:
case XFS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE: {
xfs_flock64_t bf;
if (copy_from_user(&bf, arg, sizeof(bf)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return xfs_ioc_space(ip, inode, filp, ioflags, cmd, &bf);
}
case XFS_IOC_DIOINFO: {
struct dioattr da;
xfs_buftarg_t *target =
XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip) ?
mp->m_rtdev_targp : mp->m_ddev_targp;
da.d_mem = da.d_miniosz = target->bt_logical_sectorsize;
da.d_maxiosz = INT_MAX & ~(da.d_miniosz - 1);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &da, sizeof(da)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return 0;
}
case XFS_IOC_FSBULKSTAT_SINGLE:
case XFS_IOC_FSBULKSTAT:
case XFS_IOC_FSINUMBERS:
return xfs_ioc_bulkstat(mp, cmd, arg);
case XFS_IOC_FSGEOMETRY_V1:
return xfs_ioc_fsgeometry_v1(mp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_FSGEOMETRY:
return xfs_ioc_fsgeometry(mp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_GETVERSION:
return put_user(inode->i_generation, (int __user *)arg);
case XFS_IOC_FSGETXATTR:
return xfs_ioc_fsgetxattr(ip, 0, arg);
case XFS_IOC_FSGETXATTRA:
return xfs_ioc_fsgetxattr(ip, 1, arg);
case XFS_IOC_FSSETXATTR:
return xfs_ioc_fssetxattr(ip, filp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_GETXFLAGS:
return xfs_ioc_getxflags(ip, arg);
case XFS_IOC_SETXFLAGS:
return xfs_ioc_setxflags(ip, filp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_FSSETDM: {
struct fsdmidata dmi;
if (copy_from_user(&dmi, arg, sizeof(dmi)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_set_dmattrs(ip, dmi.fsd_dmevmask,
dmi.fsd_dmstate);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_GETBMAP:
case XFS_IOC_GETBMAPA:
return xfs_ioc_getbmap(ip, ioflags, cmd, arg);
case XFS_IOC_GETBMAPX:
return xfs_ioc_getbmapx(ip, arg);
case XFS_IOC_FD_TO_HANDLE:
case XFS_IOC_PATH_TO_HANDLE:
case XFS_IOC_PATH_TO_FSHANDLE: {
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t hreq;
if (copy_from_user(&hreq, arg, sizeof(hreq)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return xfs_find_handle(cmd, &hreq);
}
case XFS_IOC_OPEN_BY_HANDLE: {
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t hreq;
if (copy_from_user(&hreq, arg, sizeof(xfs_fsop_handlereq_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return xfs_open_by_handle(filp, &hreq);
}
case XFS_IOC_FSSETDM_BY_HANDLE:
return xfs_fssetdm_by_handle(filp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_READLINK_BY_HANDLE: {
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t hreq;
if (copy_from_user(&hreq, arg, sizeof(xfs_fsop_handlereq_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return xfs_readlink_by_handle(filp, &hreq);
}
case XFS_IOC_ATTRLIST_BY_HANDLE:
return xfs_attrlist_by_handle(filp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_ATTRMULTI_BY_HANDLE:
return xfs_attrmulti_by_handle(filp, arg);
case XFS_IOC_SWAPEXT: {
struct xfs_swapext sxp;
if (copy_from_user(&sxp, arg, sizeof(xfs_swapext_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_ioc_swapext(&sxp);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_FSCOUNTS: {
xfs_fsop_counts_t out;
error = xfs_fs_counts(mp, &out);
if (error)
return -error;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &out, sizeof(out)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return 0;
}
case XFS_IOC_SET_RESBLKS: {
xfs_fsop_resblks_t inout;
__uint64_t in;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)
return -XFS_ERROR(EROFS);
if (copy_from_user(&inout, arg, sizeof(inout)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
/* input parameter is passed in resblks field of structure */
in = inout.resblks;
error = xfs_reserve_blocks(mp, &in, &inout);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return -error;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &inout, sizeof(inout)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return 0;
}
case XFS_IOC_GET_RESBLKS: {
xfs_fsop_resblks_t out;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
error = xfs_reserve_blocks(mp, NULL, &out);
if (error)
return -error;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &out, sizeof(out)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
return 0;
}
case XFS_IOC_FSGROWFSDATA: {
xfs_growfs_data_t in;
if (copy_from_user(&in, arg, sizeof(in)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_growfs_data(mp, &in);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_FSGROWFSLOG: {
xfs_growfs_log_t in;
if (copy_from_user(&in, arg, sizeof(in)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_growfs_log(mp, &in);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_FSGROWFSRT: {
xfs_growfs_rt_t in;
if (copy_from_user(&in, arg, sizeof(in)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_growfs_rt(mp, &in);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_GOINGDOWN: {
__uint32_t in;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(in, (__uint32_t __user *)arg))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = xfs_fs_goingdown(mp, in);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_ERROR_INJECTION: {
xfs_error_injection_t in;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&in, arg, sizeof(in)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = xfs_errortag_add(in.errtag, mp);
return -error;
}
case XFS_IOC_ERROR_CLEARALL:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
error = xfs_errortag_clearall(mp, 1);
return -error;
case XFS_IOC_FREE_EOFBLOCKS: {
struct xfs_fs_eofblocks eofb;
struct xfs_eofblocks keofb;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)
return -XFS_ERROR(EROFS);
if (copy_from_user(&eofb, arg, sizeof(eofb)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
error = xfs_fs_eofblocks_from_user(&eofb, &keofb);
if (error)
return -error;
return -xfs_icache_free_eofblocks(mp, &keofb);
}
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch,
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch)
{
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X)
return false;
switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
case BPF_JGT:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, false);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, true);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
case BPF_JLT:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, true);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, false);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
case BPF_JGE:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, true);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, false);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
case BPF_JLE:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, false);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, true);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectFilledTestForm() {
ExpectFieldValue(L"firstname", "Milton");
ExpectFieldValue(L"lastname", "Waddams");
ExpectFieldValue(L"address1", "4120 Freidrich Lane");
ExpectFieldValue(L"address2", "Basement");
ExpectFieldValue(L"city", "Austin");
ExpectFieldValue(L"state", "TX");
ExpectFieldValue(L"zip", "78744");
ExpectFieldValue(L"country", "US");
ExpectFieldValue(L"phone", "5125551234");
}
Commit Message: Convert the autofill interactive browser test to a normal browser_test. I added testing methods to fake input events that don't depend on the OS and being at the front.
BUG=121574
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10368010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135432 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add a few more confusability mapping entries
U+0153(œ) => ce
U+00E6(æ), U+04D5 (ӕ) => ae
U+0499(ҙ) => 3
U+0525(ԥ) => n
Bug: 835554, 826019, 836885
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ic89211f70359d3d67cc25c1805b426b72cdb16ae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1055894
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558928}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioFlinger::EffectHandle::commandExecuted(uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
if (mEffectClient != 0) {
mEffectClient->commandExecuted(cmdCode, cmdSize, pCmdData, replySize, pReplyData);
}
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcRenderComposite(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCompositeReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->src);
swapl(&stuff->mask);
swapl(&stuff->dst);
swaps(&stuff->xSrc);
swaps(&stuff->ySrc);
swaps(&stuff->xMask);
swaps(&stuff->yMask);
swaps(&stuff->xDst);
swaps(&stuff->yDst);
swaps(&stuff->width);
swaps(&stuff->height);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
switch (env->prog->type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
break;
default:
return 0;
}
reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
reg_type_str[reg->type]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 ");
if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf);
} else {
verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value");
}
verbose(env, " should have been 0 or 1\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: open_face( FT_Driver driver,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Int num_params,
FT_Parameter* params,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Driver_Class clazz;
FT_Face face = 0;
FT_Error error, error2;
FT_Face_Internal internal = NULL;
clazz = driver->clazz;
memory = driver->root.memory;
/* allocate the face object and perform basic initialization */
if ( FT_ALLOC( face, clazz->face_object_size ) )
goto Fail;
if ( FT_NEW( internal ) )
goto Fail;
face->internal = internal;
face->driver = driver;
face->memory = memory;
face->stream = stream;
#ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_INCREMENTAL
{
int i;
face->internal->incremental_interface = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < num_params && !face->internal->incremental_interface;
i++ )
if ( params[i].tag == FT_PARAM_TAG_INCREMENTAL )
face->internal->incremental_interface =
(FT_Incremental_Interface)params[i].data;
}
#endif
if ( clazz->init_face )
error = clazz->init_face( stream,
face,
(FT_Int)face_index,
num_params,
params );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
/* select Unicode charmap by default */
error2 = find_unicode_charmap( face );
/* if no Unicode charmap can be found, FT_Err_Invalid_CharMap_Handle */
/* is returned. */
/* no error should happen, but we want to play safe */
if ( error2 && error2 != FT_Err_Invalid_CharMap_Handle )
{
error = error2;
goto Fail;
}
*aface = face;
Fail:
if ( error )
{
destroy_charmaps( face, memory );
if ( clazz->done_face )
clazz->done_face( face );
FT_FREE( internal );
FT_FREE( face );
*aface = 0;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_layoutreturn(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
struct nfsd4_layoutreturn *lrp)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(16);
lrp->lr_reclaim = be32_to_cpup(p++);
lrp->lr_layout_type = be32_to_cpup(p++);
lrp->lr_seg.iomode = be32_to_cpup(p++);
lrp->lr_return_type = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (lrp->lr_return_type == RETURN_FILE) {
READ_BUF(16);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lrp->lr_seg.offset);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lrp->lr_seg.length);
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &lrp->lr_sid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
lrp->lrf_body_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (lrp->lrf_body_len > 0) {
READ_BUF(lrp->lrf_body_len);
READMEM(lrp->lrf_body, lrp->lrf_body_len);
}
} else {
lrp->lr_seg.offset = 0;
lrp->lr_seg.length = NFS4_MAX_UINT64;
}
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnAuthFailed() {
Shutdown(kInvalidOauthCredentialsExitCode);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit TabTime(base::TimeTicks started)
: load_start_time_(started) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlXPtrEvalChildSeq(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *name) {
/*
* XPointer don't allow by syntax to address in mutirooted trees
* this might prove useful in some cases, warn about it.
*/
if ((name == NULL) && (CUR == '/') && (NXT(1) != '1')) {
xmlXPtrErr(ctxt, XML_XPTR_CHILDSEQ_START,
"warning: ChildSeq not starting by /1\n", NULL);
}
if (name != NULL) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(name));
xmlFree(name);
xmlXPathIdFunction(ctxt, 1);
CHECK_ERROR;
}
while (CUR == '/') {
int child = 0;
NEXT;
while ((CUR >= '0') && (CUR <= '9')) {
child = child * 10 + (CUR - '0');
NEXT;
}
xmlXPtrGetChildNo(ctxt, child);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 109,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Console::inspectedObject(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info, unsigned num)
{
DCHECK(num < V8InspectorSessionImpl::kInspectedObjectBufferSize);
ConsoleHelper helper(info);
if (V8InspectorSessionImpl* session = helper.currentSession()) {
V8InspectorSession::Inspectable* object = session->inspectedObject(num);
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
if (object)
info.GetReturnValue().Set(object->get(isolate->GetCurrentContext()));
else
info.GetReturnValue().Set(v8::Undefined(isolate));
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_interrupt_msg(struct usb_device *usb_dev, unsigned int pipe,
void *data, int len, int *actual_length, int timeout)
{
return usb_bulk_msg(usb_dev, pipe, data, len, actual_length, timeout);
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DGAAvailable(int index)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen;
assert(index < MAXSCREENS);
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[index];
return DGAScreenAvailable(pScreen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gtco_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
{
/* Grab private device ptr */
struct gtco *gtco = usb_get_intfdata(interface);
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
/* Now reverse all the registration stuff */
if (gtco) {
input_unregister_device(gtco->inputdevice);
usb_kill_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
usb_free_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
usb_free_coherent(udev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco->buffer, gtco->buf_dma);
kfree(gtco);
}
dev_info(&interface->dev, "gtco driver disconnected\n");
}
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix potential out-of-bound access
parse_hid_report_descriptor() has a while (i < length) loop, which
only guarantees that there's at least 1 byte in the buffer, but the
loop body can read multiple bytes which causes out-of-bounds access.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GetPinnedState(const TabStripModel& model) {
std::string actual;
for (int i = 0; i < model.count(); ++i) {
if (i > 0)
actual += " ";
actual +=
base::IntToString(GetID(model.GetTabContentsAt(i)->tab_contents()));
if (model.IsAppTab(i))
actual += "a";
if (model.IsTabPinned(i))
actual += "p";
}
return actual;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SpinLock::lockSlow()
{
static const int kYieldProcessorTries = 1000;
do {
do {
for (int count = 0; count < kYieldProcessorTries; ++count) {
YIELD_PROCESSOR;
if (!m_lock.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) && LIKELY(!m_lock.exchange(true, std::memory_order_acq_rel)))
return;
}
YIELD_THREAD;
} while (m_lock.load(std::memory_order_relaxed));
} while (UNLIKELY(m_lock.exchange(true, std::memory_order_acq_rel)));
}
Commit Message: Add MIPS version of YIELD_PROCESSOR in a arch-independent way.
Also adds CPU(MIPS), CPU(MIPS64) to CPU.h
BUG=564657
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1501533004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#364065}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EnsureOrientationMatches(const PrintMsg_Print_Params& css_params,
PrintMsg_Print_Params* page_params) {
if ((page_params->page_size.width() > page_params->page_size.height()) ==
(css_params.page_size.width() > css_params.page_size.height())) {
return;
}
page_params->page_size.SetSize(page_params->page_size.height(),
page_params->page_size.width());
page_params->content_size.SetSize(page_params->content_size.height(),
page_params->content_size.width());
page_params->printable_area.set_size(
gfx::Size(page_params->printable_area.height(),
page_params->printable_area.width()));
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::StartLoad(FrameLoadRequest& frame_load_request,
WebFrameLoadType type,
NavigationPolicy navigation_policy,
HistoryItem* history_item,
bool check_with_client) {
DCHECK(Client()->HasWebView());
ResourceRequest& resource_request = frame_load_request.GetResourceRequest();
WebNavigationType navigation_type = DetermineNavigationType(
type, resource_request.HttpBody() || frame_load_request.Form(),
frame_load_request.TriggeringEventInfo() !=
WebTriggeringEventInfo::kNotFromEvent);
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
DetermineRequestContextFromNavigationType(navigation_type));
resource_request.SetFrameType(
frame_->IsMainFrame() ? network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kTopLevel
: network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested);
Document* origin_document = frame_load_request.OriginDocument();
if (origin_document && origin_document->GetContentSecurityPolicy()
->ExperimentalFeaturesEnabled()) {
WebContentSecurityPolicyList initiator_csp =
origin_document->GetContentSecurityPolicy()
->ExposeForNavigationalChecks();
resource_request.SetInitiatorCSP(initiator_csp);
}
bool had_placeholder_client_document_loader =
provisional_document_loader_ && !provisional_document_loader_->DidStart();
RecordLatestRequiredCSP();
ModifyRequestForCSP(resource_request, origin_document);
navigation_policy = ShouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(
resource_request, origin_document, frame_load_request.GetSubstituteData(),
nullptr, frame_load_request.ShouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy(),
navigation_type, navigation_policy, type,
frame_load_request.ClientRedirect() ==
ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect,
frame_load_request.TriggeringEventInfo(), frame_load_request.Form(),
frame_load_request.GetBlobURLToken(), check_with_client);
if (navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
if (had_placeholder_client_document_loader &&
!resource_request.CheckForBrowserSideNavigation()) {
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
}
return;
}
if (had_placeholder_client_document_loader)
provisional_document_loader_->SetSentDidFinishLoad();
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (!had_placeholder_client_document_loader &&
type == WebFrameLoadType::kStandard &&
(navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab ||
navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClient)) {
frame_->GetDocument()->CheckCompleted();
}
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
if (!frame_->GetPage())
return;
progress_tracker_->ProgressStarted();
if (navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClientForInitialHistory)
return;
DCHECK(navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab ||
navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClient);
provisional_document_loader_ = CreateDocumentLoader(
resource_request, frame_load_request, type, navigation_type);
if (!had_placeholder_client_document_loader ||
navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyHandledByClient) {
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
}
if (frame_load_request.Form())
Client()->DispatchWillSubmitForm(frame_load_request.Form());
provisional_document_loader_->AppendRedirect(
provisional_document_loader_->Url());
if (IsBackForwardLoadType(type)) {
DCHECK(history_item);
provisional_document_loader_->SetItemForHistoryNavigation(history_item);
}
frame_->GetFrameScheduler()->DidStartProvisionalLoad(frame_->IsMainFrame());
Client()->DispatchDidStartProvisionalLoad(provisional_document_loader_,
resource_request);
DCHECK(provisional_document_loader_);
if (navigation_policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab) {
provisional_document_loader_->StartLoading();
probe::frameClearedScheduledClientNavigation(frame_);
} else {
probe::frameScheduledClientNavigation(frame_);
}
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
{
kenter("%d", key_serial(key));
key_check(key);
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags))
key_schedule_gc_links();
up_write(&key->sem);
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AffineTransform SVGLayoutSupport::deprecatedCalculateTransformToLayer(const LayoutObject* layoutObject)
{
AffineTransform transform;
while (layoutObject) {
transform = layoutObject->localToSVGParentTransform() * transform;
if (layoutObject->isSVGRoot())
break;
layoutObject = layoutObject->parent();
}
PaintLayer* layer = layoutObject ? layoutObject->enclosingLayer() : 0;
while (layer && layer->isAllowedToQueryCompositingState()) {
if (layer->compositingState() != NotComposited)
break;
if (TransformationMatrix* layerTransform = layer->transform())
transform = layerTransform->toAffineTransform() * transform;
layer = layer->parent();
}
return transform;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine(RootInlineBox* lineBox, BidiRun* firstRun, GlyphOverflowAndFallbackFontsMap& textBoxDataMap,
VerticalPositionCache& verticalPositionCache)
{
setLogicalHeight(lineBox->alignBoxesInBlockDirection(logicalHeight(), textBoxDataMap, verticalPositionCache));
for (BidiRun* r = firstRun; r; r = r->next()) {
ASSERT(r->m_box);
if (!r->m_box)
continue; // Skip runs with no line boxes.
if (r->m_object->isOutOfFlowPositioned())
r->m_box->setLogicalTop(logicalHeight());
if (r->m_object->isText())
toRenderText(r->m_object)->positionLineBox(r->m_box);
else if (r->m_object->isBox())
toRenderBox(r->m_object)->positionLineBox(r->m_box);
}
lineBox->markDirty(false);
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowPageInfo(content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url,
const NavigationEntry::SSLStatus& ssl,
bool show_history) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
window()->ShowPageInfo(profile, url, ssl, show_history);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKit::WebData TestWebKitPlatformSupport::loadResource(const char* name) {
if (!strcmp(name, "deleteButton")) {
const char red_square[] =
"\x89\x50\x4e\x47\x0d\x0a\x1a\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x0d\x49\x48\x44\x52"
"\x00\x00\x00\x1e\x00\x00\x00\x1e\x04\x03\x00\x00\x00\xc9\x1e\xb3"
"\x91\x00\x00\x00\x30\x50\x4c\x54\x45\x00\x00\x00\x80\x00\x00\x00"
"\x80\x00\x80\x80\x00\x00\x00\x80\x80\x00\x80\x00\x80\x80\x80\x80"
"\x80\xc0\xc0\xc0\xff\x00\x00\x00\xff\x00\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\xff"
"\xff\x00\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x7b\x1f\xb1\xc4\x00\x00\x00"
"\x09\x70\x48\x59\x73\x00\x00\x0b\x13\x00\x00\x0b\x13\x01\x00\x9a"
"\x9c\x18\x00\x00\x00\x17\x49\x44\x41\x54\x78\x01\x63\x98\x89\x0a"
"\x18\x50\xb9\x33\x47\xf9\xa8\x01\x32\xd4\xc2\x03\x00\x33\x84\x0d"
"\x02\x3a\x91\xeb\xa5\x00\x00\x00\x00\x49\x45\x4e\x44\xae\x42\x60"
"\x82";
return WebKit::WebData(red_square, arraysize(red_square));
}
return webkit_glue::WebKitPlatformSupportImpl::loadResource(name);
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_flow_mod(struct ofputil_flow_mod *fm,
const struct ofp_header *oh,
enum ofputil_protocol protocol,
const struct tun_table *tun_table,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
ofp_port_t max_port, uint8_t max_table)
{
ovs_be16 raw_flags;
enum ofperr error;
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
enum ofpraw raw = ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT11_FLOW_MOD) {
/* Standard OpenFlow 1.1+ flow_mod. */
const struct ofp11_flow_mod *ofm;
ofm = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *ofm);
error = ofputil_pull_ofp11_match(&b, tun_table, vl_mff_map, &fm->match,
NULL);
if (error) {
return error;
}
/* Translate the message. */
fm->priority = ntohs(ofm->priority);
if (ofm->command == OFPFC_ADD
|| (oh->version == OFP11_VERSION
&& (ofm->command == OFPFC_MODIFY ||
ofm->command == OFPFC_MODIFY_STRICT)
&& ofm->cookie_mask == htonll(0))) {
/* In OpenFlow 1.1 only, a "modify" or "modify-strict" that does
* not match on the cookie is treated as an "add" if there is no
* match. */
fm->cookie = htonll(0);
fm->cookie_mask = htonll(0);
fm->new_cookie = ofm->cookie;
} else {
fm->cookie = ofm->cookie;
fm->cookie_mask = ofm->cookie_mask;
fm->new_cookie = OVS_BE64_MAX;
}
fm->modify_cookie = false;
fm->command = ofm->command;
/* Get table ID.
*
* OF1.1 entirely forbids table_id == OFPTT_ALL.
* OF1.2+ allows table_id == OFPTT_ALL only for deletes. */
fm->table_id = ofm->table_id;
if (fm->table_id == OFPTT_ALL
&& (oh->version == OFP11_VERSION
|| (ofm->command != OFPFC_DELETE &&
ofm->command != OFPFC_DELETE_STRICT))) {
return OFPERR_OFPFMFC_BAD_TABLE_ID;
}
fm->idle_timeout = ntohs(ofm->idle_timeout);
fm->hard_timeout = ntohs(ofm->hard_timeout);
if (oh->version >= OFP14_VERSION && ofm->command == OFPFC_ADD) {
fm->importance = ntohs(ofm->importance);
} else {
fm->importance = 0;
}
fm->buffer_id = ntohl(ofm->buffer_id);
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(ofm->out_port, &fm->out_port);
if (error) {
return error;
}
fm->out_group = (ofm->command == OFPFC_DELETE ||
ofm->command == OFPFC_DELETE_STRICT
? ntohl(ofm->out_group)
: OFPG_ANY);
raw_flags = ofm->flags;
} else {
uint16_t command;
if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT10_FLOW_MOD) {
/* Standard OpenFlow 1.0 flow_mod. */
const struct ofp10_flow_mod *ofm;
/* Get the ofp10_flow_mod. */
ofm = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *ofm);
/* Translate the rule. */
ofputil_match_from_ofp10_match(&ofm->match, &fm->match);
ofputil_normalize_match(&fm->match);
/* OpenFlow 1.0 says that exact-match rules have to have the
* highest possible priority. */
fm->priority = (ofm->match.wildcards & htonl(OFPFW10_ALL)
? ntohs(ofm->priority)
: UINT16_MAX);
/* Translate the message. */
command = ntohs(ofm->command);
fm->cookie = htonll(0);
fm->cookie_mask = htonll(0);
fm->new_cookie = ofm->cookie;
fm->idle_timeout = ntohs(ofm->idle_timeout);
fm->hard_timeout = ntohs(ofm->hard_timeout);
fm->importance = 0;
fm->buffer_id = ntohl(ofm->buffer_id);
fm->out_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(ofm->out_port));
fm->out_group = OFPG_ANY;
raw_flags = ofm->flags;
} else if (raw == OFPRAW_NXT_FLOW_MOD) {
/* Nicira extended flow_mod. */
const struct nx_flow_mod *nfm;
/* Dissect the message. */
nfm = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *nfm);
error = nx_pull_match(&b, ntohs(nfm->match_len),
&fm->match, &fm->cookie, &fm->cookie_mask,
tun_table, vl_mff_map);
if (error) {
return error;
}
/* Translate the message. */
command = ntohs(nfm->command);
if ((command & 0xff) == OFPFC_ADD && fm->cookie_mask) {
/* Flow additions may only set a new cookie, not match an
* existing cookie. */
return OFPERR_NXBRC_NXM_INVALID;
}
fm->priority = ntohs(nfm->priority);
fm->new_cookie = nfm->cookie;
fm->idle_timeout = ntohs(nfm->idle_timeout);
fm->hard_timeout = ntohs(nfm->hard_timeout);
fm->importance = 0;
fm->buffer_id = ntohl(nfm->buffer_id);
fm->out_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(nfm->out_port));
fm->out_group = OFPG_ANY;
raw_flags = nfm->flags;
} else {
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
fm->modify_cookie = fm->new_cookie != OVS_BE64_MAX;
if (protocol & OFPUTIL_P_TID) {
fm->command = command & 0xff;
fm->table_id = command >> 8;
} else {
if (command > 0xff) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "flow_mod has explicit table_id "
"but flow_mod_table_id extension is not enabled");
}
fm->command = command;
fm->table_id = 0xff;
}
}
if (fm->command > OFPFC_DELETE_STRICT) {
return OFPERR_OFPFMFC_BAD_COMMAND;
}
fm->ofpacts_tlv_bitmap = 0;
error = ofpacts_pull_openflow_instructions(&b, b.size, oh->version,
vl_mff_map,
&fm->ofpacts_tlv_bitmap,
ofpacts);
if (error) {
return error;
}
fm->ofpacts = ofpacts->data;
fm->ofpacts_len = ofpacts->size;
error = ofputil_decode_flow_mod_flags(raw_flags, fm->command,
oh->version, &fm->flags);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (fm->flags & OFPUTIL_FF_EMERG) {
/* We do not support the OpenFlow 1.0 emergency flow cache, which
* is not required in OpenFlow 1.0.1 and removed from OpenFlow 1.1.
*
* OpenFlow 1.0 specifies the error code to use when idle_timeout
* or hard_timeout is nonzero. Otherwise, there is no good error
* code, so just state that the flow table is full. */
return (fm->hard_timeout || fm->idle_timeout
? OFPERR_OFPFMFC_BAD_EMERG_TIMEOUT
: OFPERR_OFPFMFC_TABLE_FULL);
}
return ofpacts_check_consistency(fm->ofpacts, fm->ofpacts_len,
&fm->match.flow, max_port,
fm->table_id, max_table, protocol);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t uvesafb_show_oem_string(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct fb_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(to_platform_device(dev));
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
if (par->vbe_ib.oem_string_ptr)
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",
(char *)(&par->vbe_ib) + par->vbe_ib.oem_string_ptr);
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LiveSyncTest::SetupSync() {
if (profiles_.empty()) {
if (!SetupClients())
LOG(FATAL) << "SetupClients() failed.";
}
for (int i = 0; i < num_clients_; ++i) {
if (!GetClient(i)->SetupSync())
LOG(FATAL) << "SetupSync() failed.";
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
{
int sig_id, md_id;
if (!md)
return 0;
md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
if (md_id == -1)
return 0;
sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
if (sig_id == -1)
return 0;
p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_vfsmnt(struct mount *mnt)
{
kfree_const(mnt->mnt_devname);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
free_percpu(mnt->mnt_pcp);
#endif
kmem_cache_free(mnt_cache, mnt);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparateTiles2SeparateStrips)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToSeparateStrips,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __perf_event_read(void *info)
{
struct perf_read_data *data = info;
struct perf_event *sub, *event = data->event;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu;
/*
* If this is a task context, we need to check whether it is
* the current task context of this cpu. If not it has been
* scheduled out before the smp call arrived. In that case
* event->count would have been updated to a recent sample
* when the event was scheduled out.
*/
if (ctx->task && cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx)
return;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
if (ctx->is_active) {
update_context_time(ctx);
update_cgrp_time_from_event(event);
}
update_event_times(event);
if (event->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!data->group) {
pmu->read(event);
data->ret = 0;
goto unlock;
}
pmu->start_txn(pmu, PERF_PMU_TXN_READ);
pmu->read(event);
list_for_each_entry(sub, &event->sibling_list, group_entry) {
update_event_times(sub);
if (sub->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) {
/*
* Use sibling's PMU rather than @event's since
* sibling could be on different (eg: software) PMU.
*/
sub->pmu->read(sub);
}
}
data->ret = pmu->commit_txn(pmu);
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cookie_find(cookie_t *in)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAXINITIATORS; i++) {
if (memcmp(in, &cookiecache[i].initiator, sizeof(*in)) == 0)
return i;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 61,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
sd->tss_desc->type = 9; /* available 32/64-bit TSS */
load_TR_desc();
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintController::FinishCycle() {
DCHECK(new_display_item_list_.IsEmpty());
DCHECK(new_paint_chunks_.IsInInitialState());
current_paint_artifact_.FinishCycle();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool hub_descriptor_is_sane(struct usb_host_interface *desc)
{
/* Some hubs have a subclass of 1, which AFAICT according to the */
/* specs is not defined, but it works */
if (desc->desc.bInterfaceSubClass != 0 &&
desc->desc.bInterfaceSubClass != 1)
return false;
/* Multiple endpoints? What kind of mutant ninja-hub is this? */
if (desc->desc.bNumEndpoints != 1)
return false;
/* If the first endpoint is not interrupt IN, we'd better punt! */
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(&desc->endpoint[0].desc))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asn1_encode(sc_context_t *ctx, const struct sc_asn1_entry *asn1,
u8 **ptr, size_t *size, int depth)
{
int r, idx = 0;
u8 *obj = NULL, *buf = NULL, *tmp;
size_t total = 0, objsize;
for (idx = 0; asn1[idx].name != NULL; idx++) {
r = asn1_encode_entry(ctx, &asn1[idx], &obj, &objsize, depth);
if (r) {
if (obj)
free(obj);
if (buf)
free(buf);
return r;
}
/* in case of an empty (optional) element continue with
* the next asn1 element */
if (!objsize)
continue;
tmp = (u8 *) realloc(buf, total + objsize);
if (!tmp) {
if (obj)
free(obj);
if (buf)
free(buf);
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
buf = tmp;
memcpy(buf + total, obj, objsize);
free(obj);
obj = NULL;
total += objsize;
}
*ptr = buf;
*size = total;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dwc3_gadget_enable_irq(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
u32 reg;
/* Enable all but Start and End of Frame IRQs */
reg = (DWC3_DEVTEN_VNDRDEVTSTRCVEDEN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_EVNTOVERFLOWEN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_CMDCMPLTEN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_ERRTICERREN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_WKUPEVTEN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_CONNECTDONEEN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_USBRSTEN |
DWC3_DEVTEN_DISCONNEVTEN);
if (dwc->revision < DWC3_REVISION_250A)
reg |= DWC3_DEVTEN_ULSTCNGEN;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DEVTEN, reg);
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int accel_fp_mul2add(int idx1, int idx2,
mp_int* kA, mp_int* kB,
ecc_point *R, mp_int* a,
mp_int* modulus, mp_digit mp)
{
#define KB_SIZE 128
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
unsigned char* kb[2] = {NULL, NULL};
#else
unsigned char kb[2][KB_SIZE];
#endif
int x, err;
unsigned y, z, bitlen, bitpos, lut_gap, first, zA, zB;
mp_int tka, tkb, order;
if (mp_init_multi(&tka, &tkb, &order, NULL, NULL, NULL) != MP_OKAY)
return MP_INIT_E;
/* if it's smaller than modulus we fine */
if (mp_unsigned_bin_size(kA) > mp_unsigned_bin_size(modulus)) {
/* find order */
y = mp_unsigned_bin_size(modulus);
for (x = 0; ecc_sets[x].size; x++) {
if (y <= (unsigned)ecc_sets[x].size) break;
}
/* back off if we are on the 521 bit curve */
if (y == 66) --x;
if ((err = mp_read_radix(&order, ecc_sets[x].order,
MP_RADIX_HEX)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
/* kA must be less than modulus */
if (mp_cmp(kA, &order) != MP_LT) {
if ((err = mp_mod(kA, &order, &tka)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
} else {
if ((err = mp_copy(kA, &tka)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
}
} else {
if ((err = mp_copy(kA, &tka)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
}
/* if it's smaller than modulus we fine */
if (mp_unsigned_bin_size(kB) > mp_unsigned_bin_size(modulus)) {
/* find order */
y = mp_unsigned_bin_size(modulus);
for (x = 0; ecc_sets[x].size; x++) {
if (y <= (unsigned)ecc_sets[x].size) break;
}
/* back off if we are on the 521 bit curve */
if (y == 66) --x;
if ((err = mp_read_radix(&order, ecc_sets[x].order,
MP_RADIX_HEX)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
/* kB must be less than modulus */
if (mp_cmp(kB, &order) != MP_LT) {
if ((err = mp_mod(kB, &order, &tkb)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
} else {
if ((err = mp_copy(kB, &tkb)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
}
} else {
if ((err = mp_copy(kB, &tkb)) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
}
/* get bitlen and round up to next multiple of FP_LUT */
bitlen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(modulus) << 3;
x = bitlen % FP_LUT;
if (x) {
bitlen += FP_LUT - x;
}
lut_gap = bitlen / FP_LUT;
/* get the k value */
if ((mp_unsigned_bin_size(&tka) > (int)(KB_SIZE - 2)) ||
(mp_unsigned_bin_size(&tkb) > (int)(KB_SIZE - 2)) ) {
err = BUFFER_E; goto done;
}
/* store k */
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
kb[0] = (unsigned char*)XMALLOC(KB_SIZE, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
if (kb[0] == NULL) {
err = MEMORY_E; goto done;
}
#endif
XMEMSET(kb[0], 0, KB_SIZE);
if ((err = mp_to_unsigned_bin(&tka, kb[0])) != MP_OKAY) {
goto done;
}
/* let's reverse kb so it's little endian */
x = 0;
y = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&tka);
if (y > 0) {
y -= 1;
}
mp_clear(&tka);
while ((unsigned)x < y) {
z = kb[0][x]; kb[0][x] = kb[0][y]; kb[0][y] = (byte)z;
++x; --y;
}
/* store b */
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
kb[1] = (unsigned char*)XMALLOC(KB_SIZE, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
if (kb[1] == NULL) {
err = MEMORY_E; goto done;
}
#endif
XMEMSET(kb[1], 0, KB_SIZE);
if ((err = mp_to_unsigned_bin(&tkb, kb[1])) == MP_OKAY) {
x = 0;
y = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&tkb);
if (y > 0) {
y -= 1;
}
while ((unsigned)x < y) {
z = kb[1][x]; kb[1][x] = kb[1][y]; kb[1][y] = (byte)z;
++x; --y;
}
/* at this point we can start, yipee */
first = 1;
for (x = lut_gap-1; x >= 0; x--) {
/* extract FP_LUT bits from kb spread out by lut_gap bits and
offset by x bits from the start */
bitpos = x;
for (y = zA = zB = 0; y < FP_LUT; y++) {
zA |= ((kb[0][bitpos>>3] >> (bitpos&7)) & 1) << y;
zB |= ((kb[1][bitpos>>3] >> (bitpos&7)) & 1) << y;
bitpos += lut_gap; /* it's y*lut_gap + x, but here we can avoid
the mult in each loop */
}
/* double if not first */
if (!first) {
if ((err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(R, R, a, modulus,
mp)) != MP_OKAY) {
break;
}
}
/* add if not first, otherwise copy */
if (!first) {
if (zA) {
if ((err = ecc_projective_add_point(R, fp_cache[idx1].LUT[zA],
R, a, modulus, mp)) != MP_OKAY) {
break;
}
}
if (zB) {
if ((err = ecc_projective_add_point(R, fp_cache[idx2].LUT[zB],
R, a, modulus, mp)) != MP_OKAY) {
break;
}
}
} else {
if (zA) {
if ((mp_copy(fp_cache[idx1].LUT[zA]->x, R->x) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_copy(fp_cache[idx1].LUT[zA]->y, R->y) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_copy(&fp_cache[idx1].mu, R->z) != MP_OKAY)) {
err = GEN_MEM_ERR;
break;
}
first = 0;
}
if (zB && first == 0) {
if (zB) {
if ((err = ecc_projective_add_point(R,
fp_cache[idx2].LUT[zB], R, a, modulus, mp)) != MP_OKAY){
break;
}
}
} else if (zB && first == 1) {
if ((mp_copy(fp_cache[idx2].LUT[zB]->x, R->x) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_copy(fp_cache[idx2].LUT[zB]->y, R->y) != MP_OKAY) ||
(mp_copy(&fp_cache[idx2].mu, R->z) != MP_OKAY)) {
err = GEN_MEM_ERR;
break;
}
first = 0;
}
}
}
}
done:
/* cleanup */
mp_clear(&tkb);
mp_clear(&tka);
mp_clear(&order);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
if (kb[0])
#endif
ForceZero(kb[0], KB_SIZE);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
if (kb[1])
#endif
ForceZero(kb[1], KB_SIZE);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(kb[0], NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
XFREE(kb[1], NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC_BUFFER);
#endif
#undef KB_SIZE
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return err;
return ecc_map(R, modulus, mp);
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 81,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_write_resource_fork(struct archive_write_disk *a, unsigned char *buff,
size_t bytes, uint32_t position)
{
int ret;
ret = fsetxattr(a->fd, XATTR_RESOURCEFORK_NAME, buff, bytes,
position, a->rsrc_xattr_options);
if (ret < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Cannot restore xattr: %s at %u pos %u bytes",
XATTR_RESOURCEFORK_NAME,
(unsigned)position,
(unsigned)bytes);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
a->rsrc_xattr_options &= ~XATTR_CREATE;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(listen, int, fd, int, backlog)
{
struct socket *sock;
int err, fput_needed;
int somaxconn;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock) {
somaxconn = sock_net(sock->sk)->core.sysctl_somaxconn;
if ((unsigned)backlog > somaxconn)
backlog = somaxconn;
err = security_socket_listen(sock, backlog);
if (!err)
err = sock->ops->listen(sock, backlog);
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::flowAwareBorderBefore() const
{
switch (transformedWritingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
return borderTop();
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
return borderBottom();
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
return borderLeft();
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
return borderRight();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return borderTop();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int MockNetworkTransaction::Read(net::IOBuffer* buf,
int buf_len,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
CHECK(!done_reading_called_);
int num = 0;
if (read_handler_) {
num = (*read_handler_)(content_length_, data_cursor_, buf, buf_len);
data_cursor_ += num;
} else {
int data_len = static_cast<int>(data_.size());
num = std::min(static_cast<int64_t>(buf_len), data_len - data_cursor_);
if (test_mode_ & TEST_MODE_SLOW_READ)
num = std::min(num, 1);
if (num) {
memcpy(buf->data(), data_.data() + data_cursor_, num);
data_cursor_ += num;
}
}
if (test_mode_ & TEST_MODE_SYNC_NET_READ)
return num;
CallbackLater(callback, num);
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::BindTexImage2DCHROMIUMImpl(const char* function_name,
GLenum target,
GLenum internalformat,
GLint image_id) {
if (target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid target");
return;
}
TextureRef* texture_ref =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTargetUnlessDefault(&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "no texture bound");
return;
}
gl::GLImage* image = image_manager()->LookupImage(image_id);
if (!image) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"no image found with the given ID");
return;
}
Texture::ImageState image_state = Texture::UNBOUND;
{
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindTexImage2DCHROMIUM", GetErrorState());
if (internalformat) {
if (image->BindTexImageWithInternalformat(target, internalformat))
image_state = Texture::BOUND;
} else {
if (image->BindTexImage(target))
image_state = Texture::BOUND;
}
}
gfx::Size size = image->GetSize();
GLenum texture_internalformat =
internalformat ? internalformat : image->GetInternalFormat();
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(texture_ref, target, 0,
texture_internalformat, size.width(),
size.height(), 1, 0, texture_internalformat,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, gfx::Rect(size));
texture_manager()->SetLevelImage(texture_ref, target, 0, image, image_state);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool isIDString(const char *s) {
if (!isAlpha(*s))
return false;
while (*s) {
if (!(isAlpha(*s) || isNumeric(*s)))
return false;
s++;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 82,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::viewportFillDebouncerTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
m_mostlyFillingViewport = true;
if (m_webMediaPlayer)
m_webMediaPlayer->becameDominantVisibleContent(m_mostlyFillingViewport);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int i8042_enable_aux_port(void)
{
i8042_ctr &= ~I8042_CTR_AUXDIS;
i8042_ctr |= I8042_CTR_AUXINT;
if (i8042_command(&i8042_ctr, I8042_CMD_CTL_WCTR)) {
i8042_ctr &= ~I8042_CTR_AUXINT;
i8042_ctr |= I8042_CTR_AUXDIS;
pr_err("Failed to enable AUX port\n");
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 86,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_gpu_transfer_to_host_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
int h;
uint32_t src_offset, dst_offset, stride;
int bpp;
pixman_format_code_t format;
struct virtio_gpu_transfer_to_host_2d t2d;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(t2d);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_xfer_toh_2d(t2d.resource_id);
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, t2d.resource_id);
if (!res || !res->iov) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, t2d.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
if (t2d.r.x > res->width ||
t2d.r.y > res->height ||
t2d.r.width > res->width ||
t2d.r.height > res->height ||
t2d.r.x + t2d.r.width > res->width ||
t2d.r.y + t2d.r.height > res->height) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: transfer bounds outside resource"
" bounds for resource %d: %d %d %d %d vs %d %d\n",
__func__, t2d.resource_id, t2d.r.x, t2d.r.y,
t2d.r.width, t2d.r.height, res->width, res->height);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
format = pixman_image_get_format(res->image);
bpp = (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(format) + 7) / 8;
stride = pixman_image_get_stride(res->image);
if (t2d.offset || t2d.r.x || t2d.r.y ||
t2d.r.width != pixman_image_get_width(res->image)) {
void *img_data = pixman_image_get_data(res->image);
for (h = 0; h < t2d.r.height; h++) {
src_offset = t2d.offset + stride * h;
dst_offset = (t2d.r.y + h) * stride + (t2d.r.x * bpp);
iov_to_buf(res->iov, res->iov_cnt, src_offset,
(uint8_t *)img_data
+ dst_offset, t2d.r.width * bpp);
}
} else {
iov_to_buf(res->iov, res->iov_cnt, 0,
pixman_image_get_data(res->image),
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image)
* pixman_image_get_height(res->image));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 6,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleShaderBinary(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::ShaderBinary& c) {
#if 1 // No binary shader support.
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glShaderBinary: not supported");
return error::kNoError;
#else
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
if (n < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary: n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei length = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.length);
if (length < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary: length < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLuint* shaders = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLuint*>(
c.shaders_shm_id, c.shaders_shm_offset, data_size);
GLenum binaryformat = static_cast<GLenum>(c.binaryformat);
const void* binary = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
c.binary_shm_id, c.binary_shm_offset, length);
if (shaders == NULL || binary == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
scoped_array<GLuint> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfo(shaders[ii]);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary: unknown shader");
return error::kNoError;
}
service_ids[ii] = info->service_id();
}
return error::kNoError;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static X509 * php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zval ** val, int makeresource, long * resourceval TSRMLS_DC)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = -1;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_RESOURCE) {
/* is it an x509 resource ? */
void * what;
int type;
what = zend_fetch_resource(val TSRMLS_CC, -1, "OpenSSL X.509", &type, 1, le_x509);
if (!what) {
return NULL;
}
/* this is so callers can decide if they should free the X509 */
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = Z_LVAL_PP(val);
}
if (type == le_x509) {
return (X509*)what;
}
/* other types could be used here - eg: file pointers and read in the data from them */
return NULL;
}
if (!(Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_STRING || Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_OBJECT)) {
return NULL;
}
/* force it to be a string and check if it refers to a file */
convert_to_string_ex(val);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(val) > 7 && memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), "file://", sizeof("file://") - 1) == 0) {
/* read cert from the named file */
BIO *in;
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(Z_STRVAL_PP(val) + (sizeof("file://") - 1) TSRMLS_CC)) {
return NULL;
}
in = BIO_new_file(Z_STRVAL_PP(val) + (sizeof("file://") - 1), "r");
if (in == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(in);
} else {
BIO *in;
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
if (in == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
#ifdef TYPEDEF_D2I_OF
cert = (X509 *) PEM_ASN1_read_bio((d2i_of_void *)d2i_X509, PEM_STRING_X509, in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
#else
cert = (X509 *) PEM_ASN1_read_bio((char *(*)())d2i_X509, PEM_STRING_X509, in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
BIO_free(in);
}
if (cert && makeresource && resourceval) {
*resourceval = zend_list_insert(cert, le_x509);
}
return cert;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init n_tty_init(void)
{
tty_register_ldisc(N_TTY, &n_tty_ops);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 76,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsSCT(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) magick,"CT",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int network_config_set_string (const oconfig_item_t *ci, /* {{{ */
char **ret_string)
{
char *tmp;
if ((ci->values_num != 1)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING))
{
WARNING ("network plugin: The `%s' config option needs exactly "
"one string argument.", ci->key);
return (-1);
}
tmp = strdup (ci->values[0].value.string);
if (tmp == NULL)
return (-1);
sfree (*ret_string);
*ret_string = tmp;
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_set_string */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ndisc_recv_ns(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nd_msg *msg = (struct nd_msg *)skb_transport_header(skb);
const struct in6_addr *saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
const struct in6_addr *daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
u8 *lladdr = NULL;
u32 ndoptlen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - (skb_transport_header(skb) +
offsetof(struct nd_msg, opt));
struct ndisc_options ndopts;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct neighbour *neigh;
int dad = ipv6_addr_any(saddr);
bool inc;
int is_router = -1;
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nd_msg)) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "NS: packet too short\n");
return;
}
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&msg->target)) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "NS: multicast target address\n");
return;
}
/*
* RFC2461 7.1.1:
* DAD has to be destined for solicited node multicast address.
*/
if (dad && !ipv6_addr_is_solict_mult(daddr)) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "NS: bad DAD packet (wrong destination)\n");
return;
}
if (!ndisc_parse_options(msg->opt, ndoptlen, &ndopts)) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "NS: invalid ND options\n");
return;
}
if (ndopts.nd_opts_src_lladdr) {
lladdr = ndisc_opt_addr_data(ndopts.nd_opts_src_lladdr, dev);
if (!lladdr) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn,
"NS: invalid link-layer address length\n");
return;
}
/* RFC2461 7.1.1:
* If the IP source address is the unspecified address,
* there MUST NOT be source link-layer address option
* in the message.
*/
if (dad) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn,
"NS: bad DAD packet (link-layer address option)\n");
return;
}
}
inc = ipv6_addr_is_multicast(daddr);
ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(dev_net(dev), &msg->target, dev, 1);
if (ifp) {
if (ifp->flags & (IFA_F_TENTATIVE|IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)) {
if (dad) {
/*
* We are colliding with another node
* who is doing DAD
* so fail our DAD process
*/
addrconf_dad_failure(ifp);
return;
} else {
/*
* This is not a dad solicitation.
* If we are an optimistic node,
* we should respond.
* Otherwise, we should ignore it.
*/
if (!(ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC))
goto out;
}
}
idev = ifp->idev;
} else {
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
idev = in6_dev_get(dev);
if (!idev) {
/* XXX: count this drop? */
return;
}
if (ipv6_chk_acast_addr(net, dev, &msg->target) ||
(idev->cnf.forwarding &&
(net->ipv6.devconf_all->proxy_ndp || idev->cnf.proxy_ndp) &&
(is_router = pndisc_is_router(&msg->target, dev)) >= 0)) {
if (!(NEIGH_CB(skb)->flags & LOCALLY_ENQUEUED) &&
skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST &&
inc &&
NEIGH_VAR(idev->nd_parms, PROXY_DELAY) != 0) {
/*
* for anycast or proxy,
* sender should delay its response
* by a random time between 0 and
* MAX_ANYCAST_DELAY_TIME seconds.
* (RFC2461) -- yoshfuji
*/
struct sk_buff *n = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (n)
pneigh_enqueue(&nd_tbl, idev->nd_parms, n);
goto out;
}
} else
goto out;
}
if (is_router < 0)
is_router = idev->cnf.forwarding;
if (dad) {
ndisc_send_na(dev, NULL, &in6addr_linklocal_allnodes, &msg->target,
!!is_router, false, (ifp != NULL), true);
goto out;
}
if (inc)
NEIGH_CACHE_STAT_INC(&nd_tbl, rcv_probes_mcast);
else
NEIGH_CACHE_STAT_INC(&nd_tbl, rcv_probes_ucast);
/*
* update / create cache entry
* for the source address
*/
neigh = __neigh_lookup(&nd_tbl, saddr, dev,
!inc || lladdr || !dev->addr_len);
if (neigh)
neigh_update(neigh, lladdr, NUD_STALE,
NEIGH_UPDATE_F_WEAK_OVERRIDE|
NEIGH_UPDATE_F_OVERRIDE);
if (neigh || !dev->header_ops) {
ndisc_send_na(dev, neigh, saddr, &msg->target,
!!is_router,
true, (ifp != NULL && inc), inc);
if (neigh)
neigh_release(neigh);
}
out:
if (ifp)
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
else
in6_dev_put(idev);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 43,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::getPropertyValue(const String &propertyName)
{
CSSPropertyID propertyID = cssPropertyID(propertyName);
if (!propertyID)
return String();
return getPropertyValue(propertyID);
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeName(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebString& name) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (!render_view_->renderer_preferences_.report_frame_name_changes)
return;
render_view_->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_UpdateFrameName(render_view_->GetRoutingID(),
routing_id_,
!frame->parent(),
base::UTF16ToUTF8(name)));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool StructTraits<bluetooth::mojom::UUIDDataView, WTF::String>::Read(
bluetooth::mojom::UUIDDataView data,
WTF::String* output) {
return data.ReadUuid(output);
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvmppc_core_vcpu_put(vcpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOKE
vcpu->arch.vrsave = mfspr(SPRN_VRSAVE);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 SyncBackendHost::GetAuthenticatedUsername() const {
DCHECK(syncapi_initialized_);
return UTF8ToUTF16(core_->syncapi()->GetAuthenticatedUsername());
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isNativeSlider() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (!isHTMLInputElement(node))
return false;
return toHTMLInputElement(node)->type() == InputTypeNames::range;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: weechat_plugin_end (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin)
{
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) plugin;
if (logger_timer)
{
weechat_unhook (logger_timer);
logger_timer = NULL;
}
logger_config_write ();
logger_stop_all (1);
logger_config_free ();
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 60,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Range> findPlainText(const Range* range, const String& target, FindOptions options)
{
range->ownerDocument()->updateLayout();
size_t matchStart;
size_t matchLength;
{
CharacterIterator findIterator(range, TextIteratorEntersTextControls);
matchLength = findPlainText(findIterator, target, options, matchStart);
if (!matchLength)
return collapsedToBoundary(range, !(options & Backwards));
}
CharacterIterator computeRangeIterator(range, TextIteratorEntersTextControls);
return characterSubrange(computeRangeIterator, matchStart, matchLength);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DidCommitProvisionalLoadForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params> params,
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderRequest
interface_provider_request) {
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(std::move(params),
std::move(interface_provider_request));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_llc *uaddr = (struct sockaddr_llc *)msg->msg_name;
const int nonblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
unsigned long cpu_flags;
size_t copied = 0;
u32 peek_seq = 0;
u32 *seq;
unsigned long used;
int target; /* Read at least this many bytes */
long timeo;
lock_sock(sk);
copied = -ENOTCONN;
if (unlikely(sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
goto out;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
seq = &llc->copied_seq;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
seq = &peek_seq;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
copied = 0;
do {
u32 offset;
/*
* We need to check signals first, to get correct SIGURG
* handling. FIXME: Need to check this doesn't impact 1003.1g
* and move it down to the bottom of the loop
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (copied)
break;
copied = timeo ? sock_intr_errno(timeo) : -EAGAIN;
break;
}
/* Next get a buffer. */
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb) {
offset = *seq;
goto found_ok_skb;
}
/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
break;
if (copied) {
if (sk->sk_err ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
!timeo ||
(flags & MSG_PEEK))
break;
} else {
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
break;
if (sk->sk_err) {
copied = sock_error(sk);
break;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) {
/*
* This occurs when user tries to read
* from never connected socket.
*/
copied = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!timeo) {
copied = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
}
if (copied >= target) { /* Do not sleep, just process backlog. */
release_sock(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
} else
sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo);
if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) && peek_seq != llc->copied_seq) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("LLC(%s:%d): Application bug, race in MSG_PEEK\n",
current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current));
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
}
continue;
found_ok_skb:
/* Ok so how much can we use? */
used = skb->len - offset;
if (len < used)
used = len;
if (!(flags & MSG_TRUNC)) {
int rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov, used);
if (rc) {
/* Exception. Bailout! */
if (!copied)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
*seq += used;
copied += used;
len -= used;
/* For non stream protcols we get one packet per recvmsg call */
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
goto copy_uaddr;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
/* Partial read */
if (used + offset < skb->len)
continue;
} while (len > 0);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
copy_uaddr:
if (uaddr != NULL && skb != NULL) {
memcpy(uaddr, llc_ui_skb_cb(skb), sizeof(*uaddr));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*uaddr);
}
if (llc_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags)
llc_cmsg_rcv(msg, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
goto out;
}
Commit Message: llc: fix info leak via getsockname()
The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.
Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HeapAllocator::expandVectorBacking(void* address, size_t newSize) {
return backingExpand(address, newSize);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_functs);
ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_reasons);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int unregister_netdevice_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
int err;
rtnl_lock();
err = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&netdev_chain, nb);
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThread::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kLost)
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
if (!gpu_channel_.get())
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mptsas_reply(MPTSASState *s, MPIDefaultReply *reply)
{
if (s->doorbell_state == DOORBELL_WRITE) {
/* The reply is sent out in 16 bit chunks, while the size
* in the reply is in 32 bit units.
*/
s->doorbell_state = DOORBELL_READ;
s->doorbell_reply_idx = 0;
s->doorbell_reply_size = reply->MsgLength * 2;
memcpy(s->doorbell_reply, reply, s->doorbell_reply_size * 2);
s->intr_status |= MPI_HIS_DOORBELL_INTERRUPT;
mptsas_update_interrupt(s);
} else {
mptsas_post_reply(s, reply);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
result);
free(result);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 79,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Performance::UpdatePerformanceObserverFilterOptions() {
observer_filter_options_ = PerformanceEntry::kInvalid;
for (const auto& observer : observers_) {
observer_filter_options_ |= observer->FilterOptions();
}
UpdateLongTaskInstrumentation();
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int peer_recv_tpkt_pdu(freerdp_peer* client, wStream* s)
{
rdpRdp* rdp;
UINT16 length;
UINT16 pduType;
UINT16 pduLength;
UINT16 pduSource;
UINT16 channelId;
UINT16 securityFlags;
rdp = client->context->rdp;
if (!rdp_read_header(rdp, s, &length, &channelId))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Incorrect RDP header.\n");
return -1;
}
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_read_security_header(s, &securityFlags))
return -1;
if (securityFlags & SEC_ENCRYPT)
{
if (!rdp_decrypt(rdp, s, length - 4, securityFlags))
{
fprintf(stderr, "rdp_decrypt failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
}
if (channelId != MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL_ID)
{
if(!freerdp_channel_peer_process(client, s, channelId))
return -1;
}
else
{
if (!rdp_read_share_control_header(s, &pduLength, &pduType, &pduSource))
return -1;
client->settings->PduSource = pduSource;
switch (pduType)
{
case PDU_TYPE_DATA:
if (!peer_recv_data_pdu(client, s))
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Client sent pduType %d\n", pduType);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_queue_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_queue_info info;
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
q = queueptr(info.queue);
if (q == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.queue = q->queue;
info.owner = q->owner;
info.locked = q->locked;
strlcpy(info.name, q->name, sizeof(info.name));
queuefree(q);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_mmap_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_mmap_event *mmap_event)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int size = mmap_event->event_id.header.size;
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&mmap_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
mmap_event->event_id.header.size);
if (ret)
goto out;
mmap_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
mmap_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
perf_output_put(&handle, mmap_event->event_id);
__output_copy(&handle, mmap_event->file_name,
mmap_event->file_size);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
mmap_event->event_id.header.size = size;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qcow2_save_vmstate(BlockDriverState *bs, QEMUIOVector *qiov,
int64_t pos)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int64_t total_sectors = bs->total_sectors;
int growable = bs->growable;
bool zero_beyond_eof = bs->zero_beyond_eof;
int ret;
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_VMSTATE_SAVE);
bs->growable = 1;
bs->zero_beyond_eof = false;
ret = bdrv_pwritev(bs, qcow2_vm_state_offset(s) + pos, qiov);
bs->growable = growable;
bs->zero_beyond_eof = zero_beyond_eof;
/* bdrv_co_do_writev will have increased the total_sectors value to include
* the VM state - the VM state is however not an actual part of the block
* device, therefore, we need to restore the old value. */
bs->total_sectors = total_sectors;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,827
|
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