instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int v9fs_reopen_fid(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *f)
{
int err = 1;
if (f->fid_type == P9_FID_FILE) {
if (f->fs.fd == -1) {
do {
err = v9fs_co_open(pdu, f, f->open_flags);
} while (err == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
}
} else if (f->fid_type == P9_FID_DIR) {
if (f->fs.dir.stream == NULL) {
do {
err = v9fs_co_opendir(pdu, f);
} while (err == -EINTR && !pdu->cancelled);
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init aes_s390_init(void)
{
int ret;
if (crypt_s390_func_available(KM_AES_128_ENCRYPT, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
keylen_flag |= AES_KEYLEN_128;
if (crypt_s390_func_available(KM_AES_192_ENCRYPT, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
keylen_flag |= AES_KEYLEN_192;
if (crypt_s390_func_available(KM_AES_256_ENCRYPT, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
keylen_flag |= AES_KEYLEN_256;
if (!keylen_flag)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* z9 109 and z9 BC/EC only support 128 bit key length */
if (keylen_flag == AES_KEYLEN_128)
pr_info("AES hardware acceleration is only available for"
" 128-bit keys\n");
ret = crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg);
if (ret)
goto aes_err;
ret = crypto_register_alg(&ecb_aes_alg);
if (ret)
goto ecb_aes_err;
ret = crypto_register_alg(&cbc_aes_alg);
if (ret)
goto cbc_aes_err;
if (crypt_s390_func_available(KM_XTS_128_ENCRYPT,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4) &&
crypt_s390_func_available(KM_XTS_256_ENCRYPT,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4)) {
ret = crypto_register_alg(&xts_aes_alg);
if (ret)
goto xts_aes_err;
xts_aes_alg_reg = 1;
}
if (crypt_s390_func_available(KMCTR_AES_128_ENCRYPT,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4) &&
crypt_s390_func_available(KMCTR_AES_192_ENCRYPT,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4) &&
crypt_s390_func_available(KMCTR_AES_256_ENCRYPT,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4)) {
ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctrblk) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto ctr_aes_err;
}
ret = crypto_register_alg(&ctr_aes_alg);
if (ret) {
free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
goto ctr_aes_err;
}
ctr_aes_alg_reg = 1;
}
out:
return ret;
ctr_aes_err:
crypto_unregister_alg(&xts_aes_alg);
xts_aes_err:
crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_aes_alg);
cbc_aes_err:
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_aes_alg);
ecb_aes_err:
crypto_unregister_alg(&aes_alg);
aes_err:
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetTouchKeyboardEnabled() {
return g_touch_keyboard_enabled;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestWebKitPlatformSupport::~TestWebKitPlatformSupport() {
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ax25_free_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
ax25_cb_put(sk_to_ax25(sk));
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int open_net_fd(const char *spec)
{
char *p;
int fd, port;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
struct hostent *he;
p = strchr(spec, ':');
if (!p)
return -1;
*p++ = '\0';
port = strtol(p, NULL, 10);
/* printf("Host %s, port %d\n",spec,port); */
sa.sin_family = PF_INET;
sa.sin_port = htons(port);
he = gethostbyname(spec);
if (!he) {
#ifdef HAVE_HERROR
herror("open_net_fd");
#endif
return -1;
}
memcpy(&sa.sin_addr, he->h_addr, he->h_length);
/* printf("using ip %s\n",inet_ntoa(sa.sin_addr)); */
fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof (sa)) < 0)
return -1;
return fd;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
| 0
| 91,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ehci_update_frindex(EHCIState *ehci, int uframes)
{
int i;
if (!ehci_enabled(ehci) && ehci->pstate == EST_INACTIVE) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < uframes; i++) {
ehci->frindex++;
if (ehci->frindex == 0x00002000) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_FLR);
}
if (ehci->frindex == 0x00004000) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_FLR);
ehci->frindex = 0;
if (ehci->usbsts_frindex >= 0x00004000) {
ehci->usbsts_frindex -= 0x00004000;
} else {
ehci->usbsts_frindex = 0;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::frontFace(GLenum mode) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->FrontFace(mode);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Plugin* Plugin::New(PP_Instance pp_instance) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::New (pp_instance=%"NACL_PRId32")\n", pp_instance));
Plugin* plugin = new Plugin(pp_instance);
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::New (plugin=%p)\n", static_cast<void*>(plugin)));
if (plugin == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return plugin;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<base::FieldTrial> CreateFieldTrial(
const std::string& trial_name,
int total_probability,
const std::string& default_group_name,
int* default_group_number) {
return FieldTrialList::FactoryGetFieldTrial(
trial_name, total_probability, default_group_name,
base::FieldTrialList::kNoExpirationYear, 1, 1,
base::FieldTrial::SESSION_RANDOMIZED, default_group_number);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 110,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *iova_to_vaddr(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, int length)
{
size_t offset;
int m, n;
void *addr;
if (mem->state != RXE_MEM_STATE_VALID) {
pr_warn("mem not in valid state\n");
addr = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (!mem->map) {
addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)iova;
goto out;
}
if (mem_check_range(mem, iova, length)) {
pr_warn("range violation\n");
addr = NULL;
goto out;
}
lookup_iova(mem, iova, &m, &n, &offset);
if (offset + length > mem->map[m]->buf[n].size) {
pr_warn("crosses page boundary\n");
addr = NULL;
goto out;
}
addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)mem->map[m]->buf[n].addr + offset;
out:
return addr;
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* Document::SequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(
WebFocusType type) const {
if (focused_element_)
return focused_element_.Get();
if (!sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_)
return nullptr;
DCHECK(sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->IsConnected());
if (!sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->collapsed()) {
Node* node = sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->startContainer();
DCHECK_EQ(node,
sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->endContainer());
if (node->IsElementNode())
return ToElement(node);
if (Element* neighbor_element = type == kWebFocusTypeForward
? ElementTraversal::Previous(*node)
: ElementTraversal::Next(*node))
return neighbor_element;
return node->ParentOrShadowHostElement();
}
if (sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->startContainer()
->IsElementNode() &&
!sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->startContainer()
->hasChildren() &&
sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->startOffset() == 0)
return ToElement(
sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->startContainer());
if (Node* next_node =
sequential_focus_navigation_starting_point_->FirstNode()) {
if (next_node->IsShadowRoot())
return next_node->OwnerShadowHost();
if (type == kWebFocusTypeForward) {
Node* previous = next_node;
do {
previous = FlatTreeTraversal::Previous(*previous);
} while (previous && !previous->IsElementNode());
return ToElement(previous);
}
if (next_node->IsElementNode())
return ToElement(next_node);
Node* next = next_node;
do {
next = FlatTreeTraversal::Next(*next);
} while (next && !next->IsElementNode());
return ToElement(next);
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LiveSyncTest::IsTestServerRunning() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
std::string sync_url = cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL);
GURL sync_url_status(sync_url.append("/healthz"));
SyncServerStatusChecker delegate;
URLFetcher fetcher(sync_url_status, URLFetcher::GET, &delegate);
fetcher.set_request_context(Profile::GetDefaultRequestContext());
fetcher.Start();
ui_test_utils::RunMessageLoop();
return delegate.running();
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_crl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 4,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_mtrr_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
int index;
/* MSR_MTRRcap is a readonly MSR. */
if (msr == MSR_MTRRcap) {
/*
* SMRR = 0
* WC = 1
* FIX = 1
* VCNT = KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR
*/
*pdata = 0x500 | KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR;
return 0;
}
if (!msr_mtrr_valid(msr))
return 1;
index = fixed_msr_to_range_index(msr);
if (index >= 0)
*pdata = *(u64 *)&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[index];
else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType)
*pdata = vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.deftype;
else if (msr == MSR_IA32_CR_PAT)
*pdata = vcpu->arch.pat;
else { /* Variable MTRRs */
int is_mtrr_mask;
index = (msr - 0x200) / 2;
is_mtrr_mask = msr - 0x200 - 2 * index;
if (!is_mtrr_mask)
*pdata = vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.var_ranges[index].base;
else
*pdata = vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.var_ranges[index].mask;
*pdata &= (1ULL << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu)) - 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8
MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").
0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds. The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f. Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2016-3713.
Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MarkEntryAsForeign() {
MakeCacheAndGroup(kManifestUrl, 1, 1, true);
cache_->AddEntry(kEntryUrl, AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT));
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record;
entry_record.cache_id = 1;
entry_record.url = kEntryUrl;
entry_record.flags = AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT;
entry_record.response_id = 0;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertEntry(&entry_record));
EXPECT_FALSE(cache_->GetEntry(kEntryUrl)->IsForeign());
storage()->MarkEntryAsForeign(kEntryUrl, 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(cache_->GetEntry(kEntryUrl)->IsForeign());
EXPECT_TRUE(cache_->GetEntry(kEntryUrl)->IsExplicit());
FlushAllTasks();
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record2;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindEntry(1, kEntryUrl, &entry_record2));
EXPECT_EQ(AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT | AppCacheEntry::FOREIGN,
entry_record2.flags);
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ENUM_PTRS_WITH(pdf14_device_enum_ptrs, pdf14_device *pdev)
{
index -= 5;
if (index < pdev->devn_params.separations.num_separations)
ENUM_RETURN(pdev->devn_params.separations.names[index].data);
index -= pdev->devn_params.separations.num_separations;
if (index < pdev->devn_params.pdf14_separations.num_separations)
ENUM_RETURN(pdev->devn_params.pdf14_separations.names[index].data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::MaybeStartDrag(TabGtk* tab, const gfx::Point& point) {
if (IsAnimating() || tab->closing() || !HasAvailableDragActions())
return;
std::vector<TabGtk*> tabs;
for (size_t i = 0; i < model()->selection_model().size(); i++) {
TabGtk* selected_tab =
GetTabAtAdjustForAnimation(
model()->selection_model().selected_indices()[i]);
if (!selected_tab->closing())
tabs.push_back(selected_tab);
}
drag_controller_.reset(new DraggedTabControllerGtk(this, tab, tabs));
drag_controller_->CaptureDragInfo(point);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterf(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLfloat param) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterf: unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(
feature_info_, info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(param))) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexParameterf: param GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return;
}
glTexParameterf(target, pname, param);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void net_disable_timestamp(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
if (in_interrupt()) {
atomic_inc(&netstamp_needed_deferred);
return;
}
#endif
static_key_slow_dec(&netstamp_needed);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_matching_model_microcode(int cpu, unsigned long start,
void *data, size_t size,
struct mc_saved_data *mc_saved_data,
unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd,
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
{
u8 *ucode_ptr = data;
unsigned int leftover = size;
enum ucode_state state = UCODE_OK;
unsigned int mc_size;
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header;
struct microcode_intel *mc_saved_tmp[MAX_UCODE_COUNT];
unsigned int mc_saved_count = mc_saved_data->mc_saved_count;
int i;
while (leftover) {
mc_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)ucode_ptr;
mc_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
if (!mc_size || mc_size > leftover ||
microcode_sanity_check(ucode_ptr, 0) < 0)
break;
leftover -= mc_size;
/*
* Since APs with same family and model as the BSP may boot in
* the platform, we need to find and save microcode patches
* with the same family and model as the BSP.
*/
if (matching_model_microcode(mc_header, uci->cpu_sig.sig) !=
UCODE_OK) {
ucode_ptr += mc_size;
continue;
}
_save_mc(mc_saved_tmp, ucode_ptr, &mc_saved_count);
ucode_ptr += mc_size;
}
if (leftover) {
state = UCODE_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (mc_saved_count == 0) {
state = UCODE_NFOUND;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < mc_saved_count; i++)
mc_saved_in_initrd[i] = (unsigned long)mc_saved_tmp[i] - start;
mc_saved_data->mc_saved_count = mc_saved_count;
out:
return state;
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aio_read_evt(struct kioctx *ioctx, struct io_event *ent)
{
struct aio_ring_info *info = &ioctx->ring_info;
struct aio_ring *ring;
unsigned long head;
int ret = 0;
ring = kmap_atomic(info->ring_pages[0]);
dprintk("in aio_read_evt h%lu t%lu m%lu\n",
(unsigned long)ring->head, (unsigned long)ring->tail,
(unsigned long)ring->nr);
if (ring->head == ring->tail)
goto out;
spin_lock(&info->ring_lock);
head = ring->head % info->nr;
if (head != ring->tail) {
struct io_event *evp = aio_ring_event(info, head);
*ent = *evp;
head = (head + 1) % info->nr;
smp_mb(); /* finish reading the event before updatng the head */
ring->head = head;
ret = 1;
put_aio_ring_event(evp);
}
spin_unlock(&info->ring_lock);
out:
kunmap_atomic(ring);
dprintk("leaving aio_read_evt: %d h%lu t%lu\n", ret,
(unsigned long)ring->head, (unsigned long)ring->tail);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@yahoo.co.in>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXCodec::waitForBufferFilled_l() {
if (mIsEncoder) {
return mBufferFilled.wait(mLock);
}
status_t err = mBufferFilled.waitRelative(mLock, kBufferFilledEventTimeOutNs);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("Timed out waiting for output buffers: %zu/%zu",
countBuffersWeOwn(mPortBuffers[kPortIndexInput]),
countBuffersWeOwn(mPortBuffers[kPortIndexOutput]));
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __ath6kl_init_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
{
int r;
rtnl_lock();
r = ar6000_init(dev);
rtnl_unlock();
if (r) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("ar6000_avail: ar6000_init\n"));
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void beginTest()
{
postSetNeedsCommitThenRedrawToMainThread();
postSetNeedsCommitThenRedrawToMainThread();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NaClIPCAdapter::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: activation_start_mountables (ActivateParameters *parameters)
{
NautilusFile *file;
GMountOperation *start_op;
if (parameters->start_mountables != NULL)
{
file = parameters->start_mountables->data;
start_op = gtk_mount_operation_new (parameters->parent_window);
g_signal_connect (start_op, "notify::is-showing",
G_CALLBACK (activate_mount_op_active), parameters);
nautilus_file_start (file,
start_op,
parameters->cancellable,
activation_mountable_started,
parameters);
g_object_unref (start_op);
return;
}
if (parameters->mountables == NULL && parameters->start_mountables == NULL)
{
activation_get_activation_uris (parameters);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::DownloadItem* MockDownloadItemFactory::CreateSavePageItem(
DownloadItemImpl::Delegate* delegate,
const FilePath& path,
const GURL& url,
bool is_otr,
content::DownloadId download_id,
const std::string& mime_type,
const net::BoundNetLog& bound_net_log) {
int local_id = download_id.local();
DCHECK(items_.find(local_id) == items_.end());
content::MockDownloadItem* result =
new StrictMock<content::MockDownloadItem>;
EXPECT_CALL(*result, GetId())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(local_id));
items_[local_id] = result;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fq_find(__be32 id, u32 user, struct in6_addr *src, struct in6_addr *dst)
{
struct inet_frag_queue *q;
struct ip6_create_arg arg;
unsigned int hash;
arg.id = id;
arg.user = user;
arg.src = src;
arg.dst = dst;
read_lock_bh(&nf_frags.lock);
hash = inet6_hash_frag(id, src, dst, nf_frags.rnd);
q = inet_frag_find(&nf_init_frags, &nf_frags, &arg, hash);
local_bh_enable();
if (q == NULL)
goto oom;
return container_of(q, struct nf_ct_frag6_queue, q);
oom:
pr_debug("Can't alloc new queue\n");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tracing_open_pipe(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct trace_array *tr = inode->i_private;
struct trace_iterator *iter;
int ret = 0;
if (tracing_disabled)
return -ENODEV;
if (trace_array_get(tr) < 0)
return -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
/* create a buffer to store the information to pass to userspace */
iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
__trace_array_put(tr);
goto out;
}
trace_seq_init(&iter->seq);
iter->trace = tr->current_trace;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&iter->started, GFP_KERNEL)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/* trace pipe does not show start of buffer */
cpumask_setall(iter->started);
if (tr->trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_LATENCY_FMT)
iter->iter_flags |= TRACE_FILE_LAT_FMT;
/* Output in nanoseconds only if we are using a clock in nanoseconds. */
if (trace_clocks[tr->clock_id].in_ns)
iter->iter_flags |= TRACE_FILE_TIME_IN_NS;
iter->tr = tr;
iter->trace_buffer = &tr->trace_buffer;
iter->cpu_file = tracing_get_cpu(inode);
mutex_init(&iter->mutex);
filp->private_data = iter;
if (iter->trace->pipe_open)
iter->trace->pipe_open(iter);
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
tr->current_trace->ref++;
out:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
return ret;
fail:
kfree(iter);
__trace_array_put(tr);
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t shrink_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nop_on_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestAutofillExternalDelegate* external_delegate() {
return external_delegate_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 118,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBindSampler(GLuint unit,
GLuint sampler) {
api()->glBindSamplerFn(unit, GetSamplerServiceID(sampler, resources_));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *skb_realloc_headroom(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int headroom)
{
struct sk_buff *skb2;
int delta = headroom - skb_headroom(skb);
if (delta <= 0)
skb2 = pskb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else {
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb2 && pskb_expand_head(skb2, SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta), 0,
GFP_ATOMIC)) {
kfree_skb(skb2);
skb2 = NULL;
}
}
return skb2;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void blowfish_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
blowfish_enc_blk(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit MockObserver(DownloadItem* item) : item_(item), updated_(false) {
item_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::EnsureRenderViewInitialized(
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host,
SiteInstance* instance) {
DCHECK(frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame());
if (render_view_host->IsRenderViewLive())
return;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy = GetRenderFrameProxyHost(instance);
if (!proxy)
return;
InitRenderView(render_view_host, proxy);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inet_del_ifa(struct in_device *in_dev, struct in_ifaddr **ifap,
int destroy)
{
__inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, destroy, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tcp_sacktag_write_queue(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *ack_skb,
u32 prior_snd_una, struct tcp_sacktag_state *state)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const unsigned char *ptr = (skb_transport_header(ack_skb) +
TCP_SKB_CB(ack_skb)->sacked);
struct tcp_sack_block_wire *sp_wire = (struct tcp_sack_block_wire *)(ptr+2);
struct tcp_sack_block sp[TCP_NUM_SACKS];
struct tcp_sack_block *cache;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int num_sacks = min(TCP_NUM_SACKS, (ptr[1] - TCPOLEN_SACK_BASE) >> 3);
int used_sacks;
bool found_dup_sack = false;
int i, j;
int first_sack_index;
state->flag = 0;
state->reord = tp->packets_out;
if (!tp->sacked_out) {
if (WARN_ON(tp->fackets_out))
tp->fackets_out = 0;
tcp_highest_sack_reset(sk);
}
found_dup_sack = tcp_check_dsack(sk, ack_skb, sp_wire,
num_sacks, prior_snd_una);
if (found_dup_sack)
state->flag |= FLAG_DSACKING_ACK;
/* Eliminate too old ACKs, but take into
* account more or less fresh ones, they can
* contain valid SACK info.
*/
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(ack_skb)->ack_seq, prior_snd_una - tp->max_window))
return 0;
if (!tp->packets_out)
goto out;
used_sacks = 0;
first_sack_index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_sacks; i++) {
bool dup_sack = !i && found_dup_sack;
sp[used_sacks].start_seq = get_unaligned_be32(&sp_wire[i].start_seq);
sp[used_sacks].end_seq = get_unaligned_be32(&sp_wire[i].end_seq);
if (!tcp_is_sackblock_valid(tp, dup_sack,
sp[used_sacks].start_seq,
sp[used_sacks].end_seq)) {
int mib_idx;
if (dup_sack) {
if (!tp->undo_marker)
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDNOUNDO;
else
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDOLD;
} else {
/* Don't count olds caused by ACK reordering */
if ((TCP_SKB_CB(ack_skb)->ack_seq != tp->snd_una) &&
!after(sp[used_sacks].end_seq, tp->snd_una))
continue;
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPSACKDISCARD;
}
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), mib_idx);
if (i == 0)
first_sack_index = -1;
continue;
}
/* Ignore very old stuff early */
if (!after(sp[used_sacks].end_seq, prior_snd_una))
continue;
used_sacks++;
}
/* order SACK blocks to allow in order walk of the retrans queue */
for (i = used_sacks - 1; i > 0; i--) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (after(sp[j].start_seq, sp[j + 1].start_seq)) {
swap(sp[j], sp[j + 1]);
/* Track where the first SACK block goes to */
if (j == first_sack_index)
first_sack_index = j + 1;
}
}
}
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
state->fack_count = 0;
i = 0;
if (!tp->sacked_out) {
/* It's already past, so skip checking against it */
cache = tp->recv_sack_cache + ARRAY_SIZE(tp->recv_sack_cache);
} else {
cache = tp->recv_sack_cache;
/* Skip empty blocks in at head of the cache */
while (tcp_sack_cache_ok(tp, cache) && !cache->start_seq &&
!cache->end_seq)
cache++;
}
while (i < used_sacks) {
u32 start_seq = sp[i].start_seq;
u32 end_seq = sp[i].end_seq;
bool dup_sack = (found_dup_sack && (i == first_sack_index));
struct tcp_sack_block *next_dup = NULL;
if (found_dup_sack && ((i + 1) == first_sack_index))
next_dup = &sp[i + 1];
/* Skip too early cached blocks */
while (tcp_sack_cache_ok(tp, cache) &&
!before(start_seq, cache->end_seq))
cache++;
/* Can skip some work by looking recv_sack_cache? */
if (tcp_sack_cache_ok(tp, cache) && !dup_sack &&
after(end_seq, cache->start_seq)) {
/* Head todo? */
if (before(start_seq, cache->start_seq)) {
skb = tcp_sacktag_skip(skb, sk, state,
start_seq);
skb = tcp_sacktag_walk(skb, sk, next_dup,
state,
start_seq,
cache->start_seq,
dup_sack);
}
/* Rest of the block already fully processed? */
if (!after(end_seq, cache->end_seq))
goto advance_sp;
skb = tcp_maybe_skipping_dsack(skb, sk, next_dup,
state,
cache->end_seq);
/* ...tail remains todo... */
if (tcp_highest_sack_seq(tp) == cache->end_seq) {
/* ...but better entrypoint exists! */
skb = tcp_highest_sack(sk);
if (!skb)
break;
state->fack_count = tp->fackets_out;
cache++;
goto walk;
}
skb = tcp_sacktag_skip(skb, sk, state, cache->end_seq);
/* Check overlap against next cached too (past this one already) */
cache++;
continue;
}
if (!before(start_seq, tcp_highest_sack_seq(tp))) {
skb = tcp_highest_sack(sk);
if (!skb)
break;
state->fack_count = tp->fackets_out;
}
skb = tcp_sacktag_skip(skb, sk, state, start_seq);
walk:
skb = tcp_sacktag_walk(skb, sk, next_dup, state,
start_seq, end_seq, dup_sack);
advance_sp:
i++;
}
/* Clear the head of the cache sack blocks so we can skip it next time */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tp->recv_sack_cache) - used_sacks; i++) {
tp->recv_sack_cache[i].start_seq = 0;
tp->recv_sack_cache[i].end_seq = 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < used_sacks; j++)
tp->recv_sack_cache[i++] = sp[j];
if ((state->reord < tp->fackets_out) &&
((inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Loss) || tp->undo_marker))
tcp_update_reordering(sk, tp->fackets_out - state->reord, 0);
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
out:
#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0
WARN_ON((int)tp->sacked_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) < 0);
#endif
return state->flag;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 55,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cxusb_dualdig4_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
u8 ircode[4];
int i;
struct i2c_msg msg = { .addr = 0x6b, .flags = I2C_M_RD,
.buf = ircode, .len = 4 };
if (usb_set_interface(adap->dev->udev, 0, 1) < 0)
err("set interface failed");
cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_DIGITAL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
/* reset the tuner and demodulator */
cxusb_bluebird_gpio_rw(adap->dev, 0x04, 0);
cxusb_bluebird_gpio_pulse(adap->dev, 0x01, 1);
cxusb_bluebird_gpio_pulse(adap->dev, 0x02, 1);
adap->fe_adap[0].fe =
dvb_attach(zl10353_attach,
&cxusb_zl10353_xc3028_config_no_i2c_gate,
&adap->dev->i2c_adap);
if ((adap->fe_adap[0].fe) == NULL)
return -EIO;
/* try to determine if there is no IR decoder on the I2C bus */
for (i = 0; adap->dev->props.rc.core.rc_codes && i < 5; i++) {
msleep(20);
if (cxusb_i2c_xfer(&adap->dev->i2c_adap, &msg, 1) != 1)
goto no_IR;
if (ircode[0] == 0 && ircode[1] == 0)
continue;
if (ircode[2] + ircode[3] != 0xff) {
no_IR:
adap->dev->props.rc.core.rc_codes = NULL;
info("No IR receiver detected on this device.");
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string ContextualSearchFieldTrial::GetSwitch(const std::string& name) {
if (!HasSwitch(name))
return std::string();
else
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(name);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::rejectPlayPromisesInternal(ExceptionCode code,
const String& message) {
DCHECK(code == AbortError || code == NotSupportedError);
for (auto& resolver : m_playPromiseRejectList)
resolver->reject(DOMException::create(code, message));
m_playPromiseRejectList.clear();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RecordInProgressDBCount(InProgressDBCountTypes type) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Download.InProgressDB.Counts", type);
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOLEAN btm_serv_trusted(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec, tBTM_SEC_SERV_REC *p_serv_rec)
{
if(BTM_SEC_IS_SERVICE_TRUSTED(p_dev_rec->trusted_mask, p_serv_rec->service_id))
{
return(TRUE);
}
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StateBase* checkException(StateBase* state)
{
return m_tryCatch.HasCaught() ? handleError(JSException, "", state) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int pfkey_sockaddr_fill(const xfrm_address_t *xaddr, __be16 port,
struct sockaddr *sa,
unsigned short family)
{
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
{
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = port;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = xaddr->a4;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
return 32;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6:
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = port;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = *(struct in6_addr *)xaddr->a6;
sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0;
return 128;
}
#endif
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int async_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
return setkey(crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(tfm), key, keylen);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: packet_stats(const tcpreplay_stats_t *stats)
{
struct timeval diff;
COUNTER diff_us;
COUNTER bytes_sec = 0;
u_int32_t bytes_sec_10ths = 0;
COUNTER mb_sec = 0;
u_int32_t mb_sec_100ths = 0;
u_int32_t mb_sec_1000ths = 0;
COUNTER pkts_sec = 0;
u_int32_t pkts_sec_100ths = 0;
timersub(&stats->end_time, &stats->start_time, &diff);
diff_us = TIMEVAL_TO_MICROSEC(&diff);
if (diff_us && stats->pkts_sent && stats->bytes_sent) {
COUNTER bytes_sec_X10;
COUNTER pkts_sec_X100;
COUNTER mb_sec_X1000;
COUNTER mb_sec_X100;
if (stats->bytes_sent > 1000 * 1000 * 1000 && diff_us > 1000 * 1000) {
bytes_sec_X10 = (stats->bytes_sent * 10 * 1000) / (diff_us / 1000);
pkts_sec_X100 = (stats->pkts_sent * 100 * 1000) / (diff_us / 1000);
} else {
bytes_sec_X10 = (stats->bytes_sent * 10 * 1000 * 1000) / diff_us;
pkts_sec_X100 = (stats->pkts_sent * 100 * 1000 * 1000) / diff_us;
}
bytes_sec = bytes_sec_X10 / 10;
bytes_sec_10ths = bytes_sec_X10 % 10;
mb_sec_X1000 = (bytes_sec * 8) / 1000;
mb_sec_X100 = mb_sec_X1000 / 10;
mb_sec = mb_sec_X1000 / 1000;
mb_sec_100ths = mb_sec_X100 % 100;
mb_sec_1000ths = mb_sec_X1000 % 1000;
pkts_sec = pkts_sec_X100 / 100;
pkts_sec_100ths = pkts_sec_X100 % 100;
}
if (diff_us >= 1000 * 1000)
printf("Actual: " COUNTER_SPEC " packets (" COUNTER_SPEC " bytes) sent in %zd.%02zd seconds\n",
stats->pkts_sent, stats->bytes_sent, (ssize_t)diff.tv_sec, (ssize_t)(diff.tv_usec / (10 * 1000)));
else
printf("Actual: " COUNTER_SPEC " packets (" COUNTER_SPEC " bytes) sent in %zd.%06zd seconds\n",
stats->pkts_sent, stats->bytes_sent, (ssize_t)diff.tv_sec, (ssize_t)diff.tv_usec);
if (mb_sec >= 1)
printf("Rated: %llu.%1u Bps, %llu.%02u Mbps, %llu.%02u pps\n",
bytes_sec, bytes_sec_10ths, mb_sec, mb_sec_100ths, pkts_sec, pkts_sec_100ths);
else
printf("Rated: %llu.%1u Bps, %llu.%03u Mbps, %llu.%02u pps\n",
bytes_sec, bytes_sec_10ths, mb_sec, mb_sec_1000ths, pkts_sec, pkts_sec_100ths);
fflush(NULL);
if (stats->failed)
printf("Failed write attempts: " COUNTER_SPEC "\n",
stats->failed);
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vsock_core_init(const struct vsock_transport *t)
{
int retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&vsock_register_mutex);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (transport) {
retval = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
transport = t;
retval = __vsock_core_init();
if (retval)
transport = NULL;
out:
mutex_unlock(&vsock_register_mutex);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::MarkFirstSetupComplete() {
signin::SetUserSkippedPromo(profile_);
ProfileSyncService* service = GetSyncService();
if (!service || service->IsFirstSetupComplete())
return;
base::FilePath profile_file_path = profile_->GetPath();
ProfileMetrics::LogProfileSyncSignIn(profile_file_path);
sync_blocker_.reset();
service->SetFirstSetupComplete();
FireWebUIListener("sync-settings-saved");
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_CCtx_setParametersUsingCCtxParams(
ZSTD_CCtx* cctx, const ZSTD_CCtx_params* params)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_CCtx_setParametersUsingCCtxParams");
if (cctx->streamStage != zcss_init) return ERROR(stage_wrong);
if (cctx->cdict) return ERROR(stage_wrong);
cctx->requestedParams = *params;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 89,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_IsHdr(const txt *hh, const char *hdr)
{
unsigned l;
Tcheck(*hh);
AN(hdr);
l = hdr[0];
assert(l == strlen(hdr + 1));
assert(hdr[l] == ':');
hdr++;
return (!strncasecmp(hdr, hh->b, l));
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Condor_Auth_SSL::isValid() const
{
if ( m_crypto ) {
return TRUE;
} else {
return FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendImpl::BufferDeleted(int size) {
buffer_bytes_ -= size;
DCHECK_GE(size, 0);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::StartDownloadItem(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadCreateInfo> info,
const download::DownloadUrlParameters::OnStartedCallback& on_started,
download::InProgressDownloadManager::StartDownloadItemCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!info->is_new_download) {
download::DownloadItemImpl* download = downloads_by_guid_[info->guid];
if (!download || download->GetState() == download::DownloadItem::CANCELLED)
download = nullptr;
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(info), download,
should_persist_new_download_);
OnDownloadStarted(download, on_started);
} else {
GetNextId(base::BindOnce(&DownloadManagerImpl::CreateNewDownloadItemToStart,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(info),
on_started, std::move(callback)));
}
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
int i;
unsigned long field;
u64 field_value;
struct vmcs *shadow_vmcs = vmx->nested.current_shadow_vmcs;
const unsigned long *fields = shadow_read_write_fields;
const int num_fields = max_shadow_read_write_fields;
preempt_disable();
vmcs_load(shadow_vmcs);
for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
field = fields[i];
switch (vmcs_field_type(field)) {
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U16:
field_value = vmcs_read16(field);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U32:
field_value = vmcs_read32(field);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U64:
field_value = vmcs_read64(field);
break;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_NATURAL_WIDTH:
field_value = vmcs_readl(field);
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
continue;
}
vmcs12_write_any(&vmx->vcpu, field, field_value);
}
vmcs_clear(shadow_vmcs);
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd_racache_init(int cache_size)
{
int i;
int j = 0;
int nperbucket;
struct raparms **raparm = NULL;
if (raparm_hash[0].pb_head)
return 0;
nperbucket = DIV_ROUND_UP(cache_size, RAPARM_HASH_SIZE);
nperbucket = max(2, nperbucket);
cache_size = nperbucket * RAPARM_HASH_SIZE;
dprintk("nfsd: allocating %d readahead buffers.\n", cache_size);
for (i = 0; i < RAPARM_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&raparm_hash[i].pb_lock);
raparm = &raparm_hash[i].pb_head;
for (j = 0; j < nperbucket; j++) {
*raparm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct raparms), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*raparm)
goto out_nomem;
raparm = &(*raparm)->p_next;
}
*raparm = NULL;
}
nfsdstats.ra_size = cache_size;
return 0;
out_nomem:
dprintk("nfsd: kmalloc failed, freeing readahead buffers\n");
nfsd_racache_shutdown();
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebString RenderFrameImpl::userAgentOverride(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebURL& url) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (!render_view_->webview() || !render_view_->webview()->mainFrame() ||
render_view_->renderer_preferences_.user_agent_override.empty()) {
return blink::WebString();
}
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view_->webview()->mainFrame();
WebDataSource* data_source = NULL;
if (main_frame->provisionalDataSource())
data_source = main_frame->provisionalDataSource();
else
data_source = main_frame->dataSource();
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data = data_source ?
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDataSource(data_source) : NULL;
if (internal_data && internal_data->is_overriding_user_agent())
return WebString::fromUTF8(
render_view_->renderer_preferences_.user_agent_override);
return blink::WebString();
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __printf(2,3) void svc_printk(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, const char *fmt, ...) {}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetProfiles(std::vector<AutofillProfile>* profiles) {
WindowedPersonalDataManagerObserver observer(browser());
GetPersonalDataManager()->SetProfiles(profiles);
observer.Wait();
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); /* iff sk_type == SOCK_STREAM */
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp, intv;
u64 rate64;
bool slow;
u32 rate;
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
return;
info->tcpi_state = sk_state_load(sk);
/* Report meaningful fields for all TCP states, including listeners */
rate = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_pacing_rate);
rate64 = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
info->tcpi_pacing_rate = rate64;
rate = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_max_pacing_rate);
rate64 = rate != ~0U ? rate : ~0ULL;
info->tcpi_max_pacing_rate = rate64;
info->tcpi_reordering = tp->reordering;
info->tcpi_snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
if (info->tcpi_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
/* listeners aliased fields :
* tcpi_unacked -> Number of children ready for accept()
* tcpi_sacked -> max backlog
*/
info->tcpi_unacked = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
info->tcpi_sacked = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
return;
}
info->tcpi_ca_state = icsk->icsk_ca_state;
info->tcpi_retransmits = icsk->icsk_retransmits;
info->tcpi_probes = icsk->icsk_probes_out;
info->tcpi_backoff = icsk->icsk_backoff;
if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok)
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_TIMESTAMPS;
if (tcp_is_sack(tp))
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_SACK;
if (tp->rx_opt.wscale_ok) {
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_WSCALE;
info->tcpi_snd_wscale = tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
info->tcpi_rcv_wscale = tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale;
}
if (tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK)
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_ECN;
if (tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_SEEN)
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_ECN_SEEN;
if (tp->syn_data_acked)
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_SYN_DATA;
info->tcpi_rto = jiffies_to_usecs(icsk->icsk_rto);
info->tcpi_ato = jiffies_to_usecs(icsk->icsk_ack.ato);
info->tcpi_snd_mss = tp->mss_cache;
info->tcpi_rcv_mss = icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss;
info->tcpi_unacked = tp->packets_out;
info->tcpi_sacked = tp->sacked_out;
info->tcpi_lost = tp->lost_out;
info->tcpi_retrans = tp->retrans_out;
info->tcpi_fackets = tp->fackets_out;
info->tcpi_last_data_sent = jiffies_to_msecs(now - tp->lsndtime);
info->tcpi_last_data_recv = jiffies_to_msecs(now - icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime);
info->tcpi_last_ack_recv = jiffies_to_msecs(now - tp->rcv_tstamp);
info->tcpi_pmtu = icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie;
info->tcpi_rcv_ssthresh = tp->rcv_ssthresh;
info->tcpi_rtt = tp->srtt_us >> 3;
info->tcpi_rttvar = tp->mdev_us >> 2;
info->tcpi_snd_ssthresh = tp->snd_ssthresh;
info->tcpi_advmss = tp->advmss;
info->tcpi_rcv_rtt = jiffies_to_usecs(tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt)>>3;
info->tcpi_rcv_space = tp->rcvq_space.space;
info->tcpi_total_retrans = tp->total_retrans;
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
info->tcpi_bytes_acked = tp->bytes_acked;
info->tcpi_bytes_received = tp->bytes_received;
info->tcpi_notsent_bytes = max_t(int, 0, tp->write_seq - tp->snd_nxt);
tcp_get_info_chrono_stats(tp, info);
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
info->tcpi_segs_out = tp->segs_out;
info->tcpi_segs_in = tp->segs_in;
info->tcpi_min_rtt = tcp_min_rtt(tp);
info->tcpi_data_segs_in = tp->data_segs_in;
info->tcpi_data_segs_out = tp->data_segs_out;
info->tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited = tp->rate_app_limited ? 1 : 0;
rate = READ_ONCE(tp->rate_delivered);
intv = READ_ONCE(tp->rate_interval_us);
if (rate && intv) {
rate64 = (u64)rate * tp->mss_cache * USEC_PER_SEC;
do_div(rate64, intv);
info->tcpi_delivery_rate = rate64;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0cc8 ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 68,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_false(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
return mrb_false_value();
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PassRefPtr<CSSPrimitiveValue> fontStyleFromStyle(RenderStyle* style)
{
if (style->fontDescription().italic())
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueItalic);
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueNormal);
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ReplaceFile(const FilePath& from_path, const FilePath& to_path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return (rename(from_path.value().c_str(), to_path.value().c_str()) == 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 115,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline long calc_load_fold_idle(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_window_deletion(void *user_data, Evas_Object *window, void *event_info)
{
window_close(browser_window_find(window));
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_mountpoint(struct mountpoint *mp)
{
if (!--mp->m_count) {
struct dentry *dentry = mp->m_dentry;
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_MOUNTED;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
hlist_del(&mp->m_hash);
kfree(mp);
}
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::updateFromStyle()
{
RenderBoxModelObject::updateFromStyle();
RenderStyle* styleToUse = style();
bool isRootObject = isDocumentElement();
bool isViewObject = isRenderView();
if (isRootObject || isViewObject)
setHasBoxDecorations(true);
setFloating(!isOutOfFlowPositioned() && styleToUse->isFloating());
bool boxHasOverflowClip = false;
if (!styleToUse->isOverflowVisible() && isRenderBlock() && !isViewObject) {
if (node() != document().viewportDefiningElement()) {
boxHasOverflowClip = true;
if (!hasOverflowClip()) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
repaint();
}
}
}
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled() && (boxHasOverflowClip != hasOverflowClip())) {
for (RenderObject* child = firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
child->setShouldDoFullRepaintIfSelfPaintingLayer(true);
}
setHasOverflowClip(boxHasOverflowClip);
setHasTransform(styleToUse->hasTransformRelatedProperty());
setHasReflection(styleToUse->boxReflect());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void start_cfs_bandwidth(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b)
{
u64 overrun;
lockdep_assert_held(&cfs_b->lock);
if (cfs_b->period_active)
return;
cfs_b->period_active = 1;
overrun = hrtimer_forward_now(&cfs_b->period_timer, cfs_b->period);
cfs_b->runtime_expires += (overrun + 1) * ktime_to_ns(cfs_b->period);
cfs_b->expires_seq++;
hrtimer_start_expires(&cfs_b->period_timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string SitePerProcessBrowserTest::DepictFrameTree(FrameTreeNode* node) {
return visualizer_.DepictFrameTree(node);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static time_t asn1_time_to_time_t(ASN1_UTCTIME * timestr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/*
This is how the time string is formatted:
snprintf(p, sizeof(p), "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ",ts->tm_year%100,
ts->tm_mon+1,ts->tm_mday,ts->tm_hour,ts->tm_min,ts->tm_sec);
*/
time_t ret;
struct tm thetime;
char * strbuf;
char * thestr;
long gmadjust = 0;
if (timestr->length < 13) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "extension author too lazy to parse %s correctly", timestr->data);
return (time_t)-1;
}
strbuf = estrdup((char *)timestr->data);
memset(&thetime, 0, sizeof(thetime));
/* we work backwards so that we can use atoi more easily */
thestr = strbuf + timestr->length - 3;
thetime.tm_sec = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_min = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_hour = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mday = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mon = atoi(thestr)-1;
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_year = atoi(thestr);
if (thetime.tm_year < 68) {
thetime.tm_year += 100;
}
thetime.tm_isdst = -1;
ret = mktime(&thetime);
#if HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
gmadjust = thetime.tm_gmtoff;
#else
/*
** If correcting for daylight savings time, we set the adjustment to
** the value of timezone - 3600 seconds. Otherwise, we need to overcorrect and
** set the adjustment to the main timezone + 3600 seconds.
*/
gmadjust = -(thetime.tm_isdst ? (long)timezone - 3600 : (long)timezone + 3600);
#endif
ret += gmadjust;
efree(strbuf);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long writeaccess,
unsigned long address)
{
unsigned long vec;
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct * vma;
int si_code;
int fault;
siginfo_t info;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
vec = lookup_exception_vector();
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*/
if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) {
if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0)
return;
if (notify_page_fault(regs, vec))
return;
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
}
if (unlikely(notify_page_fault(regs, vec)))
return;
/* Only enable interrupts if they were on before the fault */
if ((regs->sr & SR_IMASK) != SR_IMASK)
local_irq_enable();
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/*
* If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running
* in an atomic region then we must not take the fault:
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto no_context;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
if (writeaccess) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE)))
goto bad_area;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, writeaccess ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
if (user_mode(regs)) {
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = si_code;
info.si_addr = (void *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
return;
}
no_context:
/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
if (fixup_exception(regs))
return;
if (handle_trapped_io(regs, address))
return;
/*
* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
* terminate things with extreme prejudice.
*
*/
bust_spinlocks(1);
if (oops_may_print()) {
unsigned long page;
if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL "
"pointer dereference");
else
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging "
"request");
printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
printk(KERN_ALERT "pc = %08lx\n", regs->pc);
page = (unsigned long)get_TTB();
if (page) {
page = ((__typeof__(page) *)page)[address >> PGDIR_SHIFT];
printk(KERN_ALERT "*pde = %08lx\n", page);
if (page & _PAGE_PRESENT) {
page &= PAGE_MASK;
address &= 0x003ff000;
page = ((__typeof__(page) *)
__va(page))[address >>
PAGE_SHIFT];
printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %08lx\n", page);
}
}
}
die("Oops", regs, writeaccess);
bust_spinlocks(0);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
info.si_addr = (void *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, tsk);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DesktopSession* DaemonProcessTest::DoCreateDesktopSession(int terminal_id) {
return new FakeDesktopSession(daemon_process_.get(), terminal_id);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ax25_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
ax25_cb *ax25;
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
sock_hold(sk);
sock_orphan(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
ax25 = ax25_sk(sk);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
switch (ax25->state) {
case AX25_STATE_0:
release_sock(sk);
ax25_disconnect(ax25, 0);
lock_sock(sk);
ax25_destroy_socket(ax25);
break;
case AX25_STATE_1:
case AX25_STATE_2:
ax25_send_control(ax25, AX25_DISC, AX25_POLLON, AX25_COMMAND);
release_sock(sk);
ax25_disconnect(ax25, 0);
lock_sock(sk);
ax25_destroy_socket(ax25);
break;
case AX25_STATE_3:
case AX25_STATE_4:
ax25_clear_queues(ax25);
ax25->n2count = 0;
switch (ax25->ax25_dev->values[AX25_VALUES_PROTOCOL]) {
case AX25_PROTO_STD_SIMPLEX:
case AX25_PROTO_STD_DUPLEX:
ax25_send_control(ax25,
AX25_DISC,
AX25_POLLON,
AX25_COMMAND);
ax25_stop_t2timer(ax25);
ax25_stop_t3timer(ax25);
ax25_stop_idletimer(ax25);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_AX25_DAMA_SLAVE
case AX25_PROTO_DAMA_SLAVE:
ax25_stop_t3timer(ax25);
ax25_stop_idletimer(ax25);
break;
#endif
}
ax25_calculate_t1(ax25);
ax25_start_t1timer(ax25);
ax25->state = AX25_STATE_2;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY);
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
ax25_destroy_socket(ax25);
}
sock->sk = NULL;
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_load_firmware_cpu(struct tg3 *tp, u32 cpu_base,
u32 cpu_scratch_base, int cpu_scratch_size,
struct fw_info *info)
{
int err, lock_err, i;
void (*write_op)(struct tg3 *, u32, u32);
if (cpu_base == TX_CPU_BASE && tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
netdev_err(tp->dev,
"%s: Trying to load TX cpu firmware which is 5705\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS))
write_op = tg3_write_mem;
else
write_op = tg3_write_indirect_reg32;
/* It is possible that bootcode is still loading at this point.
* Get the nvram lock first before halting the cpu.
*/
lock_err = tg3_nvram_lock(tp);
err = tg3_halt_cpu(tp, cpu_base);
if (!lock_err)
tg3_nvram_unlock(tp);
if (err)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < cpu_scratch_size; i += sizeof(u32))
write_op(tp, cpu_scratch_base + i, 0);
tw32(cpu_base + CPU_STATE, 0xffffffff);
tw32(cpu_base + CPU_MODE, tr32(cpu_base+CPU_MODE)|CPU_MODE_HALT);
for (i = 0; i < (info->fw_len / sizeof(u32)); i++)
write_op(tp, (cpu_scratch_base +
(info->fw_base & 0xffff) +
(i * sizeof(u32))),
be32_to_cpu(info->fw_data[i]));
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PressMouseButton(ui::EventFlags mouse_button_flags, int extra_flags) {
ui::MouseEvent press(ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED, mouse_position_, mouse_position_,
ui::EventTimeForNow(), mouse_button_flags,
mouse_button_flags | extra_flags);
textfield_->OnMousePressed(press);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void closeListeningSockets(int unlink_unix_socket) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < server.ipfd_count; j++) close(server.ipfd[j]);
if (server.sofd != -1) close(server.sofd);
if (server.cluster_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < server.cfd_count; j++) close(server.cfd[j]);
if (unlink_unix_socket && server.unixsocket) {
serverLog(LL_NOTICE,"Removing the unix socket file.");
unlink(server.unixsocket); /* don't care if this fails */
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 70,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExecutionContext* BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getExecutionContext()
const {
return ContextLifecycleObserver::getExecutionContext();
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgUpdateScreenRectsAck() {
waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_ = false;
if (!view_)
return;
if (view_->GetViewBounds() == last_view_screen_rect_ &&
view_->GetBoundsInRootWindow() == last_window_screen_rect_) {
return;
}
SendScreenRects();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_objects_store_mark_destructed(zend_objects_store *objects TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_uint i;
if (!objects->object_buckets) {
return;
}
for (i = 1; i < objects->top ; i++) {
if (objects->object_buckets[i].valid) {
objects->object_buckets[i].destructor_called = 1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const base::string16& WebContentsImpl::GetTitle() const {
NavigationEntry* entry = controller_.GetTransientEntry();
std::string accept_languages =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetAcceptLangs(
GetBrowserContext());
if (entry) {
return entry->GetTitleForDisplay(accept_languages);
}
WebUI* navigating_web_ui = GetRenderManager()->GetNavigatingWebUI();
WebUI* our_web_ui = navigating_web_ui
? navigating_web_ui
: GetRenderManager()->current_frame_host()->web_ui();
if (our_web_ui) {
entry = controller_.GetVisibleEntry();
if (!(entry && entry->IsViewSourceMode())) {
const base::string16& title = our_web_ui->GetOverriddenTitle();
if (!title.empty())
return title;
}
}
entry = controller_.GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (controller_.IsInitialNavigation() &&
((controller_.GetVisibleEntry() &&
!controller_.GetVisibleEntry()->GetTitle().empty()) ||
controller_.GetPendingEntryIndex() != -1)) {
entry = controller_.GetVisibleEntry();
}
if (entry) {
return entry->GetTitleForDisplay(accept_languages);
}
return page_title_when_no_navigation_entry_;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewImpl::CanUpdateLayout() {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_init_opendata_res(struct nfs4_opendata *p)
{
p->o_res.f_attr = &p->f_attr;
p->o_res.f_label = p->f_label;
p->o_res.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
p->c_res.seqid = p->c_arg.seqid;
p->o_res.server = p->o_arg.server;
p->o_res.access_request = p->o_arg.access;
nfs_fattr_init(&p->f_attr);
nfs_fattr_init_names(&p->f_attr, &p->owner_name, &p->group_name);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_build_principal_va(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal princ,
unsigned int rlen,
const char *realm,
va_list ap)
{
return build_principal_va(context, princ, rlen, realm, ap);
}
Commit Message: Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]
In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug
affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
affected.
CVE-2015-2697:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this
function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8252 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_use_port(struct idr *ps, struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
struct rdma_bind_list *bind_list;
unsigned short snum;
int ret;
snum = ntohs(cma_port(cma_src_addr(id_priv)));
if (snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
bind_list = idr_find(ps, snum);
if (!bind_list) {
ret = cma_alloc_port(ps, id_priv, snum);
} else {
ret = cma_check_port(bind_list, id_priv, id_priv->reuseaddr);
if (!ret)
cma_bind_port(bind_list, id_priv);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool dccp_invert_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *inv,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
{
inv->src.u.dccp.port = tuple->dst.u.dccp.port;
inv->dst.u.dccp.port = tuple->src.u.dccp.port;
return true;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgBlur() {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_RWH5"));
GetProcess()->ReceivedBadMessage();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnFrameSwapMessagesReceived(
uint32_t frame_token,
std::vector<IPC::Message> messages) {
frame_token_message_queue_->OnFrameSwapMessagesReceived(frame_token,
std::move(messages));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: standard_name(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_byte colour_type,
int bit_depth, unsigned int npalette, int interlace_type,
png_uint_32 w, png_uint_32 h, int do_interlace)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, colour_types[colour_type]);
if (npalette > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "[");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, npalette);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "]");
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, bit_depth);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " bit");
if (interlace_type != PNG_INTERLACE_NONE)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " interlaced");
if (do_interlace)
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(pngvalid)");
else
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "(libpng)");
}
if (w > 0 || h > 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, " ");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, w);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "x");
pos = safecatn(buffer, bufsize, pos, h);
}
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __videobuf_iolock (struct videobuf_queue* q,
struct videobuf_buffer *vb,
struct v4l2_framebuffer *fbuf)
{
int pages;
struct videbuf_vmalloc_memory *mem=vb->priv;
BUG_ON(!mem);
MAGIC_CHECK(mem->magic,MAGIC_VMAL_MEM);
pages = PAGE_ALIGN(vb->size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* Currently, doesn't support V4L2_MEMORY_OVERLAY */
if ((vb->memory != V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP) &&
(vb->memory != V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR) ) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Method currently unsupported.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* FIXME: should be tested with kernel mmap mem */
mem->vmalloc=vmalloc_user (PAGE_ALIGN(vb->size));
if (NULL == mem->vmalloc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "vmalloc (%d pages) failed\n",pages);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dprintk(1,"vmalloc is at addr 0x%08lx, size=%d\n",
(unsigned long)mem->vmalloc,
pages << PAGE_SHIFT);
/* It seems that some kernel versions need to do remap *after*
the mmap() call
*/
if (mem->vma) {
int retval=remap_vmalloc_range(mem->vma, mem->vmalloc,0);
kfree(mem->vma);
mem->vma=NULL;
if (retval<0) {
dprintk(1,"mmap app bug: remap_vmalloc_range area %p error %d\n",
mem->vmalloc,retval);
return retval;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: V4L/DVB (6751): V4L: Memory leak! Fix count in videobuf-vmalloc mmap
This is pretty serious bug. map->count is never initialized after the
call to kmalloc making the count start at some random trash value. The
end result is leaking videobufs.
Also, fix up the debug statements to print unsigned values.
Pushed to http://ifup.org/hg/v4l-dvb too
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 74,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ui::TouchStatus UserActivityDetector::PreHandleTouchEvent(
aura::Window* target,
aura::TouchEvent* event) {
MaybeNotify();
return ui::TOUCH_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_restorefh(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4);
*p = cpu_to_be32(OP_RESTOREFH);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_restorefh_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
else
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: my_object_send_car (MyObject *obj, GValueArray *invals, GValueArray **outvals, GError **error)
{
if (invals->n_values != 3
|| G_VALUE_TYPE (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 0)) != G_TYPE_STRING
|| G_VALUE_TYPE (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 1)) != G_TYPE_UINT
|| G_VALUE_TYPE (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 2)) != G_TYPE_VALUE)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid incoming values");
return FALSE;
}
*outvals = g_value_array_new (2);
g_value_array_append (*outvals, NULL);
g_value_init (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1), G_TYPE_UINT);
g_value_set_uint (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1),
g_value_get_uint (g_value_array_get_nth (invals, 1)) + 1);
g_value_array_append (*outvals, NULL);
g_value_init (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1), DBUS_TYPE_G_OBJECT_PATH);
g_value_set_boxed (g_value_array_get_nth (*outvals, (*outvals)->n_values - 1),
g_strdup ("/org/freedesktop/DBus/GLib/Tests/MyTestObject2"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jpc_ppxstabent_destroy(jpc_ppxstabent_t *ent)
{
if (ent->data) {
jas_free(ent->data);
}
jas_free(ent);
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 70,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CompositorImpl::HavePendingReadbacks() {
return !readback_layer_tree_->children().empty();
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
Key *key;
char *cuser, *chost;
u_char *blob;
u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
enum mm_keytype type = 0;
int allowed = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
type = buffer_get_int(m);
cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
(!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
!auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt);
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
auth_method = "publickey";
if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
(!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
auth_clear_options();
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
cuser, chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
auth_clear_options();
auth_method = "rsa";
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
}
}
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
key_blob = blob;
key_bloblen = bloblen;
key_blobtype = type;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
free(blob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
}
debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
__func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 42,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stbl_AddBox(GF_Box *s, GF_Box *a)
{
GF_SampleTableBox *ptr = (GF_SampleTableBox *)s;
if (!a) return GF_OK;
switch (a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STTS:
if (ptr->TimeToSample) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->TimeToSample = (GF_TimeToSampleBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CTTS:
if (ptr->CompositionOffset) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->CompositionOffset = (GF_CompositionOffsetBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CSLG:
if (ptr->CompositionToDecode) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->CompositionToDecode = (GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSS:
if (ptr->SyncSample) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->SyncSample = (GF_SyncSampleBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSD:
if (ptr->SampleDescription) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->SampleDescription =(GF_SampleDescriptionBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STZ2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSZ:
if (ptr->SampleSize) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->SampleSize = (GF_SampleSizeBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSC:
if (ptr->SampleToChunk) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->SampleToChunk = (GF_SampleToChunkBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_PADB:
if (ptr->PaddingBits) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->PaddingBits = (GF_PaddingBitsBox *) a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CO64:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STCO:
if (ptr->ChunkOffset) {
gf_isom_box_del(ptr->ChunkOffset);
}
ptr->ChunkOffset = a;
return GF_OK;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSH:
if (ptr->ShadowSync) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->ShadowSync = (GF_ShadowSyncBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STDP:
if (ptr->DegradationPriority) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->DegradationPriority = (GF_DegradationPriorityBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SDTP:
if (ptr->SampleDep) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->SampleDep= (GF_SampleDependencyTypeBox *)a;
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SUBS:
if (!ptr->sub_samples) ptr->sub_samples = gf_list_new();
gf_list_add(ptr->sub_samples, a);
{
GF_SubSampleInformationBox *subs = (GF_SubSampleInformationBox *)a;
GF_SubSampleInfoEntry *ent = gf_list_get(subs->Samples, 0);
if (!ent) {
gf_list_rem(subs->Samples, 0);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] first entry in SubSample in track SampleTable is invalid\n"));
}
else if (ent->sample_delta==0) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] first entry in SubSample in track SampleTable has sample_delta of 0, should be one. Fixing\n"));
ent->sample_delta = 1;
}
}
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SBGP:
if (!ptr->sampleGroups) ptr->sampleGroups = gf_list_new();
gf_list_add(ptr->sampleGroups, a);
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SGPD:
if (!ptr->sampleGroupsDescription) ptr->sampleGroupsDescription = gf_list_new();
gf_list_add(ptr->sampleGroupsDescription, a);
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SAIZ:
if (!ptr->sai_sizes) ptr->sai_sizes = gf_list_new();
gf_list_add(ptr->sai_sizes, a);
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SAIO:
if (!ptr->sai_offsets) ptr->sai_offsets = gf_list_new();
gf_list_add(ptr->sai_offsets, a);
break;
default:
return gf_isom_box_add_default((GF_Box *)ptr, a);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 91,884
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.